New Levels of Understanding
The Functionalist Model of Emotion
Introduction
It is entirely possible to use logical inferences, from the existing literature, to construct a theoretical framework capable of revolutionizing our understanding of emotions. This theoretical framework is aptly titled the Functionalist Model of Emotions, and essentially builds on the foundation of one of the models now existing in mainstream western academia. The Functionalist model differs from the current models, however, by explaining the functional purpose of emotions and strongly suggesting distinct levels of both cognitive development and cognitive evolution. The Functionalist Model of Emotion served as my honors thesis as an undergraduate student in university (see notes section for details), as my presentation at an undergraduate research conference, and it will be fleshed out in more detail in future publications as well. Thus, this article can serve as a simple introduction of the topic to a global audience, and hopefully begin actualizing its potential to change the way we understand emotions.
Defining Emotion
Perhaps the most logical way to start building a theoretical framework for the concept of an emotion is to define the word emotion. Google defines emotion as “a natural instinctive state of mind deriving from one’s circumstances, mood, or relationships with others” (2020). Unfortunately, this definition focuses on mainly external causes and it frames the emotion as merely being the result of those causes. This tells us nothing about the function of emotions, and fails to even mention the relationship between thoughts and emotions; except to say, in a footnote, that an emotion is a “distinctive or intuitive feeling as distinguished from reasoning or knowledge” (Google, 2020). Yet, in academia most scholars prefer to conceptualize an emotion as being a sort of construct, comprised of three core parts: the feeling or affective component, the cognitive or belief component, and the target or object of this emotion (Aristotle in Solomon, 2003; Shiota & Kalat, 2012). Thus, to properly please the academic experts, an ideal model of emotion should adequately explain the exact relationships between the feeling component of an emotion, the thought component, and the environmental component. Now that we have a basic understanding of how emotions are generally defined and conceptualized, the next step is to outline the existing theoretical models of emotion used in western academia.
Current Models of Emotion
The Basic Emotions Model was based on Ekman’s empirical research on facial expressions. Ekman used the following criteria to identify basic emotions: “basic emotions should be universal,” “if an emotion is basic, people should have a distinct, built in way of expressing it,” and “a basic emotion should be evident early in life” (Shiota & Kalat, 2012). With these criteria, and a massive collection of research data, Ekman identified six basic emotions: anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise (Ekman, 1994; Shiota & Kalat, 2012). Expressions of these emotions are consistently similar across cultures, which could support a nature (rather than nurture) explanation of emotional expression. However, it might also be a sign that facial expressions have objectively communicated subjective feelings for enough generations that we have evolved a deeply ingrained or seemingly “instinctual” impulse to repeat behavior because it has been beneficial in the past; not only for us, but for our ancestors, and for their ancestors before them.
The dimensional models of emotion began with Russell’s Circumplex Model of Affect. Russell essentially asked a group of university students to rate how similar their feelings are to each other, and then the results were displayed visually on a scatter-spot chart; with the visual distance, between each spot on the chart, representing the average rating of the difference between the subjective feelings represented by those spots (Russell, 1980; Shiota & Kalat, 2012). The resulting image displays Russell’s research data along two dimensions: pleasure-displeasure on the horizontal axis, and degree of arousal on the vertical axis. These dimensions became the focus of dimensional models, and basic emotions have regrettably been referred to as “categorical” in contrast to dimensional models. This is unfortunate because the categories that researchers should be aware of are not six separate categories, one for each of the six basic emotions, but four general categories that can account for the four clusters of test results seen in the four corners of Russell’s scatter-spot results: top left, top right, bottom left, and bottom right. Close analysis of these clusters reveals a distinct pattern, that can be understood in terms of motivation and conditioning: avoidance feelings (top left), approach feelings (top right), punishment feelings (bottom left), and reward feelings (bottom right). Yet, this pattern seems to have gone unnoticed, and the only visual model developed out of Russel’s finding seems to be the dimensional model put forth by Watson and Tellegen (Shiota & Kalat, 2012).
Figure 1 — From “A Circumplex Model of Affect” by James A. Russell (1980). Reprinted with permission from the Author.
