Words Matter

Once Hersh’s story had been read, more closely by some than others, the reactions were not measured. What’s more, there was little follow-up reporting. Instead, their keystrokes focused on the author. Vox’s Max Fisher called it a “conspiracy theory” as he sprinted out of the gate. Unfortunately, his thin, self-satisfied logic exposed his own skimming of Hersh’s article. Others followed with cute titles like “Sigh, Sy”, “Crank Theory”, and “Lost in a Wilderness of Mirrors.” The critiques followed two, well-trod formulas:

1. Exaggerate and misstate his claims. Tag them with flourishes like “grand conspiracy” and “international hoax.” Then easily swat them down.
2. Begin with a compliment, a nod to past accomplishments. Follow with a lecture on sources and craft, winking at other Hersh scoops that did not bear fruit.

The conclusions were a version of “we wish you a speedy recovery and return to form,” or “it’s not you, it’s your age, crypt keeper.”

Of these opinions, Peter Bergen’s carried the most weight. In 1997, Bergen produced the first television interview with Osama bin Laden, which aired on CNN. Since then, he’s become CNN’s national security analyst and the media’s go-to bin Laden guru. Bergen did not hold back, “Hersh’s account of the bin Laden raid is a farrago of nonsense that is contravened by a multitude of eyewitness accounts, inconvenient facts and simple common sense.” That’s quite a salvo. His supporting paragraphs, though, don’t exactly explode on the page. He counters Hersh’s claims with “U.S. officials told me and other journalists this or that.” That’s hardly devastating.

“All sorts of things are, of course, plausible,” says Bergen, “but in both journalism and in the writing of history one looks for evidence, not plausibility.” By this standard, Bergen offers only one piece of evidence: his own, exclusive, visit to the burned-out and ransacked Abbottabad compound, where he saw bullet holes peppering sections of the compound. It’s compelling evidence because Hersh says there never was a firefight.

Bergen raises other reasonable questions:

Why would Saudi Arabia help a sworn enemy like bin Laden?

Why didn’t the Pakistanis just hand him over to the US, like they had with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Faraj al-Libi?

These questions, however, are never unpacked or followed with any substance because Bergen isn’t interested. Hersh is wrong. That’s the point.

“Hersh has had a storied career. One hopes that he won’t end it with a story about the Obama administration and the bin Laden raid that reads like Frank Underwood from “House of Cards” has made an unholy alliance with Carrie Mathison from “Homeland” to produce a Pakistani version of Watergate.”

It’s a strained comparison, at best. Perhaps Bergen has never seen those shows. It doesn’t matter. That finger pistol aimed at the cool kids is unfair to Hersh’s story.

The cable news gallery wasn’t much kinder. Philip Mudd, CNN’s former spook du jour, couldn't contain his derisive laughter when asked about Hersh’s piece, “Let me break some news for you, aliens abducted President Obama fifteen minutes ago, and Darth Vader is in the oval office making decisions for the United States. I have a secret source who told me that. It’s ridiculous.”

Seconds prior to that spasm of nonsense, Mudd, like Bergen, asks a legitimate question:

How could the top level Pakistani leadership be sheltering the head of al-Qaida at the same time they were losing their own officers fighting al-Qaida?

Eager to get in a zinger, Mudd didn’t expand on it, nor was he asked to, and it fell silently among the chatter. The linchpin of his question is the word “sheltering,” which is not an accurate representation of bin Laden’s status in Abbottabad, as described by Hersh. It is true that Pakistani officers and soldiers have been killed by militants; however, to say they died fighting al-Qaida is a significant conflation. Perhaps Mudd meant to say the Pakistani Taliban. No one asked him.

Former CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell told CNN’s Christiane Amanpour, “At the end of the day, I think the Pakistanis are putting out propaganda that they knew about this in order to save face. It must be that this American source [cited by Hersh] is somehow getting information from Pakistan and passing it on to Seymour Hersh.” Morell insisted that he personally met with the Pakistani leadership and they were extremely embarrassed by the whole affair. They were not only shocked bin Laden had been in their midst the whole time, but also that the US had penetrated their defenses so successfully. The latter part, if true, is especially damaging to a military that prides itself on vigilance against Indian aggression.

