The Transporter Test and the Three Camps of Brain Preservation
Reanimators, Uploaders and Uncertains — Which Are You?
Take the Test, and See Where You Stand on the “Copy Problem”
The first in a series on brain preservation technologies, options, and policy.
This post’s co-authors: Michael Cerullo, M.D., and Keith Wiley, Ph.D.
People who are at least a little bit intellectually curious about making the brain preservation choice at the end of their lives are a small but growing demographic. In his 2012 ebook, David Ewing Duncan estimates them at 1% of the population of most developed-world societies, and a likely smaller fraction in traditional societies. That’s a small percentage, but a large number of individuals. We can also expect this group will grow as the cost and accessibility of brain preservation drops, and as validation that preservation preserves retrievable memories (and perhaps more) in animal models grows.
The currently preservation-interested demographic can be easily divided into three camps, each with different expectations for the future. The folks in each camp don’t always understand or talk to each other all that well, but they need to learn to get along.
This post will offer you a single-question, which we call the Transporter Test, to reliably sort you into one of the three camps of folks who are now doing, or are curious about doing, brain preservation when they die. The test will help you understand your current beliefs with respect to a mind-bending concept in personal identity that philosophers call the “copy problem.”
Who should read this post? Anyone who doesn’t expect to see biological aging cured in their lifetime, for one. Today, all mature, undividing cells in all living organisms accumulate errors and trash, and while we can slow it down, we know of no credible theories or evidence that we can stop this “senescence”, at the molecular scale. With the exception of some very optimistic transhumanists, most of us are in this group.
Who else should read this post? Anyone who doesn’t expect they and all their loved ones will make it to technological singularity before they die, when, with luck, the AIs might figure out the problem of aging (cross fingers, my friends). Again, with the exception of a few optimistic transhumanists whose friends and loved ones are all in good health and who (quite unreasonably, in our view) expect the singularity to arrive in the next few years, most of us are also in this group.
If neuroscience and computer science continue their accelerating advances, at some point most folks with access to digital media may find themselves contemplating, at least briefly, the brain preservation choice. Having to think about this topic, for yourself or your loved ones, may happen earlier than you expect. Death has a way of surprising us. With that in mind, let’s take a tour of the three main ways folks tend to think about this major life choice.
Here are the three camps:
Camp 1 — Reanimators
Reanimators either desire, or expect it will be necessary, to repair and reanimate (bring back to life) themselves in the form of biological bodies, in order to live again. They believe or expect, with a greater than 50% probability (and for some, essentially 100% probability), that their personal identity (personality and self-awareness) arises out of the unique physical and informational features of biology. Thus they think human minds need to be biological in order to exist.
In philosophy of identity, they favor what is called the “body identity” or “biological identity” theory. Some reanimators also believe or expect, again with greater than 50% probability, that their own personal biological matter (including their brain’s existing molecules at death) will have to be repaired and reanimated in order for them to come back. Philosophers call this the “material identity” theory. Reanimators hope to perfect a technology some call “reversible solid-state suspended animation,” the ability to cryonically preserve and later reanimate human beings and brains. That is an exciting vision, and we can certainly expect some progress on that front. See this great Economist article, Wait not in vain (2016) for examples of the new tissue and organ preservation strategies being tried in labs around the world, with the near-term goal of expanding tissue and organ banking in medicine.
Without the benefit of a formal survey, we think the majority (at least 60%, in a first guess) of people who have presently done cryonics, or who are seriously interested in it, are reanimators. This includes most older cryonicists and most Alcor and Cryonics Institute members. Reanimators identify very strongly with their biological bodies and want to come back in them. Because they love life and have usually lived long biological lives, it’s easy for them to assume that biology is the only way to get back to all the amazing things that life has offered them so far. Are they correct in this assumption? We shall see, as they say.
