The Royal Saudi Navy as a tool of geopolitics and security policy
The Royal Saudi Navy (RSN) as an actor in foreign and security policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has grown of increasing significance in the last eighteen months having held a strong role in operations in the Yemen war. Yemen is, effectively, the southern flank of the Saudi sphere of influence in the Middle East and entry point to North-East Africa across the Red Sea. Ensuring the Yemeni government is well disposed to the KSA is of substantial importance to the Saudi strategic position.
The conflict has continued longer than had been predicted and appears to have no likely resolution in the short to medium term. The conflict has become more than a local war and is now part and representative of a broader Sunni-Shia clash of ideas over which ethno-religious culture and identity should predominate in the Middle East whether under Saudi (Arab) or Iranian (Persian) leadership. Countering the influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Gulf and wider Middle East is in part reliant on the strength of Saudi maritime forces as the Iranian navy is itself large with a variety of capabilities: submarines, fast missile boats, a strong conventional surface fleet and supported by the Iranian strategic missile forces.
The RSN’s integration as part of KSA armed forces’ deployments in southern Arabia is suggestive of the more prominent role which it will come to hold in future Saudi foreign and defence policy. Until the start of the Yemen war the RSN had not been utilised on a large scale in line with the Saudi security agenda since the 1990/1991 Gulf War.
A technologically advanced and large navy is essential to KSA border security and defence policy due to the geographical length of the Saudi coastline and territorial position across four strategic and commercial transport points which dictates the importance of maritime power to continuing Saudi influence in West Asia. These transport nodes of (1) the Red Sea and Suez Canal, (2) the Bab al-Mandab Strait and Horn of Africa, (3) Arabian Sea and (4) Persian Gulf/Strait of Hormuz are all of substantial geopolitical significance internationally and the ability to ensure their security is critical to the petroleum industry and energy supplies for states throughout Asia, Africa and beyond.[1]
It is in this overarching context that the RSN acts to help sustain Saudi influence, to secure the Kingdom’s maritime border and free-flow of trade and movement around the Arabian peninsula.
Structure of the RSN
Of all the Gulf Co-operation Council navies the RSN is the most well developed and largest.[2] Apart from the GCC navies the RSN’s principal rival in size and technological development is the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRIN).
The core vessels of the RSN fleet are seven French built frigates and four corvettes of American construction. There are also three minesweepers and nine large patrol boats.
The ships are based either in Jeddah (Western Fleet) or Jubail (Eastern Fleet) with the naval headquarters in Riyadh. A further naval facility is planned for construction in Djibouti. The latter’s construction is tied into KSA interests in extending geopolitical influence to East and Sub-Saharan Africa. The base will also be used to extend war fighting capabilities against the Houthis who, it is thought, are receiving arms supplies smuggled via nearby Somalia.
Saudi and other GCC navies are to a large extent in the shadow of the US Navy and to a lesser extent British and French navies, whose forces in the region act to a large degree as a guarantee of GCC maritime security. Nonetheless, there is some concern that Western states do not sufficiently oppose what Sunni led monarchies regard as the detrimental influence of Iran in West Asia as the Islamic Republic alters the local geopolitical status quo.
Two chief areas of weakness in terms of the RSN’s warfare capabilities are (1) a lack of submarines and (2) the relative age of the majority of its surface vessels.
1. Submarines have been under consideration for purchase since the 1990s but it is only relatively recently (from 2012) that more confirmed efforts to advance this new branch of the RSN have taken place. It appears likely that German or French manufactured vessels will be considered.[3] Submarine procurement reflects longstanding Saudi concern about matching the military and strategic influence of Iran and maintaining the capability to secure its interests in the Persian Gulf in the event of war. The Iranian navy is the only regional force capable of challenging the RSN and has a particular advantage over the Saudis in having an established submarine branch and varied inventory of Russian (Kilo diesel electric) and Iranian made (Fateh, Besat, Nahang semi-heavy to small and midget) submarines. Whilst RSN surface vessels would likely defeat their equivalents in the IRIN in a battle in the open sea, at this time there is a strategic gap in RSN capabilities in submarine and anti-submarine warfare.
