Why We Use the Scientific Framework

Synoptic Problem: Markan Priority Defies Logic (Part 3/13)

Kearlan Lawrence
The Illogic of Markan Priority
12 min readJun 29, 2022

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The Scientific Method Is Our Framework

As discussed previously, there are several other hypotheses that have been advanced over the years, and we cannot evaluate all of them. So how do we choose what to examine? Right out of the gate, we’re in a quandary. Do we: a) address all possible explanations and analyze those or b) make our best effort to limit our analysis to only those hypotheses which are testable (i.e. falsifiable)? There is merit to option a in that the “true” and complete answer is likely more complicated than any testable theory could reasonably provide. But if that’s the case, such an answer also untestable, and ultimately unknowable. Thus, for a proposed solution to have any defensibility, the obvious answer is option b. Alas, the scientific method.

If one rejects the premise that the scientific method (i.e. proposing hypotheses that can be tested and rejected/accepted based on evidence) is the tool that should be used to analyze proposed solutions to the Synoptic Problem, then the rest of this review should be set aside. Because without such a framework for the analysis, any answers put forth are “veridically worthless”¹ anyway. There’s simply no reason for anyone else to care what conclusions one reaches without those answers being amenable to examination and disproof.

Logic Is Our Tool

If the scientific method is the nail, then logic is the hammer for formulating persuasive arguments. We’ll go over some basic logic concepts, but we won’t conduct a full course on logic here. For the sake of brevity, I’ve called out some of the underlying assumptions that we’ll be using in our analyses. Some of these will be explored in more detail than others. I see these as non-controversial for our purposes, but feel free to challenge any of them!

Assumptions We’ll Be Making

Table 1 — Table of Assumptions

In our analyses, we’ll be taking a number of assumptions for granted. The most important ones are listed in Table 1 above. We’ve repeatedly discussed our bias toward falsifiability, and also Occam’s Razor. Others will be covered to varying degrees as we go, but it’s worth fleshing out some a bit further now.

The Importance of Consistency

When making logical arguments, consistency is essential. Not only does consistency help avoid fallacies, but it also makes arguments stronger. Here is an example of a typical inconsistency:

  1. We can’t trust the author attributions of the Gospels, despite the fact that all extant manuscripts, including the earliest, consistently contain the same attributions
  2. We can trust that the original ending of Mark does not include 16: 9–20 because it was not found in the earliest extant manuscripts

Do you see the issue? This is the type of inconsistency that riddles Biblical scholarship and truly does a disservice everyone. I recognize that there are arguments independent of those in the example above that can be made to strengthen/weaken these assertions, but the assertions themselves cannot simultaneously be given equal weight. In this example, focusing alone on the principle of “earliest extancy,” we must choose one or the other point of view in our arguments: a) either earliest extancy strengthens a case or b) earliest extancy is insignificant. Whatever we choose, we cannot try to argue both selectively where it works for our arguments.²

There Are Consequences

It goes without saying that choosing a “logical” approach to solving the Synoptic Problem has implications. First, there are theological implications. For example, a possible explanation for the similarities could be that they all represent the inerrant Word of God, transcribed faithfully by the writers of these Gospels. Nothing here should be read in any way as trivializing or eliminating that possibility, or related ones. We’ve just made a decision not to factor that assumption into our arguments since it’s, by definition, fundamentally non-falsifiable.

A second implication is even broader, in that myriad possibilities exist that could — like the theological explanations — also be true. For example, an accurately recorded set of precisely retained oral traditions, or even the non-zero possibility of pure coincidence. Again, nothing here should be read as discounting these as the potential “truest” answers. For instance, the significant contribution of oral tradition is well-studied and accepted. That is conceded and included in our analyses.³ Again, the reason these possibilities must be excluded from our analyses of the evidence is that they are non-falsifiable with the current set of evidence we have. For example, even if it was oral tradition alone what was the source for the uncanny Synoptic similarities, we only have extant written material available upon which to test that theory; i.e., have no way of disproving that oral tradition alone explains the similarities.

I recognize that even these clarifications will be controversial to some, and that I’ve started from the admittedly biased position that the scientific method is the framework required for the analysis here. Again, if one disagrees with this approach, then the rest of this review will be of no value.

Types of Logic Reasoning

Since we’ll be making logical arguments here, we’ll cover the basic categories of logical reasoning. Again, we cannot possibly cover all there is to know about logic,³ but we’ll touch on some highlights below.

Syllogism

Syllogism typically refers to an approach with logical arguments using two premises to deductively arrive at a conclusion. The premises are presumed to be true, and the conclusion flows deductively from those premises. The structure can be elucidated in the following example:

  • General Premise: All roses are red
  • Observation (Specific Premise): This flower is a rose
  • Conclusion: This flower is red

With standard syllogisms, the conclusion flows deductively and must be true where the premises are true. Syllogism however can be used with other, non-deductive, forms of logical reasoning, albeit with differing strengths of the conclusions. For our purposes, we will try to construct our arguments in syllogistic form wherever possible, even when the reasoning is not deductive.

