Khalil Mack Trade With Context: QB Contracts In The Modern NFL

“When you see the types of contracts that these really good quarterbacks are earning in this league, it does help to have a player of Jared’s caliber on his rookie deal still, but I think there still is a long-term perspective and vision that these guys have in place. Hopefully he continues to grow, which is what we fully accept from Jared [Goff] and then we’ll be sitting up here having a similar press conference where he’ll be making a lot of money I would imagine.”
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The Past:
The 2010 NFL draft was the final year NFL clubs had to hand Sultan of Dubai money to unproven, high draft picks. That year, Sam Bradford signed a six year, $78M deal with the St. Louis Rams, may they rest in peace. Aside from a week 17 playoff elimination at the hands of the clipboard Jesus-lead Seahawks in Bradford’s rookie season, the Rams were consistently horrible, independent of Bradford’s two torn ACLs, until he was traded to the Eagles in the 2015 offseason (this had more to do with Jeff Fisher and Billy Devaney than it did Sammy Sleeves).
The ensuing lockout during the 2011 offseason saw the implementation of the rookie wage scale. The first overall pick in that year’s draft, Panthers quarterback Cam Newton, signed a fully-guaranteed deal for “more than $22M,” about $6.5M less per year than Bradford’s rookie deal. The Panthers steadily improved over the next three seasons, and finished the 2014 season with a 12–4 record. The Panthers didn’t have to commit a sizable percentage of their cap to a rookie right off the bat, and thus were able to extend their star players and sign notable free agents.
Before that 2011 draft, the same teams would oftentimes find themselves on Penrose’s Steps — a loop.

Those teams were there because they weren’t good at evaluating talent. They’d regularly draft the wrong player and have to pay the player top dollar right off the bat, which hindered their roster-building effort and inevitably put the team back where they started (looking at you, Browns and Raiders). The 2011 rookie wage scale made a miss in the first round of the draft, of which there are plenty, less of franchise-tanker.
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The Present:
The Seattle Seahawks run of drafts from 2010 to 2012 might be the greatest streak ever. That span saw the Seahawks draft most of the core members of the now defunct “Legion of Boom”:
2010: Earl Thomas, FS, round one; Kam Chanceller, SS, round five.
2011: KJ Wright, LB, round four; Richard Sherman, CB, round five; Byron Maxwell, CB, round six; Malcom Smith, LB and eventual Super Bowl MVP, round seven; Doug Baldwin, WR, undrafted.
2012: Bruce Irvin, DE, round one; Bobby Wagner, LB, round two; Russell Wilson, QB, round three; Jeremy Lane, CB, round six.
When the Seattle Seahawks won Super Bowl XLVIII after the 2013 season, Russell Wilson’s cap hit was $681,085. Wilson beat out one-seven touchdown game wonder Matt Flynn in training camp and promptly lead the Seahawks to the playoffs, beating RGIII’s Redskins in the wild card round before losing to the Falcons by two points in the divisional round. Wilson’s cheap contract enabled the Seahawks bring in, trade for, and/or extend players like Marshawn Lynch, Cliff Avril, Michael Bennett, Red Bryant, Max Unger, and Brandon Mebane.
Since Wilson signed his second contract that kicked in at the start of the 2016 season, the Seahawks have not been the same team. Aside from Wilson, the only players mentioned thus far left on the team are Bobby Wagner and KJ Wright (with Earl Thomas currently holding out and Kam Chancellor’s career effectively over due to injury). The offensive line has gone to shambles and the Seahawks have been unable to capture the magic they did in the 2010, 2011, and 2012 drafts — almost as if there’s a degree of luck in drafting players. Wilson ran for his life all of 2017, and despite dragging the Seahawks to 9–7 they missed the playoffs for the first time since 2011.
The Seahawks now find themselves in the second phase of what the rookie wage scale has transformed modern roster-building into. Wilson is on his second contract and the Seahawks couldn’t afford to extend most of their superstars. They can’t afford to sign big name free agents. Everyone knows their offensive line is horrible sans left tackle Duane Brown, but the Seahawks signed zero linemen in free agency and spent a sole fifth round pick on lineman Jamarco Jones, who didn’t even make the final 53-man roster.
With Wilson’s second contract, the Seahawks’ success banks on two stipulations:
- They hit on multiple draft picks.
- Russell Wilson is such a good quarterback that he offsets shortcomings at other positions. In football nomenclature this is referred to as being an “elite” quarterback.
