Revenge of the Nerd, Pro Football Edition: Howie Roseman is Changing the NFL

By Jarrad Daniel Saffren

Philadelphia Eagles General Manager Howie Roseman. Photo courtesy of USA Today Sports.

Let’s begin with a little English lesson.

Epoch (Definition) — A period of time in history or a person’s life, typically one marked by notable events or particular characteristics.

Epoch (In Context) — A noun that is drastically underused by the media, because the media tends to take a micro perspective, rather than a macro perspective.

The 2018 National Football League season opens Thursday night, when the Atlanta Falcons visit Lincoln Financial Field to play the defending Super Bowl champion Philadelphia Eagles.

Philly’s 2017–18 Super Bowl run, and the 2017–18 season in general, marked the end of one NFL epoch and the beginning of another.

From 1998 to 2016, star quarterbacks and explosive offenses defined the NFL. Think, “The Greatest Show on Turf” Rams, almost every Peyton Manning team and the 2007 Patriots.

The top 13 scoring teams in NFL history played between 1998 and 2016. Forty-three of the top 50 and 88 of the top 100 scoring teams in NFL history also played between those years. The era was even bookended by two record-setting offensive teams, the 1998 Minnesota Vikings and the 2016 Atlanta Falcons.

The ’98 Vikings, quarterbacked by NFL MVP Randall Cunningham and featuring Hall of Fame wide receivers Cris Carter and Randy Moss, scored 556 points, shattering the old record of 505. The ’16 Falcons scored 540 points, an average of 33.8 per game, the seventh highest marks of all-time. Quarterback Matt Ryan won the league’s MVP award by throwing 38 touchdowns to 13 different receivers, an NFL record.

But neither team won the Super Bowl. The ’98 Vikings lost to the Falcons in the NFC Championship Game, 30–27. The ’16 Falcons, famously, blew a 28–3 lead in Super Bowl LI and lost to the Patriots, 34–28. This fact, that both teams fell short of winning the Super Bowl, epitomizes the epoch in general.

It was an age defined by historically great offense and, ultimately, irony. The historically great offensive teams rarely won the Super Bowl. Instead, they usually lost to great defensive teams.

The two highest scoring teams of all-time, the 2013 Broncos and the 2007 Patriots, both lost the Super Bowl to great defensive teams, the Legion of Boom Seahawks (2013) and the Michael Strahan-Osi Umenyiora-Justin Tuck Giants (2007). Out of the top 13 scoring teams of all-time, all of which played in this era, only two, the 1999 Rams and the 2009 Saints, won the Super Bowl.

But even though they didn’t usually win it all, the offensive powers defined an epoch that saw passing offense overtake rushing offense as the primary method for moving the ball. This scintillating brand of football also popularized fantasy football and lifted NFL TV ratings to new heights.

In 2017, though, star quarterbacks and explosive offenses ceded to a more old school type of team, one defined by roster depth, balance and versatility. The Eagles were the deepest, the most balanced and the most versatile. But two other conference finalists — the Minnesota Vikings and the Jacksonville Jaguars — and two other NFC division winners — the New Orleans Saints and the Los Angeles Rams — were defined by the same qualities.

Roster depth, balance and versatility. These were all defining qualities of NFL contenders before the late-90s, before quarterbacks and passing offenses grew to define teams in such an unbalanced way.

There is, however, one key difference with this new epoch: In the age of free agency and the salary cap, general managers need to be a lot smarter than they used to be. They need to use every means available to build contenders.

Eagles GM Howie Roseman, more than anyone, was the star of Philly’s Super Bowl season. The Eagles already had a strong core from the Andy Reid and Chip Kelly eras, guys like defensive tackle Fletcher Cox, defensive end Brandon Graham, left tackle Jason Peters, center Jason Kelce and tight end Zach Ertz. They also had a franchise quarterback, Carson Wentz, from the 2016 NFL Draft.

It was an interesting situation because the Eagles had a strong core but were not a contender. If they had been one extreme — rebuilding — or the other — a Super Bowl contender — Roseman would have been more likely to marry himself to a particular team-building philosophy, like accumulating draft picks or signing A-list free agents.

