The Contrarian Aviator Sometimes Turns Right
An example against what seems simple yet when on the ground thinking is complicated yet with time constraints flying proves complex.
The below story originally appeared in Daily Kos when the FAA Advisory Circular AC 90–66b was current; at the time of migrating this story, AC 90–66c is now current. This has little bearing on the story below both as the story was used as example of a greater concept and as, if anything, the language directing left hand traffic patterns has only grown stronger in the updated reference. Before getting to the story, I’m adding some discussion at larger concerns as readers in the previous location seemed to get sucked into the details of the example rather than seeing it merely as example.
The below piece is in part striving to get at the nature of and impact from rules. Rules create limits upon others though by their very creation, they impose limits upon themselves whether or not they are witting of such. there is no such thing as an ideal rule, no rule is perfect. Because of this, all rules should be seen as a balance of tradeoffs, what creates the most good for the least bad, or what prevents the most bad at the expense of costing the least good.
I plan to explore such more later while looking at the differences and consequences of approval or authorizing type rulesets versus prohibitive and restrictive type rulesets. The former debilitates creating a “mother may I” environment while stifling ingenuity and wrecking any sense of efficiency ruining capacity for urgency while making cogs of those subjected to them. These sorts of rules tend to generate more sins of omission which are held as lesser in weight than sins of commission. Command-in-Detail is often of this sort. The latter encourages delegation, independence, and respects the humanity of those executing while enabling creativity and efficiency. Mission Command is of this sort. OODAs are faster with restrictive rulesets. Speak to Why and What not How.
Rulesets should help not replace Decision Making. Oftentimes, such as with the left pattern rule, the rule should not be a rule rather a heuristic to share giving common understanding. In the example case, such would serve as a decision discriminate to use in the absence of other influences helping provide a common answer should nothing local provide reason for an answer.
With this, we should probably take a moment to consider decision making. Most our decisons are automatic. They are determined by mental processes which Daniel Kahneman would refer to as System 1. System 1 is a rapid decision maker using past experience and ingrained rules of thumb to determine action. System 1 does not consider alternatives, it merely matches a pattern and decides based on predictions from the pattern. System 1 need reason to engage the more energy intensive System 2 which is the more analytical processing. Note System 2 does not pick the best option, rather it at best picks the option best optimized to the desired of options considered. Doing so takes deliberate work and dedicated focus. Meanwhile, System 1 tends to work with what Gary Klein has shown to be a first fit pattern matcher. System 1 works with a pattern till theres reason to reject, then works with the next pattern. System 2 may interject to help reject while System 1 may continue with first fit. Then again, System 1 may do it all alone. With time pressure, System 2 may be engaged but it will be doing first fit as well. Kahneman recognizes there is neither System 1 nor System 2 yet uses these as a tool to examine mental engagement based on energy usage. Hence why we get a little wishy-washy as to which is doing what when. Analysis seeking best choice often leads to analysis paralysis.
Knowledge of rules plays into this though so too does learned cause and effect (even should such learned cause and effect changed or never existed; believed cause and effect can be pernicious). Note the FAA’s Aviation Instructor’s Handbook references Kahneman’s work but it does a poor job conveying proper understanding of it. I’d recommend any aviator while especially instructors to read Kahneman’s Thinking Fast and Slow. And to listen to Klein in interview with The Thinking Leader. Don’t take the handbook’s understanding of either naturalistic decision making or Kahneman as valid interpretations.
A theme we will explore in an upcoming writing plays here and is expressed by Sidney Dekker, Todd Conklin, Bob Edwards, and Andrea Baker. This is the realization that work as perceived differs from work as prescribed which differs from work as done which differs from work as reported which differs from work as assessed. Rules are a part of work as prescribed based on work as perceived. Such can never anticipate and never accommodate all the circumstances that may arise in the course of doing work. Should such try to do so then such will be too long to be knowable or useable. Flying may be considered work while the FAA merely attempts to perceive then prescribe work, and at times, comes in later to assess work based on limited observations contrasted to its prescriptions.
“Traditionally, organizations audit for compliance. Organizations actively and aggressively seek deviations from prescribed work. Organizations walk-down work practices while holding the appropriate procedure in hand, checking each step with the most serious intentions. Our organizations act like some type of combination of a workplace anthropologist and a police officer.
“All of this assurance of workers following specific and prescribed work methods is done to assure the work happening is happening precisely the way our organization has planned and proceduralized the work happening every time work is done. Our organizations want work to happen in exactly the way the organization has imagined the work will happen. Through recent history, this formalization of work has become more and more important.
“Organizations feel a high need to assure the work being done by the workers is the work that is represented in the organization’s formal work control documents. The idea being, we guess, the actual identification and intervention of some type of ‘shortcut’ or ‘creative adaption’ will allow the organization to prevent an accident before the accident happens. If the worker would simply follow the process nothing bad will happen, nothing bad could happen.
“That idea is crap.”
- Do Safety Differently, Sidney Dekker & Todd Conklin (pgs 60–61)
So now we come to the republishing:
The Contrarian Aviator Sometimes Turns Right by Fffflats, June 16, 2022
What is the problem with Right Hand Traffic Patterns?
[recommend you watch, sets a scene for conversation] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2CG5gNuEQio
A month and a half ago, I raised a question regarding why would the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) decree that airplane traffic patterns shall be left turns. While a little delayed in responding to this initial query, here’s my response. You might also consider this foreshadowing regarding yes, you can and should question expertise. I should say thanks to the author of this third link for making me think again about airplane left hand turns, NASCAR turns left too so guess that was a cue, and for thinking about questioning “the experts.” I do fault that author, however, for creating a blatant straw man in his second context while ignoring the expertise of one of the subjects in his first context to which he inappropriately used as analogy in justifying his position regarding the second. The situation he cited was not of ignoring expertise but rather of competing experts in this instance seeking different goals. His created false simplified stereotypes to apply to an end in a manner he had pre-determined. Such presumed his targets are dumb and that we’d shallowly ignorantly accept such. Compare this linked piece to Beau at Time 1:50,
If you are watching a channel or a pundit who is continuously trying to pin this on Biden, Why do you watch somebody who thinks so little of you?
Why would you accept a piece declaring Earnhardt a simpleton for something in a racing context?