This is the gamble teams take when they give a QB his second contract. Carson Wentz looks really good, but until there are some big holes in the Eagles’ roster and Wentz carries them to the playoffs, it’s unknown if he’s “elite”. Andrew Luck dragged the Colts to the AFC championship. He’s elite. The Seahawks narrowly missed the playoffs, but Wilson dragged them to 9–7. He’s elite.
Prior to the rookie wage scale, most teams started off in this “second phase” — Matt Ryan’s $72M in deal in 2008 and Matt Stafford’s $78M deal in 2009 propelled the Falcons and Lions into those phases upon drafting the two quarterbacks. Other teams like the Patriots, Colts, Packers, and Steelers were regularly competent throughout the 2000’s, hit on draft picks and made up for roster deficiencies with their QB play. Where this ties in to the whole “second phase” idea is that these teams regularly looked for cheaper replacements or let players walk in free agency — they simply couldn’t resign everyone or fill every glaring need.
This is the reality in which the Seattle Seahawks find themselves. The Carolina Panthers are experiencing similar problems with their offensive line as well as their defensive backs — it was almost cocky the way they let Josh Norman walk in the 2016 offseason. They’ve yet find anything resembling a viable replacement at cornerback. The Dolphins are similar with their front seven and offensive line. The Bengals, Colts, and Raiders are similar with their entire teams.
Unfortunately players like Jake Locker, Christian Ponder, Blaine Gabbert, the entire 2013 QB draft class, Johnny Manziel, the Redskins’ handling of Kirk Cousins, Colin Kaepernick (bites tongue) being unemployed, and the implosion of Teddy Bridgewater’s knee have prevented us from seeing more teams enter this second phase.
Those teams expected to enter that second phase within the next few years saw the blueprint set forth by the Seahawks and are playing copycat. As soon as the Buccaneers, Titans, Eagles, Rams, and now Bears realized they had the guy, they went all in on the window during which they can dish out big contracts to notorious free agents as well as extend their superstars. It’s clear that the Bucs failed at this while the Titans messed around with Mike Mularky for too long, although both teams still have two seasons to make it work since Jameis Winston and Marcus Mariota are first round picks and thus are subject to the fifth-year option implemented by the rookie wage scale.
Note: The Cowboys should fit in here but they haven’t quite caught on.
The Eagles and Rams have extended their superstars and brought on big names free agents. Both have traded for impact players; they’re able to because of Carson Wentz and Jared Goff’s contracts. Saturday morning, the Bears hedged their next two first-round picks in perhaps the most “all-in” move of this new era in the NFL by trading for Khalil Mack and promptly extending the 2016 defensive player for the year with the richest defensive contract in NFL history. This offseason Chicago signed free agents Allen Robinson, Trey Burton, Taylor Gabriel, and matched the $56M phantom that is the transition tag the Packers used to attempt a heist of cornerback Kyle Fuller.
THE FUTURE:
Unless the rules change when the collective bargaining agreement is renegotiated in 2021, this is the loop in which NFL teams find themselves. Here are the where all the teams currently sit:
Phase One: QB on their rookie deal (either the starter or heir apparent) — Jaguars (Bortles’ extension kicks in in 2019), Buccaneers, Titans, Rams, Eagles, Cowboys, Bears, Chiefs, Texans, Browns, Jets, Bills, Cardinals.
Phase Two: QB signed to second contract (or third and so on) — Raiders, 49ers, Colts, Dolphins, Vikings, Seahawks, Bengals, Panthers, Lions, Ravens, Falcons, Packers, Redskins, Steelers, Chargers, Giants, Saints, Patriots.
Phase 1.5: Somewhere in between — Broncos.
The Buccaneers are the prime candidate to break precedent and decide against extending their starter and thus reboot the cycle with Winston’s off the field issues but it’ll be at least another season before any decision is made (unless the 49ers, Vikings, and Broncos have tangentially fulfilled this idea).
Then there’s the long-term “phase two” teams that’ll be reverting to phase one in the next couple years. The Bengals, Dolphins, Ravens, and Giants are candidates to move one from their current starters while the Chargers, Steelers, Saints, and Patriots are in retirement territory.
More intriguing is to see what happens when some of these long-term phase two teams hit reset, whether that’s the Dolphins or Bengals moving on, the Ravens or Giants pulling the plug, or the Saints, Chargers, Steelers, or the Patriots.
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John Andersen is an award-winning NFL journalist and has written books about Ronnie Brown and Ellis Hobbs. You can follow John on Twitter @_JohnAndersen
