The Russo-Japanese War:The Politics and Objectives in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05)

The Russo-Japanese War was the first major war fought entirely in the twentieth-century. This war is interesting because it embodies the Clausewitzian ideal of achieving the coveted “decisive victory.” Japan’s successes against the Russian forces in both naval and land warfare were all decisive victories. The Battle of Tsushima Strait (naval) and the Battle of Mukden (land) are textbook examples of decisive victories because Japan not only achieved its objectives, but it also broke the Russian resolve to push on after being inflicted with these massive defeats. The Russo-Japanese War, therefore, is not an anomaly in history but a continuation of what had been started in the long history of warfare. As such, the Russo-Japanese War foreshadowed the events in the First World War and even more so in the Second World War. The war made use of trench warfare, the use of artillery barrage before an infantry advance, and machine guns were introduced in the battlefield. Likewise, faster communications, better logistical transport, underwater mines technology and the emergence of torpedoes made war all the more deadly. The most important lesson of all was Japan’s predilection in the use of surprise attacks, first shown in the naval attacks in Manchuria in 1904 and again at Pearl Harbour in 1941. In this essay, I will argue that Japan won the Russo-Japanese War, not because Russia was militarily weaker, but because Russia’s leaders had less political will, Russia had a dysfunctional intelligence network, Russia had unreliable financial support, and Russia lacked the needed public support to have motivated soldiers.

The Political Will

Japan had been very interested in Western military science. Even before the Meiji Restoration and the end of the shogunate reign, Japanese officials had already grasped the real need for improving their military and naval arsenal and this was primarily done through the importation of books, ships, and military equipment. This was necessitated, in part, by the Russian attacks (September 12, 1806) in what was then the northern Japanese island of Sakhalin.[1] An account made by Takashima Shuhan, a Japanese official of Nagasaki, indicates that “[the Japanese] defeat was to be attributed to the superiority of the Western guns and so [Takashima] proposed to the shogunate that Japan [should] adopt Western gunnery.”[2] This means that Japan’s “isolation” was not total. In fact, the so-called ‘isolationist’ country had kept in contact with the Dutch which bestowed Japan the marvels of Western military science. The problem with this sort of “contact,” however, is the time lag between new information and advancements in technology and tactics. The Dutch did bring Japan “new” knowledge, but since Japan had no consecutive contacts with another European power its leaders failed to grasp the extent of its backwardness.

By the nineteenth century, Europe was advancing at a rapid pace when it comes to industrial development while Japan remained stagnant and unchanged — a feudal society. This means that although Japan had the military knowledge from the Dutch, they did not have the practical knowledge on how to manufacture the weapons, nor do they have the knowledge to initiate Japan’s industrial revolution. Therefore, Japan’s industrial transformation only started after Commodore Matthew Perry’s arrival (1852). Upon realizing that their defence technologies were hopelessly out-dated and useless against the weapons manufactured in the United States of America and Europe, Japan decided that it was time to modernize.

The Meiji Era, the era that introduced Japan to the Western way of thinking, to Western goods, and Western science, proved to be the most eventful era in early-modern Japan. Only two generations prior to the Russo-Japanese War, Japan was hopelessly vulnerable to any foreign invasion. But by 1904, Japan had already acquired enough know-how to compete and even defeat the traditional land power in Europe — Russia. Japan’s determination to modernize itself was unprecedented. To accomplish such a monumental achievement, Japan simplified modernization by studying from the experience of others. This means that instead of developing new weapons or new ideas for itself, it imported and studied almost all the best Western weapons and ships available for sale, and it also adopted the best military system in Europe — Prussia’s.[3] Imperial Japan was a blend of the best military science available, and this was a major factor in its victory against the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War.

