Understanding the rise of the SNP in British Politics
The growth of the Scottish National Party (SNP) has caused an irreversible paradigm shift in British politics. The SNP are now the third largest party in Britain and their political strength in Westminster and Scotland is undeniable. Established through the merger of two parties (National Party of Scotland and The Scottish Party) in 1934, the SNP has come to represent one of the strongest ethno-regionalist parties, championing self-determination, in Europe. To understand their political rise, this paper shall focus on the failure of British Labour and Conservative parties to adapt and understand the Scottish questions and political needs of Scotland, whilst also analysing conflict between Westminster and Scotland in an era of dealignment and mass political change; and the impact of recent devolution measures and the reorganisation of the SNP as a political force in the wake of this.
By the 2016 Scottish Parliament election, the SNP had more votes and seats than Labour and the Conservatives combined. To understand this phenomenon, we must understand how and why the demise of the main parties occurred, whilst the SNP rose to the main stage of British politics.
The collapse of the Scottish Tories:
In contrast to their electoral fortunes in the late twentieth/early twenty-first century, Kendrick and McCrone (1989) state that the Scottish Conservative and Unionist party performed well in the 1950s, enjoying moderate success. Despite Scotland’s predominantly manual workforce and large-scale public housing (p589). They did so thanks to the Protestant working-class voting bloc, who held a strong sense of nationhood, Unionism and Orangeism (p595). This bloc eroded with the secularization of British politics, enabling Labour and the SNP to gain (Ibid, p596). However, the Tories held on to support, thanks to their pro-devolution stance, which enabled them to bolster Scottish national consciousness ‘as a weapon against socialism’ (Miller, 1981, p205). Although this piecemeal devolution stance by Heath’s government was contrasted by the government’s rapid extraction of North Sea Oil in the face of the SNP’s “Its Scotland’s Oil” campaign. This polarized the demand for devolution as the oil was viewed as a revenue which could benefit Scotland’s small economy and failing industries, whilst also legitimising the economic argument for an independent Scotland (Grasmuck, 1980, p486).
North-Sea Oil bolstered SNP support, allowing victories like the Glasgow-Goven by-election, in which the SNP won a solid Labour seat. They also saw relative success in the October 1974 election, gaining eleven MPs and over thirty percent of the vote. However, this did not persist, and the two parties reacted with pro-devolution policies to retain Scottish Politics for the time-being.
Conservative flirtation with Devolution abruptly ended with the election of Margaret Thatcher. Prior to her election, a Scottish political and economic lens had begun to evolve (Kendrick Et Al., 1989, p598). The devolution referendum returned a ‘Yes” vote but was thwarted by the controversial Cunnignham amendment. Thatcher reversed this, power was centralised around London, and the post-war consensus left with devolution. Scotland had not voted for Thatcher, forty percent of Scotland voted Labour, thirty-percent Tory and the SNP gained seventeen percent of the vote. However, Thatcher had gained nearly fifty percent of the English vote, and with this took power, administering control and influence over an era of politics which saw key industries and factories (Ravenscraig and the Scottish Coal mines etc.) close. This was acknowledged by John Major (1999) who described the closing of the Clyde and Ravenscraig as actions which represented “an uncaring English government” (p476).
Unemployment grew to nearly fifteen per-cent of the Scottish population in 1986 (Fraser Et Al., 1986, p144). It became widely accepted that under Thatcher, Scotland would suffer. The introduction of the poll-tax was the last straw for many. The SNP’s call for civil disobedience gained widespread support (Hassan Et Al., 2012, p56), and the anti-Thatcherite mood in Scotland increased. This accelerated the Conservative decline in Scotland, aiding Labour and the SNP. Thatcher’s policies appeared to ignore Scotland and show a callous conscience towards their socio-economic impacts leading to the demise of the Conservative vote. By 1997 there were no Scottish Conservative MPs in Westminster, whilst the SNP were the second largest party.
Thatcherism’s brutal polarising politics benefitted the SNP in many ways, and when Labour began its decline in Scotland, the SNP were ripe for political success bolstered by the growth of pro-independence voters born in the Thatcher period. Analysis of age-based voting in the 2014 independence referendum revealed the ‘Yes’ vote gained fifty-five per-cent from those aged twenty-five to thirty-five year-olds (Johns Et Al.,YouGov fieldwork). Those born during Thatcherism, witnessed the decline of Scottish industry, or socialised around friends/family affected by policies, and were thus influenced politically, to support further devolution/independence.
The erosion of Labour’s hold over Scotland:
It is important to note that the Labour/Tory decline in Scotland came within an era of partisan and class-dealignment. When class voting became more fluid and party identification weakened. This decade of dealignment which Ivor Crewe (1983) highlighted, enabled third parties like the SNP to arise, as a new body-politic, appealing to voters becoming detached from the main-parties (Mitchell Et Al., 2012, p24). Not obsessed with the class question, or dogmatic beliefs; instead, in de-emphasising class, they were able to strike a chord with voters (Grasmuck, 1980, p481). Tapping into post-materialist ideas like; quality of life, and not succumbing to the economics which had taken over post-war politics.
