Frank Costello, Carlos Marcello, and the Long Political Machine: Organized Crime in New Orleans

In 1891, an angry mob lynched eleven Italian immigrants accused of murdering New Orleans Police Chief David Hennessey. The victims, labeled as organized crime members by several news outlets, made New Orleans the supposed birthplace of American organized crime. A debate exists around what contributed to the rise of organized crime in Louisiana, specifically in the greater New Orleans area. Historians such as and David L. Chandler and John H. Davis believe the large amount of Italian immigration to New Orleans in the nineteenth century is to blame. Other historians such as Jay Precht and Lamar White Jr. believe that New Orleans’ inherent acceptance of gambling is responsible. Historians such as Michael L. Kurtz and Anthony M. DeStefano blame the Long political machine for organized crime’s sophistication. Evidence from news clippings, the Kefauver Committee, the McClellan Committee, declassified Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) files, and historians such as Kurtz and DeStefano proves that the cooperation of the Louisiana government, from the sheriff’s office all the way up to the governor, was the main reason for organized crime’s dominance in New Orleans. Crime boss Frank Costello built a monopoly on gambling rackets in New Orleans and organized crime increased into an unstoppable force under the rule of Carlos Marcello.

Chandler asserted in 1975 that organized crime in New Orleans dated back to the 1860s when thousands of Italians, mostly from western Sicily, immigrated to New Orleans. Chandler declared that Joseph P. Macheca, born to immigrants from Palermo, Sicily, founded the American Mafia and utilized the increased Sicilian population to form a monopoly on criminal activities in New Orleans’ French Quarter and on fruit importation at the Port of New Orleans. Chandler stated that Macheca’s syndicate was the same organized crime group that prospered under Marcello’s rule in the twentieth century. Davis also traced organized crime in New Orleans to the 1860s and believed the immigration of Sicilians was the birth of organized crime. He declared that more Sicilians immigrated to New Orleans than any other area in American in the 1860s. According to Davis, by the 1880s, this Sicilian community in New Orleans formed a close-knit and organized band of criminals based on a secret society that they brought from their native Sicily. Davis connected the social consciousness of Sicily to Louisiana. He stated that much like Sicily’s relationship to the rest of Italy, Louisiana adopted an antiauthority mentality as a southern state in America. Both Davis and Chandler mistakenly put New Orleans organized crime, pre-Costello, on the same level as post-Costello and Marcello era organized crime. Despite this era, Davis does have good detail surrounding the Marcello era of New Orleans organized crime, but he was too easily persuaded by Chandler’s theories. The debate shifted with Kurtz in 1983.

Kurtz diminished Chandler’s claims as unsubstantiated and based on a sensationalized anti-Italian press. Kurtz originally believed that the lack of criminal convictions against Marcello showed organized crime in New Orleans to be relatively inactive. Kurtz evolved his opinion five years later. Based on declassified FBI documents on three-time governor Earl Long, the younger of the Long brothers, Kurtz asserted that the Long political machine holds the blame for organized crime. Huey P. Long, the older Long brother, established a political machine where bribery was commonplace, and this political machine, which thrived on a one-party Democratic rule in the South, endured well after his assassination. DeStefano also declared that the Costello-Long partnership led to advanced organized crime in New Orleans. Writers such as Jay Precht and Lamar White Jr. connect New Orleans’ history with gambling as the main contributor to the climb in organized crime. According to Precht, gambling in New Orleans dated back well before Italians immigrated to the country and received the blame for increased organized crime. White discourages the Italian immigrant theory and reiterates Precht’s points how gambling and vice in New Orleans existed well before the massive influx of Italian immigration and the days of Costello and Marcello. Precht and White also have good information on the history of gambling in New Orleans but they underestimate just how deeply rooted organized crime was in Louisiana politics, and how they used their monopoly on gambling to establish more harmful rackets such as narcotics trafficking and loansharking. Kurtz and DeStefano have the strongest assumptions in how politics, specifically the Long political machine, led to organized crime’s dominance in New Orleans.