Camp 2 — Uploaders
Uploaders are “patternists,” meaning they believe or expect, with greater than 50% probability (and for some, essentially 100% probability), that the functional abilities (informational and computational patterns) of their biology are their true self, not their biology, which presently carries that pattern, and not their matter either, which changes constantly during their lives. Another way of defining an uploader is that they believe or expect that there is less than 50% probability that repair and reanimation of their biology or their matter will be necessary in order to wake up in the future. They expect instead to be scanned and uploaded, and wake up as a technological mind, inside some kind of technological body, in a future environment.
This brain scanning and uploading technology is already much farther along than most people think. For example, neuroscience labs around the world are already using automated FIBSEM machines (a kind of electron microscopy) to scan and upload into computers detailed connectomes of small animal brains, including flies, zebrafish, and even parts of mouse brains. We don’t yet understand how to read memories from these digital connectomes. But give it a little time. Lots of folks are trying to crack that fascinating puzzle right now. What neuroscientists have recently done is some truly sci-fi feats like removing individual memories and even implanting fake memories into mice by shrinking things called dendritic spines and synapses inside a living mouse’s connectome, using lasers and optogenetics. I’m not kidding.
See the above amazing TED talk by Steve Ramirez and Xu Liu (2015) if you want the story. So we’re very close to understanding the way the brain’s neurons (connectome) physically store individual memories.
Philosophers call this camp the “functionalism” or “psychological identity” theory. Uploaders believe their memories, personality, and consciousness are “substrate-independent”, meaning they can be moved into any substrate that has sufficient pattern complexity, whether it is biology or technology. As evidence, they note the growing number of technologies, called “neuroprosthetics”, that functionally replicate features of our hearing, vision, and other parts of our biology, and deep learning neural networks that now replicate many features of biological neural networks, including sensory processing and memory. This replication process always starts out crude and imperfect, but it gets better as we learn all the critical patterns in biology that must also exist in the new substrate.
Some uploaders cite the Moravec transfer, from Hans Moravec’s Mind Children (1988), a proposed process of replacing one’s biological neurons, bit by bit, with nanotechnological substitutes, to maintain “continuity of consciousness” during the upload. While this proposal has the benefit of being easy to conceptualize, others have argued continuity of consciousness is an illusion, and it is easy to argue that any such nanotech-dependent procedure will likely arrive later, be less effective, more expensive, and less popular than brain scanning and uploading. In the uploader’s view, if you’re just a pattern, keeping that pattern preserved is all that matters. Not the matter.
Uploaders are generally younger cryonicists (teens and 20’s in particular), or they have a computer science, neuroscience, or computational neuroscience familiarity or background. Based on conversations within these communities over the years, and in monitoring online conversations about these topics in communities like r/Futurology (with 6.5M “futurists”), we’d presently estimate (again without benefit of a formal survey) that uploaders are on the order of 10% of those interested in cryonics today, and their percentage, along with the evidence they offer for their position, is presently growing.
Uploaders note that just as deep learning computers are clearly accelerating in their learning abilities versus biological brains, technology offers some major apparent advantages over biology for representing, storing, communicating, and updating our future mental patterns. They note the millionfold improvements in speed, the near-perfect memory fidelity, the unlimited flexibility, and the much faster resource efficiency improvement trends in computers relative to biological brains. Uploaders usually grant that they might come back in biological form, and they generally would like that future option. But many expect they’d rarely, if ever, become fully biological again. If they did, they’d likely do so with only part of their future selves. Most of their future patterns would likely continue to be postbiological, as the capacity for continued personal growth and evolution appear to be so much greater in technology. Are uploaders correct in these assumptions? We shall see.
Camp 3 — Uncertains
Uncertains as their name implies, don’t yet buy the arguments of either of these two camps, which puts them firmly in a third camp. They usually talk about cryonics and brain preservation as an “experiment” or a “bet” that they’d much rather make, given the alternative experimental groups, that of either certain death or a religious afterlife. If asked, they might put the odds for reanimation being necessary for them to come back at something like 50/50, or simply unknown.
