Concept of substance.
There is no prime matter or pure elements, there is always a mixture. Neither the bare particulars nor property bundles have their antecedent, according to Aristotle, all matter exists in all forms. Withing this, a ratio weighing the four potential combinations of primary and secondary properties are analyzed into discrete one-step and two-step abstract transmutations between the elements. They call it basic power transformation. Every single propriety carries two potential combinations, one of which would make it to the top. According to Aristotle’s theology, a form of invarient form exists without matter, beyond the cosmos, powerless and obvious, in the eternal substance of the unmoved movers. The way modern philosophers treated the segment is blurry or impercievable. According to Descartes, an entity which exists in such a way that it needs no other entity in order to exist. Therefore, only God is a substance in this strict sense. As Aristotle sayings put a god’s conditions as Pneuma, which translates to soul, he says that within it, what’s driving our potential life is the soul we carry inside of us, humans of the wild, and from that we inter-develop a substance or objecthood which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject. Descartes then proceed to extended the terms to create things, but they still need only the occurence of God to exist. Of these, there two things and only two : Mind and Matter, each being distinct from the other in order to exist. The attribute to the Mind, matter combo is what we conceive as contributing the single essence of the substance. Wrapping up all this gets you a not-so-nice enigma. The substance exists and doesn’t exist at the same time. The substance is distinct for its proprieties, what makes it relevant and invisible in the same time matter. David Thume critiqued the substance and said that it cannot be perceived and it should not be assumed to exist. Nietzsche on the other hand rejected the notion of substance, but in the same movement, the concept of subject was contained. For he, only a subjective form of liberty could be conceived. To the contrary of Deleuze who talks about “a life”, as an impersonal and immanent form of liberty.
For Heidegger, Descartes means by substance that by which “we can understand nothing else than an entity which is in such a way that it need no other entity in order to be.” Therefore, only God is a substance as ens perfectissimus (most perfect thing). Heidegger showed the inextricable relationship between the concept of substance and of subject.
Substance Attribute Theory.
WE have treated of that which is primarily and to which all the other categories of being are referred For it is in virtue of the concept of substance that the others also are said to be-quantity and quality and the like; for all will be found to involve the concept of substance, as we said in the first part of our work. And since ‘being’ is in one way divided into individual thing, quality, and quantity, and is in another way distinguished in respect of potency and complete reality, and of function, let us now add a discussion of potency and complete reality. And first let us explain potency in the strictest sense, which is, however, not the most useful for our present purpose. For potency and actuality extend beyond the cases that involve a reference to motion. But when we have spoken of this first kind, we shall in our discussions of actuality’ explain the other kinds of potency as well.
We have pointed out elsewhere that ‘potency’ and the word ‘can’ have several senses. Of these we may neglect all the potencies that are so called by an equivocation. For some are called so by analogy, as in geometry we say one thing is or is not a ‘power’ of another by virtue of the presence or absence of some relation between them. But all potencies that conform to the same type are originative sources of some kind, and are called potencies in reference to one primary kind of potency, which is an originative source of change in another thing or in the thing itself qua other. For one kind is a potency of being acted on, in the very thing acted on, of its being passively changed by another thing or by itself qua other; and another kind is a state of insusceptibility to change for the worse and to destruction by another thing or by the thing itself qua other by virtue of an originative source of change. In all these definitions is implied the formula if potency in the primary sense.-And again these so-called potencies are potencies either of merely acting or being acted on, or of acting or being acted on well, so that even in the formula of the latter the formula of the prior kinds of potency are somehow implied.
Obviously, then, in a sense the potency of acting and of being acted on is one (for a thing may be ‘capable’ either because it can itself be acted on or because something else can be acted on by it), but in a sense the potencies are different. For the one is in the thing acted on; it is because it contains a certain originative source, and because even the matter is an originative source, that the thing acted on is acted on, and one thing by one, another by another; for that which is oily can be burnt, and that which yields in a particular way can be crushed; and similarly in all other cases. But the other potency is in the agent, e.g. heat and the art of building are present, one in that which can produce heat and the other in the man who can build. And so, in so far as a thing is an organic unity, it cannot be acted on by itself; for it is one and not two different things. And ‘impotence’and ‘impotent’ stand for the privation which is contrary to potency of this sort, so that every potency belongs to the same subject and refers to the same process as a corresponding impotence. Privation has several senses; for it means that which has not a certain quality and that which might naturally have it but has not it, either (a) in general or (b) when it might naturally have it, and either (a) in some particular way. And in certain cases if things which naturally have a quality lose it by violence, we say they have suffered privation.