In contrast, Russia was less aggressive in its military modernization. It can be argued that Russia had the capacity to be the greatest land power in Europe, with its wide expanse of land, millions of people available for military service, and vast mineral resources. But despite its extremely advantageous position, Russia failed to undergo an extensive military reform to modernize its military. Unlike most of Europe, Russia had failed to apply new military tactics and strategies essential to be competent in the wars of the twentieth century. In fact, during the Russo-Japanese War, the biggest mistake — among other mistakes Russia did — was to have an extremely high proportion of reservist in their army. According to one account, it was up to 50 percent of an infantry unit.[4] As a result, Russia’s infantry forces in Manchuria were largely composed of men who lacked adequate training and had low morale. As a consequence, they were easily repulsed by the advancing highly trained infantry of the Japanese forces.[5]

This mistake could be attributed, in part, in Czar Nicholas II’s incompetence. Although highly educated in “foreign languages, law, economics, and military science,”[6] he lacked the practical experience essential to properly run an empire, much less wage wars. The czar, however, was not the only one to blame in Russia’s defeat since his political actions ultimately depended upon his financial resources and the political will of his generals. While Japan was modernizing its defence at an astonishing speed (its government actually spent more than 81.4 percent of its 1905 national budget on defence), Russia — which was suffering tremendous civilian upheavals — failed to take advantage of the war, which would have given some degree of legitimacy to the czar had Russia won and acquired Manchuria. But the fact that the czar’s government only allocated 10 percent[7] of its national budget for defence made it highly unlikely for the czar to exploit the war (through the acquisition of better-trained soldiers and better intelligence) to his political advantage. Also, with such major defense expenditure on the part of Japan, it is easy to see which of the two countries is more determined to win the war.

Government

It is fairly easy to see how an autocratic government leads a country into wars. Autocracies typically have an all-powerful political leader that holds the ultimate decision for both domestic and foreign policy. These leaders are typically revered as living gods or, as in Russia and Japan, appointed to rule by God. Their strong belief in their divine appointment makes these leaders either extremely beneficial or extremely damaging to the society they rule. They are either despotic or they are liberal. This is the reason why the study of Japan and Russia’s government is essential in seeing the wider picture of why Japan won and why Russia lost. It is by knowing their government structures that we can determine if there is any difference between the two empires and analyze if these differences are crucial to Japan’s victory over Russia.

In Japan, the Emperor holds the ultimate political and military power. Japan’s government was a theocracy, with the Emperor at the apex of the social order. This supremacy is clearly written in the old Japanese Constitution which was written in 1884 and was put into effect in 1889.[8] In an English quotation translated from the Japanese Constitution, it says that “[the] Constitution of Japan begins with the declaration: ‘The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal’ and this was followed by a justification that ‘The Emperor is sacred and inviolable. . . .’[9] The old Japanese Constitution basically gave its Emperors every single political power possible to remain in absolute power — and rule through his subordinates — in perpetuity. Under such a system, the people basically have no say towards the functioning of their own government. Thus, if their government asks them to do something (like go to war); there is no other choice but to follow the order.

Nevertheless, an autocracy is not always a negative thing. There are also ‘good’ things that it can do that would have generally been impossible to do in a democracy. For instance, the Emperor of Japan during the Russo-Japanese War was undeniably a major character in Japan’s drive towards modernization. Through his social reforms, the Japanese way of life was changed, more for the better than for the worse. The Japanese army and navy were also reformed and were subsequently “reorganized on European models.”[10] Education, infrastructure reforms, politics, and the economy were all reformed to follow along European lines. The Japanese Emperor Mutsuhito (known commonly by his posthumous name, Emperor Meiji or “enlightened rule”), exemplified a progressive Japan. Although he ruled as an absolute semi-divine ruler, his policies and reforms certainly benefited the majority of the Japanese people.