Howie didn’t need to build a core, but he couldn’t make the Eagles a contender with just a few big signings. So, he used every means available — free agency, the draft and trades — to round out the roster. Out of necessity, he may have changed the prevailing method for building NFL teams.

Those three principles — depth, balance and versatility — guided every move.

Howie invested in backup quarterbacks, paying Nick Foles $7 million in guaranteed money and signing Nate Sudfeld, a promising developmental project, after he was cut by Washington.

Roseman traded for three really good NFL starters — defensive tackle Timmy Jernigan, cornerback Ronald Darby and running back Jay Ajayi — still on their rookie contracts, essentially using trades to do what draft picks normally do: add to a young core.

He strengthened positions of weakness by signing quality, under-the-radar veterans — cornerback Patrick Robinson, running back LeGarrette Blount, wide receivers Alshon Jeffery and Torrey Smith — to manageable contracts. Robinson, Blount and Jeffery signed one-year deals. Smith agreed to a three-year, $15-million contract. Howie did the same thing at a position of strength, defensive end, signing Chris Long (two years, $4.5 million) to add depth and keep the starters fresh.

Most importantly, Howie flooded positions of weakness with options. The Eagles had not had good cornerback play in about a decade. So, Roseman traded for Darby, signed Robinson and drafted Rasul Douglas and Sidney Jones. Darby, Robinson and Douglas combined for nine interceptions last year. Jones missed most of the season with an injury, but that’s why you flood the position with options. One doesn’t work, others do. Howie did the same thing at wide receiver, signing Jeffery and Smith and drafting Mack Hollins and Shelton Gibson.

Other well-rounded 2017 contenders used similar tactics.

The Vikings entered the season with an unreliable, oft-injured starting quarterback, Sam Bradford. They also had a former franchise quarterback, Teddy Bridgewater, who was close to full health, but still a question mark after more than a year on the shelf. Both guys were capable starters when healthy, but there was no guarantee they would stay or get healthy. GM Rick Spielman insured the position with a third viable option, Case Keenum. When Bradford got hurt, and Bridgewater wasn’t quite ready, Keenum stepped in and had a career year, throwing for 3,547 yards and 22 touchdowns, leading the Vikings to the NFC Championship Game.

The Rams, perennially weak at wide receiver under former coach Jeff Fisher (2012–2016), did what Roseman did at cornerback, flooded the position with options. GM Les Snead and new coach Sean McVay traded for Sammy Watkins, signed Robert Woods and drafted Cooper Kupp in the third round. They completely rebuilt the receiving corps by finding affordable options, and it worked. Quarterback Jared Goff threw for 3,804 yards and 28 touchdowns in 2017.

The Jaguars already had the core of a good young defense, especially on the line. They just needed to complement that core with veterans still in their primes. GM David Caldwell and coach Doug Marrone signed three such veterans — defensive end Calais Campbell (four years, $60 million), cornerback AJ Bouye (five years, $67.5 million) and safety Barry Church (four years, $26 million) — to complete what became the league’s best defense.

Before 2017, all these tactics — investing in backup quarterbacks, trading for quality starters, flooding positions of weakness with options, strengthening weak spots by signing quality veterans to manageable contracts — were either under-utilized or unused completely. But in 2017, they rounded out almost every contender.

Not surprisingly, in the 2018 offseason, more and more teams started using these tactics.

Four teams drafted quarterbacks in the top 10 selections of the 2018 NFL Draft. Three of those teams insured the position with a capable veteran. Cleveland drafted Baker Mayfield and traded for Tyrod Taylor. The Jets picked Sam Darnold and re-signed Josh McCown. The Cardinals chose Josh Rosen and signed Sam Bradford. A Super Bowl contender, the Saints, also insured the quarterback position, trading for Teddy Bridgewater to back up Drew Brees.

