An Arab country on the edge of the African world: Mauritania and its geopolitical position — China, the West or the rest?
Mauritania’s position at the edge of the African continent, and, as the most westerly Arab led state in the MENA region mark it out as a state of significance in ethno-religious and geopolitical terms. Mauritania is key as a geographical and cultural link between the zones of Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa, with substantial natural resources which ought to place it at the forefront of economic development in the region.
The government is largely stable and in an enviable position by way of comparison with several other nearby states. Nonetheless, Mauritania is faced with several challenges not least of which is in developing a work force able to meet the requirements of a commodities driven economy, and, of determining its future geopolitical orientation whether towards its traditional engagement with France and Western states; increasing its encounters with the People’s Republic of China; or with others such as the League of Arab States.
As of 2017 Mauritania remains a sparsely populated state of c.3,600,000 people in an area of 398,000 sq miles. Such size of population versus size of territory and weak diversification of the economy see growth centred in only a few locations and principally in the capital of Nouakchott and the city of Nouadhibou, both of which are on the Atlantic coast.
History
Mauritania as a modern state emerged in the codification of territories in North-West Africa following the withdrawal of French imperial rule in the 1960s.
The region of what is today Mauritania emerged into world history in the ninth century when the Ghanaian Empire’s capital was located in the south of the country. From the mid-eleventh century, Mauritanian territory formed part of the Almoravid Empire which stretched from North-West Africa to the Iberian peninsula. Despite forming part of an Islamic empire the Mauritanian population’s accretion to Islamic identity was, by way of comparison, to the rest of North Africa relatively slow and, perhaps, only comprehensively achieved in the late medieval period, if not later. The Islamisation of Mauritania linked it in to the wider Arab led “Muslim world” and which has continued into the present.
Due to the size of Mauritanian territory and the hot desert climate accessing the interior and developing local infrastructure has been a consistent challenge to local rulers. Despite French colonial administration being advanced from the mid-nineteenth century it was, only from 1904, that progress was made in extending their rule to central regions with the proclamation of a protectorate.
French rule brought with it limited material advantages to the native peoples with no great effort placed in advancing local economic development. Nevertheless, owing to Mauritania’s size and geographical position it was a vital territory insofar as it permitted the extension of French influence from the Atlantic Ocean and deep into the Sahara.
Mauritania gained independence in 1960 from which time efforts have focused on consolidating the political structures and economic control of the state and determining the status of Western Sahara. The Kingdom of Morocco and local Sahrawi guerillas disputed Mauritania’s claims with a peace agreement concluded in 1979 which saw the renouncement of control in Western Sahara. Mauritanian society was impacted by relative political instability from the mid-1980s and which inhibited concentrations on economic development. This was further reinforced as a result of the extant divides in society over the relative status of Arab Berber and black citizens — the latter often, in fact, or perceived as of lower social status because of their positions as slaves or in slave like or indentured service. These divisions have led to conflict, with the Forces de Libération Africaines de Mauritanie an active resistance group seeking to alleviate Black Mauritanians’ position. FLAM historically received backing from Senegal and the group’s leadership is currently in exile from Mauritania.
Following Mauritania’s independence the local population have not seen substantial improvement in standards of living with the country remaining one of the materially poorest states on the African continent. Such a scenario, in recent times, is offset, to an extent, by the presence of a strong and stable political leadership over the last decade.
Since 2008, Mauritania’s leader has been Mohammed Ould Abdel Aziz who took power via a coup, prior to success in the Presidential elections of 2009 and 2014. Aziz has balanced his foreign and security policy through permitting the presence of French and American military and intelligence bases as well as joining the Saudi led anti-terrorist coalition of forty-one predominantly Sunni states.
Economy and geopolitics
At present, the economy is overly reliant on iron ore (>45% of Mauritania’s exports). However, Mauritania has the largest gold deposits in West Africa and has entered the club of oil producing states, with offshore extraction beginning in 2006. As these commodities begin to be accessed in earnest this will lead to improved possibilities for integration into the wider economic networks found in North and West Africa. This points, for example, to the possibility of engaging more closely with other Arab states as well as the People’s Republic of China as part of the “One Belt One Road” (OBOR) strategy which expands its geopolitical footprint on the African continent.
Engagements with the PRC date to 1965 when diplomatic relations were established. Ongoing efforts since 2000 to expedite PRC investment have also taken place including infrastructure projects as well as commodity extraction. For example: the China National Petroleum Corporation has had a presence since 2006. Nonetheless, even with Chinese interest, economic growth is held back by the lack of requisite infrastructure to support commodities extraction throughout the country as well as hesitancy for investors to sufficiently put in place the funding required to better exploit resources located in the interior.
Circumstances for economic growth are further complicated because of the expansion of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and concerns regarding overall regional stability in North-West Africa. AQIM’s progress has been restricted through local efforts and French led interventions, the former with the support of the Sahel Quartet of Mauritania, Algeria, Niger and Mali. Such joint efforts are key to Mauritania’s internal and border security because of the size of the country relative to its available security forces. The Mauritanian Air Force is very small and lacks the capability to consistently oversee the state’s land borders.