Costello’s arrival to New Orleans was due to a loss of his political protection in New York. In 1934, New York City Mayor Fiorello La Guardia declared war on gambling in New York City. He ordered raids on Costello’s Manhattan offices of the Tru-Mint Mills Novelty Company and confiscated 1,825 machines in the raids. La Guardia detailed the criminal-political component which existed. “It could never had existed without political protection,” La Guardia exclaimed to reporters. With his political protection interrupted in New York, Costello looked elsewhere for his gambling machines. This event signaled just how important political alliances were in order for organized crime to properly flourish.

Despite the claims of Chandler and Davis, politics and organized crime did not become fully united in New Orleans until Costello and Long met at the Sands Point Bath and Country Club on Long Island in August 1933. A drunken and boisterous Long got into an altercation in the club’s restroom where he left with a black-eye. Costello allegedly came to Long’s aid and prevented a more violent clash. A year after the alleged incident, Long officially invited Costello, known as “The Prime Minister of the Underworld,” to bring his gambling machines to New Orleans, a place so rife with gambling that tourists were genuinely unaware that gambling was illegal in the state. More important than New Orleans’ acceptance of gambling was the political agreement between Long and Costello. Long guaranteed Costello political and police protection in exchange for ten percent of the profits from the gambling machine business. Costello made a deal with Sicilian organized crime boss, Sam Corallo, that Costello’s political protection crossed over for Corallo’s own criminal endeavors. This was a clear turning point in organized crime in New Orleans. Costello brought the heights of political protection which Corallo, or any other organized crime boss in New Orleans before him, always lacked. Before Costello’s arrival, Corallo’s organized crime syndicate did not have connections to the Long political machine. Costello unambiguously initiated this milestone moment. In order to make this arrangement work, Costello needed allies.

Costello’s two original on-site managers of his New Orleans gambling machines were notorious organized crime figures, Philip “Dandy Phil” Kastel and James “Diamond Jim” Moran, the latter a friend and ex-bodyguard for Long. Once again, the multifaceted connection between the Long political machine and organized crime members existed. Costello, Kastel, and Moran established the Bayou Novelty Company, the Pelican Novelty Company, and the Louisiana Mint Company as front businesses that distributed the machines in bars, restaurants, and other establishments in New Orleans. The pivotal role that Kastel played also further discredits the Italian immigrant theory proposed by Chandler and Davis. Kastel was American-born, of Jewish ancestry, and began his career as a stockbroker in New York City. The reason men like Kastel excelled in organized crime was because of his ties to corrupt politicians such as the Long political machine. After the men established their original gambling enterprises, they looked to increase their alliance with the Long political machine.

Despite Long’s September 1935 assassination, his political machine persisted with its partnership with organized crime. Records from the Bayou Novelty Company show gross income in the two years after Long’s death. The company grossed $1,294,995.10 in 1936 and $1,297,580.60 in 1937. Costello, Kastel, and Meyer Lansky, the latter a well-known and politically-connected financial genius of organized crime, met with Seymour Weiss, Bob Maestri, and Huey’s younger brother Earl, all members of the Long political machine. They agreed to “honor the earlier Huey Long-Costello agreement and to expand it.” This meeting symbolized the importance of the agreement between established Louisiana politicians and the organized crime leaders. Only with the support of these politicians could the organized crime leaders expand. With this expansion, Marcello entered the picture and would bring organized crime’s stranglehold on New Orleans politics to an even greater level than Costello.

Marcello established the Jefferson Music Company, which served the same purpose as Costello’s Bayou, Pelican, and Mint companies, it operated as a front to distribute the gambling machines. Whereas before, Costello placed the machines in bars and restaurants primarily in New Orleans’ French Quarter, Marcello extended the reach throughout New Orleans’ West Bank. Marcello installed 250 machines in his initial agreement with Costello and had an undeniable ability to avoid law enforcement scrutiny. After a conviction for assault and robbery, Marcello served less than five years of a fourteen-year prison sentence after he received a mysterious pardon from Governor O.K. Allen, a known member of the Long political machine. This was yet another example of a political-organized crime connection that directly contributed to the rise of New Orleans’ most infamous crime boss. Marcello proved to be relentless and reliable in his ability to collect from vendors. He had an aura of leadership, power, and the impending threat of violence, key factors in an effective organized crime leader. More important than these traits, however, were Marcello’s relationships that would eventually put him beyond the political reach of Costello. He formed a lasting alliance with Gretna police chief, Beauregard Miller, who represented the groundwork of the Long political machine. His law enforcement position enabled him to allow or disallow the gambling machines to operate. Costello’s gambling machines proved to be a lucrative business, but he, and his organized crime partners, set their sights on expansion in the gambling business, even in the face of political uncertainty.