The Lions have had a weak running game since Barry Sanders retired in 1999. Detroit’s one-dimensional offense has held back talented Lions rosters for years. This is a team that had Matthew Stafford, Calvin Johnson and Ndamukong Suh for five years together, and never won a playoff game. So, after new coach Matt Patricia took over in February, Patricia and GM Bob Quinn flooded the Lions’ longtime weakness with options, drafting Auburn standout Kerryon Johnson and signing the NFL’s best clock-burning power back, LeGarrette Blount.

The Rams had the most high profile offseason of any team, in an attempt to capitalize on having a quarterback, Jared Goff, still on his rookie deal. LA traded for three quality starters, cornerbacks Marcus Peters and Aqib Talib and wide receiver Brandin Cooks, and signed another, Suh, to a manageable contract, one year and $14 million.

The Bears are also trying to capitalize on having a quarterback, Mitch Trubisky, still on his rookie contract. Trubisky struggled as a rookie last year, accumulating more turnovers, 13, than touchdowns, seven. He did not have any decent receiving options, so in the offseason, Chicago flooded the receiving positions with options, signing two good wideouts, Allen Robinson and Taylor Gabriel, and a tight end with potential, Trey Burton. The Bears also drafted slot receiver Anthony Miller in the second round. Defensively, the Bears did not merely trade for a quality starter. They traded for a three-time Pro Bowler and a one-time Defensive Player of the Year (2016), outside linebacker Khalil Mack, who is very much still in his prime.

Green Bay has had the best quarterback in football, Aaron Rodgers, for more than a decade, yet the Packers have not won a Super Bowl in eight years. Former Packers GM Ted Thompson (2005–2017) preferred to build his teams almost entirely through the draft. But Green Bay did not draft as well in recent years, which helps explain why it failed to withstand a Rodgers injury last year, going 3–5 without him, and ultimately missing the playoffs with a 7–9 record. New GM Brian Gutekunst is more keen on using every means available to build around Rodgers’ annually astronomical contract. Gutekunst signed three quality veterans, tight end Jimmy Graham (three years, $30 million), defensive end Muhammad Wilkerson (one year, $5 million) and cornerback Tramon Williams (two years, $10 million), to manageable contracts in the offseason.

It remains to be seen if these moves will work for any of these teams. But either way, teams are embracing the strategy of using every means available to build deep, balanced and versatile rosters. Now, it is one thing to use one of these tactics to strengthen a weakness and get a little better. It is another to use many of these tactics to build a deep, balanced and versatile roster.

In 2017, those other contenders used one, maybe two, of these tactics to become more well-rounded. The Eagles used all of them to become the deepest, most balanced, most versatile NFL team in recent memory.

In 2017, the Eagles lost their franchise quarterback (Wentz), future Hall of Fame left tackle (Peters), middle linebacker (Jordan Hicks), all-purpose back (Darren Sproles) and best special teamer (Chris Maragos) to season-ending injuries, and still won the Super Bowl. Wentz, Peters and Hicks were probably their three most important players, and it didn’t matter!

Roseman’s Eagles showed that conventional NFL wisdom is antiquated. You don’t need a franchise quarterback or a historically great defense to win a Super Bowl. You can win with a deep, balanced, versatile roster, one where no unit is markedly better than any other, but one where all three are elite.

The challenge is building this roster. As Roseman showed, it requires immense creativity, on a level the NFL never saw before last year. It is much easier to take a narrow, simple view and focus on building a team with a clear identity: Let’s find that one lottery ticket of a franchise quarterback! Let’s draft five defensive players a year for the next three years! Let’s draft a running back and then a bunch of offensive linemen!

Roseman essentially did all three at once. It was the greatest team-building job in NFL history. The league wasn’t ready for such a well-rounded machine.

The NFL wasn’t ready for the Eagles because the NFL is not like the MLB and the NBA. Many MLB and NBA franchises have hired sports nerds, like Theo Epstein in baseball and Daryl Morey in basketball, to build their teams. These are people who spend their lives not playing sports (although they probably did at some point, just not at a high level) but watching sports, reading about sports, thinking about sports and growing to understand sports. This cultivates the creativity to use any means necessary to build a championship contender.