Question Norms. Question Rules. Question Elite. Question Expertise and Experts. It is a part of Science to do so. As is being Falsifiable and regularly trying to Falsify.
Anyway, to answer my delinquency in questioning a different set of experts:
In a FAA Safety Team (FAAST) web based presentation “Calling all CFIs…” on April 26th in which the ME, NH, VT Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) discussed not mixing and matching right and left patterns. They clearly said using right hand patterns “was not authorized” except as specifically prescribed (by “RP” on sectional charts and by airfield markers). Immediately below is the link the the “Advisory Circular” (AC) in question with the paragraph they cited. Seems they missed that part about recognizing what may be already in common practice. Per AC 90–66b,
9.1 Left Traffic. Use of standard traffic patterns (left turns) for all aircraft and CTAF procedures by radio-equipped aircraft are required at all airports without operating control towers unless indicated otherwise by visual markings, light gun signals, airport publications, or published approach procedure. It is recognized that other traffic patterns (right turns) may already be in common use at some airports or that special circumstances or conditions exist that may prevent use of the standard traffic pattern. Right-hand patterns are noted at airports on an aeronautical chart with an “RP” designator and the applicable runway next to the airport symbol.” (Emphasis bold underline in their slideshow, not in circular itself; italicized my doing)
Though not mentioned in the presentation, paragraph 9.6 discussing “circle to land” from instrument approaches also illuminates the FAA’s directive thinking:
9.6 Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) Traffic. Pilots conducting instrument approaches should be particularly alert for other aircraft in the pattern so as to avoid interrupting the flow of traffic, and should bear in mind they do not have priority over other VFR traffic. Pilots are reminded that circling approaches require left-hand turns unless the approach procedure explicitly states otherwise. This has been upheld by prior FAA legal interpretations of § 91.126(b).” (Emphasis added)
This seems rather stupid to me considering weather isn’t uniform; a right pattern could be ‘clear and a million’ (meaning no ceiling and unlimited visibility) while the left is ‘clobbered.’ Are you really going to circle left into thicker weather increasing chances to lose sight of the field and other traffic if it be clear to the right?
The AC derives from Federal Regulation 14 CFR 91.126:
§ 91.126 Operating on or in the vicinity of an airport in Class G airspace.
(a) General. Unless otherwise authorized or required, each person operating an aircraft on or in the vicinity of an airport in a Class G airspace area must comply with the requirements of this section.
(b) Direction of turns. When approaching to land at an airport without an operating control tower in Class G airspace -
(1) Each pilot of an airplane must make all turns of that airplane to the left unless the airport displays approved light signals or visual markings indicating that turns should be made to the right, in which case the pilot must make all turns to the right; and
(2) Each pilot of a helicopter or a powered parachute must avoid the flow of fixed-wing aircraft.
The presentation specifically referenced traffic arriving from the southwest to Hancock Bar Harbor, ME (KBHB) which predominantly lands to the southwest on runway 22. The presenters said the airport manager there had been tracking offenders of the rule noting corporate and commuter jets were the biggest offenders while expressing concern for right pattern arrivals creating conflict with gliders, helicopters, and ultralights (aka non-airplane aircraft).
The AC seems to give some relief to such aircrew “operating… in the vicinity of an airport…” Per AC 90–66b,
8.2.1 The FAA does not regulate traffic pattern entry, only traffic pattern flow.” (Emphasis added)
This would seem to indicate that the right pattern as an entry is valid. A jet arriving at Bar Harbor from the southwest for a runway 22 landing would be ok using the right downwind in its arrival. If one were to go around, however, then the subsequent lap would be expected to be left per this paragraph though contrary to paragraph 11.3,
Traffic Pattern Entry. Arriving aircraft should be at traffic pattern altitude and allow for sufficient time to view the entire traffic pattern before entering. Entries into traffic patterns while descending may create collision hazards and should be avoided. Entry to the downwind leg should be at a 45 degree angle abeam the midpoint of the runway to be used for landing. The pilot may use discretion to choose an alternate type of entry, especially when intending to cross over midfield, based upon the traffic and communication at the time of arrival.
Note: Aircraft should always enter the pattern at pattern altitude, especially when flying over midfield and entering the downwind directly. A midfield crossing alternate pattern entry should not be used when the pattern is congested. Descending into the traffic pattern can be dangerous, as one aircraft could descend on top of another aircraft already in the pattern. All similar types of aircraft, including those entering on the 45 degree angle to downwind, should be at the same pattern altitude so that it is easier to visually acquire any traffic in the pattern.
Consider for a parallel entry to a holding pattern, you make two turns counterflow before joining the flow. We should ask, when have you entered the pattern? When are you in flow?
Points that immediately come to my mind as either reasons against same side patterns or reasons for mixing patterns are as follows:
- Closure is hard to see running up someone’s butt while such speed differences help reveal aircraft across the other pattern; this is due to a lack of line of sight rates in the one case while the other exaggerates such rates.
- There’s reason Beale Air Force Base, California (KBAB) spilt left and right patterns for SR-71 and U-2 aircraft.
- Consider why trucks must put red flags on poles, ladders, lumber that stick out aft of their beds.
- The FAA shows 82% of traffic pattern collisions are nose to tail.
- Seeing your interval in front of you can be hard as you’re at increased Angle of Attack (AOA) in the pattern,
- Neglecting thermals, As you should be flying level in Downwind, thus your relative wind is level, AOA is also Pitch in the Downwind. If you’re not familiar with AOA, you can substitute Pitch limited to the confines of this piece of the discussion.
- in the case of most General Aviation (GA) aircraft this increased AOA (and Pitch) is worse due to the engine in front of you, and
- if you’re stepped up a bit and/or they’re stepped down, they’ll more easily be masked out of sight.
- Someone turning base will immediately show their planform, or give you a “wing flash,” cross pattern as opposed to in front of you as the front traffic must displace about the turn prior to revealing such
- that traffic in front will likely start descent too thus increasing likelihood of they’re going to masked areas of view which
- isn’t a concern cross patterns till after the 90 but will remain a concern same side throughout.
- Intervals regularly get cut out on the same side of the patterns as too often seen in Navy Field Carrier Landing Practice periods (FCLPs).
- This can be due to viewing one’s interval’s interval as one’s own interval. This happens more at night when cultural (background) lighting can wash out your interval’s lights then you see your interval’s interval in their base turn.