The cooperation of the Long political machine obviously made it possible for Costello to originally bring his gambling machines to New Orleans in the 1930s. However, Sam H. Jones defeated the younger Long in the 1940 race for the governorship of Louisiana. On the surface, this looked to be a major blow to organized crime. Long’s defeat occurred mainly due to the public backlash from the scandals brought on from previous governor, Richard W. Leche. Despite losing an ally in the governorship, Costello established his first illegal casino in the New Orleans area in 1944. The Beverly Country Club, located in Jefferson Parish, an area described in the 1951 Kefauver Committee as, “one of America’s largest concentrations of gambling houses,” greatly expanded organized crime’s control of the area. The Kefauver Committee, chaired by Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver, shed a light on the vast national organized crime syndicate that existed in the United States. However, up until that point, many believed that organized crime was not a legitimate threat to society. The Committee exposed just how entrenched organized crime was within Louisiana politics. Costello’s casino was able to thrive, even without an ally in the governorship, mainly due to Marcello’s political and police connections.

Marcello oversaw the day-to-day control of the Beverly Club’s casino. More important than Marcello’s competence in managing the gambling operations, was his unique relationship to Chief Miller and Sheriff Frank Clancy. With the top of the Long political machine seemingly in a brief state of flux, Costello knew the cooperation of Miller and Clancy was extremely important. When called to testify before the Kefauver Committee in 1951, Clancy cited his Fifth Amendment right and repeatedly refused to answer questions about organized crime activity in his precinct. When questioned by the committee, Miller conceded to the importance of gambling rackets in the area. He also acknowledged that it was in his best interest not to disrupt the Beverly Club. Miller stated that anyone who interrupted organized crime’s activities lost any chance at reelection or job security. This statement from Miller showed just how deeply ingrained organized crime’s control had become. 2.5 percent of the Beverly Club’s profits were strictly reserved for political and police payoffs. Costello and Marcello’s blatant activities proved that any effort from an anti-Long government to disrupt organized crime was a fallacy and that gambling rackets were virtually untouchable by law enforcement. More anti-Long and anti-organized crime candidates failed efforts through the 1940s proved just that.

In 1945, reform candidate DeLesseps Morrison ran for mayor of New Orleans on a familiar promise that he would rid the area of corruption and eradicate organized crime’s grip. In the common theme of surface-level attacks against organized crime, several raids on Louisiana Mint Company’s gambling machines resulted in the confiscation of approximately 1,000 unlicensed machines. However, by Mayor Morrison’s own account to the Kefauver Committee in 1951, the distribution of the machines endured through other front companies. Among owners of those fronts, Morrison testified, included Kastel, Costello’s brother-in-law Theodore Geigerman, and Marcello. The 1947 deportation of Corallo, a Marcello and Costello organized crime ally, was another superficial attack on organized crime in New Orleans. This only paved the way for Marcello, a much more sophisticated organized crime leader who held deep ties with the political machine, to succeed Corallo as New Orleans’ unquestioned organized crime leader. Shortly after Corallo’s deportation, Costello confirmed Marcello to be the new mafia boss of New Orleans at a meeting held at the Black Diamond Club. The presence of Mayor Morrison, the raids against the Louisiana Mint Company, and the deportation of Corallo did little to stop the momentum of organized crime. Reform-minded politicians could not crack the armor in the organized crime infiltration in Louisiana politics. The organized crime leaders used their political protection base to increase their activities.

