The Second Chechen War, Guises of “International Terrorism,” and Putin’s Power Consolidation
Russia’s intervention in Chechnya constitutes one of the greatest violations of human rights in the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Though a history of conflict exists in the region, the First Chechen War drew international attention to it for the first time. It appalled both a Russian and global audience as the Federation’s military indiscriminately utilized its firepower to attack secular separatists and level the densely-populated Chechen capital of Grozny. Though the Russian government suffered a humiliating strategic loss in 1995, its efforts cruelly punished the Chechen civilian population and set a precedent for reckless violence in the region. This precedent was applied almost half a decade later during the Second Chechen War. The disproportionate Russian response to the actions of a minority without popular support destroyed the tiny republic and left it in a state of psychological devastation. In framing the conflict as one against international terrorism and purposefully overlooking definitions of armed conflict set forth by international law in order to avoid violations of the Geneva Conventions, the Russian government was able to take action against Chechens as it saw fit in order to advance President Putin’s agenda of power consolidation. Though the Chechen separatist faction was organized and large enough to be classified as a military force itself, Vladimir Putin ignored complexities related to factions within Chechnya and framed them all as radical terrorists guided by international jihadist ideology in order to restore Russian nationalism in the wake of a new “foreign” enemy.
POST-USSR RUSSIA-CHECHNYA RELATIONS: THE FIRST CHECHEN WAR
Chechnya’s struggle for independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union did not begin with the violence with which it is characterized by today. On the contrary, 1991 saw the potential for an alliance between Boris Yeltsin’s Russia and Zhokhar Dudayev’s Chechnya. Both leaders had risen to power following struggles to replace the ruling USSR elite, and it seemed as though they might work together for a common goal. Even so, Moscow’s emerging democracy did not recognize the legitimacy of Dudayev’s power, which had come to fruition after a coup. They decided to hold elections in Chechnya in order to elect a government that was legitimate in their eyes. Dudayev and his Chechen National Congress could not accept an intervention from the Supreme Soviet and would hold elections a month earlier, in response. In an escalation of the conflict, the Russian Supreme Soviet Presidium recognized the rival (Moscow-backed) Provisional Supreme Council as the only government in Chechnya and ordered the Chechen National Congress to turn in all arms and cancel their elections. To demonstrate their popular support and the unpopularity of Russian intervention, Dudayev’s Chechen National Congress organized a pro-Dudayev demonstration of fifty-thousand Chechens in Grozny. The Chechen leader later rejected Russian demands in a negotiation, decidedly won Chechen parliamentary and presidential elections, and declared the independence of the Chechen Republic. This finally led Yeltsin to send Russian troops to Chechnya, though no violence took place at this point and the troops were sent back after being disarmed by Chechen forces. Instead of immediately resorting to violence, Yelstin decided to impose an economic blockade on the Republic that would prove devastating.
After mismanaging the Russian economic blockade and facing a rising Moscow-backed opposition, Dudayev dissolved the parliament and consolidated power as the sole leader of Chechnya: triggering the series of events that would lead to a civil war. During this time, Russia spent almost four years denying Dudayev’s authority in Chechnya. The year 1994, however, saw Russian attempts at negotiation with the Dudayev government take place. Frustratingly to both parties, all negotiations during this period fell through as Dudayev was unwilling to compromise on independence and Yeltsin was unwilling to grant it. As a result, attempts to support growing Chechen opposition to Dudayev were made by Moscow but proved unsuccessful in the long run. Several more falling outs and escalations of rhetoric on both sides ensued. Finally, on December 15, 1994, Russian armored vehicles and almost 40,000 troops entered Chechnya.
What Russia got from this conflict was another Afghanistan, where fighting against guerrilla fighters was very costly in both lives and resources. Russian troops did not leave the republic for another two years. Methods of asymmetrical warfare employed by the Chechens won them the war, and allowed them to retake Grozny several times over, inflicting heavy casualties on Russian troops during the course of the conflict. On the other side, reports of extreme violence against civilians in Chechnya by the Russian military were widespread across the country and ignited contempt across the federation. This brutality and the humiliating loss in Chechnya proved to be a heavy burden on Yeltsin’s 1996 presidential campaign and contributed to his sharp decline in popularity.