Most NFL general managers grew up playing football at increasingly higher levels, so they, like anyone who grows up within a system, were indoctrinated by traditional methods. People like Roseman, Epstein and Morey grew up just thinking on their own. This is not to say that sports nerds are smarter than jocks, necessarily. They are just more used to thinking outside the box because, if they wanted to get into sports, they had no other choice. They had to make up for their lack of high level playing experience with intellect and creativity.

We will soon see more Rosemans in the NFL, especially after the Eagles’ Super Bowl run. Or, at the very least, we will see more ex-jock general managers embracing Roseman’s methods. We are actually already seeing this, as described above.

More Rosemans will mean more teams using every means available to build deep, balanced and versatile rosters. Star quarterbacks and explosive offenses are not going anywhere. They are just part of a larger whole now, instead of a defining quality for the league and its most notable teams.

A deep, balanced, versatile roster, however, means nothing if you don’t have a coach who knows how to maximize these qualities. A coach who is willing to do what Bill Belichick has been doing for two decades: Reinvent the team to attack the weaknesses of each opponent. “We do what we do” is dying. “We do what beats you” is the present and future.

Roseman found this coach in Doug Pederson. Doug reinvented the 2017 Eagles week after week.

In week five, against a depleted Arizona Cardinals defense, Pederson aired it out. Wentz launched touchdowns of 72, 59, 15 and 11 yards, respectively, in a 34–7 win.

In week 11, the Cowboys were missing middle linebacker Sean Lee, so Pederson pounded the rock. The Eagles gutted the Cowboys’ Lee-less defense, rushing for 215 yards and two touchdowns, winning 37–9.

In the divisional playoffs against Atlanta, Pederson installed the run-pass option, Chip Kelly offense to make things easier for Foles, who had struggled in his previous two starts. The Eagles trailed 10–9 at halftime. But in the second half, Foles led two long field goal drives that made the difference in the 15–10 final score. He finished 23-of-30 for 246 yards and no interceptions, a 100.1 QB rating.

Now, let’s consider Bill Belichick for a second. Belichick has not merely been coaching this way for two decades. He has also been building deep, balanced and versatile rosters, like the 2017 Eagles.

“The Patriot Way” is not just about selflessness and coachability. It is as much about using a deep, balanced, versatile roster to reinvent the team as the perfect foil for each opponent.

For almost two decades, these rosters and this method gave Belichick a distinct advantage in a league littered with unbalanced, uncreative teams. With this distinct advantage, the Patriots repeatedly beat pass happy teams in big games, especially from 2001–2004, when they won three Super Bowls. During that run, they beat the Kurt Warner Rams and the Donovan McNabb Eagles in Super Bowls. They also topped the Peyton Manning Colts twice in the AFC playoffs.

People call Belichick a genius because he is the greatest coach of all-time. This actually undersells his legacy. He’s a genius because he’s the greatest coach and the greatest GM of all-time. As a GM, he has reinvented the Pats at least four or five times. Can any other GM, in any sport, say that?

Belichick builds deep, balanced, versatile rosters and coaches them into chameleonic teams. If you are great at one, you’re a Hall of Famer. If you are great at both, in the era of the salary cap, free agency and massive contracts, you’re a genius. Belichick is a genius. Gregg Popovich, who plays a similar dual role for the San Antonio Spurs, is the only person in sports who compares.

These guys are rare, and while we may see another Belichick or Popovich at some point, it is becoming increasingly unlikely. NBA teams are already eliminating the coach-GM role. The Detroit Pistons fired coach-GM Stan Van Gundy after the 2017–18 season. The Los Angeles Clippers stripped coach Doc Rivers of his personnel power after the 2016–17 campaign.

NBA teams are eliminating the dual role because it is more efficient to divide the labor. The GM devotes all his time to building a deep, balanced, versatile roster. The coach devotes all his time to reinventing the team as the perfect foil for each opponent. You can’t GM to that degree if you also have to coach. You can’t coach to that degree if you also have to GM. There just aren’t enough hours in the day. It’s like having two fantasy teams. One will be neglected in your thought space.