Similarly, the Russian Empire was also an autocracy ruled by dynastic supreme rulers: the czars. But this is where the similarity between Russia and Japan’s government ends. During the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05), Russia was ruled by Czar Nicholas II, an absolute monarch bent on using his autocratic power for the benefit of the few (the nobility) at the expense of the many.[11] Like the Japanese Emperor, “Nicholas [II believed] that he was divinely appointed to rule and that he was responsible to God and to his conscience to preserve the autocracy and to defend the dignity, honour, and worth of Russia.”[12] The Czar can do whatever he wants, but for him to be like Emperor Mutsuhito, he should have had done things beneficial to his people. Unfortunately, Czar Nicholas II was corrupted by extreme greed and power. He “characterized proposals for political reform as ‘senseless dreams.’[13] These attributes made Nicholas II the embodiment of the negative effects of an autocratic government has over its people. Without checks and balances in place, Nicholas II’s capacity for sustained indifference over the plight of the Russian people made him extremely unpopular.

The historical role of the czar, however, was not always that of indifference. There were czars who ruled through an enlightened rule. One czar that has personified the duty of a “good czar” was Czar Alexander II (1818–1881). He brought good to the Russian people through his reforms.[14] On the contrary, Czar Nicholas II was never a “good czar.” He failed to improve the conditions of the Russian people, and primarily focused in the further enrichment of himself and the nobility. This shows that Nicholas II’s interests were more for himself rather than for his people, exactly the complete opposite of Cardinal Richelieu’s raison d’état,[15] or national interest: the upholding of the nation’s interest above anything else. He wasted money and lives in his Manchurian misadventure, and he paid dearly for it.

All in all, it is easy to discern the difference between Emperor Mutsuhito and Czar Nicholas II by just examining their legacy. The possible reason why the Japanese people did not rebel against their government to the degree that the Russian people had can be argued as a testament to Emperor Mutsuhito’s reforms. Had the Japanese people resented their leader as the Russians resented theirs, Japan would not have been able to modernize quickly enough to have the materials needed to go to war against Russia. This analysis shows that because the Japanese government made reforms that benefited its people, the people are then more willing to serve the needs of the government, as a duty for the common good and not just for the good of the few.

War Preparations and the Importance of a General Objective

Japan had more at stake in the occupation of Manchuria than Russia had. Therefore, even before the war, Japan had diligently planned for its objectives if it were to go to war with Russia. Japanese generals pondered how far its finances would take Japan in case it went to war with Russia. This preparation was brought about by its view that “Korea [is the] linchpin [to] its continued economic and military prosperity.”[16] Without Korea and Manchuria, Japan believed that it would not rise to become a global power. This was the primary justification by Japan for instigating the war. It needed more natural resources to sustain its explosive industrial growth, and Manchuria was the closest land with an abundance of natural resources that was yet to be fully occupied or exploited by any imperial power — except, of course, Russia. The secondary objective was to make Manchuria as a buffer zone between Japan and the encroaching powers of the West. Japan was aware that if Russia were to take Manchuria, its national security would be at risk considering that it was one of only two nations in Asia that was yet to be colonized by a European power (Thailand was the other). With these two objectives in place, Japan then proceeded to build a fairly robust war plan that was designed to anticipate circumstances that might lead to a prolongation of the war and subsequently a domestic social revolution, both of which could destabilize Japanese society and jeopardize the Japanese grand strategy.

In contrast, Russia had a much different objective. The Czar wished to have an ice-free port all year round and Port Arthur was the best place to be if the Russian Empire were to have one. In addition, some Russian noblemen wanted to make more money in the forests of Manchuria. Because of this one selfish purpose for the occupation of Manchuria, Russian leaders “failed to convince the Russian public that national interest was at stake.”[17] As a result, the Russian people were less willing to fight for the czar. Aside from the people’s unwillingness to fight, Russia never seriously prepared for the possible prospect of war against Japan. Czar Nicholas II thought that if a war were to start between Russia and Japan, it would be because “he wished it.”[18] The lack of strategic planning for war meant that Russia was already at a disadvantage even before the war began.[19] Without adequate planning and a credible rallying cause for Manchuria’s occupation, the Russian people saw Russia’s entrance in the war in Manchuria as an example of all that is wrong in the Czarist government.[20]