Due to the success of the Beverly Club, Costello and Marcello expanded their gambling operations into the racing wire services, which supplemented profitable bookmaking operations, and eventually gave Marcello a monopoly on sports and horse betting in the entire New Orleans area. It also established Marcello as the sole operator of loansharking in New Orleans. Gamblers who frequently got in debt, could receive loans made by Marcello that exceeded 100 percent interest a year. Those who could not pay weekly interest and received threats of violence had to give up their businesses to Marcello. Mayor Morrison testified to the Kefauver Committee that it was hopeless to combat illegal gambling in New Orleans. His statements rang true, as Costello and Marcello continued to expand. They opened up Club Forest, equipped with a 24-hour running casino with a full bar and restaurant. According to records seized and presented before the Kefauver Committee, Club Forest netted $2,008,796 in 1949 just from the casino. Gambling was a vice outright championed by the New Orleans community, and those in powerful positions, Chief Morrison testified that gambling helped Jefferson Parish thrive, and without it, it would be a “dead city.” From the profits they gained through gambling, they expanded their criminal enterprises into other areas that would further plague New Orleans.

Under Marcello’s directive, New Orleans became a hub of narcotics trafficking. Heroin by the bulk entered New Orleans by plane, train, and boat. Marijuana came through the Mexican border and then from Galveston, Texas, where Marcello had a close associate in known narcotics trafficker, Joseph Civello. In fact, according to testimony before the Kefauver Committee from Federal Bureau of Narcotics agent Thomas McGuire, the 1947 deportation of Corallo to Sicily likely enhanced narcotics trafficking from across the Atlantic Ocean. Despite never being charged, mainly due to his political protection, law enforcement connected Marcello to the 1943 and 1944 murders of narcotics traffickers Gene Mano and Tom Siracusa. Meanwhile, law enforcement met quotas by persecuting against the Black community to reach their arrest quotas, an unfortunate and common theme of prejudice in the era. As New Orleans chief of police Clarence Giarusso later bluntly explained, “We made cases in Black neighborhoods because it was easy.” He further added, “We don’t care about Carlos Marcello or the Mafia. City cops have no interest in who brings the dope in.” It was the profits from gambling that made it possible for Marcello to expand into narcotics and further torment New Orleans. These profits also furthered Marcello’s ability to bribe public officials and enabled him to “legitimize” his income through various real estate and business holdings. Another major boost for continued organized crime dominance was the return of the Long political machine.

The younger Long won the 1948 election for Louisiana governor. In traditional one-party rule in the South, the election came down to the Democratic primary between Long and the unsuccessful “anti-Long” reformer Sam H. Jones. Organized crime knew the ally they had in Long and helped finance his campaign. Costello personally funneled $500,000 to Long’s campaign, profits that undoubtedly came from Costello’s gambling earnings in the state. Throughout Long’s first term, Marcello made regular payoffs to Long’s righthand man, Seymour Weiss, and New Orleans became, “the most wide-open center of gambling, vice, and political corruption in the United States.” The connection between organized crime and the Long political machine could not be clearer demonstrated by Marcello’s massive rise in the late 1940s and into the 1950s, even with his exposure on a national level by the Kefauver Committee, he was able to withstand.

When Kefauver called Marcello to testify in January 1951, the stubborn mobster refused to answer any questions with the exception of his name and address. The committee questioned Marcello about his control of illegal gambling operations, control of restaurants, bars, nightclubs, and most importantly, the influence of organized crime on public officials. Marcello’s refusal to answer any of the committee’s questions resulted in him being cited for contempt of Congress. He had his contempt conviction overturned in 1952 by an appeals court. Costello, who publicly presented himself as a legitimate businessman, attempted to cooperate with the committee. He acknowledged his history of bootlegging during Prohibition, but claimed he moved on from his criminal past. Eventually his frustration with the television cameras, radio mics in the courtroom, and questions about his connection to politicians led him to also defy the committee. For the duration of the 1950s, Costello was in and out of federal courts for his contempt of Congress conviction and appeal, tax evasion charges, and deportation proceedings. A 1957 assassination attempt on Costello by a rival New York organized crime leader ended his criminal ambitions. Despite Costello’s absence from New Orleans organized crime for the remainder of the 1950s, the alliance that he formed in the 1930s with the Long political machine continued on with Marcello as the undisputed leader of organized crime in New Orleans. Even with the publicity from the Kefauver Committee, Marcello validated that his grip on New Orleans organized crime was unbreakable. While the Long political machine dealt with another crack in their power, Marcello refused to let it interrupt him.

