Taiwan’s Relatively Peaceful Transition to Democracy: The Positive Effects of Geopolitics from 1949–1987
The relationship between geopolitics and democratization has always been evident, but what is less evident is why some countries transition from authoritarianism to democracy much more peacefully than others. Taiwan is a case in point. In contrast to its East Asian neighbours, Taiwan’s transition to democracy from 1949 to 1987 — which is the period between the relocation of the Kuomintang (KMT) to the island and the end of martial law — is arguably much more peaceful than either South Korea or the Philippines. In the latter cases, the events leading up to their democratization are often highlighted by mass uprisings, bloody acts of repression, and politically-motivated assassinations. There are multiple theories regarding Taiwan’s relatively peaceful transition: rising middle class, an enlightened leadership, strong party politics, managed transition, etc. — factors which partly explain Taiwan’s relatively peaceful democratization; but they are focused mostly on Taiwan’s domestic political environment. Likewise, theories regarding the role of globalization and the increasing importance of the international human rights regime are important international factors, but these forces ultimately played a very marginal role in Taiwan’s democratization and they certainly do not explain why it was a relatively peaceful transition. The key therefore is to find a middle-ground explanation which combines the role of domestic forces and international forces. Based on this idea, this paper will argue that it was the KMT’s capacity to act on geopolitical realities and its competence to anticipate future challenges by instituting political liberalization policies which eventually led to a conducive environment primed for a peaceful transition from authoritarianism to democracy.
To be clear, geopolitics alone does not provide the best explanation for Taiwan’s peaceful transition to democracy; therefore, the primary purpose of this paper is to simply highlight and analyze, using empirical evidence, the positive effects that geopolitics has had on Taiwan’s leadership and their political decisions in the three-decades leading up to Taiwan’s formal transition to democracy. This means that this paper will focus its level of analysis on the national and international level. Consequently, this paper will not differentiate between General Chiang Kai-shek (CKS) and President Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK), only that they were leaders of the KMT during the 1949–1988 period. Any discussion of their decisions are therefore lumped under the monolithic KMT regime. There are obviously serious problems in doing this, particularly when one is discussing the KMT regime’s dynamism and its sprawling bureaucracy, but these issues should not affect the integrity of the argument premised on the effects of geopolitics on the KMT. Also, any mention of the United States (U.S.) or the People’s Republic of China (PRC) implies only their national governments, chiefly the decisions made by the executive branch. As well, there will be no discussion of the international human rights regime and its effects on Taiwan’s democratization process since the topic is simply too broad for this paper to cover.
As with any political process, it is important to note that democratization is distinct from liberalization. The former, which is typically based — though not exclusively — on the notion of representative democracy, means a more inclusive, participatory, responsive, and accountable government where all political parties and citizens are given their full civil, political rights and human rights, enshrined within a popularly approved constitution; while the latter, often employed by authoritarian regimes, shows some degree of tolerance for freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and even opposition politicians, but the ruling regime nevertheless “do not relinquish ultimate control” (Jacobs 5). Oftentimes, these two political ideas are confused and this leads to disappointment among the public who finds that what they thought of initially as democratization was really only political liberalization.
Legitimacy and the KMT’s raison d’être
To understand the role of geopolitics in Taiwan’s democratization, one must first consider the KMT’s structure and history and its raison d’être in Taiwan. These are important factors since these essentially formed the bedrock of Taiwan’s peaceful transition to democracy. Of particular interest is Taiwan’s governmental arrangement. From 1949 up until the mid-1980s, the KMT has ruled Taiwan like a ‘country’ but officially perceives it as a ‘province’ of China. At its core, the KMT divided the government into two-layers: “the central government (which also claimed, but of course did not actually rule, the provinces of mainland China) and a provincial government for Taiwan itself” (Rigger, “Voting for Democracy” 6). Such an arrangement was borne out of Taiwan’s post-Chinese Civil War history.
After the KMT’s defeat in the sanguinary Chinese Civil War, which lasted from 1946 to 1949, millions of KMT forces, civilians and soldiers, crossed the Taiwan Strait and settled into the small island. They all had a singular mission in mind: to build up the necessary military capacity and resources for the eventual resumption of war on the mainland. In the face of its defeat, however, the KMT’s main preoccupation gradually shifted from warfare to survival. Concurrent to this preoccupation with survival was the realization that it would also become responsible in governing the local Taiwanese population, which entails the need to create the impression that it is the sole legitimate government. This was the KMT’s raison d’être.
