As with all things, the truth is too complicated to categorize easily. What is that Truth? Well, our military is remarkably good at achieving points a and b of the DOD mission statement, to the point where the defense of our constitution and protection of our vital interests are no longer realistically contested in any meaningful way. However, point c, which embodies the Clauswitzian framework of advancement of politics by other means rather than the more existential preservation of life, liberty, and territorial integrity (embodied in a and b) is far more challenging to evaluate effectively and, politicians rhetoric aside, serves as the basis for every post World War II intervention (including Korea and vietnam). That begs the question what does it mean to “uphold” and “advance” the interest and policies of the United States? One could argue that establishing a baseline of broad principles for when military intervention is appropriate and sticking to it, in and of itself, “upholds” the interests of the United States even if the specific policies objectives of a given conflict are less than fully achievable. A US military that doesn’t engage in conflicts involving point C… may no longer be able to avoid conflicts involving type A and B of the DOD charter.

If we are seen as unwilling or too reluctant to intervene in foreign conflicts that are peripheral to our core interests and where the outcome is neither certain nor vital, the grey zone in other words, than regional powers will inevitably intervene on their own behalf at great risk to world stability. As is the case with our relative ‘absence’ in the conflict in Syria weak state internal struggles can quickly devolve into all out regional wars and that in and of itself becomes extremely dangerous extremely quickly. In this formulation, a tie or a minor loss isn’t necessarily a bad outcome and may well serve the larger interests of the United States if it prevents something worse. That’s certainly not to say every conflict is worth fighting just for the sake of principle and we are well served by staying out Syria. However, if we engage in grey zone conflicts for a reasonable and rational reason it has some broader value (the metrics of which are too hard to calculate) that exist above and beyond our ability to achieve the immediate policy aims of the conflict. A tie or a loss therefore shouldn’t always be viewed in absolute terms and to some extent are merely the cost associated with being the guarantor of World Order. An ordered world is clearly in the interest of the United States.

To some extent, therefore, the answer is to get used to losses and ties and avoid doubling down on unwinnable conflicts in an attempt to gain ill conceived Pyrric victories with the understanding that sometimes the best outcome isn’t achievable and merely preventing a worse outcome is good enough.