Theoretical to Institutional

US Army Posture from 1812 to the Cold War

For nearly half of the US Army’s 239-year existence since June of 1775, the capabilities of the United States Army have been largely theoretical. Determining the appropriate size of the army has been politically sensitive; central to the debate is the fear that a strong military represents tyranny and degrades freedom. Throughout most of the army’s history, Congress would authorize an army to be raised only to combat a specific threat and it would be just as quickly disbanded, causing the loss of valuable knowledge and experience. Initially this resulted in a fluid force structure between a large, active army engaged in conflict, and a small, somewhat disorganized band of aloof militias. Conflicts increased and became more complex as US economic interests and participation in global trade increased. This increased the requirement for defense, resulting in what exists today as a globally capable, persistently ready force. While these changes can be easily seen over time, both the War of 1812 and the Second World War provide quality examples of the US Army moving to institutionalize knowledge.

Following the Revolutionary War the status of the US Army fell into debate and became one of the central points to resolve during the Constitutional Convention in 1787. The fear existed that a standing army could potentially be used for political purposes and usurp hard-won freedoms, as was done by the British Army in the Colonies. However, with British agents roaming the West and forming alliances with Native American tribes and territorial threats along the Canadian border, it was becoming clear that a military controlled by a central government was important for national security. During the period of limbo between 1783 and 1787, the strength of the US Army had fallen to just 80 enlisted soldiers and officers, with Captain John Doughty serving as the senior officer in the entire army. To resolve these issues and establish a permanent army capable of occupying abandoned British forts, the Constitution was established with a system of checks and balances that authorized Congress to raise and maintain an army, primarily through financial means, created an executive branch of government to conduct regular business, and allowed the states to raise and equip separate militias that could be called into federal service by Congress. While the status of the US Army was solidified by the Constitution, it would be the War of 1812 that would shape how a federalized army would conduct operations.

British agents had been acting as belligerents against the United States since the Treaty of Paris in 1783. Indians were conducting raids in the areas around the Great Lakes, areas that had been surrendered by the British, despite a treaty signed between the Shawnee and Lieutenant Colonel Josiah Harmar at Fort McIntosh in 1785. When American merchant ships became targets for search and seizure, and their crews subject the military impressment by the British, during the Napoleonic Wars beginning in 1803, it was only a matter of time before the United States was dragged back to war. In 1807, President Thomas Jefferson requested a 24,000 strong volunteer force to be raised and prepared in the event of war, but Congress authorized only a temporary increase of 6,000 personnel to the US Army, primarily due to political division and reliance on the state militia system. Again, in 1810, President James Madison requested Congress authorize an increase of 20,000 volunteer personnel, but Congress again refused. It was not until January of 1812 that a new authorization of 25,700 federal personnel and 50,000 militiamen were called into service.

Because of the heavy reliance on the militia system, the US Army was severely unprepared for war. The Militia Act of 1792 required the states to appoint officers and establish a militia, but provided no money for doing so and therefore no reciprocity for enforcement. Because of political disagreements over going to war, some states, particularly in New England, refused to authorize their militias for any service beyond the defense of their state. However, under competent federal leadership, such as that from William Henry Harrison and Andrew Jackson, the militias won significant battles and the US Army was seen as largely victorious in the eyes of the American public, even though the war essentially ended in a stalemate.

At the height of the War of 1812, the total US Army authorization was 62,674, with 3,495 officers and 59,179 enlisted soldiers. At the end of the war, Congress ordered a restructuring of the army to 10,000 excluding commissioned and noncommissioned officers, bringing the total strength to 12,383. The army is further structured into two regional divisions, which report directly to the Secretary of War, establishing the modern system of command structure that exists today. The emphasis of the army turns to Indian Affairs and the training of officers until the War with Mexico begins in 1844.

While outnumbered nearly three to one at the start of the War with Mexico, the quality of the officers and training allows for an American victory. The Civil War temporarily divides the army, but structure and operations remain largely the same during Reconstruction and the Indian Wars, with small units scattered across the continent. By the late 19th century, American politics and economics had entered the world scene, and with the outset of the Spanish-American War, the army began to mobilize beyond domestic responsibilities. This new global effort permanently increased the size of the regular army. The Militia Act of 1903 finally formalized the state militias into the National Guard, provided federal funding and equipment while establishing training requirements, and subjected the state units to regular inspections. But it took yet another war, the First World War, to finally realize the importance of institutionalizing the US Army, and then the Second World War to make it happen.

The United States wanted to avoid conflict in the First World War. With the threat of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the allies in the West locked in a stalemate of trenches, and the unrestricted submarine warfare declared by Germany, the United States reluctantly began building an army for war. By August of 1918 there were approximately 1.3 million American soldiers in Europe. More than two million would participate in the war. But by 1940, only 269,023 remained on active federal service, which was up from the 1933 count of 132,000 , and only had enough equipment for a force of approximately 75,000 personnel.

Two inactive divisions, the 5th Division at Fort McClellan, Alabama, and the 6th Division at Fort Lewis, Washington, were reactivated into the regular army in late 1939 in preparation for expanding the US Army. France began petitioning the United States to join the war to no effect, the US was not only war weary, but again unprepared for war. After the Empire of Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, the United States had no choice.

In an attempt to capture and develop institutional knowledge, the US Army prepared war plans in the intervening years between WWI and WWII. These war plans, Rainbow 5 in particular, were developed into the Victory Program in the summer of 1941. Using the Army Air Corps to bomb, Navy to establish a blockade, and intelligence services to conduct subversive activity, while sufficient numbers of personnel were prepared and mobilized. The total size of the US Army rapidly increased, reaching a size of 8.2 million in 1945. With the industrial power garnered by George Marshall, the US Army became the greatest army force ever fielded.

The post-war demobilization restructured the US Army to approximately 500,000 by 1950. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander during the war and the Chief of Staff of the Army, replacing George Marshall, in the post war years before running for president, understood that “Our defense [policy] must be one we can bear for a long and indefinite period of time. It cannot consist of sudden, blind responses to a series of fire alarm emergencies.” Using the experience gained and lessons learned from the Second World War, Eisenhower utilized an opportunity as President to take a New Look at the military, and established a permanent institution with an evolving body of knowledge.

Losing institutional knowledge is detrimental to any organization, binding it to repeat its own mistakes at great cost. If the cost of liberty is unceasing vigilance, it is critical to ensure a well trained and ready defense mechanism exists. With the War of 1812 the US Army created knowledgeable and capable officers at West Point, and established a modern command structure for regular, volunteer, and militia forces. With the Second World War, the industrial power of the United States was used to create a smaller, regular force with incredible firepower. The United States military in general, and the US Army in particular, have become permanent institutions in the deterrence of war. It very well may be true that the best way to prevent a war is to always be ready for one.

Bibliography

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