The Evaluative Space Model and Component Process Theory are based on dimensional and basic emotion models so, while they are unique theories, they are still operating within the same general paradigms. The Evaluative Space Model still focuses on the dimensions, but rather than depicting them as dimensions per se, they disconnect the positive and negative affects (or feelings); allowing positive and negative affects to vary independently, rather than being constricted to feeling only positively or negatively but never both (Shiota & Kalat, 2012). The Component Process Theory is like the Basic Emotion Model, the key difference is that the Component Process Theory breaks down a facial expression into specific parts (Shiota & Kalat, 2012). Consequently, there are now two camps of emotion theories held central to the study of emotion; the dimensional camp, and the basic emotion camp. The Functionalist Model of Emotion owes its existence to research findings that were originally intended to support a dimensional model, but rather than focusing on the dimensions themselves, this model focuses on the four general categories of emotion which are observable as four clusters when the emotions are mapped out along those dimensions.
The Functionalist Model of Emotion
The Functionalist Model of Emotions gains its name because the four distinct categories of emotion reveal to us the four primary or fundamental functions that underlie all internal feelings (related to both emotions and drives), each of which has an important motivational role in behavior. Approach and avoidance feelings are probably pretty self-explanatory for anyone who has taken a psychology class, but the basic idea is that an organism is conditioned by punishments and rewards to approach or avoid certain stimuli in its environment (Day, 2016). For example, if a person’s pet cat is rewarded with attention for a cute behavior then that reward conditions it to repeat that behavior, especially when looking for attention. Similarly, if a person sprays their pet cat with a water-bottle when it claws their couch, then that punishment will condition the cat to avoid repeating that behavior in the future. Running with this example, when the cat feels excited to get attention we should expect that feeling to fall into the approach category; and sure enough, excitement falls into the top-right cluster of emotions with the other emotions likely to motivate an organism to approach something in the environment. Similarly, if the cat stops clawing the couch when the owner grabs the spray bottle we should expect the fear it feels to fall into the avoidance cluster in the top-left corner, and sure enough it does; along with other feelings that would likely motivate an organism to avoid something in its environment, or (in the case of anger) possibly even remove that trigger from the environment so that it need not be avoided in the future. Such approach and avoidance motivations are simple, but the punishment and reward feelings are not.
Punishment and reward feelings are more complex than approach and avoidance feelings, they are social, and as such they lack the fundamental universality of approach and avoidance behavior. All living organisms, including single celled organisms, show signs of approach or avoidance behavior (Elliot & Covington, 2001). Alternatively, only organisms that have evolved to survive in groups seem to develop the punishment and reward emotions. Furthermore, even among social animals, any given individual will show signs of approach and avoidance feelings such as excitement and fear following its birth; but not until years later does the individual begin demonstrating any sign that it experiences “higher-order” social emotions like pride or shame (Berk, 2013). An example of these social feelings could be a chimpanzee who accidentally hurts a playmate, the chimp is a social animal so it will express guilt or shame using body-language and gestures; possibly making sad, whinny sounds, and offering a banana or something it believes to be valuable as an apologetic gift. Charles Darwin believed that praise and blame foster group cohesion by promoting such behavior (Darwin, 2015). So, feelings seem to motivate behavior; approach and avoidance behavior is universal, but punishment and reward feelings are exclusive to socially evolved species of animal; suggesting at least two developmental and evolutionary stages of feeling, with the approach and avoidance feelings coming first and the punishment and reward following later in both development and evolution.
Fugure 2 — A rough visual representation of The Functionalist Model of Emotion.
By fleshing out the data this far we already have a better understanding of what these feelings are. For instance, if a mouse or a baby gets startled by something threatening it avoids it; not because of some logical thought process, but because the individual feels afraid and it acts on that impulsive feeling to avoid the environmental cause of that feeling. If a monkey or toddler gets shamed by its primary social group then that negative feeling will act as a punishment to socially condition the individual to avoid making the same mistake in the future. The same way approach and avoidance motivation evolved to better ensure the survival of individual organisms, punishment and reward feelings evolved to better ensure the survival of a pack, group, or community. Such feelings required no thought to act on, in fact we still often struggle to think about our actions before acting on our feelings; because the impulse to act on such feelings is older, more instinctual, unlike abstract thought which seems to be an even more exclusive and complex level of cognitive functioning then both of the levels proceeding it. In this view, the feeling component of any given emotion is a primitive form of thought, a proto-thought of sorts (the word proto here recognizes that these are pre-emotional feelings, because emotions — by definition — have a thought component that would require the third level of cognitive processing).
