This anti-Brexit editorial shows why so many people voted for Brexit.
Some people aspire to be more than benign.
Today I read a Bloomberg.com editorial, and the thoughts I had in response overcame my writer’s block. It lamented the likely consequences of Brexit, but on a very general level. As it explained, no one knows the specifics of what will happen.
But that’s exactly what the many pro-Brexit voters were looking for: some sense of choice or possibility. Human nature rebels against strict systems that force the many aspects of life into boxes. People may celebrate the streamlining, but over time, some will get aggravated. Even if circumstances don’t change much, people’s tolerance of downsides does, especially as new generations don’t know the trade-offs that were made in the implementation.
Don’t they know the systems are there for a reason? Aren’t they aware of the benefits? Why aren’t people grateful for all the improvements? It’s 2019 — doesn’t progress speak for itself? These arguments are vehemently asserted as self-evident. It’s all been taken care of. We don’t need to go through this again! But that’s never the case. No system lasts forever, even if it is perfect, which none of them are. And it’s rarely set up for the benefit of every group — it supports the interests of a certain coalition, and no matter how “sensible” the reasons for that may be to you, others can always disagree.
But they’re not experts, you might say — they’re incompetent to judge such matters. I agree that if you don’t know the limits of your relevant knowledge and abilities, you’re not competent to make such decisions, and perhaps those limits have been exceeded in this case. But many leaders are just as guilty of this — whatever claim to expertise they make, unilaterally settling anything is quite evidently outside anyone’s limits. Eventually, some people resist — some for reasons that seem good, some for other reasons. It is part of the human condition. That is why the founders chose a relatively flexible, non-specific Constitution. They also expected it to be amended regularly, in response to negotiations between states in response to changing conditions. Our devotion to its original form is misplaced, though the general principles underlying most of it are not something to toss away lightly. Still, the founders were not foolish enough to believe their “expertise” had allowed them to settle the nation’s issues permanently.
Even when a strict, broad rule is put in place for good reasons, conflict over it is likely to destabilize things enough that it is amended or repealed. A requirement of free societies is the agreement to let people do things you strongly disagree with, recognizing that the alternative is constant conflict and the possibility that you will be the one crushed by opponents. It doesn’t mean you like or respect these things — you just tolerate them. Of course, there are issues where lines must be drawn, but typically even these things are a constant negotiation. Even when something cannot be tolerated, or must be reluctantly accepted, there are many courses of action.
To expect utter predictability, stability, and order in foreign relations or international finance is ridiculous. A functional human being must expect some change and adapt accordingly — especially if they are in a powerful, educated, and worldly position. Yes, there is a limit to what most people can be expected to handle, and you hope that things don’t turn upside-down, but life will always be a series of negotiations and adjustments. No policy is ever settled; no one ever has the last word. No matter how right you are convinced you are, you always have to defend your position, and defend it effectively. The fact that you reached the high ground does not mean you will retain it.
Many people, especially those who voted for Brexit, do not like the way things are. They would like some changes. Emphasizing, as this editorial does, that it will result in changes, misses the point. So does emphasizing the fact that the consequences are unpredictable — these people are looking for some options, not another rigid system. They’ve tried that — and to them, that system is unpredictable itself. They have had to adapt to changing social and economic conditions, often ones that leaders insisted would not occur, and sometimes truly did not foresee. Maybe the unpredictability occurred at a lower level of life, but that makes no difference to them. They’re used to adapting — more than that, they do not even expect that such a system will be there to benefit them. They are comfortable without that security, and may not even perceive it as security. They’re ready to take the chance, and they don’t want the same people dictating a version of the same system to replace the old one.
Which brings us to the text of the editorial:
But when those options are whittled down to a single choice — which is unlikely to happen until much closer to March 29 — the hard part won’t even have begun. That is the part of Brexit that is so easily forgotten in these moments of high drama: the British government is entering an era where the only certainty is a semi-permanent state of negotiations.
I don’t know that this has been forgotten. Whatever a “semi-permanent” state is, it is well understood by many voters that Brexit will entail negotiations. Some people see that as desirable — as essentially the function of government and societal leaders. Many do not understand the complexity involved, and many overestimate the leverage Britain will have in the negotiations. But that negotiations will happen is a feature, not a bug. And they are not alone. Arguably, many Trump voters picked him exactly for this “deal-making” quality. There is nothing inherently bizarre about that. The people who talk constantly about the need for well-reasoned, pragmatic compromise, on the other hand, seem to be horrified by the actual process of compromise.