2. The relative age of the majority of RSN vessels will hinder war-fighting capabilities with all but three of its frigates, and all of its corvettes and patrol boats dating to the 1980s. In the event of a sustained period of naval conflict or desire to impose a blockade in the Gulf, Red Sea or Yemeni coast, for example, wear and tear of older vessels would rapidly begin to show.
Future developments
The relative surprise at the ongoing Houthi resistance (albeit with Iranian backing) to the Saudi led intervention could well lead to a wider strategic rethink for rejuvenating aspects of the Saudi armed forces in general, but especially the navy. This was apparent following the January 2017 attack on the RSN frigate Al-Madinah which saw the deaths of two Saudi sailors. The attack, launched by the Houthis, had been disputed as to the cause: whether suicide bomber via small boat, unmanned “drone” boat or anti-ship missile. That there was dispute about this may point to concern of RSN ability to contain asymmetric threats and thus a need for greater numbers of patrol vessels to meet the challenges of a “swarm” of suicide or drone attack boats. Alternatively, if it was a missile attack, to consider whether RSN surface-to-air missile and other counter-measures are as effective as hoped in containing this type of attack. This would be of particular importance to the RSN in any future combat with Iranian naval forces. A substantial aspect of Iranian naval tactics are dedicated to utilising small fast missile boats as well as ground launched anti-ship missiles from the south-west coast of Iran.
Nevertheless, this is the first such incident to effect the RSN so, perhaps, we should not read too much into the event and consider it as an aspect of relatively limited combat readiness or experience of the Al-Madinah’s crew. Nonetheless, it does suggest a need for a re-consideration of dealing with such type of threats to the larger vessels in the RSN.
There has, in general, been substantial thought given to how the RSN might progress as a leading regional force. The second Saudi Naval Expansion Programme (SNEP-II) envisions a total investment of up to $20 billion and with an especial focus on upgrading and expanding the Eastern Fleet — i.e. that which is closest to Iran. New surface vessel needs including frigates and corvettes will likely come from the USA with plans already in place for forty-eight fast patrol boats from Germany’s Luerssen dockyard.
Because of Saudi geographical position and territory until such a time as it extends maritime forces beyond the Middle East on a regular basis Saudi territory acts a as “natural” aircraft carrier and permits it to extend air power in the crucial strategic areas of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. Investing in a large aircraft carrier then may only take place in the next evolution of the RSN —a potential SNEP-III.
Conclusion
The Saudi naval situation in general terms is relatively strong but, if it is to retain its position within the Gulf context, the KSA will need to procure newer vessels and consider in more detail what role the RSN will play in future foreign policy and security actions. If the KSA sees itself as continuing to extend support to Sunni allies more widely — for example in North-East Africa — a more well rounded navy will need to emerge with greater provision for landing craft and troop transports. With the substantial use of helicopters in the Saudi Air Force and Army a helicopter carrier (LHD) might also be useful to permit further close air support for Saudi troops.
Notes
[1] A fifth strategic point, although not integral to Saudi state security per se, is the protection of the pilgrim route for the Hajj. Pilgrims generally arrive by air direct to Mecca, however, the proximity of the port of Jeddah (c.40 miles) means it is a transport link utilised by some Muslims travelling from East Africa. The Arabian peninsula as the site of the origins of Islam must be sufficiently protected for the KSA to retain legitimacy as the “guardian state” of many aspects of Muslim tradition.
[2] Other GCC members are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the UAE. The UAE Navy is, other than the RSN, perhaps the most technologically capable and going through a period of expansion.
[3] It seems probable that the French Scorpene class will be bought as the Royal Malaysian Navy is considering offering submarine training to the Saudis. The Malaysian Navy has traditionally utilised French submarines and currently has two Scorpenes in its fleet. That Malaysia is like the KSA a predominantly Sunni Muslim state may also prove a determining factor in who the Saudis engage with for training support.
