A Second Term for Hassan Rouhani? Not So Fast
With Iran’s former chief executive Mahmoud Ahmadinejad effectively out of the picture after being “advised” by the Supreme Leader not to enter the 2017 election, observers across the globe have been breathlessly arguing that President Hassan Rouhani’s path to victory has been cleared. For instance, Iranian scholar, Ali Omidi, wrote this month that “all the political conditions for the smooth re-election of Rouhani seem to be in place.” But such prognostications overlook three main factors that will continue to plague President Rouhani for the duration of his term — the targeting of his cabinet; the imprisonment of dual-nationals and political dissidents; and the doubling down of Tehran in its regional and terrorist machinations. All undermine the confidence at home and abroad in President Rouhani’s ability to lead beyond the confines of the nuclear file.
A fifth column of conservative forces has routinely attempted to uproot members of the Rouhani administration. Parliament axed his Science, Research and Technology Minister, Reza Faraji-Dana, in August 2014 due to his policy of readmitting student “seditionists” from the 2009 Green Revolution to universities around the country. And this week, President Rouhani was forced to dismiss Culture Minister Ali Jannati, who made waves for his approval of controversial concerts and the decrease in the censorship of books under his watch. His resignation letter leaves no room for doubt in the calculations behind his removal: “[c]onsidering that the secret policymaking rooms [of hardliners] have demonstrated serious determination to destroy all the government’s achievements … tensions will intensify in the coming months… I would rather [leave office for] the government to pursue its cultural policies in a calmer atmosphere.”
We’ve seen this movie before in Iranian politics — during the last presidency of a reform-minded Iranian leader, Mohammad Khatami, his then Culture Minister, Atoallah Mohajerani, survived an impeachment vote, but later resigned in 2000 under pressure, writing “the conditions and requirements that have taken shape in the realms of art, culture, and the intellect have made it impossible for me to continue my duties.” Like Khatami’s thwarted attempts to ease the domestic repression that is rampant in the country, such an abrupt departure casts doubt on Rouhani’s ability to further deliver on the expansion of social freedoms he promised during his 2013 campaign — potentially weakening enthusiasm among reformists.
Likewise, the continued imprisonment of dual-nationals — Iranian-Americans Siamak and Baquer Namazi and U.S. green card holder Nizar Zakka who were all sentenced this week to 10 years in prison, respectively — is intended to embarrass President Rouhani on the international stage. And during 2016 alone, at least six other dual-nationals have been arrested. So, as Iran’s Foreign Minister, Economy Minister, and Central Bank Governor embark on a global roadshow to showcase Iran as the next frontier for foreign investment, these never-ending headlines are already causing Western companies to think twice about exposing their employees to a high risk of harassment, arrest, prosecution, and incarceration without due process of law. Consider a recent report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which said that annual foreign direct investment dropped from $4.662 billion in 2012 to $2 billion in 2015 — at least two years into President Rouhani’s presidency. It is also noteworthy that in 2016, the first company with whom the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) inked a deal using a new contractual model to attract outside investment was Persia Oil & Gas Industry Development Co., which is part of an Iranian firm directly controlled by the Supreme Leader. This lack of global confidence in the Iranian market trickles down to the streets of Tehran — President Rouhani admitted as such when he highlighted that Iran required annual foreign investment of $30–50 billion to reach its goal of an eight percent growth rate. This gap in expectations on the part of the public is sure to be exploited by President Rouhani’s opponents.
Lastly, while Iran has dialed-back atomically in adhering to the letter of the nuclear accord with the P5+1, it has doubled down in its hegemonic regional designs and support for terrorism. Yemen is the latest example of this worrying trend. According to a report in Reuters, weapons transfers between Iran and its Houthi rebel allies have increased over the past few months — particularly anti-ship missiles, explosives, money, and personnel through over-land routes in Oman. That’s not to mention the Houthis firing on at least two U.S. warships in the Red Sea last week; the three thousand Iranian-backed fighters arriving in Aleppo to bolster the Assad regime; and the Treasury Department and Saudi Arabia sanctioning four individuals and one entity this week for ties to Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah, which, according to the U.S. government “continues to plan, coordinate and execute terrorist attacks around the world.” Such developments dampen the global economy’s confidence in not wanting to be associated with Tehran’s menacing behavior, which in turn hinders improvement in the lives of ordinary Iranian citizens still reeling from years of economic stagnation.
Hardliners also seem hell-bent on not doling out too much relief to suffering Iranian families. Consider that Article 22 of Iran’s 2016–2017 budget orders money received as settlements — and in some cases ransom for American hostages — from past arms sales between the United States and Iran be deposited in the Islamic Republic’s defense accounts.
While it is unknown who will be the conservative standard-bearer in the 2017 elections, President Rouhani’s reelection prospects are far from certain. Next spring is a lifetime in the political life of any country, including Iran, and Hassan Rouhani’s enemies have plenty of time to continue their campaign to hamstring his political potential.
Jason M. Brodsky is the Policy Director of United Against Nuclear Iran.