Deductive Reasoning

For standard logic, there are generally three types of logical reasoning that are recognized. The first is deductive reasoning. Deductive arguments flow from general premises to a specific conclusion; a conclusion that must true if the premises are true. The classic example is: all men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal. There is no other conclusion possible if the preceding premises are true. Deductive arguments (in the form of syllogism) like this one are always preferred where they are available.

Inductive Reasoning

The next type of logical reasoning is inductive. Inductively reasoned arguments flow from specific observations to a general conclusion which is probably true, but not certainly so. For example: Every Monday this year, the woman was at the train station, today is Monday, therefore the woman will be at the train station today. This conclusion is probable, and becomes more probable with more observations, data points, evidence, etc. But it is not certain. Today, the woman might not be at the station.

Humans use inductive reasoning all the time whether we are aware of it or not. That said, we’re unlikely to rely on it much here. However, this type of “predictive” reasoning will be helpful to us here where we have patterns of data that suggest a probable hypothesis worthy of further testing.

Abductive Reasoning

The final type of reasoning we will be using here is called “abductive.” An abductive argument makes the best prediction based on the available evidence. Abductive arguments aim to eliminate less viable conclusions from consideration. For example: all cats are blue animals, Fluffy is a blue animal, therefore Fluffy is a cat. This conclusion is potentially true, however it is not certain. Fluffy could be some animal other than a cat. Still between the choice that, say, Fluffy is a dog and the choice that Fluffy is a cat, the latter is preferred. Without more data, the dog hypothesis is less viable than the cat one and should not be favored. This does not mean the dog hypothesis is false or wrong. Rather, it’s that without more data that hypothesis is more speculative than the cat one. If one wishes to pursue it, one would need more evidence (e.g. evidence that Fluffy barks rather than meows, etc.).

Abductive reasoning is common in forensic cases and medicine. For example if a detective arrives on burglary scene with all the entry points locked, but sees a broken first floor window, they would argue that entry and exit through that window was the best theory given the evidence. Even though that would not be a certain conclusion, it would be preferred to arguing that the perpetrator entered through the heavily locked door (even though that improbable conclusion remains “possible”). For our work here, we will be relying heavily on abductive reasoning in identifying the best arguments for the evidence available.

Table 2 — Logical Reasoning Examples

Understanding Our Reasoning

What’s critical for our purposes here is that we know when and where to use each form of logical reasoning and what it means. For instance, shouldn’t be making certain, deductive conclusions when we’re in an inductive or abductive reasoning situation. Already, this should draw attention to statements such as “Markan Priority is settled.” At best, that’s a hypothesis that’s been arrived at abductively. And given the presence of substantial evidence supporting other viable theories, the most anyone should say about it is that it’s more likely true than not. The difference between more likely true than not and certainly true may seem trivial to some people, but it’s major. Certainly true shuts the door on alternatives, while more likely true does not.

Beware the Logical Fallacy

As important as the underlying assumptions in Table 1 above are, it’s arguably more important to have a critical eye for logical fallacies. A logical fallacy is where one uses faulty reasoning in forming arguments. Fallacies can often be difficult to spot (and we will address some major ones that seem to have been missed by synoptic scholars later on). For now, the table below can be used as a quick primer the ones we’ll be keeping an eye out for. This table is not meant to be complete, and there are myriad online resources if you’re interested in a deeper dive.

Table 3 — Common Logical Fallacies

Illogical Doesn’t Mean Wrong Per Se

Just because we find an argument to be illogical, or alogical, doesn’t mean the conclusion cannot be true. As very simple example, we return to Fluffy: All cats are blue, Fluffy is either a cat or a dog, therefore Fluffy is blue. This proof fails logically in that the conclusion does not flow from the premises. However, that does not eliminate the very real possibility that Fluffy is, in fact, blue.

When we arrive at invalid arguments here, we must remain mindful that such invalidation does not mean the conclusions are certainly false. Thus when I argue that the arguments for Markan Priority are invalid, that does not per se mean that Mark could not have been first. For the record, nothing here eliminates that possibility (though we’ll see why it should be demoted behind the far stronger argument for Matthean Priority).

Don’t Fear Boogeymen

Before we leave this section, we need to call out some points of view that are not necessarily fallacious in and of themselves, but are no less pernicious. These are often hidden biases that come from a fear of what I call “boogymen.” Boogeymen fears don’t appear directly in the arguments themselves, but they lurk in the shadows and tacitly lead scholars to fallacious reasoning. That is whenever these monsters “threaten” an appearance, many scholars try to reassuringly explain them away.

Table 4 — Synoptic Boogeymen. This is admittedly a bit tongue-in-cheek. As we progress, it will become clearer that regardless of one’s take on the above, these boogeymen have little bearing on the logical analyses here.

Here’s a quick example of how the boogeymen fears can play out.