Morell’s statement is important. However, it’s also important to remember the previous position he held, and the fact that the individuals who hold such positions tend to keep their big secrets, regardless of retirement, books deals, and television appearances. Peter Bergen might disagree. Soon after bin Laden’s death, he wrote one of the first comprehensive accounts of the decade-long manhunt and raid. His story is the official version, supported by the accounts of former officials like Morell.

If Hersh has invested his reputation in his own version and sources, Bergen’s reputation is invested in the hope that it’s fiction.

Words matter.

The Messenger

Perception also matters, and Hersh, who might as well be dubbed “Ol’ Zero Fucks,” could care less. He’s a prickly, self-deprecating, old school grinder who came up during the Nixon era. And the qualities that make a good investigative journalist do not necessarily translate to public relations. Isaac Chotiner’s interview with Hersh, which was published in Slate, is a perfect example. Hersh’s “mood” likely brought in a fair share of the views. Thanks to Chotiner’s good questions, Hersh did provide additional insight into his story, and the story behind its publication.

Hersh may not always get it right, but he takes his craft seriously. The writers who fashioned him a tin foil hat did so at their own risk.

Anatomy of an Article

Hersh’s article deserves a careful reading, especially the quotes attributed to his main source: a retired senior intelligence official.

The Walk-in

“In August 2010 a former senior Pakistani intelligence officer approached Jonathan Bank, then the CIA’s station chief at the US embassy in Islamabad. He offered to tell the CIA where to find bin Laden in return for the reward that Washington had offered in 2001.”

The walk-in claimed bin Laden and his family had lived in the Hindu Kush mountains from 2001–2006 until Pakistan’s intelligence service, the ISI, paid local tribesmen to betray him. He added that bin Laden was now a sick man, confined to the grounds of the compound. The walk-in was carefully vetted and his claims investigated. He and his family were smuggled out of Pakistan.

New York Times correspondent, Carlotta Gall, who has reported from the region for the last 12 years, says this part of Hersh’s story tracks with her own reporting. In a radio interview, she also said she wouldn’t use the word “prisoner” to describe bin Laden’s status in Abbottabad. “I think it’s a type of custody, which is constraining but it’s also with some consent, because it’s also protective…I learned about this over many years in Pakistan, that they often do this with people that the intelligence service wants to use and control…I believe they’re doing it with Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader, right now, today. Pakistan has long done this.”

Surveillance

“The compound was put under satellite surveillance. The CIA rented a house in Abbottabad to use as a forward observation base and staffed it with Pakistani employees and foreign nationals.”

At this stage, only a small number of individuals were informed about the walk-in. The Pakistanis were not told for fear they’d move bin Laden.

The Options

Aside from the walk-in’s confession, the military and intelligence community had no way of confirming it was bin Laden. They did suspect the compound contained a high-value target, but there were no communications coming out, nothing to intercept. All they had was the overhead view of a man pacing around his yard. Possible military options were discussed: drone strike, bunker buster, lone assassin, etc. All of them had their problems.

In October, Obama was briefed on the intelligence. He was not impressed. The military and CIA determined they needed two things to get the green light: DNA evidence and a low risk mission.

“The only way to accomplish both things, the retired official said, ‘was to get the Pakistanis on board.’”

The Carrot

What might the Pakistani leadership value more than their blue chip asset? Generous American military aid. It came in all forms and flavors, including personal security funds and goodies for the ISI.

“‘The intelligence community knew what the Pakistanis needed to agree — there was the carrot. And they chose the carrot. It was a win-win. We also did a little blackmail. We told them we would leak the fact that you've got bin Laden in your backyard. We knew their friends and enemies’ — the Taliban and jihadist groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan — ‘would not like it.’”