The Anticipation for Peace

Among the most important principles in warfare is the planning for its conclusion. Japan prepared for this. The reason why the Japanese society did not collapse after the war was over was that its leaders had planned from the start that the purpose of the war was to attain those objectives. Any excess beyond the fixed objectives would just be an additional burden to the Japanese society. Because Japan was aware of the possibility of prolongation of the war it reasoned that a third power should act as its backer in order to prevent a disastrous and destabilizing prolonged war.[21] Also, a third power was essential in order for Japan to “extricate” itself from the war if it were to become unfavourable to its society’s stability.[22] Japan allied with Britain who was the world superpower at that time and was also eager to “check Russia’s expansion.”[23] Thus, “In 1902, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was signed . . . .”[24] This relationship with Britain afforded Japan with an added insurance; insurance which ensured that Japan would not be interfered with by any Russian ally if it were to be victorious.

During the peace negotiations at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Japan was given an unfavourable indemnity by Russia. Czar Nicholas II would simply not give Japan any indemnity and it would have prolonged the war had Japan not accepted his offer. After Japan accepted the unfair offer, “[the] world was stunned . . .” and many saw the event as Japan withdrawing from the war.[25] The world leaders even thought that Russia might have intimidated Japan severely for it to accept such a minuscule reparation. Unsurprisingly, the Czar was also stunned and could not believe what had happened. Many thought that Japan would not accept the Czar’s offer and would, therefore, continue to fight. But pragmatically speaking, Japan had already set its objectives even before the war began. Thus, Japanese military leaders quickly urged the civilian leaders to make peace, favourable or not, because they knew that their financial resources had been exhausted and further escalation would only backfire against Japan.

On the contrary, Russia’s leader never prepared for this inevitability. Russian society was in turmoil as hundreds of thousands of men were sent to the frontlines only to be defeated by the more eager Japanese forces. The prospect of Russia’s defeat was never anticipated by any world power, let alone the Czar. Nicholas II was unrelenting in his drive for victory — regardless of the cost. In fact, he was reluctant to accept any defeat and would have continued the war. Unfortunately, there were no preparations done to mitigate the possibility of a Japanese victory, so it was a shock to the world that Russia lost to Japan. The Russian people subsequently rose against the Czar in rebellion.[26]

Intelligence

Intelligence is among the most important components in modern warfare. With modern wars often covering massive swaths of the earth’s surface, it is practical for any nation to know what its enemies are up to. Any intelligence pertaining to the quality of the soldiers (training and equipment), the number of soldiers, the number and types of ships the enemy have, their location(s), the soldier’s morale, the military discipline, and most importantly, its people’s level of cohesion. Knowing some or all of these, military and political leaders can scrutinize the data and find weaknesses in the enemy and exploit those weaknesses to the nation’s advantage.

The extensive intelligence network Japan had across the globe provided it with enough useful information to overcome its weaknesses over Russia. Out of necessity, the Japanese took advantage of whatever intelligence information they could gather, be it about the terrain, the weather, or the position of the enemy.[27] First, Japan had an intelligence network in St. Petersburg, which afforded it with the ability to extract information about the “primary sources of moral or physical strength, power and resistance” of the Russian forces.[28] Second, Japan took advantage of Russia’s lack of control of the world press. Its troop movements were conveniently published in the press, thus Japan’s military and naval leaders were able to move its troops and ships around the battlefield strategically. Lastly, Japan employed escort officers assigned to every military or naval attaché which limited their ability to travel around Japan.[29] This is analogous to how autocratic countries (such as North Korea) today also assign an escort officer to accompany every tourist who visits the country to limit these tourists within the areas where they are allowed to take pictures or walk around. In this way, Japan was able to control Russia’s access to information within its borders and was also able to keep Russia in the fog preventing it from effectively allocating enough troops and equipment to stop the Japanese advance.