That is, unless you are a step ahead of your contemporaries in each area, like Belichick was for almost two decades. But Belichick met his match, in Roseman’s Eagles, in Super Bowl LII in February. Now that he has, NFL teams will probably eliminate the dual role as well.

The Eagles defeated Belichick’s Patriots, 41–33, in the Super Bowl. The game came down to a few plays, but only because Tom Brady — 505 passing yards, three touchdowns — singlehandedly kept the Patriots in it. Philadelphia, with a backup quarterback, Foles, controlled the game and led throughout, trailing only once, by one point, for 7:01.

The Eagles were deeper (backup quarterback, five players scored touchdowns, two players threw touchdowns), more balanced (out-rushed the Patriots 164–113, made two game-ending stops) and more versatile (The Philly Special). Even the greatest quarterback of the quarterback epoch, and of all-time, couldn’t overcome all that.

For the Eagles, Roseman played the Belichick GM role, and Pederson played the Belichick coach role. The sports nerd GM built a deep, balanced, versatile, Belichickian roster. The coach then coached that roster into a chameleonic team. Two equally capable, equally daring heads are better than one, and the division of labor between Roseman and Pederson gave the Eagles an advantage over Belichick.

The Eagles were a better version of the team Belichick had been building and regenerating for 17 years. They had a deeper, more balanced, more versatile roster. After all, Roseman had all his working hours to devote to it.

They also had a bolder, more creative game plan. New England depended on Brady. Philadelphia tried a little bit of everything. Corey Clement, Philly’s third running back, led the team with 100 receiving yards. Trey Burton, the second tight end, threw a touchdown to Foles, the quarterback.

Pederson even went for it on fourth down in his own territory in the fourth quarter. The Eagles were only down one with about 5:00 left. They could have punted and trusted their defense. Pederson chose the unconventional route, and it led to the game-winning touchdown.

On that touchdown, Pederson was, again, one step ahead. Tight end Zach Ertz split out wide and got a matchup with a slower safety, Devin McCourty. Foles hit Ertz cutting across the middle for the touchdown.

Pederson was a step ahead of Belichick the whole night. He was, after all, able to focus all his working hours on his coaching duties leading up to the game.

The Eagles were a complete team. They were not overly dependent on one quarterback or unit to carry them each week. The defense played terribly in the Super Bowl, but it won them the Atlanta playoff game. The offense was unstoppable in the Super Bowl, but it had to settle for field goals throughout the Atlanta game. When all three units were clicking, though, you got games like the NFC Championship, when the Eagles thrashed the Vikings 38–7.

The Eagles were complete enough to survive a bad day by one unit. They became the most complete team in recent memory by allowing a creative, outside the box thinker, a sports nerd, to implement his vision. Instead of distrusting Howie because he didn’t play college football (Chip Kelly), Pederson was fully on board. In turn, Roseman let Pederson manage without meddling.

These types of franchises, led by sports nerd GMs who build complete teams and coached by creative strategists who reinvent the team over and over, have already proliferated the MLB.

Look at the last two World Series champions, the 2016 Chicago Cubs and the 2017 Houston Astros. Both were built by Roseman-type visionaries from different backgrounds. Epstein, a law school graduate and college newspaper editor, built the Cubs. Jeff Luhnow, a former business entrepreneur and consultant, constructed the Astros.

Both were also managed by creative thinkers, Joe Maddon (Cubs) and AJ Hinch (Astros), willing to tailor strategies, like defensive alignments, to each specific opponent.

Roseman, also a law school graduate, is the first such GM to A) Gain full power in an NFL organization and B) Lead the organization to a Super Bowl. Now that he has done both, and especially if the Eagles continue to succeed, more Rosemans will get their shots.

They, in turn, will hire more Pedersons; coaches who embrace strategic flexibility and calculated risks. Together, they will build teams like the 2017 Eagles, not the 2003 Indianapolis Colts or the 2013 Denver Broncos or every other incomplete Peyton Manning team. They will build complete teams that can have a bad day on offense or defense and still win a playoff game.

