Analysis of Daniel Dennett’s Essay, “Where Am I?”

Lance Mann
6 min readMar 12, 2020

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In his paper, “Where Am I?” Daniel Dennett presents a philosophical theory of personal identity. He illustrates a thought experiment in which his brain disconnected from his body and placed in a vat in Houston, Texas while his body is sent on a mission to recover a warhead beneath the surface of the earth in Tulsa, Oklahoma. His brain is still connected to his body and able to control his tasks through radio links. Dennett then proposes the question of, “where am I?” If his brain is in a whole different location than his body, then where is his personal identity? For the following thought experiment, he names his brain, “Yorick,” his body “Hamlet,” and he, his identity, is Dennett. He presents three possible answers to the question, “where am I?”

The first answer Dennett proposes is wherever Hamlet goes, there goes Dennett. This the answer does not satisfy him, though. He refutes that principle by using a brain-transplant thought experiment where if two people switch bodies but kept their same brains, they would each claim to be the same person with the same memories. He also cites that most people would rather be the donor, not the recipient, for the brain-transplant operation. For Dennett, these ideas are substantial enough to prove that he could possibly be separated from his current body but could not possibly be separated from his brain.

The second answer that Dennett proposes is that wherever his brain, Yorick, goes so too goes Dennett. This answer was not appealing to him either because he could see that his brain is in the vat which made him feel like he was mobile and looking down at his brain which was immobile. He then proposed another thought experiment in which he robs a bank in California and gets caught in the act. Would he be tried in the state in which he committed the crime? Or, would he be tried in the state where his brain was located, which is Texas? Also, could it be possible that the crime would be tried as an interstate or Federal offense? He then explains that he would rather his brain get locked up in prison than his body get locked up in prison because he feels that he would still have freedom. He states, “If the state has an interest in forcibly relocating persons in institutions, it would fail to relocate me in any institution by locating Yorick there,” (Dennett).

The third answer to the question of “where am I” that Dennett provides and the one that seems to satisfy him the most is that Dennett is wherever Dennett thinks Dennett is. In other words, he says, “At any given time, a person has a point of view, and the location of the point of view (which is determined internally by the content of the point of view) is also the location of the person,” (Dennett). He then describes an example of this proposition in which a person is at the movies watching roller coaster footage and begins to freak out and get scared. Obviously, that person has failed to remember, due to his point of view of the intense video footage, that his physical body is safe and far from engaging in a real roller coaster ride. Dennett then gives another example of how your point of view constitutes where you are. He explains how scientist who work with extremely dangerous and toxic materials in laboratories can experience major shifts in point of view when operating with complex mechanical arms that send feedback loops. They can shift their point of view from within the hazard zone to back out in the safe laboratory which, in affect, can seem as though they are shifting themselves in and out of the hazard zone. He likens that example to his current experience of his brain residing in a vat while his body is free to roam and begins to attempt to shift his point of view from outside of the vat to inside the vat and proclaims that the task is a difficult one to perform.

I will now offer a critique of Daniel Dennett’s theory of personal identity. In his story, Dennett’s brain being removed from his body, his brain is still able to control his body as it traverses the underground terrain of Tulsa. But unfortunately his radio links start to fail and he eventually loses contact with his body. When he talks about losing contact with his body while it is underground, he continues the thought experiment as if he takes on the point of view of a brain in a vat that has no sensory perception at all. However, I do not think such a perspective is coherent. One reason being is that without a biological brain-body connection to narrow down and effectively limit consciousness through the senses to experience everyday human life, the consciousness is not limited and therefore ever expansive. I believe that consciousness predates matter and is not a product of matter. I believe that consciousness created matter to experience itself, consciousness, subjectively through living beings because without limitations it cannot experience itself in its entire oneness. Also, if one was just pure consciousness, there would be no purpose in life. The brain is just an organ for consciousness that cannot function without being connected to a body and other organs. If the brain was not connected to the rest of the body, there would be no biological desires to fulfill, no limitations to overcome and nothing to create with, therefore, only pure consciousness. The construct of personal identity created by human intelligence is useful in interacting with the world but it is just projection. It adapts and evolves through time to help humans try to survive. Yet, overall, we are consciousness channeling through biological bodies to experience itself subjectively.

Another critique that I have of Dennett’s theory is when he proposes in his story that after his brain has been disconnected from his old body and is suspended in a vat in Houston, he reawakens after one year and finds himself in a new body. Later, Dennett learns that the lab technicians had constructed a computer that is completely identical to his old brain which they call, “Hubert,” and have placed it within his new body called, “Fortinbras.” I do not think it is it plausible to suppose that Hubert-Fortinbras pair is in fact Dennett, but a machine that resembles Dennett in computerized thoughts and memories. However, this machine has not had the same life experiences that his old body and brain had collectively so therefore, it would have different reactions to stimuli than Dennett would. A common theme that I have noticed in materialistic theories of personal identity is that there is no attention payed to other centers of intelligence in the body, only the brain. The harmonious relationship between the brain, the beating heart, the microbiome residing in our guts, and other subtle biological factors combined with a channeling of consciousness dictates our existence and our personal identity. If one does not keep all of those centers of intelligence in tact and connected to one another, automatically one would become a fundamentally different person. Thankfully, no actual brain transplant has ever been conducted and I believe with the new evidence showing the significance of the subtle biological factors such as the gut microbiome and how it dictates much of our brains’ actions, a person would become a different person because the fundamental relationship between the biology would be different. As long is the brain is connected to the body in some way and is still fully functioning, the question of “where am I?” viewed from a materialistic point of view is the same as it is to ask when you brain is not removed and is safely in its home in your head, except in Dennett’s case, part of him was in Houston and the other part of him was in Tulsa. If we could view ourselves as consciousness experiencing itself subjectively through a biological body and personal identity as just a construct to help the body operate and survive in the world, we would be much better off. The question of “where am I?” would become obsolete because you would realize that personal identity is just a construct for survival. The actual state of being is unlimited consciousness and time, space and matter are purposeful limitations to help you, consciousness, experience and know yourself.

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Lance Mann
Lance Mann

Written by Lance Mann

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Freelance writer, philosopher, humanist