Now a clear hierarchy begins to emerge, with three clear levels of cognitive development and evolution. All living organisms first develop approach and avoidance feelings, to govern individual behavior and promote individual survival; then only the social animals develop punishment and reward feelings, to govern social behavior and group survival; then only the animals with complex language develop abstract thought and reasoning capacities. Coincidently, it has long been noted that three levels of cognitive processing seem to correlate with three layers in the physical structure of the brain, the brain stem (or “Lizard Brain”), the Limbic System, and the Cerebral Cortex respectively (MacLean, 1980). Unfortunately, the work done by MacLean was dismissed years ago and, to make matters worse, seems as though the whole theory may have been discredited due to some poor reasoning and misconceptions.
Implications of the New Model
The data collected by MacLean strongly suggests biological implications for the Functionalist Model of Emotion, but since his work has been discredited lets discuss the validity of the criticism that discredited his work. The evidence against MacLean’s Triune Brain Theory of Emotions reports that when brain scans were done the results showed activity not only in parts of the brain that were supposed to be associated with the task being performed at the time, but also in brain areas that are not supposed to be directly associated with the task being performed at the time (Kirverstein & Miller, 2015). Yes, MacLeans theory does posit that the three layers of brain structure are directly linked to three levels of reasoning, so during a brain-scan a type A processes should show some activity in brain region A, and type B processes should show activity in brain region B, and so on; but some activity in region A while performing type B mental processes is not enough counter evidence to dismiss the goldmine that this scholar stumbled on years ago, after all his theory does not even seem to exclude the possibility that these brain regions might learn to work together. Perhaps the theory required some fine-tuning, but the data that that he collected still undeniably suggests physical levels of the brain that strongly correlate with the three levels of cognitive brain functions suggested by the Functionalist Model of Emotion.
Figure 3 — A rough visual representation of The Three Levels of Cognitive Development.
The developmental and evolutionary implications of this theory are as obvious as they are enlightening, but perhaps the biggest insight provided by unpacking this new theory is a powerful new understanding of love that we did not have conceptual grounding for until now. To make clear the path of reasoning leading up to this discovery about love, we should start at the first theoretical implication we stumbled upon while exploring the model and follow that line of reasoning through to its full conclusion. The first and most obvious implication of the Functionalist Model of Emotion is that it can help us to better understand and explain child development, both from a psycho/social perspective and from a biological/clinical perspective. From this first inference, of three distinct levels of cognitive development, we can deduce that there are also three levels of cognitive evolution based on the parallels between development and evolution noted by reputable sources over recent decades (Olsson, Levit, & Hoβfeld, 2017). Now, from an evolutionary perspective it is reasonable to assume that the catalyst responsible for initiating the third level of cognitive functioning is complex language.
Image 4 — A rough visual representation of The Three levels of Cognitive Evolution.
The third level of cognitive functioning (which we call thought) is abstract, conceptual, and symbolic; so symbolic, in fact, that people do most (if not all) of their conscious thinking using symbols to represent every thought in any given stream of consciousness. This is often done using language itself, a sort of inner dialogue, but it can also be done using numbers, pictures and moving “video-like” mental images, sounds, colors, or any other possible form of abstract subjective symbol. Thus, it makes sense that some sort of complex system of symbols is needed to properly develop this level of cognitive processing, which would also need to be physically facilitated by certain brain structures that are needed (at least in part) to conduct abstract thought and reasoning. This means, not only can we better understand what scans of our own brain activity might indicate, but we can also likely infer the depth of any given animal’s language system based on the objectively observable Cerebral Cortex. Like dolphins, or elephants, for example; this theory would imply that animals with such large Cerebral Cortexes are more likely to have a complex system of symbols that they use to think, and possibly communicate with each other in ways that we might not yet fully understand.
If language was the catalyst that launched cognition into a third level of information processing then there should be a catalyst that performs the same function when the second level of cognition first evolved, and that is where love comes in. Love is the only, so-called, emotion that does not fall into any of the four categories; and the reason for this is simple, love is not an emotion. This may sound bold, but consider what the fundamental difference is between the autonomous organisms and the social animals. The difference is social connection, of course. This also explains why the primary evolutionary priority of these behaviour-driving proto-thoughts shifts suddenly from the simple basic focus on the survival and reproduction of the individual, to suddenly orienting itself toward survival of the whole group and sometimes even promotes altruistic behavior. This shift maintains the central focus on survival and reproduction, but the variable that shifted was the definition of the self whose survival and reproduction is being prioritized. When the species evolved from identifying itself as an individual, to identifying itself as part of a relationship or group, its most fundamental orientation shifted.