  1. Premise: Peter was an eyewitness to Jesus
  2. Observation: Peter was the source for stories in Mark’s Gospel (Church Fathers)
  3. Observation: Mark’s Gospel tried to faithfully record what Peter relayed (Church Fathers)
  4. Conclusion: Mark’s Gospel is likely an eyewitness account of Jesus

Boogeymen Fears Should Be Put Out In the Open

Without getting into the validity of the argument itself, the Boogeymen fears come in when analyzing the observations (and occasionally, the premises). For example, there is evidence that Papias claimed that Mark was the interpreter of Peter and that “Mark recorded, not in order, all that he remembered…” A valid attack on this evidence would be to present evidence as to why we shouldn’t accept the account of Papias (e.g. no extant writings of Papias himself survive, etc.). But it would be invalid to tacitly reject the argument above because one is unwilling to accept the possibility that eyewitnesses could have written the Gospels, or that the writers weren’t recalling their truth, etc. Premises and observations should be analyzed on their merits, and if a boogeyman is impacting that analyses, it should be called out explicitly.

Boogeymen Fears Lead to Unpersuasive Analyses

There are two more problems with the boogeyman perspective. First, until proven otherwise, these aren’t boogeymen at all. They are real possibilities that shouldn’t be categorically discounted. In fact, they should be presumed true unless there is specific, logically coherent reason to argue otherwise (and then those arguments should be put forth for scrutiny). Second, even if these are boogeymen, the reassuring rationales are too conclusory to be probative (again, without testable arguments supporting them). In short, without more, we shouldn’t be coloring our analyses with speculative, unvalidated biases. If these assumptions are necessary, they should be included in any proofs or counter arguments, otherwise they are worthless. In short, simply rejecting any argument where one sees a “boogeyman” is de facto fallacious.

A Quick Word on Biblical Criticism

The concept of trying to interpret what the Bible text says, how it got to be that way, what sources contributed to that, where they came from and when can be broadly grouped under the heading of “literary criticism.” I am far from an expert on this subject. And we will not get into detail on the major schools of criticism here, but as background, they include broadly: 1) source criticism which tries to find the source of the original materials used to develop a text, 2) redaction criticism which examines how texts were assembled by their authors, editors, etc., 3) textual criticism which aims to find the most original or authoritative text and understand what it said, and 4) form criticism which attempts to classify texts by a literary pattern (e.g. pericopae, parable, psalm, etc.).⁴

We’re most focused here on the types of questions source criticism focuses on: who, what, when, where, and why was it written? And while there is no general formula for determining what information is best, there are some generally accepted principles that are understood by all Biblical scholars. The following principles are by no means exhaustive, and many conform to our common sense. However, they will be of some relevance here, so I’ve called out a few⁵:

  • Proximity: The closer a source is the the event it claims to describe, the more reliable that source generally is for providing an accurate description of the event
  • Credibility: If a number of independent sources contain the same message, the credibility of the message is strongly increased
  • Bias. The tendency of a source is its motivation for providing some kind of bias. Tendencies should be minimized or supplemented with opposite motivations. If it can be demonstrated that the witness (or source) has no direct interest in creating bias, the credibility of the message is increased.
  • Originality: A given source may be forged or corrupted; strong indications of the originality of the source increases its reliability
  • Unanimity: If the sources all agree about an event, historians can consider the event proved
  • Eyewitnesses: Eyewitnesses are, in general, to be preferred especially in circumstances where the ordinary observer could have accurately reported what transpired and, more specifically, when they deal with facts known by most contemporaries

Later, we’ll very briefly (and admittedly cursorily) examine literary critical arguments where they are made. As we’ll see, most of the arguments of this type that are put forth by the proponents of any of the Synoptic Problem theories are reversible (i.e. can be argued in the other direction) and/or circular (i.e. they presume the conclusion they aim to prove). As such, they mostly serve to add support to an already-advanced conclusion, but they have limited persuasive value on the issue of priority standing on their own.

Next up, we’ll discuss how we test logical arguments (Part 4/13).

[1]: “Claims that cannot be tested, assertions immune to disproof are veridically worthless, whatever value they may have in inspiring us or in exciting our sense of wonder.” Sagan, Carl. The Demon-Haunted World: Science As a Candle in the Dark, p. 157. New York: Random House, 1995.

[2]: Some might be saying that both statements in the example can be true. Indeed, that is the case. There may be reasons, for example, to doubt Mark’s ending while also holding to the importance of earliest extancy generally or otherwise. But that’s not the point here. The issue we’re looking out for here are the situations where such inconsistencies manifest absent of such distinguishing analyses.

[3]: For a good beginner’s guide to logical reasoning, I recommend Logic: A Complete Introduction by Siu-Fan Lee.

[4]: Mckenzie, Steven L., and Stephen R. Haynes. To Each Its Own Meaning: An Introduction to Biblical Criticisms and Their Application (“To Each Its Own”), p. 35. Westminster: John Knox Press, 1999.

[5]Howell, Martha C., Prevenier, Walter. From Reliable Sources: An Introduction to Historical Methods, pp. 70–71. United Kingdom: Cornell University Press, 2001; also citing Thurén, Torsten. (1997). Källkritik. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell (source not verified)

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Kearlan Lawrence
The Illogic of Markan Priority

I write on a variety of topics under the nomme de guerre Kearlan Lawrence.