- In other words, this is not a mixed pattern phenomenon which could actually occur more with same side patterns.
- Not all patterns use the same altitude though human nature presumes such
- High Key entries for practice precautionary approaches to Navy Outlying Landing Field (NOLF) Joe Williams in Mississippi (KNJW) use right traffic to maximum extent practicable so as to be more easily seen by normal traffic in the left and to more easily spot the traffic in the left.
- Such couldn’t be done at Navy McCain (KNMM) for conflict with the parallel runways.
- KNJW has functioned both towered and uncontrolled.
- You say it is “Not Authorized.” That is not the same as “Restricted” or “Prohibited.” But this gets into an entirely different discussion.
- The FAA seems locked into a rule not recognizing that sometimes the unsafe thing is following the rule as rules are made for some situations but can’t fit all situations.
- The rule is good so as to have guidance to set a flow when no physical realities naturally dictate a flow; in this sense, it shouldn’t be a rule rather it should be a heuristic for what to do if nothing else readily indicates a good choice. Such shouldn’t actually be a rule and should be worded as a guideline.
As the FAAST discussed the concerns of Bar Harbor, I asked via chat functionality “What is the danger of right patterns?” This question was not answered. The presentation, however, continued on to show a video of a near mid-air collision that involved one aircraft on Final with the other turning off a Right Base and overflying the first aircraft as it entered its own Final. We should note that neither aircraft were jets which constituted the aircraft of concern at Bar Harbor. Jets are faster and fly higher and wider patterns; their base legs will be displaced further to give longer Final Approach Legs. Hence this conflict wouldn’t develop as seen with a light plane and a jet. Such higher wider patterns also negate concerns of jets mixing with helicopters, gliders, and ultralights. To me, while sensational and attention grabbing, the video was not illuminating in any way as to why mixed patterns are dangerous. It was not explanatory.
[if you haven’t yet watched, I highly recommend doing so] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2CG5gNuEQio
As I was unhappy with the lack of explanation as to why mixed patterns might be dangerous, I emailed the presenters which also included representation for the FSDOs covering all of New England. It has been over a month and they have not responded.
As I was unhappy with the lack of explanation as to why mixed patterns might be dangerous, I emailed the presenters which also included representation for the FSDOs covering all of New England. It has been over a month and they have not responded.
I also sought expert advice by emailing the question to the Navy’s Landing Signals Officer (LSO) School figuring they are the true experts of everything landing and landing pattern. They did not respond. I wrote to the Navy’s School of Aviation Safety. They replied with the quotes of the Federal Regulations seen above in the AC paragraph 9 and 14 CFR 91.126. I asked for clarification as to actual safety concerns rather than regulatory compliance while raising my above points. They did not respond to this. I sought a general audience query through a blog here on DK which did generate some comments. The reasons seen as supporting same side patterns are excess closure in the Base Legs of mixed patterns as well as setting a common basis of expectations for all pilots and aircraft.
I’ll discuss head-to-head Base Legs in a bit. Regarding the setting of common expectations, this actually has a negative effect in lulling a false sense of security as to what others will do. Those not expecting a common way will scan more while those expecting a set of norms will scan to the norms. We look for expectations; this is human nature.
Sight angles make it easier for the jet traffic to keep others in sight across patterns. Jets fly higher Downwinds. Compare triangles. Jets on the same side will have to look further downward to see propeller airplanes on the same side. Their sight angles are steeper. This requires more scan while also being more susceptible to being occluded by one’s own aircraft structure.
With the speed differences, the jet will have deeper Base turns requiring the jet to look behind though the jet can see much further behind across to the opposite side with mixed patterns than nearly straight behind with same side patterns. Again, triangles. Someone turning base inside the jet will be easier to see across patterns as this person create a significantly less area of scan requirement. With the same side case, the scan is more ergonomically difficult and is also more likely to be airframe obscured.
Regard must be given to the reverse — being seen. This is easier to think about by swapping positions or roles. I assure you you’ll have an easier time seeing your jet traffic interval or jet traffic follower across mixed patterns than you will having them on your right in their now more cross cockpit and further stepped up angularly same side pattern. They are now outside your predominant area of looking. You’ll be looking toward the runway more than you will be outside your own pattern therefore toward their Downwind across mixed patterns but not with same side patterns. If side-by-side seating, you’ll have less of your own aircraft in the way with them cross pattern than same side. You could say they have to look across a cockpit if they’re in a right pattern (though in the same direction of view as the field) but this gets mitigated as the jets are typically dual crew. Excluding wide bodies that are generally not landing at uncontrolled fields, the cross cockpit viewing is still easier than the down and rearward viewing; triangles. Further, many light airplanes are high wing; this means the same side wider stepped up jet traffic is also more easily occluded by aircraft structure (triangles).
Note that the video is actually from Pavullo, Italy (LIDP) not Bar Harbor. The poster of the video stated in the video notes “Comments are OFF. This is getting second guessed enough all over the web. Don’t need anymore here.” — I disagree. This absolutely should be second guessed. And triple guessed. This causal chain has multiple links. We cannot see them all from the video; the most important issues happened before the video. Both planes had opportunity to avoid this situation from developing hence both have culpability.
Consider the “guilty” aircraft likely failed in lookout probably by failing to look down. Alternately, the “innocent aircraft” could have been hard to see in ground clutter. Or the “guilty aircraft” could have overseen the “innocent aircraft” by having seen a third aircraft and thought that the third was the interval. This failure to see turning Base to Final is the factor most would consider the principle or critical issue. Yet this “guilty aircraft” had plenty of opportunity to scan and also made the mistake in missing the interval prior to turning from Downwind to Base. It is with the turn from Downwind to Base that the “guilty aircraft” set the condition for the near midair. This is the actual critical factor.
A good landing starts Abeam the Landing on Downwind; this is true for flying the pattern as well as for awareness of your interval. This is the true most significant factor. It is not a mistake resulting from mixed patterns. Seeing the interval in the opposite Downwind or Base or on an Extended Final while on one’s own Downwind is a readily achievable task. Missing an interval same side is just as easy to do if not more so (remember Navy FCLPs).
Consider the “innocent aircraft” likely had opportunity to prevent this hazardous situation from developing as it did while arriving on a Straight-In or from a left pattern. If he were on a right pattern then this would be the same discussion as for a left-left same side pattern and the contention against the right pattern would be moot.