Which brings us to the word “process.”
We continually hear (and some of us have repeated the mantra) that Brexit is a process not an event. But that’s not quite right. Processes are orderly and have an endpoint. There is, as yet, no order to Brexit and no endpoint. A sense of chronic impermanence is virtually certain whatever path parliament takes, according to trade specialists and analysts.
That’s not quite right either, was my initial response. Then I looked up the definition of the word, and was somewhat surprised to see how well it matched that definition: “a series of actions or steps taken in order to achieve a particular end,” for example, “military operations could jeopardize the peace process.”
I think the reason the definition did not initially sit right with me is that there is a difference between “actions or steps” and “orderly actions or steps.” And when that series of actions or steps is “taken in order to achieve” something, there is no guarantee that an endpoint will be reached. Some sort of goal is being pursued, but ultimately achieving it is not part of the definition of a process. And really, there is never an “endpoint” in most things, as the example given illustrates. What exactly is a peace process? I think we know from looking at both historical and contemporary conflicts that the process doesn’t necessarily result in peace. And what is “peace,” exactly? Can such a process ever be said to have reached an endpoint? History is full of treaties designed to permanently end warfare — we know how that goes. “The end of history” has turned out to be far from an endpoint.
How many processes end up being orderly? Even comparably minor and unimportant processes tend to go awry. It’s not like people zoom through bureaucratic processes in an orderly manner, filled with gratitude for the experts who drafted them. Has a peace process ever really been orderly? They are fraught with uncertainty and contingency by nature.
A negotiation is a process — “discussion aimed at reaching an agreement”. Steps or actions are taken toward a particular end, which can actually be many possible ends that resolve the conflict or accomplish the arrangement at hand, which is the real goal. It is aimed at that goal, and that’s all it can lay claim to.
A no-deal scenario would bring the most uncertainty, leaving the Irish border question unresolved, no trading relationship in place and a great many sore feelings. Since Ireland itself will hold a veto over any future EU trade agreement with the U.K., Britain can’t simply pretend the question of how to maintain an open border between the two countries is Dublin’s problem.
This is certainly a cause for concern. But is the Irish border question resolved? It certainly hasn’t disappeared from discussion. And if someone brings it up, Britain won’t even be able to “simply pretend” otherwise — this is apparently a disturbing development. Maybe people don’t know exactly what they’re getting, but they couldn’t have known that under a government that can’t function without feigned ignorance in its toolbox, either.
May’s negotiated deal at least sets out a transition period during which the work on a future trade relationship can begin. And yet exactly what shape that takes will be a matter of bitter internal debate and long, iterative negotiations.
Again, this is basically the function of representatives in republican government. Maybe “bitter” isn’t the best way to put it, as debate isn’t supposed to be consistently personal, but “ferocious” debate would not be inconsistent with its expected role. Congress and Parliament are designed to do exactly this, and it is considered a triumph of modern republican government. This ensures that any new agreement will have been closely examined, with proponents, opponents and the uncommitted of all sorts being able to make their arguments and hear the responses.
Outside of government, are these leaders what they claim to be — the innovators and “change agents,” successful because they are so exceptionally qualified to tackle challenges with their rare insight? Or are they threatened and horrified by negotiations and changes to a system they are familiar with, even favored by? They can be one or the other. They cannot be both.
It is just not plausible that this class and its pundits are so superior and yet so appalled. And it’s not even a ready-to-take action appalled, where they believe the people have made a terrible decision, but have confidence they can use their skills to tackle the problem. It’s an aggrieved appalled, where they don’t believe they should have to do a thing — in fact, they think that they have been deeply victimized, and should bear absolutely no responsibility for the outcome. Many voters may not understand all the implications and details of governing, business, economics, etc. — but they notice this attitude. They know that something doesn’t quite add up. Humans sense inconsistency, and become suspicious — and when they can’t pinpoint the source or reason behind it, as is often the case, the results can be dangerous. They may scapegoat minorities, or they may tear the system down. Both are happening to some degree in several countries. This is in part a response to the overwhelming barrage of inconsistencies inherent in modern complex systems, the causes of which they cannot possibly understand or address.
If Brexit gets delayed, or May’s deal morphs into a softer customs-union type arrangement, or a Norway-style one that leaves Britain in the single market but with no say in EU laws, extensive negotiations will be required to work out the details of the new relationship and their interpretation — all in a fractious domestic political environment. Likewise, a second referendum or a general election might sate the public’s wish for a say, but the decision must then be implemented — again, via more negotiations.
