A Third-path Military Option in North Korea
In the Gordian Knot that is the strategic situation on the Korean peninsula, U.S. military options range from bad to worse. Any direct intervention by U.S. forces would effectively re-ignite the Korean War, lead to massive loss of civilian life and certain invasion of the South by the North. The consequences grow exponentially worse when we consider the likely involvement of Russia and China and the possible deployment of nuclear weapons.
There is another path to military intervention the U.S. might consider, and that is to encourage a military strike against North Korean missile assets by a third party. To avoid any of the diplomatic trip-wires set by the Armistice, that nation could not have been a participant in the Korean War. This rules out the incumbent choice, South Korea. I suggest Japan.
The Japanese armed forces do not possess the requisite assets for a prolonged, large-scale engagement with North Korea, or even a meaningful aerial assault on their territory. However, Japan’s Kongō-class destroyers are fitted with Aegis ABM technology and JDF possess sufficient special forces assets to conduct limited raids on high-value targets. Recent signals from Abe’s government suggest they are giving strong consideration to unilateral pre-emptive action. It is in America’s interest to encourage this.
Of the two choices mentioned above, a special forces raid is the least likely to provoke a large-scale response. Providing the Japanese with timely overflight intel would increase the chances of SOF teams successfully deploying in-country and destroying a limited number of DPRK mobile rocket launchers near the coast. This approach yields four chief benefits:
- It provides a decisive (albeit limited) course of direct action against North Korean missiles and launch assets.
- It provides the United States with credible diplomatic cover in the international community.
- There is a possibility the SF teams could get in and out without capture. But if not …
- … any retaliation would be directed first against Japan as opposed to the United States.
In the event of a North Korean retaliation, the U.S. can regain the diplomatic and/or military initiatives by intervening as either a mediator, or with force on behalf of an ally. Headed into whatever subsequent talks devolve, North Korea’s military/industrial capability would be severely degraded and their bargaining position weakened, with their demands assuming a significantly lower priority than they currently occupy in the diplomatic mind. Under such circumstances, the United States could set the terms and effectively run the negotiating table.
No one wants war. But as has been observed: there is a certain kind of peace that can only be found on the other side of war. If a conflict is to be joined with North Korea, then the United States must make effective use of its diplomatic and military resources to assure that war is brief, involves minimal loss of life and strengthens America’s bargaining position in the resulting post-war reality. I believe a third-path military option provides the best chance of achieving these goals.