Under state law, Governor Long could not succeed himself in 1952. In what seemed to be a repeat of the 1940 election of Governor Jones, conservative Democrat Robert F. Kennon defeated Long candidate Carlos G. Spaht. Similar to Jones in the 1940s, Kennon also outlined plans to rid the state of corruption and to clean up New Orleans organized crime. Although reports of decreased gambling in New Orleans, Marcello’s criminal empire persevered. He established headquarters at the Town and Country Motel near the New Orleans airport where he oversaw his illegal rackets, which by the 1950s included gambling, narcotics, prostitution, extortion, infiltration of businesses, labor racketeering, fencing stolen goods, robberies, and murder. In 1957, Senator John McClellan chaired the McClellan Committee, with Robert F. Kennedy appointed as chief counsel. Much like the infamous Kefauver Committee, the McClellan Committee exposed Marcello’s deep ties to Louisiana public officials. Marcello refused to answer any questions probed by Kennedy, but Aaron Kohn, an officer for the Special Citizens Investigative Committee, detailed how Marcello corrupted the New Orleans government to the point where the police department acted as muscle for him. According to Kohn, officers threatened any business owners that refused Marcello’s slot machines and jukeboxes. A little over a decade later, in a statement before the House Judiciary Committee, Kohn testified that Marcello’s political network through the 1950s and 1960s included “public officials at every critical level.” This included police, sheriffs, prosecutors, mayors, governors, judges, councilmen, state legislators, and “at least one member of Congress.

Even efforts by the federal government to deport Marcello failed. His first deportation order came in 1953, however, Marcello’s shrewd legal counsel and his political protection blocked attempts at every turn, with the exception of a questionably legal 1961 trip to Guatemala on an order from U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. Marcello returned to New Orleans and ultimately escaped permanent deportation. By 1956, Long was back as governor of Louisiana. He received campaign funds from Marcello before his election, and an additional $100,000 contribution after he won. Marcello wielded unprecedented authority in organized crime and had a political reach that surpassed Costello’s.

After he disregarded the 1959 McClellan Committee and Attorney General Kennedy’s 1961 deportation order, a majority of Marcello’s legal problems ended after the November 22, 1963 assassination of President John F. Kennedy, the attorney general’s older brother. In the decades since Kennedy’s assassination, Marcello has been linked to a conspiracy, a lasting legacy on his name. With the federal government’s legal attempts against him seemingly in the rearview mirror, Marcello expanded on his wealth and power.

By 1968, the FBI cultivated an invaluable asset in their fight against Marcello and organized crime in New Orleans. A confidential informant (CI) close to Marcello began to feed an enormous amount of information to his FBI handlers. The CI confidently put Marcello’s net worth at $30 million, with several hundred acres of land, properties, and legitimate businesses as part of his wealth. Senator John G. Schwegmann was a partner of Marcello and the CI confirmed the decades long relationship Marcello had with Chief Miller, Jefferson Parish District Attorney Frank Langridge, State Attorney General Jack P. F. Gremillion, and Kenner Mayor Eddie D’Gerolamo. In December 1968, the CI reported that four Louisiana State Representatives visited Marcello’s Town and Country Motel office to discuss funds for the construction of a freeway. The CI confirmed Marcello’s political network and his declassified FBI file proves that the cooperation of Louisiana politicians was what made organized crime so enormous in New Orleans.

As the Long political machine died down, and political corruption around the country became increasingly less blatant, the feds finally caught up with Marcello. A 1981 indictment charged him and four others with conspiracy, racketeering and mail and wire fraud in a scheme to bribe Louisiana officials to give them multimillion-dollar group insurance contracts. For the first time in his career as a criminal, Marcello faced legitimate criminal charges related to his connection to politicians. Marcello served seven years in federal prison, and spent his last few years in ill health, before he died of natural causes in 1993 at the age of 83. By the time of his incarceration, and his death, the Long political machine was no more, which showed that with the lack of a political alliance, organized crime’s influence was sharply diminished.