If the Straight-In, which seems most likely from the video though this aircraft could also have flown a deeper Base, while focusing on Landing in the time of the video, prior to the video time this aircraft should have been scanning both Downwinds and both Bases to see if anyone were turning in conflict. Having the right of way is insufficient to keep you alive. Having right of way does not absolve you from acting to prevent midair collisions.
If the “innocent aircraft” flew a left pattern, he should have readily seen his following traffic turning a tight interval on the opposite side becoming a conflict while on his own 180 (end of Downwind; also known to some as “the Perch”) through to 90 (end of Base or point perpendicular to Final initiating turn to Final). The “guilty aircraft” will have presented a big highly visible wing-flash while turning from Downwind to Base.
As civilian patterns are squared off, the “innocent aircraft” still should have been looking on the Base legs and still scanning through Not Earlier Than (NET) the 45 to Final. As the right pattern “guilty aircraft” was also on a squared off Base, this means the “innocent” should have seen that aircraft with conflict developing prior to time at which dedicated focus to Landing occurs.
The “innocent aircraft” had opportunity to detect the hazard and act.
The video doesn’t show why mixed patterns are dangerous. It fails to prove the assertion ascribed to it as it did not develop and illustrate causality. This is a case of confirmation bias.
Per Jonathan Haidt,
The social psychologist Tom Gilovich studies the cognitive mechanisms of strange beliefs. His simple formulation is that when we want to believe something, we ask ourselves, ‘Can I believe it?’ Then we search for supporting evidence, and if we find even a single piece of pseudo-evidence, we can stop thinking. We now have permission to believe. We have a justification, in case anyone asks. In contrast, when we don’t want to believe something, we ask ourselves, ‘Must I believe it?’ Then we search for contrary evidence, and if we find a single reason to doubt the claim, we can dismiss it. You only need one key to unlock the handcuffs of must.
The video had an offending aircraft from a right traffic pattern cause a near midair. Right traffic patterns and mixing patterns must be bad!!! — Sorry, this video is pseudo-evidence. Correlation is not causation. One anecdotal point does not represent a system wide risk.
We should recall Daniel Kahneman,
System 1 does not keep track of alternatives that it rejects, or even of the fact that there were alternatives. Conscious doubt is not in the repertoire of System 1; it requires maintaining incompatible interpretations in mind at the same time, which demands mental effort. Uncertainty and doubt are the domain of System 2… when System 2 is otherwise engaged, we will believe almost anything. System 1 is gullible and biased to believe, System 2 is in charge of doubting and unbelieving, but System 2 is sometimes busy, and often lazy.
&
people, when engaged in a mental sprint, may become effectively blind… System 1 has more influence on behavior when System 2 is busy
In studying this video, System 2 gets engaged focusing upon the danger and potential consequence of collision hence is unavailable to process why that danger may have developed. Therefore you through System 1 accept the immediate narrative of what might be causal. We should also note that when fear is invoked, we default towards authority and rules rather than critical thinking.
This same system duality also played for the pilots in this though in their cases, they were busy focusing on Landings hence were effectively blind. It is like counting basketball passes when a gorilla walks by. In this way, perhaps we shouldn’t view “the guilty” as guilty while instead ask all to scan and pay attention so that the chances others catch our own shortfalls increase. In doing this, we don’t want to set expectations so that all involved scan greater volumes.
While we’re here, we should look at Pavullo itself. It is a single runway to the west side of a generally flat valley south of the town. The runway is generally oriented north-south being runways 02–20. There is a hill to the southeast of the runway which warrants attention for right patterns to runway 02 and left patterns to 20. However, there’s a ridge half a mile west parallel to the runway that definitely gets attention. (CFI Notebook which is aimed at smaller piston propeller aircraft states “Maintain approximately 1/2 a mile distance from the runway when on downwind”) ForeFlight shows runway 20 has a right hand pattern. According to the opening frames, they were landing runway 02 which means that the west ridge is a conflict for left traffic. Were I flying into this airfield or to one of a similar situation, I would make right traffic to runway 02 too even if such were not specifically prescribed. A crosswind turn into that ridge possibly while still climbing and a downwind leg over that ridge just don’t appeal to me.
Look at Bloomsburg, Pennsylvania (N13). Look at the west flow runway. Now look south of the river south of the runway. You’ll see a similar situation as Pavullo. There’s a ridge. Meanwhile, to the northeast, there is a hill. The sectional does not give a “RP,” but if you flew in there and they’re landing west which is the more common wind, I bet you’re gonna do a right hand pattern.
Shoot, I bet half the time at Inyokern, CA (KIYK) to runway 15 you see right patterns. Inyokern prescribes right patterns for runway 20 due to a restricted area immediately to its east. Pilots often use the same logic despite no such prescription while using 15.
Something to remember at the airport of the FAAST’s reference, Bar Harbor, ME, one reason they used to justify a right pattern to 22 as bad was presence of helicopters, ultralights, and gliders using the right pattern, yet looking at the sectional, there’s no depiction for such craft. Why would corporate or commuter jets, the highlighted offenders, coming from the SW consider adapting for such? For that matter, how is their right Downwind in any way going to conflict considering significant lateral and healthy vertical displacements? At Inyokern, we do have gliders though they typically land runway 20 while powered aircraft typically use runways 33 or 15. Not only are we mixed patterns, we’re mixed axes. Hollister, CA (KCVH) flies similarly with mixed runway operations.
Once upon a time I was sitting at the hold short of the northwest-flow runway for a Citation jet Departure somewhere in Florida while a bunch of Cessna 172s were Landing on the cross northeast-flow runway.
I don’t recall the reason I needed the northwest Departure as opposed to being able to use the northeast, but that was the situation. There were no gaps in the Cessnas with their Downwinds. I had to ask them to make right patterns for a lap so as to free up their left Downwind as it conflicted with my Departure. The fact I had to ask for such consideration bugged me at the time. Such emphasis as the FAAST’s makes the need for such a request to be made now make sense to me. Might have been a “special consideration” but it was ‘enabling’ not “preventing.” I hope they took an extra lap in the right pattern after I left for the sake of wing vortices; if so then this would have been “special circumstances preventing the use of the standard pattern” though there would have been no depiction of such.
Right hand patterns are dangerous because lefts are required and I have a video showing a near miss from a right hander.