Conversely, while Japan had an extensive and effective intelligence network, Russia had an intelligence network unfit for extraction of any crucial information about the state of Japan’s military and war plans. The reason why the Russian intelligence network was deficient was that it heavily relied on Russian attachés. These are highly educated men, although not in espionage. In fact, no Russian attaché sent to Japan prior to the war knew how to speak Japanese, not to mention understand the language. These attachés/spies heavily rely on paid translators for them to be able to work with the Japanese officials.[30] Therefore, it is probably this language barrier that disallowed any Russian military attaché to develop any close friendship with any crucial Japanese military or political leader which would have been useful if Russia were to know anything out of the Japanese state of affairs. Whatever information they gathered were either given to them through bribery of a Japanese official or through their consultation with the French — who apparently had a much better relationship with Japan. Some would even argue that English language newspapers provided better intelligence information than the Russian attachés in Japan. These newspapers were the London Times, The Japanese Weekly Times, and the North China Telegraph.[31] Furthermore, Russian “generals and admirals had no idea what the Japanese were truly capable of. They were even unsure as to the number and the condition of the Japanese ground forces — one of the most damning mistakes in Russia’s decision to go to war with Japan. [32] Next, they failed to know the Japanese weakness — money. With Japan being an information black hole, Russia never knew that Japan was actually extremely prepared to go to war, albeit for an extremely limited time. It was the fact that Russia never knew of Japan’s financial state that the war turned in Japan’s favour. Had Russia knew of Japan’s finances it would have escalated the war which would have helped avoid the ensuing revolutions that came after its defeat.

Finance

It is indisputable fact that money plays a key role in directing wars. The Russo-Japanese War was no different. Both Russia and Japan had to loan from other countries to finance their war effort. Some would even call the war a ‘world war’ because of the major role international bankers played in keeping the governments of both Japan and Russia financially afloat.[33] Without the money propping up Japan’s economy, it would not have had any fighting chance to go against Russia, a country often described as a northern colossus. It was the French who helped finance Russia, while American bankers — more prominently that of “Jacob [Henry] Schiff (and several of his Jewish friends), provided Japan with crucial loans.”[34] In the Russo-Japanese War, bankers from around the world gained the ability to control the outcome of wars by controlling the flow of credit. As mentioned above, Japan’s resources were limited to the extent that continuing the war for even another year would have not been financially sustainable. The Battle of Mukden was the last straw for Japan’s financial and logistical resources.[35] Russia too was pouring so much money into the war effort that it would have been possible for it to send more men and equipment to Manchuria had it had there been enough morale among the soldiers to push on. However, after Russia’s defeat at the Battle of Mukden, most Russian government officials started to call for peace. Sergei Witte, the former Minister of Finance (ousted from his post by the Czar in 1903), stressed in his letter to Czar Nicholas II that “further war expenditure would entirely upset the financial conditions of [Russia], that Kuropatkin’s army could not hold its position in Manchuria, and that Admiral Rozhdestvenskii’s fleet, [the Baltic fleet,] could not score a success.”[36] His prediction about the Baltic fleet proved to be true. Immediately after the Battle of Tsushima Strait, the French broke off the loan deal. Had it not done so, Japan would have most like have been defeated because Russia would have continued sending more and more troops to Manchuria, which would have bankrupted the Japanese government. After this pivotal French decision, the Czar opened up the prospect for peace.[37] This clearly shows the significant role that bankers have over the fate of nations.

The financiers of the war did not just help finance Japan and Russia just for the prospect of making a profit — although, most of the time the financial gains justified the risk. The French supported Russia because they knew that money would be made if Russia won the war. Russia was certainly a rational investment. It had a massive army and had been traditionally seen as among the great European powers. But sometimes there is a much deeper reason beyond mathematics and logic. This was the case for Japan’s American financier, Jacob Henry Schiff. Schiff was a prominent Jewish banker who supported Japan’s war effort because he wanted the Russian government to “[end] its brutal persecution of its Jewish population.”[39] This was his personal motive. Although I am not an expert on how finance works, it was certainly a giant gamble for Schiff to pour his cash in support of the underdog. I think that, without his personal motive, Schiff would not have supported Japan and Japan would have been defeated.