On the micro-scale we see this when an individual hits puberty, they change on a fundamental level; and these changes are so deep and foundational that they seem to shake and sometimes crumble the person’s entire life, like a house built upon a foundation is shaken when the foundation is ripped out and replaced by something new. We can see it in the way they lose their identity in their first real relationship, in the emotional depth of their first love, and in the first and most painful heartbreak imaginable. When people love each other they identify as part of that group (couple, family, team, etc.) so when a person loses a loved one it feels as if they lost a part of themselves, and this pain is every bit as real as their own identity.
Unlike emotions love does not just make a person approach or avoid something, it is not merely a punishment or reward; love is an expansion of the self (or ego) to include other individuals as part of the self, and through that connection a person can feel a wide range of emotions. Many of these emotions are approach and reward feelings, but it is equally possible for love to bring a host of avoidance or punishment feelings as well. Love does seem to fit the current definitions of an emotion, but this discussion has highlighted fundamental differences between love and other emotions that calls for a redefinition of emotions; or perhaps we should do away with the concept of emotions entirely and focus completely on the feeling component of emotions and drives, the proto-thoughts that we can now reasonably assume to share (in varying degrees) with the other members of the animal kingdom.
Conclusion
The study of emotions is often neglected in science, because science is objective and emotions are primarily experienced subjectively. Some theorists have tried using facial expressions as a physical measurement of emotions, others use physiological signs of arousal, while others give up entirely. Charles Darwin himself failed to explain the function of emotions in behavior, and then William James came along and reduced emotions to merely being the subjective experience of physiological changes preceding behavior; and because science is the study of that which is objective, he proposed that emotions be abandoned by the sciences completely (Campbell, 1997). In a way James was correct, emotion is a flawed concept of little use to science; but in a way he was also wrong, because subjective observations can help us better understand objective observations. Take Russell’s scatter-spot results for example. James would have us believe that a trigger in the environment causes a physiological reaction in the body that causes a behavior, and because that is all that is objectively observable that is all we have to work with. Thus, if James had his way there would be no scatter-spot, of course it’s an objective chart but the test scores that it plotted out were subjective ratings of how similar or different feelings seem to be from each other. Therefore, not only can the dimensional models stand as proof that subjective observations are still valuable in this line of research, but now the Functionalist Model of Emotion also stands as a testament to the value of subjective observations… coupled with the power of critical thinking and logic of course.
Logic and critical thought not only built this entire theoretical framework from pre-existing research, but from this resulting model the same logic and critical thought also generate: several new implications, explanations for various behaviors, and directions for future research. This article has not only highlighted the four general motivational functions of emotions, and how they indicate three distinct levels of cognitive development; but also how those levels correspond to levels of cognitive evolution, and the catalyst needed to initiate each additional level of cognitive development. All organisms begin with an approach and avoidance orientation, and lifeforms who expand their sense of self (via “love”) to include other organisms in their environment then develop an additional level of processing; consisting of social punishment and reward feelings, long thought to foster group cohesion (Darwin, 2015). Lifeforms who expand their sense of self beyond people within their immediate environment (via language) develop an additional level of processing, consisting of abstract or symbolic thought. These three levels are cumulative, meaning two or even all three often operate simultaneously and likely in conjunction with one another. Sometimes they conflict with each other causing the internal conflicts we all know so well, and other times the more advanced logical levels of thought try to exert control over our more primitive impulses and reactions.
Ultimately, the Functionalist Model of Emotion has an exceptional amount of explanatory potential, not only for the functional nature of emotions; but also for understanding identity, emotional control, inner conflicts, neuro-biology, development, evolution, social conditioning, animal psychology, and so much more. The Functionalist Model of Emotion is the first theory to explain the relationship between thought, feeling, and the environment; and it is also the first theoretical framework to explain the relationship between internal feeling states, motivation, and behavior. Perhaps most impressively, the Functionalist Model of Emotion has now been shown to not only revolutionize our understanding of emotions, but also to revolutionize our understanding of love and how it differs from basic emotions.
Acknowledgments
The theory summarized in this article was developed and fine-tuned with the guidance and support of my dear friend and mentor, Dr. Jennifer Woodrow; of Thompson Rivers University, BC, Canada. Honorable mention is also proudly granted to Dr. B. Baugh, Dr. R. Tapley, Dr. C. Ortner, Dr. M. Woloszyn, Dr. M. Sanchez-Florez, Dr. D. Dorogi, and of course Dr. J. Russell himself. I thank you each for your support and encouragement throughout my studies at TRU.
Notes
Just to be clear, my thesis was technically classified as a directed study, but only because our philosophy department had not yet established an official honors program. I did have the grades to qualify for honors so my professor set up my directed study to be equivalent to an honors thesis in every way.
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