Montaigne and the Quality of Mercy

Ethical and Political Themes in the Essais

In his book entitled Montaigne and the Quality of Mercy, David Quint, a well-published scholar on comparative literature, analyzes all three of versions of Michel de Montaigne’s seminal book Essais showing his readers the philosophical development that Montaigne went through as he slowly developed his ideas on the most appropriate moral doctrine that he hoped would bridge the gulf between power and mercy — at least for his time period, a period defined by the French Wars of Religion (1562–98). Being a comparative scholar, Quint also analyzes the texts that Montaigne himself had analyzed and critiques them within the context of Montaigne’s search for the most appropriate moral doctrine when one is faced with the dilemma, as a victor, to show mercy to the vanquished. Essentially, Quint reveals how Montaigne had eventually come to the conclusion that only the existence of an overarching sovereign authority would temper the highly volatile political environment inherent in a feudal society defined by mutual obligations and reciprocity.

Quint structured his book by dividing Montaigne’s ideas into four chapters, each containing his analysis of Montaigne’s individual essays, and each building on the ideas of the preceding ones. In the first chapter entitled “Clemency and Revenge: The First Essay and Its Place in Montaigne’s Book,” Quint starts by introducing his readers to Montaigne’s main concern: “By which tactic can soften the heart of your foe and save your life: by humble submission that seeks to stir pity and commiseration, or by a brave defiance and constancy that will impress your foe with your valor?” (Quint 3) Quint explores Montaigne’s view on valour, particularly on whether or not the submission of the vanquished necessarily elicits mercy from the victor. In this chapter, Quint shows how Montaigne, in the fashion of the classical Greek philosophers, tried to reconcile various aspects of mercy and valour through his analysis of various historical examples. In particular, Quint explores the virtues and pitfalls of Stoicism. Quint is particularly diligent in showing how over the course of Montaigne’s analysis, he constantly challenges his original assumptions, with the results constantly threatened of being disproved or challenged by another example. For instance, Quint demonstrates how Montaigne highlighted the importance of having complete faith in one’s constitution and conviction — the prerequisites to individualism (and Stoicism) — only to be contradicted by examples showing the pitfalls of unyielding conviction.

The second chapter entitled “Cruelty and Noblesse: ‘De la cruauté’ and Couardise mere de la cruauté’” delves into the idea that humans have the ability to control their passions — the ability for mercy and kindness — because they have free will. Here, Quint shows his readers how Montaigne sought to change the aristocratic culture by listing the many traditions which he thought are leading them to acts of cruelty: hunting (Quint 63–65), the duel (Quint 69), the art of fencing (Quint 71).

In the third chapter entitled “The Culture That Cannot Pardon: ‘Des Cannibales’ in the Larger Essais,” Quint shows how Montaigne used historical and contemporary examples to demonstrate the similarities between the French Wars of Religion — the religious war between Protestants and Catholics, and the French nobility’s incapacity to pardon — to the “intransigent religious zealots, Roman gladiators, and Brazilian cannibals” (Quint 76).

In the fourth chapter entitled “An Ethics of Yielding: ‘De l’art de conferer’ and ‘De la phisionimie,’” Quint merges all the ideas contained in the previous three chapters and reveals how Montaigne was an optimist and was a fierce believer in humanity’s capacity for clemency (Quint 131–135). Quint also shows how Montaigne had advanced beyond the unyielding belief of Stoicism and was able to reach a middle-position on which the Stoic notion of “superhuman self-control” is melded with the introspective notion that acknowledges one’s “human weakness” (Quint 120). Furthermore, Quint has alluded in the last few pages of the fourth chapter how Montaigne’s ideas are reminiscent of Machiavelli’s realpolitik (Quint 143). In contrast to Machiavelli, however, Montaigne was more optimistic of human nature; that is, Montaigne believed that humans are better persuaded by a mixture of clemency and force, or a mixture compassion and coercion (Quint 143). In other words, Montaigne had reached the same conclusion as Machiavelli but Montaigne, or at least Quint’s portrayal of Montaigne, seems to have not pushed the idea to its logical endpoint, which is ultimately how one could achieve power and keep that power, for one could argue that one could only be truly be merciful when one is in the position of the victor, or in a position of power.