The Saudi Connection

“A worrying factor at this early point, according to the retired official, was Saudi Arabia, which had been financing bin Laden’s upkeep since his seizure by the Pakistanis. ‘The Saudis didn’t want bin Laden’s presence revealed to us because he was a Saudi, and so they told the Pakistanis to keep him out of the picture. The Saudis feared if we knew we would pressure the Pakistanis to let bin Laden start talking to us about what the Saudis had been doing with al-Qaida. And they were dropping money — lots of it.’”

As previously noted, Peter Bergen scoffed at the logic of this revelation: “Common sense would tell you that the idea that Saudi Arabia was paying for bin Laden’s expenses while he was living in Abbottabad is simply risible. Bin Laden’s principal goal was the overthrow of the Saudi royal family as a result of which his Saudi citizenship was revoked as far back as 1994.”

The problem with Bergen’s assertion is that it skates over the long and complicated history between the Saudis and bin Laden, and the close relationship between Saudi intelligence and the ISI. Bergen, who should know this history, simply ignores the complex and shifting nature of alliances and relationships in the Greater Middle East.

Robert Baer, a highly regarded former CIA Case Officer, who is more qualified than most to speak on the geopolitics of the region, seconds the close relationship between Saudi intelligence and Pakistan in a radio interview about Hersh’s article. He says the Saudis pay for the ISI in many ways, and has no problem with the idea that both spy services colluded on the question of how to handle bin Laden.

The Nukes that Bind Us

“It’s understood in Washington that US security depends on the maintenance of strong military and intelligence ties to Pakistan. The belief is mirrored in Pakistan.”

Despite the public dust-ups, both real and manufactured, the relationship between the US and Pakistani military and intelligence services is much closer and cooperative behind closed doors. The reason for discretion is obvious: the Great Satan doesn’t poll well in Pakistan. The US government invests so heavily in such a difficult alliance because Pakistan has more than a hundred nuclear warheads.

“‘The Pakistanis also know that their trump card against aggression from India is a strong relationship with the United States. They will never cut their person-to-person ties with us.’”

This is not to say that the two powers don’t have trust issues. Even if they depend on each other for security, their interests are often at odds. The actions resulting from those interests have led to serious diplomatic rows, such as the outing of the CIA’s station chief in Islamabad.

The Generals Relent

“‘Was bin Laden ever there? Was the whole story a product of Pakistani deception? What about political blowback in case of failure?’”

According to Hersh’s main source, Obama was anxious for proof. A tough reelection campaign was around the corner and no president wanted to repeat the Carter administration’s fiasco. The Pakistanis provided the crucial DNA sample. Generals Kayani and Pasha had reluctantly agreed to give bin Laden up. They viewed bin Laden as a resource, as leverage against the Taliban and al-Qaida. American aid programs, however, trumped his value.

“Bargaining continued over the way the mission would be executed.”

The Pakistanis wanted a small strike force, and they wanted bin Laden dead. The US wanted guarantees that there would be no opposition to the raid. To drive home the seriousness of the US government’s position and Pakistan’s predicament, the Americans slowed down the flow of hardware and cash. It worked. They got the commitment they needed to launch the raid.

“Pasha and Kayani were responsible for ensuring that Pakistan’s army and air defence command would not track or engage with the US helicopters used on the mission.”

Former CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell said Kayani and Pasha did not know of the raid in advance. He did leave open the possibility that rogue elements of the ISI aided bin Laden in Abbottabad.

Robert Baer, however, challenges that assertion, “You cannot hide a foreigner in Abbottabad for any length of time without coming to the attention of…Pakistani intelligence…and let’s don’t forget that ISI is not a rogue element in the Pakistani government…these officers are all in rotation. Everything it does goes up to the prime minister and the president and the army command. So, if in fact bin Laden was a prisoner there in Abbottabad, he was a prisoner of the Pakistani government…can you go seven years and hide in Abbottabad and not know? You simply don’t set up a compound…and not have people notice. Impossible.”

Baer says he can’t speak to the accuracy of Hersh’s sources, but his own analysis supports their major claims: bin Laden was under Pakistani control, the US found out, the Pakistanis allowed the raid to happen.