Some uncertains will grant that neuroscience and computer science now argue that human memories are stored in a small set of stable molecular features (most importantly, dendritic spines) in neural connectomes, and that if these are well-preserved at death, then our life’s memories can very likely be scanned and uploaded to future computers, to share with our loved ones or the world. But they are typically agnostic on the question of whether all the brain’s functions, including emotion, personality, and consciousness, are substrate-independent.
Without a survey (anyone want to do one?), we’d guess that around 30% (the remainder) of those who have done cryonics, or who have seriously considered brain preservation, are in this camp. Uncertains remind us that definitive answers to many of these questions are still unknown. We still know little about the deepest questions of neuroscience, including consciousness, and the nature and limits of physics and information in both biological and technological systems.
Why aren’t the majority of cryonics members in the uncertain camp today? One reason may be that the current cost of cryonics is so high. At $80,000 for a neuropreservation at Alcor, for example, members tend to have a well-reasoned personal belief that at least one of the first two camps are likely to work. Most folks don’t spend $80,000 on a hunch. Instead, they tend to develop a personal set of future beliefs, and unfortunately, “I’m not sure” isn’t as attractive a belief as it would be if we were all being more scientifically-minded, given the current limits of our knowledge about the consequences of this choice. Another reason is that as materialists, we know our biology is at least one proven material foundation for the making of our minds. So it makes sense that reanimation is the most intellectually attractive camp for those thinking about cryonics, at least at first.
Which of these camps feels like yours? Keep in mind that your camp today may not be where you are tomorrow. As progress continues in neuroscience and computer science, some folks will change their minds. So as you think about these issues, feel free to move around, hang out for a while in a different camp, and see if that group of people feel more like home.
Ready to see which camp you reside in at present? Let’s take a test.
The Transporter Test
A good test of whether you are a reanimator, an uploader, or uncertain, and whether you have an instinctual bias to reanimation, as most folks do when they first engage with these ideas, is to ask the Transporter question, a test that uncovers your assumptions and biases with respect to the copy problem.
Would you go through a Star Trek transporter (molecular scanner, disassembler, pattern storer, beamer, and reassembler, using new molecules at the other end) if many others had done it, claimed to be themselves on the other end, and as far as you could tell they seemed the same? Or would you not go because you presently believe the process would cause your own death as your brain was being molecularly disassembled, and your new brain and body would be some kind of copy that only “thinks” it is you?
This is actually a deep question, as your answer depends on your view of the nature of personal identity. What’s more, your answer may change over time. This helps us understand why all three camps exist today, and why some folks move between the camps as they learn more about the world.
If you are not willing to go through the transporter, you’re very likely a reanimator. You think your biological body is your identity, the philosophical distinctions of “original” versus “copy” still matter to you, and you’d never willingly let your physical body be destroyed, no matter the claimed “benefits.” For most people today, the very thought of going through this device makes their hair rise and heartbeat race, at least a little bit. In their view of the world and themselves, it would subjectively feel like death. Even though evidence in this case (others have gone before you, with no apparent harm) argues strongly otherwise, our instinct still tells us to preserve ourselves, and not go. Reanimators trust that instinct, and behave accordingly.
If you are willing to go through the transporter under these conditions, gaining the benefit of instantaneous travel, while acknowledging the risk that you may in fact be killing yourself each time, you are likely an uploader. Uploaders say that as long as being transported doesn’t feel like being killed or changed when they wake up on the other side, whether “killing” is actually occurring during molecular disassembly is an irrelevant philosophical distinction. They see their instinct in this case, evolved in a time when humans were only biological, as simply wrong. They may flinch, dig their nails, or grit their teeth the first few times they are being disassembled, but they will go. Over time, they know their instinctual fear will subside, as with any low-risk but still potentially catastrophic activity, like flying, and their mind will learn to manage their fears.
If you aren’t sure, or if you suspect that even after the successful transporter experiences of others, your copy could easily still have subtle but important “pattern insufficiencies”, defects in the copy that might only be discovered years later, at which point you might feel grief for the permanent loss of those particular parts of yourself, you’re probably an uncertain. Alternatively, you expect you’d have continuing high levels of fear and doubt each time you transported, like those folks who remain abnormally fearful of flying even after many flights, you are also still in the uncertain camp.