On this thought, I can already hear “Compliance Is Safety!”
False.
The truth is compliance has a strong overlap with safety, however, these are not superimposed on the VENN. They’re certainly not concentric.
I care about not crashing. I care about and follow rules to the extent that they help me not crash. Following rules for the sake of compliance, however, is foolish. Rules cannot account for all situations and circumstances. They’re written ideally for the majority of situations though really for a plurality of experienced circumstances. This means sometimes the rules actually put you into more danger and make it more likely for you to crash. This is why Douglas Bader, or perhaps Harry Day, said
rules are for the obedience of fools and the guidance of wise men.
In this case, it seems someone writing the rules realized this thus trying to give us wiggle room,
The FAA does not regulate traffic pattern entry,
and
It is recognized that other traffic patterns (right turns) may already be in common use at some airports or that special circumstances or conditions exist that may prevent use of the standard traffic pattern.
There are just too many variables to decree all patterns be left. There are too many variables to think you can make an exception for patterns specifically prescribed then think you’ll adequately prescribe all the patterns of exception. Trying to do so, and by so doing is to lock others into patterns that do not make sense, are not functional, and are unsafe.
Thoughts that favor same side patterns are high closure along opposite Base Legs. This closure will be hard to see as nose-on aspect makes for smaller sight area of aircraft and little line of sight rates will exist. But by doing same side, while you may alleviate the concern on the Base, all you really do is displace the convergence earlier. We should note that the convergence cross pattern isn’t actually on the Base Legs, it is at the start of the Final. We may draw rectangular patterns, but we don’t fly such. Our corners are not squared off.
I will concede increased focus is required turning off Base with a more precise Lineup and Glideslope going into the start of the Final. More mental capacity is needed than does the focus toward properly arriving on a Downwind. For any given moment, mental capacity is zero sum. We can increase the capacity through practice and with currency (recency of practice), but this occurs over time. Hence less capacity is available for scanning for that converging traffic when turning off Base and flying through Final on any given Final compared to its respective Downwind. But the scan needs less as only the opposite Base and the Straight In are the only other lines of arrival. The 45 to Downwind can have multiple lines of arrival especially as not everyone will enter the Downwind at the same point while some may not yet be on altitude and such may occur from both directions. You can argue they should so be to a singular point, but that doesn’t mean they will be so. Such discounting also discounts the fact that not all platforms use the same Downwind altitude. Sure, there could be altitude variance through the Base to Final but the degree of it hence scan area for it hence mental demand from it is less.
This brings us back to the FAA’s point not prescribing pattern entry. Tracking one’s interval is probably easier same side as one’s interval will be in front Upwind, plenty visible in the Crosswind turn, and in front again through most the Downwind. Tracking is not the same as detecting, however. In front ergonomics make the same side tracking easier. With low relative motions and less aircraft sight area available and with less visible sight viewing angles from one’s own aircraft due to AOA, engine, and panel, detecting is harder.
Consider if you lose sight while tracking, you know the track is there and generally have a tighter area in which to look to re-detect to continue tracking. In such a case, you’ll focus attention to the task and if you don’t see you’ll keep looking as you know the traffic is present and in that vicinity. If you don’t initially detect someone somewhere, however, you’ll conclude they’re not there and move on in your scan. This tendency mitigates forward sight challenges as applied to tracking but not to failure in detecting. If anything, we will naturally assume our best detection is forward hence excessively disregard conflict forward if we fail to detect forward. This can be simplified to “we assume we will see someone in front of us” cuts against same side detecting. We won’t make this same assumption in tracking.
Now consider you’re in the pattern turning Crosswind to Downwind. You have your previous interval in sight yet another aircraft is entering 45 to Downwind. While entering a same side pattern, that person is now cross cockpit and a challenge to detect. That person may also be low sight angle rate becoming a constant bearing decreasing range (CBDR) issue. If you missed that plane’s call about entering, you may not be scanning sufficiently and if so you may not be scanning outward of pattern sufficiently; you are not expecting someone so it is easier not to see someone. If you glance outside and don’t see someone while not expecting to see someone, you’ve met expectations and move on to your next task. Detection is more an issue to same side patterns hence conflict potential is an issue throughout the same side pattern. You have the entire pattern to detect a potential conflict across the mixed pattern, that is not true in the same side pattern.
Perhaps now is also a good time to note how autonomous driving cars fail because they fail to anticipate others not adhering to strict rules. People gonna J-walk. You’re still guilty if you hit them. This error equally applies to the FAA in presuming how we should fly while flying in relation to others. They’re not going to enter at your prescribed spot in your prescribed way; they’re going to slush it if not outright ignore it. Better to expect and train to more varied circumstances. You think it simple or Clear while in reality sitting at a table it is Complicated though at speed unable to account for all variables, it is Complex. Rules aka constraints need to accommodate this.
Being condensed into the same side while trying to detect especially if faster might not be the wisest. I was flying in a Vans RV-6 into Oceanside, CA (KOKB) with broken weather above as well as west and north with at best two miles visibility to these directions, scattered to the south and clear east with visibility perhaps five to six miles though with a light hazy mist through this making visibility existent but difficult. There were two other light and likely slower aircraft coming from the west entering the prescribed right hand pattern for 25, another two aircraft coming from the east for Straight-Ins. This was my first and thus far only time flying into Oceanside, I was unaware of their arrivals from the north and west being to overfly a bridge northwest of the field essentially flying a wide Downwind then check right and check left so as to close in to a normal Downwind. Again, the field does have a right pattern prescribed on the sectional for runway 25 (RP 25). Hence same side thinking and the FAA dictate all use right patterns. They also have an extended Upwind to which I was ignorant at that point in time though such was clobbered with weather such that anyone would turn early over the “avoid” areas.
I had flown over the broken and was spiraling down in a clear area in the southeast. I had too much energy to lose though was lower than the broken so I took it to an initial for an overhead break entry. At first I extended upwind then I broke left. Why? I couldn’t push further west with the weather; I couldn’t extend anymore. (Turns out I broke just east of the south “avoid” area.) I couldn’t see the traffic in the right pattern either. By going left I knew I had a downwind clear of traffic so no immediate collision concern while I’d have an easier time continuing to scan to detect the other aircraft looking north across the field.