Evidently, the KMT knew early on that the PRC would do anything to undermine its legitimacy.[1] After all, the civil war has actually never been formally ended. Therefore, during the early years of the KMT’s leadership, the prime object was political and social stability. Outlined in the 1947 Constitution was the basis for the decades-long martial law, which was officially declared in 1949. It stipulates “that all freedoms and rights may be restricted by law ‘for reasons of averting an imminent crisis, maintaining social order, or advancing the general welfare’” (Copper 1). Naturally, this preoccupation with stability also extended to the economy. For instance, the KMT strived to reign in on the hyperinflation in the 1950s by using mainland China’s foreign currency reserves to establish a gold-standard reserve currency to back up the newly created New Taiwan Dollars (Brown, Hempson-Jones, and Pennisi 3).
Therefore, over the course of its authoritarian rule, the KMT strived to differentiate itself from the PRC by focusing on making Taiwan its model province — one which is based on constitutional democracy — for the whole of China (Nathan and Ho 39). This aim was further advanced by CCK by the time he became premier in 1972 when he allowed more political participation and political liberalization by “recruiting more Taiwanese to party membership and government posts, and allowing somewhat more freedom of speech” (Nathan and Ho 50). At its zenith in the mid-1980s, “party membership almost reached almost 18 percent of the entire adult male population” (Chu 46–47). Ultimately, this was part of CCK’s plan to shift the KMT from one primarily dominated by mainland Chinese (the vanguard) to a party led by the local Taiwanese (Chu 46). Through constant adaptation and reform, the KMT has eventually created a political environment in which political inclusion is valued over exclusion, an important pre-requisite to a peaceful democratic transition.
Reforms and Constant Reassessments and Transformations
In the years after 1949, the KMT passed a series of reforms which it hoped would demonstrate to the local population its enlightened and benevolent intentions. Among these reforms are (1) the continuation of the tradition, first established under the Japanese, of having regular local elections, (2) the KMT’s promise of eventual democratization, (3) land reform, (4) education reforms, and (5) the promise of economic development (Chao and Myers 390, 387, 388, 409). Unintentionally, or perhaps, intentionally, these measures ultimately linked the KMT’s legitimacy, as well as its survival, to its capacity to successfully deliver these promises.
In retrospect, one could argue that the KMT’s survival was really only assured when the Korean War (1950–53) led the U.S. to provide Taiwan the necessary aid it required for its military and economic development. Note that this U.S. guarantee was only provided once Taiwan became a crucial element to the Cold War arena. During this period of U.S. support, the KMT received US$4 billion annually throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. In one account, US$1.5 billion of this aid was invested on industrial development and the rest went to the military (Brown, Hempson-Jones, and Pennisi 4). Also note that the KMT was still very much focused on the re-conquest of the mainland during this period and so it was more preoccupied with propping up its military than in making Taiwan an economic powerhouse. With all these investments on the military, however, it is therefore curious that the military somehow never attempted to take over the government during the more than three-decade of martial law. Instead, it simply allowed itself to be “depoliticized” by the KMT; that is, the military’s role in policing, governance, as well as indoctrination was gradually removed. Over the 1980s, civilian leadership eventually took complete control over the military, and this is probably one of the most important reasons why Taiwan had such an orderly transition to democracy (Hood 76–77; Rigger, “Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Taiwan” 10). Although interesting, this is neither within the scope of nor directly pertinent to this paper.
Another geopolitical change came in 1969 in the form of U.S. President Nixon and his Nixon Doctrine. Borne out of the U.S. debacle in the Vietnam War, the doctrine was a partial departure from the much more “hands-on” Truman Doctrine.[2] The Nixon Doctrine stresses that countries across the world would have to become more responsible for their own defense as the U.S. would no longer provide the level of manpower as it had done in Vietnam. It was under this new geopolitical reality, among various other factors, that Taiwan’s political elite undertook a thorough reassessment of both its political and economic priorities.
The 1972 loss of Taiwan’s UN membership to the PRC, followed by the 1978 U.S. decision to sever formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, all made it necessary for the KMT to redouble its efforts to keep its legitimacy. In 1973 a year after losing its UN membership, Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK), then the premier of Taiwan, shifted the KMT’s focus from political stability, which is primarily military, to economic development. This was not the first of these “shifts”, however. In fact, from 1958–1973 the KMT had already pursued an export-led development, with small to medium-size businesses thriving under strong government protectionist policies during this period (Baldwin, Chen, and Nelson 42). But the 1973 oil crisis forced the government to invest on massive state-led infrastructure projects to maintain Taiwan’s stellar economic growth. Among these are the construction of “an island-wide highway system, hydraulic and nuclear power plants, heavy industrial complexes, new or expanded harbors, tax-free industrial parks, and other projects . . .” (Hsu 13–14). All these state-funded construction projects, aside from initiating Taiwan’s shift from light industries to heavy industries, also led to the appearance of Taiwan’s middle-class, made up of skilled labourers and a whole host of other skilled positions (Baldwin, Chen, and Nelson 43).