Society and Propaganda

When it comes to waging a successful war it is important that the majority of the people support the cause. Also, no successful war can be waged if the domestic media is not fully supportive of it. The role of propaganda in warfare cannot be underestimated. Autocratic governments are often obsessed controlling the flow of information so they can filter it for any “undesirable” bits and only show a more preferable view of things — their spin on things. Hence, it is reasonable to speculate that Japan would also not have won the war if not for its fervent censors and its effective propaganda machine.

The Japanese government was a master in the art of censorship. During the war, it diligently kept bad news from reaching the public, which could have started a crippling anti-war movement. One example of its censorship was revealed “when the battleship Hatsuse and Yashima were lost to mines outside of Port Arthur on May 15, 1904, the Japanese [government] suppressed the information and released only the loss of Hatsuse . . . .”[40] The reason why Hatsuse was even revealed was only because the Russians saw it sink. Had the Russians not seen it, the Japanese public would not have known any of the ships’ whereabouts at all. Also, since the Japanese government was adamant in keeping any bad news from reaching its people, they decided that foreign journalists should be kept in mainland Japan where the Japanese government can censor the news before it reached them.[41] This was the primary reason why Japan was often seen in the positive light across the world, even though it was the aggressor. Not only was information censored, but Japan also employed an extensive and effective propaganda campaign to belittle the Russians (which could partly explain why Japan had a positive image abroad) and boost Japanese morale during the war.

Nevertheless, censorship and propaganda cannot hide the fact that many Japanese families suffered as a result of the war. In an article written by Naoko Shimazu, she writes that although the Japanese people “understood the importance of duty,” young men from the lower classes were reluctant to join the ranks because their labour was crucial for their family’s livelihoods.[42] Furthermore, military men were reportedly abusing Japanese civilians and causing social unrest during the days leading up to the war.[43] Obviously, these acts of violence were often censored from the press because the Japanese military believed that it could damage the morale of the army. The disturbing thing was that the “[wives] [of conscripted men] resorted to committing suicide with their children” because of the endemic poverty that affected many parts of Japan — mostly in the rural agricultural regions.[44] But still, this human tragedy was twisted by the propagandists to their own advantage by portraying these “destitution and social dislocation . . . as acts of patriotism by a conscript who willingly sacrificed his family to serve the state.”[45] Such was the extent of the human tragedy in rural Japan. In short, despite what most authors think about Japanese society during the Russo-Japanese War, it is important to bear in mind that Japan was not fully united in its support for war and that the government spent significant time and energy to instil to the public the idea that war with Russia is not only essential but a patriotic duty of the Japanese people.

In contrast, Russian society was already unstable during the war and it was even less supportive of the war in Manchuria. For instance, revolutionary Russians were systematically killing a number of Russian noblemen. One such nobleman was Czar Nicholas II’s uncle, Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich, who was bombed on the 17th of February 1905. The first victim, however, was the Russian Minister of the Interior Vyacheslav Konstantinovich von Plehve who was killed the previous year, also by a bomb.[46] These deaths were a signal of the Russian people’s discontent in their government. The Russian people were clamouring for political change. As a rational response to these attacks, the Czar subsequently opened the Duma (the Russian State Assembly with an elected body) for voted representatives. However, these representatives had no power beyond “advisory role.”[47] In essence, these so-called elected politicians were just a façade to cover up the ruthless autocratic rule which continued unabated even after the Russo-Japanese War.