If analyzed as a whole, therefore, Quint’s analyses of Montaigne’s Essais is ultimately a study of how mercy is applied by people on different levels of power, from the imperial power of Nero and Alexander the Great to the more limited power held by the Stoics, cannibals, and philosophers. In relation to their enemies, these people could be seen as essentially exercising whatever power they have, and some are therefore privileged to have the power to accord mercy while others only have the misfortune of accepting their fate in the face of such a power imbalance. Basically, Quint demonstrates how Montaigne had discovered that violence and mercy are both manifestations of power, that these two opposing ideas are linked by the same fabric known as power. To overcome this destructive tension, Montaigne prescribed the need for an overarching power — a sovereign authority. Montaigne’s prescription, however, returns to the ultimate goal which is the acquisition of ultimate power, the power that some would reserve to a deity, and others to a “divinely ordained” sovereign power.

In the end, Quint shows how Montaigne’s came to the realization that morality is created by power and that it is similarly destroyed by power. The only solution, therefore, was a political one in the form of a sovereign who is given the overarching authority and privilege of being obeyed so that it could create the environment necessary to achieve some form of peace. Montaigne’s advocacy for such an overarching political-religious authority is essentially the idea that would later be witnessed through the gradual formation of the nation-state — a centralized system of governance that departs from the feudal system of Montaigne’s time period (Quint 104–108). In Quint’s analysis, Montaigne essentially argues that everyone needs to have control over themselves in order to voluntarily submit oneself to a sovereign; and it does not necessarily mean that there is something special to the sovereign for being in such a privileged position. The point is that Montaigne simply sees the sovereign as symbolizing the overarching authority that is needed in society for it to achieve peace and political order, just as Thomas Hobbes depicts the sovereign as the head of a symbolic body politic (Quint 117–118).

Quint has arguably written an excellent commentary of Montaigne’s views on the relationship between power and mercy, but he did so in a way that is rather unreasonably convoluted, at least in the first chapter. For instance, Quint includes a whole block of text from a certain passage of a classical text that Montaigne had cited in order to show his readers the context upon which Montaigne had based his analysis on (Quint 10–11). In a way, it is useful in elaborating on Montaigne’s ideas, but it is nevertheless limited in its utility for critical analysis. Also, the reader of Quint’s commentary must always be vigilant since it is very easy to confuse Quint’s commentary of Montaigne’s work, with Montaigne’s commentary of the ancient texts, and Quint’s commentary of the ancient texts that Montaigne had cited and analyzed. This is made even more complicated by the fact that Quint has added his analysis of Montaigne’s two further revisions of his book, which he labels as B and C, each of which contains a further set of classical examples which Montaigne had analyzed and which Quint has also analyzed.

There is, of course, a logic to all of this complexity. Indeed, the whole book is Quint’s meticulous attempt to extract the very gist of Montaigne’s arguments. Considering that some of Montaigne’s ideas changed in the successive B and C (second and third) versions of his book, it is therefore only appropriate for Quint to add these new (sometimes contradictory) ideas to his analysis. Unfortunately, the fact that Quint has blended many of his analyses within a few pages makes for a quite confusing read. This is made even more difficult by Quint’s abrupt introduction of parallel examples that are not necessarily from Montaigne’s ideas but are from the secondary examples that were used by Montaigne (Quint 13). For example, within a span of a few pages Quint would be discussing the secondary source that Montaigne had used to deliver a point, but then he would insert a completely new secondary source which he sees as corroborating with Montaigne’s new ideas though it is not necessarily in harmony with the whole analysis. Arguably, such commentaries would have been a better added as a footnote than as part of the body of the chapter (Quint 13–14). Nevertheless, once one overcomes the challenging first chapter, the rest should be easier to comprehend.

In conclusion, Quint’s analyses are quite thorough and understandable enough for his readers to be able to determine his understanding of Montaigne’s Essais. Considering that I have yet to read Montaigne’s Essais itself, it would be presumptuous of me to criticize the content of Quint’s analysis for any inaccuracy. On the most superficial level, however, readers are given ample endnotes for further research. However, novice readers may find it difficult to penetrate Quint’s commentary of Montaigne’s work without first learning Thomas Hobbes, Niccolo Machiavelli, and other Western philosophers since it does require some prior knowledge to understand why Montaigne had arrived at a fairly similar conclusion as the aforementioned scholars. Other readers may have other opinions, but Quint’s writing seems to suggest that Montaigne simply went on a more circuitous route using Socratic questioning, delving deeper and deeper into his inquiry, often contradicting his initial findings, but nevertheless reaching the same conclusion as Hobbes and Machiavelli.