CHECHEN POST-WAR RADICALIZATION
The first war in Chechnya did not feature the radical Islamist discourse that the second did; instead, nationalist sentiment and the need to protect their families drew Chechens to fight against what they perceived to be the Russian imperialist threat. However, extreme violence and brutality by the Russian troops during the first war ended up contributing to the eventual radicalization of some Chechens throughout the course of the war. One Chechen surgeon described an instance of such violence, which he witnessed as he was transported to a hospital in Grozny: “I passed a Russian armored personnel carrier with the word SAMASHKI written on its side in bold, black letters. I looked in my rearview mirror and to my horror saw a human skull mounted on the front of the vehicle. The bones were white; someone must have boiled the skull to remove the flesh” (McClure). The viciousness of the Russian troops and the atrocities of the war gave some Chechens a reason to hate Russia, effectively beginning the radicalization process.
Wahhabi arrival in Chechnya.
Chechens have traditionally adhered to a mystical form of Islam called Sufi Islam. In contrast, Wahhabism is a conservative, fundamentalist form of Islam that seeks to “purify” the religion and has advocated for the use of religiously motivated violence against Western imperialist powers since the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The period following the First Chechen War saw the arrival of Wahhabi missionaries from Saudi Arabia in Chechnya. These missionaries offered considerable sums of wealth to young Chechen men in exchange for joining their movement (Albert). Such efforts by internationalist forces saw the eventual formation of a militant Wahhabi faction in Chechnya that only grew in power as time progressed.
A COLD, CHECHEN CIVIL-WAR
Despite incurring losses, the Chechen separatist movement effectively won the first Chechen war when Russia pulled out. The republic’s status as a state, however, was still under question. Even so, Chechens elected a new leader to govern them as their president: Aslan Maskhadov. In 1996, Maskhadov signed a peace treaty with the Russians and agreed to defer talks on Chechen legal status for five years. During this time, the “Chechen Republic of Ichkeria” struggled to maintain control against the radical Wahhabi faction led by Shamil Basayev. Through his calls for the creation of an Islamic front against Russia, efforts at radicalizing the population, and a private army, Basayev undermined President Aslan Maskhadov’s goals of centralization, democracy, and secularism at every turn. Understanding this struggle for control of Chechnya between Maskhadov and Basayev is crucial to develop a greater understanding of the conflict in Chechnya as a whole.
Basayev’s force of Wahhabi radicals grew in power as Maskhadov’s government faced economic, social, and political problems because of Russia’s refusal to accept Chechen independence and the blockade on Chechnya. By February 1999, the influence of radicals in Chechnya had become so powerful that President Maskhadov was forced to accept Sharia as the law of the land. Basayev branded Maskhadov as a “pagan” and left the president no choice but to draw further from his goal of secularism and allow for the enforcement of traditional Muslim headcovers for women and public corporal punishment, among other non-secular laws that came to define Chechnya as an Islamist state. By doing everything in his power to take power away from the president, and aided by the Russian blockade, Shamil Basayev successfully established his radical wing as a parallel authority to the duly elected government. This proved catastrophic for the already struggling republic.
STARTING THE SECOND CHECHEN WAR
In another act of parallel authority, Shamil Basaev led radical insurgents from Chechnya to enter the neighboring republic of Dagestan on August 7th, 1999. Their goal was to create a Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus with Dagestan and enlisted the help of local Wahhabi radicals to do so. Their efforts were unsuccessful and they were pushed back into Chechnya. However, the violence in Dagestan and the terror attacks in Moscow helped form the Yeltsin administration’s pretext for war in Chechnya (Goldfarb). On September 28, 1999, acting Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin declared that “combat operations in Chechnya are already underway” (Press). Basayev’s radical incursion into Dagestan allowed Russia to wage war under the guise of fighting “international terrorism,” and to ignore centuries of Russia-Chechnya conflict. Though members of so-called international terrorist groups existed within Chechnya, the combat operation in Chechnya was solely against radical elements within the Chechen government. As such, there was no official declaration of war, nor initial acknowledgment of bombings. The whole endeavor was orchestrated in a way to minimize negative public relations and not allow Chechens the customs associated with traditional warfare. Putin would not repeat Yeltsin’s mistake of allowing asymmetrical warfare and the rest of the world to witness the violence that he would rain on Grozny’s civilians. In the Second Chechen War, the Chechen people were no longer “freedom fighters” or separatists, they were framed as terrorists.