It might be thought that some degree of obligation is placed on investors as well to try to alter these circumstances but this remains to be seen until, for example, the PRC more clearly confirms its interest in Mauritanian affairs. Mauritanian elites are aware of the strong Chinese interest in the region and commitment to diversifying its own import suppliers internationally. Mauritania’s position on the Atlantic Coast makes it an attractive point of connection for the PRC which is active in seeking secure loci of exchange for trade throughout Africa. The PRC does appear cognisant of the importance of consolidating the Mauritanian armed forces with President Aziz’s government purchasing two Chinese maritime patrol vessels. This type of investment crucial to forming a secure return on economic links which the PRC has put forward since the early 2000s. Nonetheless, the PRC plans have not consistently come to fruition with a proposed railway allowing for improved access to phosphate deposits not going forward despite the benefits which would likely accrue to Chinese investors as a result.
Reluctance to or limitation on acting in favour of fully exploiting ties with the PRC may relate to Mauritania’s status as a de facto French military hub[] even despite the end of de jure colonial governance. This is a key aspect in the retention of a position of relative deference to French economic and strategic interests in West Africa, serving as a springboard for deployments in Mali, Senegal, Niger etc and French companies’ access to oil reserves. Mauritania is also host to an American military intelligence centre which obliges the political leadership to an extent to follow the course as set by these two Western allies. With the French and American presence the Mauritanian government is supported in terms of security but gives rise to concerns of the state’s ability to pursue a realistically independent path in regional affairs when it is reliant on external powers.
Local states and what might be presumed as regional allies appear to struggle to fully comprehend and exploit their relations with Mauritania and which suggests why the government would be willing to engage more closely with other states. The 2016 Arab League Summit was held in Mauritania but only nine of twenty-two heads of state attended. Such circumstances indicative of the place which Mauritania holds in the perceived hierarchy of Arab League states — Nouakchott is not Dubai. This would have been viewed as a diplomatic snub by President Aziz, yet also with an awareness of the relative draw of Mauritania as one of the poorest Arab states and of perceived limited strategic or economic importance.
If this is the case, it is a short sighted view by other Arab leaders with Mauritania increasingly significant to countering the influence of AQIM and one of the states which forms part of the Saudi led anti-terror coalition. Given Mauritanian government commitments to a stable political order it would seem pragmatic to want to encourage and support its place within the wider Sunni Arab milieu of North Africa.
Slavery in Mauritania
A feature of Mauritanian society which gives rise to concern for some investors and state actors is the assertion that slavery and/or serf-like conditions remain a significant part of day-to-day life and the economy. However, the scale of slavery is difficult to estimate owing to the size of Mauritania geographically and local cultural paradigms which permit indentured labour to continue informally — indeed, it should be emphasised that slavery is technically illegal.
Of all states in West Africa formerly under French administration Mauritania was least impacted and this may be a cause for its persistence. However, there is dispute surrounding how slavery is practised in the nation and the extent to which Mauritania’s strong Sunni Muslim identity permits its continuation. It is suggested that between four to seventeen percent of the population are enslaved so it is far from an insignificant aspect of Mauritanian life. To hasten its removal would also impact on the local economy and social order in ways that may be difficult to predict. An aspect which inhibits reduction is the inherited slave status which passes matrilineally between generations. Given the material poverty affecting the population as a whole slave status may not differ greatly from an economic perspective, than the situation of nomads, pastoralists or peasantry other than the relative freedom of choice of employment.
Mauritania’s strongly Islamic identity passes as a point of rebuke to many states who seek to engage with Mauritania. Popular contemporary concepts in the West of religious freedom are essentially absent from Mauritania and lead to the state’s further relegation from international discourse and the perception of its “backwardness”. This is unfortunate, as precisely the type of engagement which may help alleviate Mauritania’s socio-economic situation is through productive relationships with other states and not ones which pre-suppose a scenario in which Mauritanian society is de-legitimised because of its Islamic identity.
Conclusion
The rate of change which the Mauritanian economy will see over the next decade is tied to willingness to think creatively and strategically in diversifying available resources. This is reliant also on improved work skills education and the “opening up” of the Mauritanian interior.
Engaging with the PRC may see Mauritania permitted a place within the OBOR strategy. It seems that the relationship with France and the USA offers greater support in the immediate to Mauritanian security. However, divergence may emerge as and when Mauritania is better able to develop its own security services through an improved economy which the PRC appears to be well placed to support.
However, China should not be viewed as the sole salve to Mauritanian economic development given its position in an area of instability for both racial and political conflicts and which requires more than material investment to resolve. An over reliance on gold, iron ore and oil can all lead to problems when these commodities drop in price.
Mauritania’s geopolitical position will also depend on how it positions itself in terms of governmental and state structures and for how long it will maintain its identity as an Islamic Republic. If there is sufficient interest in opting for the liberal democratic route this suggests opening up more strongly with Western states whereas engagements with other Arab Sunni led states such as via the Saudi anti-terrorist coalition fit more strongly in the state’s culture and traditions and offers a natural set of interlocutors.
Regardless of how Mauritania develops in these regards it will retain ongoing significance due to its placement in a geographically crucial point of exchange between North and Sub-Saharan Africa as well as on the Atlantic Coast. It might be presumed that, as such, the Arab League would take greater interest in Mauritania especially as a logical point of exchange with the large Muslim populations of West Africa for both religious and economic purposes.