All this is to say detection across is harder for relative size of object but easier for area of scan, ergonomics, increased line of sight rates, and more area of visible aircraft presented especially at the start of turns. When tracking, you’ll automatically shrink your scan area to that where you expect the track to be. Therefore, tracking across is harder for relative size and for those line of sight rates as the track may shift more than you expected, need to look ergonomically across as opposed to out front as you’ll need to shift your head more and adjust your ranging more, but those elements of closure will be easier across patterns helping with your own turn timing. In other words, there is no best practice, there’s only advantages and disadvantages to each making for situation dependent good practices. This is a point creating the problem. You cannot account for all situations so you don’t even have good practices; you have emergent practices. You can describe situations and how to handle those situations hoping they’ll give idea how to better handle any situation, but you cannot specifically account for every situation. Yet you wrongly treat them all alike.
The FAA wants to see this as simple or Clear and prescribe a best practice. In reality this is Complicated in which there is no one best practice. A problem with Complicated is that such is the domain of experts, of which the FAA considers themselves, where there is a tendency to dismiss thoughts and concerns from anyone other than themselves. Here’s the rub: the “known unknowns” which the experts think they’re assessing so as to direct action, they’re not actually addressing. In the case of uncontrolled fields, the assessment is done realtime by the pilots. It can’t be done by “the experts.” You can’t properly make rules for these situations as you’ll never be able to account for every aspect in advance.
The pilots executing realtime won’t know all the variables they’ll be applying beforehand hence when they’re at other than zero knots one g, they’re dealing with “unknown unknowns.” Not all variables will apply every time and not all variables will be considered, Kahneman plays too “what you see is all that there is” when it comes to consideration and decision making. The best you can do is make guidelines while raising pilots up to be their own experts. There’s too many variables to make a sufficiently expedient decision tree while the situations are too Complicated for one set of rules.
Add in time of day, sun angles, lunar level of illumination and angles, varying cultural lighting, which can be a factor in daytime too with reflections off water, solar panels & towers, or other items, topography about various airfields, differing aircraft with differing physical appearances and lighting configurations, differing aircraft performance, and weather. Now you start having too much to even know let alone account and control which means now you’re leaving the Complicated for the Complex. This means you don’t even have good practices, you have emergent ones. Granted, more often than not this situation will be in the Complicated but it is at that border and does shift back and forth while this border has a gradient (it is Liminal (should we label the Liminal ‘Convoluted?’)).
You’ve got time. In Cynefin if you have time you can shift to the Aporetic but without it you’ve got to treat it as Complex. So timeliness is a factor. — Dave Snowden.
Consider a north runway on the American Atlantic coast in wintertime. Assume you’re doing pattern work around sunrise. That sun is rising in the east southeast to southeast. You may very well want to shift to a right hand pattern as now you’ll still see the Crosswind turn with that interval’s wings illuminated in the light whether they turn left or right. You won’t blind yourself attempting to look at the airfield nor while looking at your interval along the Downwind. While trying to assess your own Base you’ll much more readily see your interval and better judge their speed so as to recognize your own turn with that interval on Base or turning Base to Final.
Compare this to staying in the left pattern. While you’re on Downwind nearing your Base turn, your interval will be in the southeast between you and the sun. “Not a concern” you say as you’ll be looking down for the field and at traffic descending on Base. This forgets the intensity of the sun and the low angles across the coast; it also forgets glare and ocean reflection.
If you and your interval both went right, you’ll see throughout. If your interval went left, you’ll see throughout. Any Straight-Ins interrupting and becoming your new interval will much easier be spot by not looking into that sun done by being more east done by being in the right pattern. The only concern would be you becoming harder to see if the aircraft behind you went left though you going right will likely cue them to do the same. For that Straight-In, you’d be out of the sun north possibly glinting from the sun so they wouldn’t be hard pressed trying to see you.
Consider how we pass other aircraft co-altitude. All other things being equal, we make way to the right for a left-to-left pass. This gives us guidance for action when everything else is equal hence we otherwise would lack common understanding as to what to do. Don’t want one to go right and the other to go left as that cancels out the conflict corrections keeping the conflict. Now, imagine were you traveling south to north and see traffic to the northeast heading southwest. If relative motion has them moving left or more forward, you’re going to offset right for that left to left pass. How about if they’re drifting right or more aft? Likely you’re going to keep the left for a right-to-right. If constant bearing decreasing range in which they’re already to your right and you’re to theirs? Again, you’ll likely go left for a right-to-right. You don’t have equal circumstances. You have an imbalanced factor driving your choice in direction. How’s this different than entering a pattern from the southwest, or even west through northwest when landing in a southwesterly direction? It’s not. You have a factor that makes more sense to enter right.
The FAA might suggest an overflight and teardrop rightward to make that 45 to left downwind, but in a jet that doesn’t make sense. Most jets are low wing, you’re going to be above pattern altitude, you will have more trouble spotting traffic to time entry. Traffic in the pattern typically won’t scan above pattern as well as they should. Therefore you’re harder to see while you’re having more difficulty seeing. By doing the overflight, you’re driving your needed sight angles down where sight gets blocked. “Scan better!” you say. Don’t deal with humans as they should be; deal with them as they are. Don’t try to make people do better when you can enable them to do different. Make your systems and procedures accommodating.
Perhaps now is a good time to remember that as you pump more volume through a pipe in a given unit of time, the flow becomes turbulent.
By doing the two mile extension then 225 degrees of turn from the field overflight to mid-Downwind 45 to Downwind entry, hope your ears are working. And hope others are talking with non-garbled radios and correct descriptions of position and you’re not busy so you’re actually listening because otherwise you’re losing awareness you just gained by overflight. You can’t see behind you and you’re allowing time in which circumstances in the pattern change (turbulence in the pipe).
This is the FAA recommended method for full pattern entry. Foolish given circumstance. You’re essentially going to have to do a full reload of regaining awareness in a compressed area at speed while necessitating wider scans left and right. This convoluted pattern entry is the sort of thing used to shoehorn overly simplified and overly rigid rules into situations for which they’re ill suited. Perhaps realization of this is why paragraph 8.2.1 says the FAA doesn’t regulate pattern entry?