It is only logical to build and coach teams this way. The challenge was figuring out how to do it. Last year, and really over the last couple years, Roseman and Pederson showed us the answer: Use every means available to build a roster. Then maximize the roster by reinventing the team as the perfect foil for each opponent. Don’t marry yourself to rules, like “never trade up,” or “we are a passing team and we will do what we do.” If a guy is worth trading up for, like Carson Wentz, trade up! If you are better off pounding the rock one week, pound the freakin’ rock!

As more teams hire these types of GMs and coaches, and use these methods, the average standard for a professional sports roster will rise steadily. It is similar to what happened to the average standard of living during the Industrial Revolution.

According to legendary economist John Maynard Keynes, for roughly 4,000 years, human beings never raised the average standard of living over the long haul. That was until 1712, when British inventor Thomas Newcomen invented the steam engine, sparking the Industrial Revolution. According to economist Jeffrey Sachs, “The steam engine marked the decisive turning point of human history.”

Professional sports are experiencing a similarly rapid, similarly decisive “turning point.”

For roughly 100 years, human beings never figured out an empirical method for building and managing professional sports teams. General managers and coaches relied on their own instincts, a player’s physical tools and the kinds of basic measurements you see on Elementary School fitness tests.

In his 2003 book “Moneyball,” author Michael Lewis explains the lack of sophistication in old school sports scouting methods.

“Scouts actually carried around checklists. ‘Tools’ is what they called the talents they were checking for in a kid. There were five tools: the abilities to run, throw, field, hit and hit with power.”

There was no math. No scouts looked at a player’s previous statistics, let alone his advanced stats.

There was no science. No scouts looked at a player’s swing plane or throwing motion, and how both affected the player’s results.

There was no english, either. No scouts looked at a player’s backstory and psychological development.

There was not even social studies. Scouts never compared a player to all the players of his type that came before him.

The process was based on pure instincts, physical tools and Elementary School metrics. It was an unwavering belief in the old eye test. The eye test tells you something, for sure, but not even close to everything. There is just so much more to be learned in the math, science, english and social studies of a player.

In this primitive age, a GM would occasionally hit on a bunch of draft picks, and his team would become a dynasty.

The 1970s Pittsburgh Steelers are the ultimate example of this. Between 1969 and 1974, coach/GM Chuck Noll picked nine Hall of Famers in the NFL Draft, including four (linebacker Jack Lambert, center Mike Webster and wide receivers John Stallworth and Lynn Swann) in one draft, 1974. The Steelers went on to win four Super Bowls in six years between 1974 and 1979. No other NFL dynasty has won four Super Bowls in six years.

Noll was not using any special method. He just had that old, proverbial “eye for talent.” His drafts were the sports equivalent of fertile harvests. Just like the bad drafts of most other NFL teams were the sports equivalent of barren harvests.

It was boom or bust, peak or valley, feast or famine. It was random, in other words. No one knew how to continuously recreate success, in any sport.

With the publishing of Lewis’ “Moneyball” in 2003, and the advent of analytics, everything changed. Teams across pro sports now use sophisticated, creative methods to evaluate players and build and manage rosters. They use methods that reveal a player’s stats, body motions, psychology and the historical success rate of different types of players.

These methods can more accurately predict future success. Like the steam engine, they can continuously power professional sports teams. Humans finally know how to replicate pro sports success.

Oakland Athletics GM Billy Beane, a jock, was the first GM to use these methods in a comprehensive way.

Beane has been running the A’s for two decades, first as GM from 1998–2015, and now as Executive Vice President of Baseball Operations. Throughout Beane’s tenure, Oakland has been the 29th largest MLB TV market, out of 30. Beane has never been able to compete with big markets, like New York and Boston, for A-list free agents.

Two A’s — Jason Giambi (2000) and Miguel Tejada (2002) — won the American League Most Valuable Player award early in the Beane era. Both left for bigger markets, New York and Baltimore, respectively, within two years.