THE SECOND CHECHEN WAR
To the citizens of Grozny — most of whom had experienced the first war against Russia — the general attitude about the war was perfectly described in graffiti on the city’s walls: “Welcome to Hell: Part Two” (“War Crimes in Chechnya,” 2008). For nearly six years, surface-to-surface rockets rained down from the skies straight onto the densely populated city and resulted in many civilian deaths. According to the Human Rights Watch, the bombing campaign indiscriminately turned “many parts of Chechnya to a wasteland,” while Russian forces simultaneously denied “safe corridors to allow civilians to leave areas of active fighting.” (“War Crimes in Chechnya,” 2008). The Russian government refused to acknowledge the complexity of the issue, Aslan Maskhadov’s distinct role as a secular leader, and the lack of general Chechen support for radicals. President Putin made sure to keep all control of the situation within the Russian government. As such, his government refused to admit the intricacies of the conflict. A civil war or ethnic conflict demands negotiation, international scrutiny, and actual deployment of troops. The “anti-terrorist operation” that Putin waged against Chechnya did not need to be held to such internationally recognized standards of war, could easily terrorize the entire population into submission and was simply easier from a strategic standpoint. This sweeping and brutal attack against all Chechens forced different factions in Chechnya to work together against their common aggressor. The existence of radicals within this desperate, common Chechen front allowed the Russian government to more easily frame the whole population as radical and with ties to international terrorism.
Russian insensitivity towards the Chechen population.
The Russian non-interest in negotiation with Chechens and the absolute destruction that resulted from the bombing campaign is proof of Putin’s singular desire to restore Russian territorial integrity at the price of the Chechen people, who were treated as anything but. In fact, there was a huge effort by the General Staff to make public statements that discounted Chechen lives. General Viktor Kazantsev, for example, made several such statements on different occasions, including his promise to “cleanse Chechnya of any scum” and “bomb the whole republic” if given the opportunity (Houen). These quotes cannot be brushed off as mere words, because powerful figures such as Russian General Gennady Troshev have threatened to destroy entire settlements if “fired upon from a settlement” (Houen), and there have been instances of such “retaliatory” destruction that caused “death tolls in the hundreds…in Grozny and in many smaller towns and villages” (“War Crimes in Chechnya,” 2008).
Zachitska (Sweep Operation): Massacre at Alkhan Yurt.
Zachitska is the unofficial military term used by Russian forces to describe an operation featuring armed patrols and door-to-door searches. These operations were very common during the Second Chechen War and have been notorious for their human rights violations of ethnic cleansing and pillaging. This is what occurred at Alkhan-Yurt. Despite the pleading of village elders, the November of 1999 saw an increasing presence of Chechen rebels and foreign fighters in the village of 9,000. In response to these forces inflicting heavy casualties on Russian units, the Russians indiscriminately bombed the village and “killed at least eight civilians” (“RUSSIA/CHECHNYA,” 2000). The rebels had already left the village when the bombings started. Unfortunately, that wasn’t the end of the carnage for Alkhan-Yurt. On December 1st, 1999, Russian military forces took control of Alkhan-Yurt. During the occupation, Russian soldiers “went on a rampage in the village, summarily executing at least fourteen civilians” (“RUSSIA/CHECHNYA,” 2000). Human Rights Watch interviewed the villagers, who said that they had personally witnessed the looting of their homes, rapes of people they knew, and executions by Russian forces. The last person to die was named Aindi Altimirov; he was killed and beheaded by Russian soldiers on December 18, after attempting to stop them from looting his home.
Geneva Conventions.
Discussion of these various atrocities warrants a parallel discussion on their applicability to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, pursuant to Article 3: conflicts not of an international character. No parties on either side of the conflict have been tried for any violations to date. Violations, however, did exist on both sides. To defend itself from ever having to account for them, the Russian government labeled the entire war as an “anti-terrorist operation.” The argument widely revolved around necessity and unwillingness to put the minimum amount of Russian troops — during wartime — in harm’s way in order to save the lives of innocents on a massive scale. That being said, necessity does not absolve any party of guilt. Necessity does not warrant taking thousands of civilian lives as “collateral” to carelessly imprecise bombings, which is considered a war crime under Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, as are the murders, mutilations, cruelty and torture of civilians by Russian troops throughout the war (“The Geneva Conventions,” 1949). The humane treatment of civilians that should be expected by nations who were a party to the Geneva Conventions was not provided in the case of the Second Chechen War against the Republic of Chechnya.