The corrupt Long political machine was always the reason that organized crime was able to establish such a powerful grip in New Orleans. It is also evident that it was Costello who originated this partnership with the Long political machine. Contrary to the claims of Chandler and Davis, there is no evidence that any New Orleans based organized crime network had any connection to politics on the level that Costello established. Additionally, there is no proof that the alleged Sicilian criminal syndicate from the late nineteenth century was in anyway the same criminal syndicate that Costello and Marcello controlled through the twentieth century. Both Chandler and Davis base most of their claims surrounding the Hennessey case and the subsequent lynching of the eleven Italian immigrants accused of murdering Hennessey in a “mafia vendetta.” However, their claims are based on a sensationalized and anti-immigrant press. There is no concrete evidence that the eleven lynching victims were guilty of the Hennessy murder. In fact, according to Kurtz, there is not any real evidence that the lynching victims were even organized crime members. It took until the 1930s, and the arrival of Costello, for organized crime to become a truly established syndicate in New Orleans, thanks to the alliance between Costello and the Long political machine.

Precht and White’s assertions about New Orleans’ history with vice and gambling are valid. Gambling in New Orleans dated back well before the increased Italian immigration in the late nineteenth century, however, both Precht and White fail to recognize the political element that Costello established and how Marcello built upon it. Both Costello and Marcello used this alliance with the Long political machine to exploit gambling in New Orleans. The title of a White journal article even uses the word “myth,” which carries the connotation that Marcello’s criminal empire was somehow not based in reality. However, demonstrated through the various Senate and Congress investigations, declassified FBI files, and the work done by Kurtz and DeStefano proves that there was no myth about Costello and Marcello’s immense influence over Louisiana politics.

When Costello, “The Prime Minister of the Underworld,” and Long “The Kingfish,” made their alliance in the 1930s, they set the standard for unparalleled organized crime and political corruption. Even after Long’s untimely assassination in 1935, and Costello’s legal problems in the 1950s, the dictatorship of the Long political machine, and the control of organized crime, persisted until the 1980s. Marcello built on what Costello started, and his run as the most influential organized crime leader plagued New Orleans for decades. The political protection provided by the Long political machine, and the gradual deepened infiltration that Costello and Marcello committed in New Orleans, was always the main contributor to organized crime in New Orleans.

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[1] John V. Baiamonte Jr, “‘Who Killa de Chief’ Revisited: The Hennessey Assassination and Its Aftermath, 1890–1991,” Louisiana History 33 no. 2, (1992), 121.

[2] David L. Chandler, Brothers in Blood: The Rise of Criminal Brotherhoods (EP Dutton, 1975) 73–78.

[3] John H. Davis, Mafia Kingfish: Carlos Marcello and the Assassination of John F. Kennedy (New York: Penguin, 1989) 21–23.

[4] Michael L. Kurtz, “Organized Crime in Louisiana History: Myth and Reality,” Louisiana History 24, no. 4 (1983) 368–375.

[5] Michael L. Kurtz, “Political Corruption and Organized Crime in Louisiana: The FBI Files on Earl Long,”

Louisiana History 29, no. 3 (1988) 243.

[6] Rudolf Heberle and Alvin L. Bertrand, “Factors Motivating Voting Behavior in a One-Party State: A Case Study of the 1948 Louisiana Gubernatorial Primaries,” Social Forces 27 no. 4, (1949) 344–345.

[7] Anthony M. DeStefano, Top Hoodlum, Frank Costello, Prime Minister of the Mafia (New York: Citadel, 2018) 145–155.

[8] Precht, “Legalized Gambling,” (2011).

[9] Lamar White Jr., “Carlos Marcello and the Making of a Mafia Myth,” Bayou Brief (May 2, 2020), 4.

[10] DeStefano, Top Hoodlum, 144–145.

[11] “1,155 Slot Machines Sunk in the Sound,” New York Times (October 14, 1934) 1, 30.

[12] “Huey Long Gets a Black Eye in Row at Long Island Party,” New York Times (August 29, 1933) 1, 3.

[13] Penny Walsh, “Secret Story of Frank Costello That Was Almost Written,” New York Times (February 27, 1973) 39.

[14] Selwyn Raab, Five Families: The Rise, Decline, and Resurgence of America’s Most Powerful Mafia Empires (New York: Thomas Dunne, 2005) 60.

[15] Kurtz, “Organized Crime in Louisiana History,” 368–369.

[16] U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce: Hearings Before the Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, 1951, 6–7.