Scotland had always been a predominant Labour stronghold. Its history of trade-unionism and labourism was self-evident, producing many high-profile Labour politicians (Grasmuck, 1980, p472). However, they were Scottish MPs playing Westminster politics and as the twentieth century carried on, Labour’s position of strength decayed (Mackay, 2009, p79). By October 1974, the SNP received a fourteen-percent swing from Labour. Although a short-lived period of success, it foreshadowed the political conflict to come. The SNP began to assert itself on the political scene as devolution and Home Rule were debated. Their blackmail potential was far reaching and forced Heath and Wilson to implement devolution policies, and a devolution referendum under Labour.
The SNP’s piecemeal growth seemed limited at the time and the arrival of Thatcher in starved the Scottish Tories of support. However, there was a cancer growing in Scottish Labour, its London based organization, was, too London focussed. This was exposed in the Poll-tax payment conflict, which Eric Shaw and Gerry Hassan (2012) saw as a landmark in Scottish politics. Prior to the scandal, it was clear that Labour’s focus was elsewhere, with little campaigning traditions in Scotland (Wainwright, 1987, p149). This was a view which was becoming increasingly obvious to some in Scotland. In Grasmuck’s (1980) piece Ideology of ethnoregionalism: The Case of Scotland, an SNP activist interviewed stated that Labour only cares for the “English working-class” (p482), the SNP in turn, capitalised on this idea that the Scottish question could not adequately be tackled by any Unionist parties in general, instead only by the SNP (P483).
This growing feeling of isolation and the misunderstanding of Scotland’s needs was the catalyst for a growing nationalist sentiment. The poll-tax increased this, the threat of the tax split Scottish politics between payment and non-payment. Labour’s hesitancy under Kinnock was crucial (Hassan et al., 2012, p50), they were called on by Scottish Labour Action to act, however, the situation uncovered Labour’s uneasiness with the Scottish question and their socialist goals.
By the time Labour decided to favour payment, chaos had ensued, with the militant-wing protesting alongside other unions. Susan Deacon (2012) stated that “Non-payment…could have won Labour Scotland” (p53). This had such a great effect that in the Glasgow-Goven by-election in November 1988, the SNP took a Labour stronghold seat, with a 3,554 majority. A BBC exit poll highlighted that thirty-two percent of voters felt that representing Scotland’s views should come first, and twenty-one percent were influenced by Labour’s poll-tax stance (Hassan et al., 2012, p53). In the aftermath, even George Galloway stated that the Labour party had not properly tackled the “Scottish question” (The Glasgow Herald, 12th November 1988).
The SNP’s position of non-payment and civil disobedience seemingly put Scotland first; contrasting Labour’s view of ‘Just pay it”. This highlighted the division between Scottish Labour, still controlled by English Labour, and the SNP, based in Scotland with proximity on their side. By the 1992 election the SNP massively increased their vote, and by 1997 they were the second largest party in Scotland.
Under New Labour with key Scottish figures like John Smith and Robin Cook, the SNP’s rise was held back. Blair’s public spending meant an increase in public investment in Scotland, which had been starved by the Conservatives, granting Labour a strong bloc of Scottish support. However, it was not as strong as he hoped, his electoral aiming of middle England, meant that he felt he did not need to rely on Celtic votes (Rentoul,2001, p458). Furthermore, Blair’s devolution policies had fermented support, as it seemed Labour had finally thought about devolution properly, instead of using it as a knee-jerk reaction to growing nationalism. However, when Blair viewed devolution as a settlement, and ran out of devolution ideas, in time for the SNP to emerge as a reorganised social-democratic force, able to politically outflank and expose Labour’s shambolic campaign, forming minority government in 2007 (Mackay, 2009, p86).
In this period of dealignment from the main parties, it would be easy to view the SNP as a considerably weak political force. Whilst able to have some victories in key nationalist periods, they were also held down constantly by the power of Labour and the Conservatives, who still held on to key seats and votes in Scotland. However, without this period, we would not understand that Tory decline, enabled Labour and the SNP to gain their votes. With the SNP arising as the second party in Scotland, able to feed off disillusioned Labour votes, paving the way for the SNP to control the constitutional debate (Mackay, 2009, p89).
The reorganisation of the SNP and the impact of Devolution:
The SNPs gradual rise in the post-war years was plagued by lack of direction (Crawford, 1982, p87). However, thanks to devolution and internal reorganisation they have risen to power, achieving solid results in Westminster/Scottish elections, while boasting a party membership of 125,534 (2018), from 16,000 members in 2002 (House of Commons Briefing Paper, August 2019).