Conclusion

I conclude that Japan was ultimately the more determined nation in the bout for control over Manchuria. There are several reasons that generally point to the direction favouring Japan’s to win over Russia. First, Japan had more political will to achieve such an ambitious goal. Sure it was a gamble to go against Russia, but Japan’s development and modernization was also a massive political gamble. Had it not been for the progressive view of the Emperor, Japan would have probably been under a foreign imperial occupier. Russia was also not taking the war seriously. As such, it is true that Czar Nicholas II was adamant against conceding defeat, but the Russian people were against the war, and the czar’s indifference over acting on any social or political reform was primarily the cause of his failure to rally the people behind him. His dilemma was later compounded by Russia’s humiliation of being defeated by Japan — a still industrializing nation that has yet to truly prove itself against Europe’s more seasoned armies. Moreover, the czar’s selfish undertakings had cost Russia thousands of lives fighting for basically nothing. Second, Japan was more prepared and ready than Russia was over its invasion of Manchuria. One the one hand, even though Russia had the advantage of its defensive position, it failed to harness this advantage mostly because it failed to prepare for the inevitable; that is, the possibility of a war against Japan. On the other hand, Japan clearly had more reason to conquer Manchuria, not only because it needed resources, but by conquering Manchuria Japan intended to halt Russia’s eastward expansion into Korea, a state which Japan planned to be a strategic buffer zone between itself and Russia. Third, Japan won over Russia because on top of its preparation for war, Japan also prepared for its conclusion — peace. Japan had already figured out its objectives and financial limits before it went to war, so it was able to prevent a prolonged war with Russia. Add to that the fact that Japan quickly signed a peace deal with Russia which, although it failed to extract a handsome indemnity, it still accomplished the objective of ending the war before its financial resources run out. The fourth reason why Japan won was that it had a more effective intelligence network. Because the Japanese military was able to control information about its troop movement, it prevented having the massive disadvantage Russia had over the publicity of its own troop movements. The fifth reason for the Japanese victory is partly because it had much more reliable financial backer(s). While Russia’s French backers desired profits, Japan’s American backer, desired the achievement of a moral goal (the stoppage of the persecution of Jews in Russia). Japan was after all a financial gamble that obviously promised no assured profit in return. However, without the money from America, Japan would not have been able to wage an effective war against Russia. The fifth and final reason why Japan won the war was that its government was obsessed in the control of information. The reason why a Japanese soldiers’ morale was high was exactly that they were not told the human tragedy happening back home. Likewise, the reason why the majority of the Japanese society was overwhelmingly in support of the war was because of the propaganda being produced by the media in collaboration with the government. The Japanese government was just more capable of curtailing dissent within its population than Russia was. For these reasons, Japan, the yet to be recognized global power — an Asian global power, overpowered and humiliated Russia, an old European imperial power.

Footnotes

[1] Seiho Arima, “The Western Influence on Japanese Military Science, Shipbuilding, and Navigation,” Monumenta Nipponica 19, no. 3/4 (1964): 359, accessed November 17, 2012, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2383177.

[2] Ibid., 362.

[3] Ibid., 377.

[4] A. M. Nikolaieff, “Universal Military Service in Russia and Western Europe,” Russian Review 8, no. 2 (April 1949): 124, accessed November 22, 2012, http://www.jstor.org/stable/125181.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Alexander Polunov, “Chapter 10,” in Russia in the Nineteenth Century: Autocracy, Reform, and Social Change, 1814–1914, ed. Thomas C. Owen and Larissa G. Zakharova, trans. Marshall S. Shatz (Armonk, NY, USA: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 190, accessed November 22, 2012, Ebrary.

[7] Clive Trebilcock, “British Armaments and European Industrialization, 1890–1914,” The Economic History Review 26, no. 2 (1973): 270, accessed November 22, 2012, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2594252.

[8] Theodore E. Burton, “JAPAN’S GOVERNMENT AN ABSOLUTE AUTOCRACY; Neither Diet Nor Cabinet Has Real Authority and Parties Are Powerless — Emperor and Ruling Class Are Supreme — Prussian Influence Evident — Movement Toward Responsible Ministry.,” The New York Times, February 08, 1920, Drama, Music, Art sec., accessed November 17, 2012, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FB0F12F7385F1B728DDDA10894DA405B808EF1D3.

[9] Ibid.