What about you? Would you currently not go? Would you currently go? Would you remain perpetually uncertain, whether you transported or not?
Consider that all three responses to this test are valid, from the point of view of members of each camp. If such a device were created, all three mental attitudes would be common, and all three would be socially reinforced as the right choice, by the members of each camp. So it should be obvious that each camp needs to learn to get along better, right?
The Three Camps in Social Media
As one might expect, whenever the topic of brain preservation comes up on social networks today, the comments among the positive responders (those who are either open to or attracted in some way to the idea) very often fall into endless discussions of the copy problem. [We’ll ignore the much larger group of negative responders for now, as they aren’t even in the market for this choice at present.
Folks on each side of the issue argue incessantly about whether an upload would really be “you”. Over time, these folks predictably sort themselves into these three camps.
In our experience, most positive responders who are new to the idea of brain preservation, whether young or old, are default reanimators (Camp 1). And because so little of the science, evidence, and arguments around the choice has been discussed in society to date, and just as importantly, since so few people have made the brain preservation choice so far, most people are still new to the idea, even if they’ve heard it in the media several times before.
Thus reanimators (Camp 1), and most of those who are new to these ideas, tend to start with a strong instinctual and emotional bias against the idea of coming back as a “copy.” Thus they think and feel that uploading (Camp 2) would be death. They are often not uncertain (Camp 3) about their position. Some even like to call others foolish for making the uploading choice. That behavior should change. We all need to get along.
A distinct minority of the positive responders in these discussions, are either uploaders or uncertains. But while they are each minorities, both Camps 2 and 3 can be quite persuasive when they use logic and evidence (or current lack of it, in Camp 3’s case) to make their case. Unfortunately, some uploaders also enflame these discussions, calling reanimators ignorant or biased. Uncertains sometimes scoff at Camps 1 and 2 as living in fantasy worlds, or having no reasonable arguments, which is also unhelpful.
The copy problem is an unresolved problem in philosophy of identity, and each camp has developed their own reasoned position on it, with today’s imperfect science, evidence, and argument.
For reanimators, a copy is not the original. It’s obviously something else. For uploaders, we are all copies of our former selves. They note that life is constantly copying our body’s essential patterns, moment-by-moment, into new molecules, just to stay alive. Uncertains say that copy problem discussions are all just unprovable speculation at this point. Some even claim the problem is metaphysics, meaning we may never know an answer, and can only make ever-finer observations of the copies. What’s more, even if the copy differs subtly from the original, it isn’t clear how much difference people would find acceptable before they stop transporting (uploading). That decision will differ for different people, and is a very personal one.
Things get even weirder when the discussion turns to making multiple copies of individual minds. Uploaders tend to see this as an advantage, something all future minds may want. Just as biology occasionally creates initially-identical twins, which then go on to live unique lives, we may one day able to create initially-identical minds, which will then “fork” into increasingly-divergent identities. We might even merge some or all of our forked minds later again, if we want, just as multiple personalities can sometimes be reassociated into one personality in psychotherapy. Reanimators and uncertains are often disbelieving or skeptical of such claims, and they may also question the value or ethics of such a process.
One more weirdness emerges when we start talking about the attitude of copied minds toward death. Some uploaders argue that for backed-up uploads, death would become a minor annoyance, not the major traumatic event it often is today. No copy would likely willingly kill itself, unless there was some benefit (as in the Transporter Test). Sentient minds want to survive. But “survival” may have a different meaning, the better our mental patterns are backed up. Unwilling or accidental deaths might cause little subjective violence to an upload that knew it had a copy that would carry on. The copied mind might be annoyed by a forced or accidental death, the way we get annoyed when our backed-up hard drive crashes today, and know we’ll now be wasting time restoring the copy. But if they had a safe and reasonably recent copy, a backed-up upload, or even a biological human with a full backup in the cloud, might not feel they were losing their personal identity, even as they were dying. If uploaders are right, the very nature of death may change, for everyone who takes this perspective in coming years.