UNPURSUED ALTERNATIVES TO WAR
The United Nations General Assembly spent decades coming up with a definition of aggression and finally passed a resolution in 1974 defining it as such: “the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations” (“DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION,” 2008). The term “State” in this definition does not apply only to states recognized by the United Nations, as per the “explanatory note” that follows the definition (“DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION,” 2008). The resolution also contains the important acknowledgment — by all members of the General Assembly — that “aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force” (“DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION,” 2008). This brings up the question of why the Russian Federation did not attempt to use any other avenues of diplomacy against the self-declared “state” that was the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria before choosing the path of full-scale war.
Other avenues of diplomacy.
The Russian government had several other options before starting a war of aggression against Chechnya. The first, and most obvious, was to negotiate with Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov. By the start of the war, Maskhadov was the only legitimate political leader in Chechnya that could be negotiated with. Yet, Russia refused any negotiation with him and assassinated the president during the course of the war, effectively ending any hopes for a peaceful resolution. Another, albeit harder, option was to win the ideological battle for the support of the Chechen people. The actions of radical Wahhabis were massively unpopular within Chechnya and winning Chechen popular support would likely not have been as difficult as the aerial bombings were destructive. The devastation of the Second Chechen War might not have occurred or would have resulted in less suffering had either of these avenues been pursued. Instead, even after the war started and Maskhadov was assassinated, little was done to organize an evacuation of innocents unaffiliated with either of the parties to the conflict: diplomacy was not an option for Putin’s Russia and no attempt was made to save Chechen lives. The question then becomes one of intent. Why did Putin not pursue negotiations with the Chechen separatists?
PRESIDENT PUTIN’S MOTIVATION FOR WAR IN CHECHNYA
Proving intent is difficult in any situation. However, there have been many speculations as to why Putin and his government decided to pursue policies in Chechnya that could be considered war crimes under international law. These speculations vary but often focus on what Putin himself stood to gain from aggression and the manner in which he handled the conflict.
Putin’s consolidation of power.
By the time that Boris Yeltsin had left office, the first President of the Russian Federation was polling at a 2% approval rating (Tran). By any account, the successor that he named should have fared similar popular disapproval. Instead, Vladimir Putin positioned himself opposite to his predecessor by attempting to build a reputation as a “man of action.” After the Dubrovka Theatre hostage crisis, perpetrated by Chechen radicals, he was granted this title, even though 129 of 912 hostages died in the process. Putin’s “ruthless handling of the siege and his refusal to negotiate with the hostage-takers” shot his approval rating to “83% after it was all over” (Engel). In Putin’s eyes, there was no reason why the handling of the greater Chechen conflict in this fashion would prove any different for his popularity. His ruthlessness was ultimately encouraged against Islamist radical Chechens, whether those Chechens killed during the course of the conflict were Islamist or radical.
The Russian President has defended his government by saying that the civilian deaths were tragic consequences of a fight against “international terrorists.” Whether it was such a lack of empathy for human life that drove Putin’s policies or a strategy to use fear to force the Chechen population to submit, thousands of civilians deaths cannot be accepted in the name of fighting separatist forces or a political win for Vladimir Putin.
CONCLUSION
The Second Chechen War left the Chechen people to suffer at the hands of two contrasting political ideals: Russian nationalism and Wahhabi radical fundamentalism. The presence of foreign mercenaries in Chechnya and the mere existence of support for this particularly dangerous strand of Islamic fundamentalism served as the excuse that Putin needed to unite Russia against a common “foreign” enemy. In positioning the Chechens as a foreign threat, the blame for terrorist attacks and incursions into neighboring republics could be placed on international players, while placing the solution for these threats within Putin’s military jurisdiction: in Chechnya. This effectively disenfranchised the Chechen people as it allowed the Russian government to not recognize the duly elected President of Chechnya: Aslan Maskhadov. In not recognizing Chechen votes, ignoring the complexities regarding factions within Chechnya, dismissing the elected secular leader as merely a pawn in a web of international Islamist radicals, Putin was able to act as ruthlessly as the Russian populous wanted him to in the wake of justified anger to terror attacks. Through this framing of events, Putin was able to avoid international scrutiny in the West for human rights violations and justify the deaths of thousands of Chechens in the name of a counterterrorism operation.
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