[10] “The Emperor of Japan,” The American Journal of International Law 6, no. 4 (October 1912): 944–949, accessed November 17, 2012, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2186896.

[11] “Some Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War,” The Advocate of Peace (1984–1920) 67, no. 10 (November 1905): 212, accessed September 26, 2012, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25752592.

[12] Raymond A. Esthmus, “Nicholas II and the Russo-Japanese War,” Russian Review 40, no. 4 (October 1981): 397, accessed September 26, 2012, http://www.jstor.org/stable/129919.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Cynthia H. Whittaker, “The Reforming Tsar: The Redefinition of Autocratic Duty in Eighteenth- Century Russia,” Slavic Review 51, no. 1 (July 1992): 98, accessed November 17, 2012, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2500262.

[15] Ibid., 80.

[16] Joel E. Hamby, “Striking the Balance: Strategy and Force in the Russo-Japanese War,” Armed Forces & Society 30, no. 3 (Spring 2004): 329, accessed September 26, 2012, doi:10.1177/0095327X0403000302.

[17] Ibid., 346.

[18] Ibid., 333.

[19] Bruce W. Menning, “Miscalculating One’s Enemies: Russian Military Intelligence before the Russo-Japanese War,” War in History 13, no. 2 (April 2006): 143, accessed September 26, 2012, doi:10.1191/0968344506wh334oa.

[20] Leo Tolstoy harshly describes Nicholas II’s affair in Manchuria as “immoral” and “ambitious.” Tolstoy absolutely condemned the war.

Leo Tolstoy, “Count Tolstoy on the Russo-Japanese War,” The Advocate of Peace (1984–1920) 66, no. 9 (September 1904): 172, accessed September 26, 2012, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25752379.

[21] Hamby, “Striking the Balance: Strategy and Force in the Russo-Japanese War,” 332

[22] Ibid., 332.

[23] Ibid., 340.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Esthmus, “Nicholas II and the Russo-Japanese War,” 410–411.

[26] Hamby, “Striking the Balance: Strategy and Force in the Russo-Japanese War,” 344.

[27] Ibid., 336.

[28] Ibid., 334.

[29] Menning, “Miscalculating One’s Enemies: Russian Military Intelligence before the Russo-Japanese War,” 146.

[30] Ibid., 145.

[31] Ibid., 151.

[32] Ibid., 149.

[33] John W. Steinberg, “Was the Russo-Japanese War World War Zero?,” Russian Review 67, no. 1 (January 2008): 3, accessed November 17, 2012, doi:10.1111/j.1467–9434.2007.00470.x.

[34] Fred G. Notehelfer, review of Warum Japan Keine Juden Verfolgte: Die Judenpolitik Des Kaiserreiches Japan Während Der Zeit Des Nationalsozialismus (1933–1945), The Journal of Japanese Studies 35, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 433, accessed November 17, 2012, http://muse.jhu.edu/.

[35] Hamby, “Striking the Balance: Strategy and Force in the Russo-Japanese War,” 333.

[36] Esthmus, “Nicholas II and the Russo-Japanese War,” 399.

[37] Ibid., 401.

[38] William George Langworthy Taylor, “A Year in Finance,” Journal of Political Economy 14, no. 3 (March 1906): 177–178, accessed November 11, 2012, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1817619.

[39] Karla Goldman, review of Jacob H. Schiff: A Study in American Jewish Leadership, by Naomi W. Cohen, Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies 21, no. 1 (Fall 2002): 139, accessed November 17, 2012, http://muse.jhu.edu/.

[40] Hamby, “Striking the Balance: Strategy and Force in the Russo-Japanese War,” 337.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Shimazu Naoko, “Patriotic and Despondent: Japanese Society at War, 1904–5,” Russian Review 67, no. 1 (January 2008): 41, accessed September 26, 2012, doi:10.1111/j.1467–9434.2007.00472.x.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid., 43.

[45] Ibid., 44.

[46] Esthmus, “Nicholas II and the Russo-Japanese War,” 399.

[47] Ibid.

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