The public “wishes” to have “a say” in their government, but that would lead to more negotiations! In a “fractious domestic political environment”! Perhaps if the public had been granted more of a “say,” earlier on — had its participation been viewed more as a matter of course than a “wish” that might be “sated” by one vote, things might be less fractious. The first vote would not have been so surprising. Somehow, these dots are not being connected.
The assumption that negotiations (or debates) are viewed with universal horror is unbelievable to me. It is not confined to Britain, and explains why America’s government is in the shape it is in. Change is impossible and absurd, the experts have decided. Why are people thinking about these things? Don’t they realize we’ve moved past all that!
Even then, notes Sam Lowe, senior research fellow and trade policy expert at the Center for European Reform, it wouldn’t be over. Another government may want to tweak what its predecessor agreed. He cites the experience of Switzerland, which has been locked in acrimonious negotiations with the EU for years. “One of the main things we should take from the Swiss is that it will never end,” he says. “When one negotiation finishes a new one begins.”
“Another government may want to tweak what its predecessor agreed.” Watch out! Opposition to the idea that this is an outrageous demand is what got Trump elected. Even a tweak is too much!
Even if there was a vote to reverse Brexit, life wouldn’t return to its pre-2016 settled norm. There would be attempts to appease leavers, perhaps with promises of a new political settlement with Brussels (something that has already started). There would be a fierce battle to whip up new forms of euroskepticism too, with unpredictable consequences.
God help us. There was no “settled norm” before 2016. That’s why the events of 2016 happened. Evidently, things weren’t quite settled. If we somehow return, it’s not going to last. And, on top of that, we might have to “appease leavers(!?!)” In other words, treat the views of a large portion of the British people as if they matter and should be recognized? [Clarification: I’m not arguing the leavers’ views should be adopted, but the fact remains that such a large group of citizens will make their influence felt, and appeasing them can take many forms, not just conceding to their desires.] I’m not sure that there will have to be a “fierce battle to whip up new forms of euroskepticism” to create euroskeptics. I suspect they are already in existence, and have a form that they are quite happy with.
We have an idea of what the economic costs are from the uncertainty generated by the Brexit vote. How a country of Britain’s size deals with a prolonged period of multi-faceted, multi-front negotiations, however, is impossible to predict. How will 10 or more years of up-and-down, publicly scrutinized negotiations affect domestic spending decisions and taxation, impact elections, reshape the civil services, determine investment decisions and impact consumer choices and voter preferences? We don’t know.
Yet another horrifying development: “publicly scrutinized” negotiations about issues of vital interest to the public. But nothing stuns me more than this paragraph:
Brexiters blithely claim the impact will be benign — but that is pure guesswork. Their logic is also tortured: If free trade is so desirable that Britain needs to get out of the customs union, leaving the closest possible free-trade deal with your largest trading partner in favor of greater friction and uncertain future relationships has to be acknowledged as a backward step.
I don’t think most supporters claim the impact will be “benign,” whatever exactly that means. That’s not what they want. They intend for it to change things, to be productive, to offer hope for new possibilities. We cannot predict what this will lead to. That is certainly true. The consequences may well be quite harmful. It is almost certain that some will be. But human nature is such that people will never really settle for “benign.” That is about as condescending and discouraging a term as could be used. It frames any actual change as by definition harmful, and many people just aren’t buying that.
To hear the leaders tell it, benign is the best case scenario. The word is defined as “not harmful.” That it might be beneficial is not even considered as an option!
Who exactly is being blithe here? Some other synonyms for benign: “Good-natured, friendly, agreeable, amiable, good-humored, genial, tender, gentle, well disposed, obliging, accommodating, generous, gracious, indulgent.” In other words, the people should stay in their places, without making their superiors feel bad about anything— they should smile, be “gracious,” and even “indulge” them. You know, “accommodating.” Much of the public respectfully declined this role.
They’d like to be more than “benign.”
I wrote this piece to clarify my thoughts on the reality of what is going on at a societal level, and to suggest that it may be advisable to consider negotiation, whatever your goal may be. It is not pro- or anti-Brexit. It does not set out my political beliefs or positions — they are not necessary for the purposes of this discussion, because I don’t control the world. The editorial referenced is representative of the mindset of many accomplished people, but they don’t control the world either. My aim was not to refute this viewpoint as a whole, but to expose its fundamental assumptions.
Because based on how blindsided these people have been lately by popular decisions, the consequences of persisting in this view are just as unpredictable as those of Brexit. If they place such value on order and certainty, they’d better rethink their process.