Reanimators would never take this philosophical position. They just don’t buy the arguments, or even if they grant them, they believe they would never change their instincts to feel this way. Uncertains consider both scenarios and their probabilities to be either unknown or unknowable.
What can we say generally about this debate among the three camps?
First, it is easy to predict that ongoing exposure to the advancing science, evidence, and arguments around these topics will keep growing the number of positive responders to the idea of brain preservation. So that’s an obvious future, even if the percentage growth is much harder to forecast. Second, we can also predict that the debate will move more people out of the default reanimation camp and into both the uploading and uncertain camps, the more we become aware of the informational nature of ourselves. This is perhaps a less obvious future. Thus the three camps should become a bit more even in their percentages in coming years, which should make the future debates even more interesting. Uploaders won’t be written off as an unimportant minority, the way they sometimes are today.
Furthermore, we think the greater diversity and depth of thinking that will result from these ongoing debates is a very worthy social goal. Discussions between the three camps and every other group in society are worthwhile, not idle speculation, and they help us better understand ourselves. In the process, we can all learn to better recognize those times when our instinctual judgments about ourselves and the world are cognitive biases, incorrect ways of thinking and feeling that falsely make others wrong, or that prevent us from seeing the real future.
Finally, we believe that humanity is at the beginning of a massive social education process on the worthiness of the brain preservation choice. This process will likely take many years to complete. Being patient, evidence-based, compassionate, and yet true to our convictions when discussing this choice, we can each do our part in that social re-education, and move the world to better ways of thinking.
From Abstract Philosophy to Concrete Choice
I bet you know what’s coming next. The transporter test is no mere philosophical exercise, but rather a real choice you have today, involving saving your life and the lives of your friends and loved ones, and returning them to the world later. That’s because the first half of this transporter exists today. It’s called brain preservation. It will take you to a future world. Or at least transport all the matter and patterns that neuroscientists presently associate with your memory, and very likely also your full personality and self, to a future time.
So the stakes are high around this choice, as high as they could possibly be, for each of us who currently have the means and privilege to consider this choice. Even so, we need to recognize that just as with the transporter test, each of these camps will have different visions and preferences for how they might come back in the future. All three camps beliefs and preferences (“I want to come back in biology,” “I’d rather come back in technology,” or “I have no idea, I’ll leave it to the future to figure out”) should be respected. Humans love to create diversity of choice and lifestyle, and there’s no need to call others wrong for their choices.
As we’ll discuss in our next post, since each of these three camps has different expectations regarding their future revival, each camp has different preferences today, with respect to the physical procedures of brain preservation. As we’ll see, there are now three evidence-backed preservation technologies that one might choose for oneself and one’s loved ones at the end of life. At present only one option, vitrification cryonics, is commercially available. But the second two options, aldehyde-stabilized cryonics and chemical brain preservation, are under development. All three will be available in the foreseeable future. The commercial emergence of all three of these preservation choices in coming years will bring much-needed diversity — and competition — to field that has long had only one option available to all three camps.
Thanks for reading, and for any feedback you’d like to share.
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I am grateful to the following BPF Fellows, each co-authors of this post:
Michael Cerullo, M.D.,
Author, The Ethics of Chemical Brain Preservation (2015).
Keith Wiley, Ph.D.,
Author, A Taxonomy and Metaphysics of Mind-Uploading (2014).
John Smart is CEO of Foresight University, author of The Foresight Guide, and co-founder, with Ken Hayworth, Ph.D., of the Brain Preservation Foundation. John studied physics, chemistry, molecular biology, medicine, computer science and business before getting his MS in Foresight from U. Houston. He blogs on foresight development at Ever Smarter World. You can support his writing on Patreon, and connect on Medium, Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, or Reddit, at /r/ForesightU.
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