[17] “’Dandy Phil’ Kastel Back Under Arrest,” New York Times (February 10, 1926) 11; DeStefano, Top Hoodlum, 149.

[18] “Doctor Shoots Huey Long in Louisiana State Capitol; Bodyguards Kill Assailant,” New York Times (September 9, 1935), 1, 3. “Slot Machine King’ Is Arrested Here,” New York Times (October 10, 1939), 28.

[19] Kurtz, “Political Corruption and Organized Crime in Louisiana,” 245.

[20] U.S. House of Representatives, House Select Committee on Assassinations, Subject: Carlos Marcello, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, January 1978, 8, https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=955#relPageId=1.

[21] George Lardner Jr., “U.S. vs. Marcello,” Washington Post (February 19, 1980).

[22] Davis, Mafia Kingfish, 47.

[23] Jerry Purvis Sanson, “Sam Jones, Jimmie Noe, and the Reform Alliance 1940–1942,” Louisiana History 27, no. 3 (1986) 239–240.

[24] Estes Kefauver, The Kefauver Committee Report on Organized Crime (New York: Didier, 1951), 60.

[25] Gilbert King, “The Senator and the Gangsters,” Smithsonian (April 18, 2012).

[26] Kefauver, Kefauver Committee, 67.

[27] Davis, Mafia Kingfish, 50.

[28] Michael L. Kurtz, “deLesseps S. Morrison: Political Reformer,” Louisiana History 17, no. 1 (1976).

[29] Kefauver, Kefauver Committee, 59.

[30] Marcello v. United States, 196 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1952).

[31] Kefauver, Kefauver Committee, 60–62.

[32] U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, 360.

[33] Estes Kefauver, The Kefauver Committee Report on Organized Crime, 62–63.

[34] U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations: Gambling and Organized Crime, 87th Congress, 1st session, August 1961, 519.

[35] Douglas Valentine, The Strength of the Wolf: The Secret History of America’s War on Drugs (New York: Verso, 2004), 63.

[36] “Earl Long, Brother of Huey, Takes Bow To Gay Throng as Louisiana’s Governor,” New York Times (May 12, 1948) 22.

[37] Kurtz, “Political Corruption and Organized Crime in Louisiana: The FBI Files on Earl Long,” 246–248.

[38] “Marcello Kefauver Committee,” The Monroe News-Star (January 26, 1951), 12.

[39] Kefauver, Kefauver Committee, 169.

[40] Davis, Mafia Kingfish, 72.

[41] Warren Moscow, “Frank Costello’s Story: From Rum to Riches,” The New York Times (March 18, 1951), 122.

[42] “Frank Costello Dies of Coronary at 82; Underworld Leader,” New York Times (February 19, 1973), 1.

[43] “Robert F. Kennon, 85; A Louisiana Governor,” New York Times (January 13, 1988), 25.

[44] Kurtz, “Political Corruption and Organized Crime in Louisiana: The FBI Files on Earl Long,” 249.

[45] Davis, Mafia Kingfish, 88.

[46] U.S. House of Representatives, House Select Committee on Assassinations, Subject: Carlos Marcello, 63.

[47] Robert Pear, “Fraud Trial Begins Today for Man U.S. Has Tried To Deport Since ‘53,” New York Times (March 30, 1981), 12.

[48] Kurtz, “Political Corruption and Organized Crime in Louisiana: The FBI Files on Earl Long,” 249.

[49] Ronald Goldfarb, “What The Mob Knew About JFK’s Murder,” Washington Post (March 14, 1993).

[50] Federal Bureau of Investigation, Subject: Carlos Marcello, (1968–1969), 12–23, https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/docid-32577900.pdf.

[51] “Around The Nation; Trial Opens in New Orleans For Reputed Mafia Leader,” New York Times (March 31, 1981), 16.

[52] “Carlos Marcello, 83, Reputed Crime Boss In New Orleans Area,” New York Times (March 3, 1993), 12.

[53] Barbara Botein, “The Hennessy Case: An Episode in Anti-Italian Nativism,” Louisiana History 20, no. 3, (1979) 263–270

[54] Kurtz, “Organized Crime in Louisiana History,” 364–366.