By doing the overfly to the teardrop, you’re also increasing your overall time in the airport environment. Such isn’t just an efficiency concern, it is a risk concern. The longer you’re exposed to and exposing others to more dense traffic, the more at risk everyone is. You’re also extending your time flying with lower potential energy hence lower total energy. What’s a more commonly encountered threat than midair? Loss of control in the landing environment. How do we get to such? Low total energy.
There is good reason to have a rule all else being equal, airplanes should turn left in the pattern. Others go right. It is not for the sake of deconfliction, it is to make decisions and therefore execution of patterns more expeditious. Faster OODA. It is to alleviate decision load from mental capacity. Providing a tie-breaker eliminates analysis paralysis. Yet this is all we need from the rule. It should really be more “heuristic” using ‘shoulds’ not ‘musts’ nor ‘shalls.’ For situations not equal in the decision, we naturally have impetus preventing indecision. An overly binding rule here, however, is less safe.
While driving to the post office recently, I swerved over the double yellow line into the oncoming lane of traffic (I also slowed). There were no cars approaching while a man was trimming his lawn along the roadside up to my right. I say this to ask, Legal? Courteous? Safe?
The same FAA webinar that began this entire train of thought ended with a slide asking “Is it Legal? Is it Safe? Is it Courteous?” As order sets priority, I’d rotate this a bit to be “Is it Safe? Is it Courteous? Is it Legal?” recognizing Safe and Legal can sometimes disagree. We say “Safety First” so put Safety first. Make Courteous next as being Courteous will amplify Safety.
Story Update Sep 16, 2022:
I missed a certain aspect in this only recently catching this,
Left Traffic. Use of standard traffic patterns (left turns) for all aircraft and CTAF procedures by radio-equipped aircraft are required at all airports without operating control towers unless indicated otherwise by visual markings, light gun signals, airport publications, or published approach procedure.
Why would they limit this to “radio-equipped aircraft”? Do they forget gliders and helos often are radio equipped aircraft too? Yes, they’re aircraft, just not airplanes. This doesn’t make much sense unless you accept gliders and helos will be slower, lower, and closer abeam in their patterns hence deconflicted the same way jets and props are. Yet it still doesn’t make much sense lest you think by having and using radios, we’ll know where others are based on talking thus permitting non-radioed aircraft easier time with less traffic on the right. This is also bogus as such presumes everyone talks, everyone properly describes their position, and everyone else actually hears and processes this information. Expecting such is a grossly flawed assumption. There’s also assumption everyone will know others’ types hence others’ performance so as to not only know positions and also forecast future positions. This too is flawed. As is another assumption in that base depths as well as crosswind depths will vary.
Story Update Sep 16, 2022:
Perhaps a good time to think again Douglas Bader (or Harry Day?)
Rules are for the obedience of fools and the guidance of wise men.
though I like to swap out fool and replace with novice. Then consider Jeff Sutherland on Shu Ha Ri,
In the martial arts you learn a concept called Shu Ha Ri, which points to different levels of mastery. In the Shu state you know all the rules and the forms. You repeat them, like the steps in a dance, so your body absorbs them. You don’t deviate at all. In the Ha state, once you’ve mastered the forms, you can make innovations. Put an extra swing in your step down the dance floor. In the Ri state you’re able to discard the forms, you’ve truly mastered the practice, and you’re able to be creative in an unhindered way, because the knowledge of the meaning of aikido or the tango is so deeply embedded in you, your every step expresses its essence.
Story Update Sep 28, 2022:
Last week I was doing some transition training. A jet called inbound from the north while the field was landing west flow. I had just done a simulated short field to a full stop landing and was taxing back for takeoff. My instructor got a little irate as the jet entered a “right downwind.” Though I didn’t really have time to get into the specifics of this article, I did have a thought. The jet happened to be five miles wide in its downwind. They went to a deep base of about five miles deep. I’ll assume they did this wanting to be about five miles starting the final so as to be on a three degree glide slope from their 1500 AGL throughout. Now here’s my thought. Being five miles or greater throughout till on the final, were they even in the airport environment? Were they in a traffic pattern? Do you really want to fix them not using a left pattern entry? If so, could they have done this mostly without talking only speaking up when joining into a “straight in” for landing? Would they gain motivation to do such in the future? Which would you rather have, hearing them throughout and gaining awareness, or having them pick up on the radio on a five mile straight in?
Story Update Sep 29, 2022:
Story Update Mar 5, 2023:
Simon Sinek — Rules are for Lazy Leaders: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eFKp-OFVsHs
Story Update May 3, 2023:
Last summer’s midair collision in Watsonville, California is being pointed to as justification to absolutist positions regarding pattern entries. In this crash, we had a light twin flying a straight in at excessive speed collide with a light single engine plane that had just turned base to final. The assessment being drawn is that this is the result of the twin flying the straight in instead of doing a “normal” pattern entry. This is a gross oversimplification of the events and thus draws completely erroneous conclusions.
You can see the event in this Finer Points YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=367&v=Y7TpAU_n_Ic
Immediately I have to disagree with the presenter of this video in describing the situation. The presenter suggests that the pattern is busy. This pattern was not full and was not busy. There were only two aircraft in the pattern. That is a light pattern. It is a pattern sufficiently light that I would expect others to do the straight in as the twin did. It would be no different than someone coming in on an Instrument Approach. Except for the speed of the twin. The speed of the twin is significant and contributory.
In the sequence of events, we hear the twin at ten miles then again at three miles. By virtue of hearing both these calls, we get a sense of how fast the aircraft is moving. Note that the single is in downwind at this point in time. Given that speed, the single could easily and should have extended downwind. Though, to be fair, the single was a student and may not have had this awareness. Students do tend to stick to scripted patterns with little situational deviation.