New-Labour devolution policies and the arrival of a Scottish parliament in 1999, breathed new life into the SNP (Mackay, 2009, p79). Holyrood has given the SNP a political platform it couldn’t have achieved itself (Ibid.) The creation of the Scottish Parliament offered a political space for Scottish thought, the SNP were no longer deemed a ‘wasted vote’ as they were in Westminster elections, but instead held a special relevance (Mitchel Et Al, 2012, p11). Furthermore, the parliament proportional electoral system, which uses the Additional Member System (AMS) and a regional-list, benefits the SNP as their votes are translated more favourably into seats, unlike First-Past-The-Post, which held the party back in the past (Ibid.). The SNP had struggled in its Westminster years, due to how spread out its vote was, however now it is able to breakthrough, as shown in the first elections to the parliament, when they became the second biggest party, it now secured itself as an attractive parliamentary party (Ibid, p37). Furthermore, the new proportional-system helped the SNP as the unionist votes were split across three parties, while the SNP could culminate a strong national vote, even being able to command a single-party government in a system meant for multi-party governance.
It became apparent after the 2003 election that party reform was needed, after they lost eight seats. Devolution had brought politics closer to the SNP, but they needed to reform, to capitalise on this. Internal and external organizational change, with a shift in power to further develop their movement was necessary (Mitchell Et Al., 2012, p12). This arrived with John Swinney’s in 2004, who began reforming the party. These reforms included introducing one-member one-vote for the leader/deputy-leader (Introducing a leader), streamlining the NEC and offering a more balanced list of candidates. Furthermore, a new Scottish headquarters was introduced with a campaigning call-centre and new techniques for campaigning. It is accepted that without Swinney’s reforms, the 2007 Scottish Parliament victory would not have been possible (Ibid, p41). It made the party seem capable of government and more organised, while the other unionist parties seemed chaotic and still Westminster centric. Swinney’s reforms took the spotlight away from the gradualist and independents internal rows which had plagued the SNP for many years. Colin Mackay (2009) stated; “The old fundamentalism demanding ‘independence, nothing less’ has gone” with the party being seen as much more pragmatic (p89), viewing devolution as a step towards independence, but also as a political tool.
The emergence of strong leaders has also been influential. Swinney’s reforms paved the way for Salmond and Sturgeon, allowing them more control (Mackay, 2009, p84). This was aided by the softening of Salmond’s image and his ‘abrasiveness’ (Radio Clyde, 3 May 2009), which was in-turn replaced by positive rhetoric, highlighted in the 2014 referendum campaign, unlike previously when Salmond would condemn Britain for colonial activities in Scotland, he now spoke of Scotland’s potential. This made him more ‘statesmanlike’, and while doing this, Nicola Sturgeon was able to focus on Holyrood (Mackay,2009, p85), with her fantastic political performances, portraying strength and competence. Nationalism vs unionism had replaced class-lines, however, politically most parties occupied the centre ground. Due to this lack of ideological divide, valence politics took heed, and the SNP and its leaders (Sturgeon/Salmond) in this period seemed competent and effective.
Another key reason for the growth of SNP support in recent times, is their adaptation of centre-left policies allowing them to outflank Labour and target voters. Their leftist politics emerged in the 1970/80s, with policies such as opposition to nuclear weapons (Mitchell Et al., 2012, p17). Alex Salmond and the ’79 group’ were key in this party movement, hoping to remove the label ‘Tartan Tories’ which would be political suicide for the party. This leftist-radicalisation in the eighties, made it attractive to the youth (Mitchell, 2012, p23). This was bolstered by the poll-tax crisis, in which the parties call for civil disobedience, put it on the left of Scottish politics (Ibid., p30). Their movement to the centre-left of politics, meant they offered an alternative to Labour in Scotland. When New-Labour moved to the centre-ground and began viewing devolution as a settlement, the SNP could outflank them, portraying themselves as a Scotland’s pragmatic centre-left, pro-EU party (Ibid., p33). Moving to the left of politics, has allowed the SNP to gain not only the youth vote, who are enticed by the removal of tuition fees and the ability to vote earlier; it has also allowed the SNP to gain Scottish Labour voters tired of their parties Westminster dominance, or the move to the centre/left under Blair/Corbyn and even the parties Brexit stance.
By 2011, the SNP polled top of every demographic electoral category in Scotland (Johns Et Al., 2014). Their policies and reorganisation have enabled them to be viewed as the party of Scotland. This was highlighted in 2015 when they received 56/59 Westminster seats. Sturgeon’s strong leadership has portrayed a strong female role in Scottish politics, while the SNP have been able to gain elderly votes by abolishing prescription charges. While also targeting youth and lower-class support with their childcare and housing policies, and also votes for sixteen-year-olds. Similarly, they have also gained the Roman-Catholic vote which traditionally was Labour, while also keeping their Protestant vote.
The rise of the SNP has been both gradual and rapid. Their progress may seem piecemeal to an observer, but in reality, they represent the chess-piece moves which have enabled them to take power. The decline of the Conservatives in Scotland opened the doors for the SNP and Labour. However, Scottish nationalism was on the rise in this period, and Westminster domination was beginning to expose itself as too England based. Both main parties were unaware of how to handle the Scottish question and the dealignment of this period. The SNP exposed this and polarised the political scene. Westminster fatigue and a declining Labour party meant that by the time devolution was properly introduced, the SNP could monopolise this. Since devolution, the Scottish parliament and the reorganisation of the party, electorally and internally, has allowed the party to take power; introducing an irreversible paradigm shift, which has resulted in the SNP dominating Scottish and British politics.