As demonstrated above, the KMT leadership is often credited for its pragmatism, and with good reason. One scholar contends that CCK’s efforts to maintain bilateral agreements with the U.S. saved the KMT’s legitimacy and Taiwan’s sovereignty (Hsiung 120–121). Indeed, with the passing of the American Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 — a year after the U.S. severed formal diplomatic relations with Taipei — economic growth skyrocketed. In one account, Taiwan’s GNP grew from $40.3 billion in 1980 to $119 billion in 1988 (Hsu 15). Initially, this may appear illogical — that international isolation should mean less foreign investments. But there is often an unmentioned difference between Taiwan’s formal diplomatic relations with other countries, which is simply based on international politics, and Taiwan’s substantive relations, which is based on trade. The difference between the two is that formal diplomatic relations are actually not prerequisites to fruitful trade relations. Taiwan has proven that it is possible to make do in such an environment. Thus from 1971 to 1978, foreign trade actually increased from $2.9 billion to $23.7 billion (Clough 144).
The Virtues of Being Able to Independently Set the Pace of Change
Ultimately, Taiwan has demonstrated that the pace of political change must be set by the society and not by external actors. Indeed, Taiwan’s success is reflected in CCK’s belief that “’Democracy must be cultivated and not transplanted and that democracy must be adapted to our own national environment so it can strike root in our own soil’” (Hu 37). Thus, the fact that there were dialogues and negotiations between moderate opposition groups and the reformist group within Taiwan’s leadership is a testament to what could be achieved if countries are allowed to decide for themselves their pace of change.
There are obviously others who would contend that democracy can be transplanted, exported, or even imposed upon. They would probably use post-WWII Japan and West Germany as examples. The problem with these examples is that these countries were completely occupied and their economic, political and social systems restructured — to varying extents. Also, there is already a strong relationship between the government and the people within these countries. Taiwan’s case is different. As discussed above, the KMT is technically a ‘foreign’ government occupying what it perceives to be a province. Its Taiwanese constituents also lacked close connections with the regime, at least initially. Considering these hurdles, it was therefore essential for the KMT to first establish its legitimacy and to create a close relationship with the people, such as through ‘Taiwanization’, prior to delving into democratization.[3]
Conclusion
Considering all the challenges outlined above, it is clear that the KMT has been very successful in its capacity to adapt to changing geopolitical realities; although admittedly, some of it — such as the timely U.S. military and economic aid, and the lack of any overt PRC aggression for over a thirty-year period — are simply due to good fortune. Nevertheless, this essay has shown that Taiwan’s relatively peaceful democratization process is ultimately encapsulated, with some degree of overlap, by the following four factors. First, an authoritarian regime (“regime”) must seek legitimacy mainly through constructive means — that is, despotism must be avoided if possible. Thus a meaningful degree of political liberalization should therefore be applied: tolerance for freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and even of opposition politicians. Second, a regime must never fossilize — that is, it should constantly anticipate and adapt to every new geopolitical reality. Social unrests are often caused by regimes failing to respond to issues in a timely manner. Third, a regime must never politically alienate the population. That is, always keep them politically engaged and, to some extent, fiscally satisfied. Most importantly, democratization should be set domestically. Taiwan was fortunate enough to have a competent leadership as well as to have its domestic affairs not overtly interfered with by a foreign power during its transition period.
[1] There were propaganda efforts by Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping to woo the Taiwanese towards the “liberation” of Taiwan (Clough 142). Still, the KMT adhered to its official narrative: that Chinese Communists are enemies, and that the KMT “shall never compromise with the enemy and never negotiate peace with him” (Clough 143).
[2] The Truman Doctrine is based on the notion that the U.S. would support, militarily and/or economically, all “democratic” nation across the world who are under the threat of authoritarian forces, either internally or externally.
[3] The Taiwanization of the regime was the only way for CCK to prevent an erosion of trust by the majority Taiwanese population to the KMT. Weakness brought on by social instability could lead to political instability and these could be exploited by Beijing (Hu 34).
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