I’m going to make a presumption that the single was at a lower altitude and hence had right of way. I am assuming this as the single turned in front of the twin which obviously had lots of closure. Having said this, having right of way does not mean you should cut in front. This was an instance in which being courteous is safer than being legally right. What is interesting here is that the single had sight of the twin. It was the twin that did not have sight of the single. As the single was the aircraft in the pattern while the twin was doing the straight it, this immediately renders arguments about the importance of using prescribed pattern entries so as to be predicable wrong. The twin was the one not in the pattern hence “not predictable,” yet he was seen. Where I really fault the twin is in not updating his game plan for his arrival. He was aware of the single’s presence yet he still kept blasting in. This was his crucial mistake. He could have offset right and flown an upwind to crosswind at this point. He could have stayed high and offset slightly right to enter a modified overhead as the presenter of the Finer Points suggests. Either would have avoided this crash. Yet I also have to fault the single as the single saw the twin and was aware the twin did not see him. The single should have acted more aggressively to avoid midair rather than turning off base to final in front of the fast straight in twin. The single had gained situational awareness with sufficient time to intercede. The real problem here is neither plane updated their respective game plans in the presence of new and contradictory information. The twin knew there was another plane with potential conflict to which he couldn’t see yet didn’t move to step away from the pattern. Despite having sight and seeing the conflict develop, the single continued stooging along his track not deviating to avoid conflict instead turning in front of and exasperating the situation. As the single had visual of the twin and as the single gained this awareness well prior to collision with time to adjust, this should not be attributed to mixing pattern entries. Now consider if the twin had entered a downwind but at the speeds seen. In such circumstance, the twin could just as easily have run up another aircraft. Not seeing your interval is just as much a challenge on the 45 to downwind and is also an issue in downwind to base turns. Again, the real problem was neither plane was Bayesian. Neither plane updated game plans with new information. As Dave Snowden with Cynefin teaches us, making hard rules seeking robustness tends to set up catastrophic failures when failures occur. Adaptability, flexibility, resiliency enable abnormalities to be less severe.
To be clear, how I see factors contributing in order are:
1. Twin’s excessive speed
2. Twin’s poor decision making
2A. To include fully realizing lacked awareness yet not offsetting to gain awareness
2B. To include not updating game plan in presence of new circumstances
3. Single’s poor decision making
3A. To include not updating game plan while fully seeing abnormal circumstances
I think the pilot of the Twin was a knucklehead here and should have waved off long before, especially as even were the single not to have been present, the Twin could not have made a landing given its excessive speed and the fact that it had not yet lowered its gear nor flaps.
I think the Single should not have turned Base with the Twin at three miles, especially given how quickly it got to three from ten. Once on Base, I think the Single should not have turned Final in front of the Twin either overshooting Final to go Upwind outside or turn early to go Upwind inside Final. Once on Final, the Single was correct to Go Around but should not have executed a normal Go Around. Instead the Single should have stayed level so as not to climb into the Twin’s altitude. Further, the Single likely started to offset right when really the single should have offset left toward the inside of the pattern. Reasoning here is to have left the right side open for the Twin in the Twin’s likely Go Around such that the Twin would pass outside the pattern as one would expect of a fast aircraft and the Twin would then have easier time searching for the Single on the left as that would be the Twin’s pilot side. But this is hard for a student to know. Really, this is hard for any non-military aviator to know as only military really see fast moving Overhead Breaks alongside already slowed in the pattern traffic. I don’t fault the Single in this Go Around regard though do write it for others to learn.
The family of the Single has plenty of room to sue the estate of the Twin.
Story Update Jul 17, 2023:
In a recent conversation with my brother who lived in Sweden for a few years, he mentioned their driving rules had a mentality that no one had right of way. This meant if anyone else had to adapt their driving to accommodate your driving, you were in the wrong. Likewise, if you had to adapt for them, they were in the wrong. In this way both parties could be simultaneously in the wrong. This is interesting as no one gets possessive about having right of way and therefore no one tries to defend their perceived right of way. Note right of way does not reflect any physical reality and is merely social construct. Think about how this would apply to the Watsonville situation. The twin was wrong as the single would have had to have adapted actions for both to survive. And the single was wrong as the twin would have had to adapt actions for both to have survived. The single would not have presumed a right of way and despite being “right,” cut in front of another fast moving aircraft. And the fast moving aircraft would have shifted right to pass outside much sooner. Our “right of way” mindset instilled in us by our rulesets and procedures kills us.
I asked him if I had this correctly, he replied
Most of it. The concept in Sweden is ‘give preference to’ — you are responsible for avoiding incidents / making a safe environment. Think of it like the classic sidewalk dance (or chicken if you prefer) — if both people approaching each other step sideways to avoid a collision, there is still a 50% chance of collision. Right of way mindset assumes one person clearly has the right of way (because they are walking into the sun, have glasses, wearing running shoes, everyone walks in that direction on this side of the street, you pick the reason). One problem with right of way is each individual decides when they ‘own’ or ‘surrender’ the right, and they communicate their perceptions and decisions by their actions. However, if you are responsible for avoiding incidents, it helps if you give preference in an expected direction. There is a much lower chance of collision (there is always someone fixated on their phone who makes erratic moves).
Story Update Oct 13, 2023:
I’ve a recent thought to share stemming from previously mentioned concerns for ergonomics and sight lines obscured by airframe. Keep these in mind then realize often the pilot in the left seat isn’t always the pilot flying. You can be PIC and still be pilot monitoring. This is the case nearly half the time.
Story Update Jan 26, 2024:
Recently I came across a James Reason developed concept regarding attribution of error. James Reason has been a prolific producer of work in safety. I found this interesting as the notion that a deliberate willful rule violation may still not be malignant on the part of the person executing as the circumstances may determine that the rule or procedure is not useful in context. This means the error is deemed system induced. And from this we see that either the error will be found specifically to be blameless or remain properly deemed as an issue with the system, which means implicitly the executor did not do wrong.
The rule says you must use left traffic, however, there’s a ridge to the left creating a crash hazard. The context of the situation does not fit the rule therefore the rule is wrong as a system induced error. Deliberate disregard for the rule is not a violation when applying context to the situation, rather the system is in error and the pilot blameless.
Consider Laconia, NH (KLCI). Notice the terrain to the south, southeast, and east. The pattern for 26 is left, it lacks prescription for right. Yet note the instrument approaches, be they for 26 or 08, all state circling is to be to the north. This emphasizes the concern for this terrain. Flying into KLCI at night with runway 26, I always use right traffic. By the rules, this would be wrong. Yet by context, the rule is a system error. Consider Lebanon, NH (KLEB). It is towered but that tower is part time. When the tower is closed, left traffic is presumed. Are you going to do that for runways 18 and 25? I don’t think so. Especially not at night after tower hours. [In Laconia, I have seen others stay left for 26 though add 1,000 feet to their downwind altitude, a different violation to accommodate the specific situation.]
Additional names worth exploring: Todd Conklin, James Reason, Gary Wong. Consider Safety Differently. Drift Into Failure.