To overcome his disadvantage, Beane has used advanced methods to find value in overlooked places. Most famously, in 2002, he signed first baseman Scott Hatteberg because Hatteberg had a .383 career on-base percentage, well above the league average. Beane correctly viewed a high on-base percentage as the stat that most often leads to runs.

Hatteberg was ready to retire because no one else wanted him. He ended up helping the A’s to two playoff appearances, in 2002 and 2003. The veteran posted on-base percentages of .374 and .342 in those seasons, respectively.

Beane has used these methods to keep the small market A’s relevant for much of his tenure. They have made the playoffs eight times (2000–2003, 2006, 2012–2014). They won more than 100 games twice, including the year after Giambi left (2002). Oakland is even in position to make the playoffs again, in 2018. At 82–56 with 24 games left, the A’s would earn the American League’s second wild card spot if the season ended today.

Beane was the subject of Lewis’ seminal, groundbreaking book, and the 2011 movie of the same name. Both revealed his backstory. Beane was a three-sport athlete in high school. Stanford University recruited him to replace John Elway at quarterback. Beane chose instead to play professional baseball. The New York Mets picked him in the first round of the 1980 MLB Draft.

Beane was a jock who was forced to search for alternative team-building methods. Ironically, he hit on one that opened the door for non-athletes, for sports nerds, to run pro teams. You don’t need to have played sports at a high level to understand how to mine value from player markets. You just need to be smart. Not baseball-smart or football-smart, either, just smart.

This is why, in the years since the early 2000s, the epoch has become Revenge of the Nerds, Pro Sports Edition. These are the nerds who never played sports at a high level. But they still loved sports, so they watched, read and thought about sports, because they had no other choice. When they got to apply all that thinking to real teams, the result was creativity, innovation and new wave teams that are revolutionizing their leagues.

The prevailing team-building method in the MLB is to develop a positional core before a pitcher core, like Epstein’s Cubs and Luhnow’s Astros. NBA teams now all try to surround their creators with three-point shooters, like Morey’s Rockets. Now, NFL teams will try to surround their franchise quarterbacks with deep, balanced and versatile rosters, like Roseman’s Eagles, instead of relying on the quarterback to carry the team each week.

The new NFL epoch is here. It just arrived a little later than the new epochs in the MLB and in the NBA. Together, they are driving a long, sweeping change in professional sports that is still only in its nascent stage, like the Industrial Revolution in the years after Newcomen’s invention. From here on out, though, the team-building curve, or the average standard for a professional sports roster, will only rise steadily.

Billy Beane was Thomas Newcomen. But the visionaries who followed Thomas Newcomen are more inextricably linked with the Industrial Revolution, because they built on Newcomen’s progress and found better ways to maximize growth and efficiency. The same holds true for the sports nerd GMs who followed Beane and built on his progress. The nerds are already responsible for the last two World Series champions and the last Super Bowl champion, and they will only continue to build on their dominance.

This new epoch may just be hitting the NFL, but it is not unique to the NFL. A whole new sports epoch is well underway.

It continues Thursday night, when Roseman’s Eagles kick off the 2018 NFL season against the Falcons. The modern NFL will look a lot like the 2017 Eagles. Super Bowl contenders will be defined by depth, balance and versatility, not a great quarterback or a great defense.

It took a sports nerd GM to build the ultimate example of this new NFL, to show us that you don’t need a great quarterback or defense to win a Super Bowl. And if the Eagles continue to succeed, more sports nerd GMs like Roseman will get chances to run teams. Based on the 2017 Eagles, they already should.

These are the larger themes to watch as the 2018 NFL season plays out, and as this new epoch continues beyond 2018.

Now let me echo an annual early September sentiment: It is great to have football back. It will be even greater to watch the sport continue to evolve this year. As it does, we will one day look back on 2017 as a landmark turning point.

Citation

McKibben, Bill. Deep Economy: the Wealth of Communities and the Durable Future. Times Books, 2008.

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