Cover Story

“The Americans who planned the mission assured Kayani and Pasha that their co-operation would never be made public. It was understood by all that if the Pakistani role became known, there would be violent protests — bin Laden was considered a hero by many Pakistanis — and Pasha and Kayani and their families would be in danger, and the Pakistani army publicly disgraced.”

The cover story was that bin Laden had been killed by a drone strike in the Hindu Kush mountains — his identity later confirmed by DNA analysis. The announcement, it was agreed, would not be made until several days after the raid.

The Raid

“‘Of course the guys [The Seals] knew the target was bin Laden and he was there under Pakistani control,’ the retired official said. ‘Otherwise, they would not have done the mission without air cover.’”

As the Black Hawk helicopters swept onto the target, they found Abbottabad without electricity. It had been purposely cut off. The SEALS entered the compound. There was no resistance. They found bin Laden on the third floor and killed him, leaving his wives and children for the ISI. After almost an hour on the ground — uncharacteristically long for an assault mission — the commandos were back in the air. The Pakistanis had delivered on their end of the deal.

There was problem, though — the wrecked, burning helicopter and the witnesses.

“After one of the SEALs’ Black Hawk helicopters crashed in Bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound, neighbors called the police and reported hearing both the crash and the subsequent explosions,” says Carlotta Gall. “The local police told me that they received the calls and could have been at the compound within minutes, but army commanders ordered them to stand down and leave the response to the military. Yet despite being barracked nearby, members of the Pakistani Army appear to have arrived only after the SEALs — who spent 40 minutes on the ground without encountering any soldiers — left.”

Obama’s Speech

“The backroom argument inside the White House began as soon as it was clear that the mission had succeeded. Bin Laden’s body was presumed to be on its way to Afghanistan. Should Obama stand by the agreement with Kayani and Pasha and pretend a week or so later that bin Laden had been killed in a drone attack in the mountains, or should he go public immediately? The downed helicopter made it easy for Obama’s political advisers to urge the latter plan. The explosion and fireball would be impossible to hide, and word of what had happened was bound to leak. Obama had to ‘get out in front of the story’ before someone in the Pentagon did: waiting would diminish the political impact.”

Obama’s speech had not been cleared by the national security establishment. Its hastily assembled contents created a mess that would take weeks to patch over with additional information, intentional leaks, and clarifying statements to the press.

In the speech “Obama said that his administration had discovered that bin Laden was in Pakistan through ‘a possible lead’ the previous August; to many in the CIA the statement suggested a specific event, such as a walk-in. Obama also praised ‘a small team of Americans’ for their care in avoiding civilian deaths and said: ‘After a firefight, they killed Osama bin Laden and took custody of his body.’ Two more details now had to be supplied for the cover story: a description of the firefight that never happened, and a story about what happened to the corpse. Obama went on to praise the Pakistanis: ‘It’s important to note that our counterterrorism co-operation with Pakistan helped lead us to bin Laden and the compound where he was hiding.’ That statement risked exposing Kayani and Pasha.”

Gates Dissents

Robert Gates, the secretary of defense, was livid about what transpired after the raid. He was against the speech, screwing over the Pakistanis, and the new cover story taking shape, one that included language about “enhanced interrogation.”

“‘Gates told them this was not going to work,’ the retired official said. ‘He was never on the team. He knew at the eleventh hour of his career not to be a party to this nonsense.’”

New Cover Story

“‘The fact that there was an agreement with the Pakistanis and no contingency analysis of what was to be disclosed if something went wrong — that wasn't even discussed. And once it went wrong, they had to make up a new cover story on the fly.’ There was a legitimate reason for some deception: the role of the Pakistani walk-in had to be protected.”

The new cover story eventually gelled into what has now become the accepted version of events. The CIA tracked a trusted courier to bin Laden, who was directing al-Qaida from the compound in Abbottabad. The Pakistani leadership was in the dark on both counts: bin Laden’s whereabouts and the mission that killed him. There had been a firefight at the compound; the courier, his brother, a bin Laden son, and a woman were killed. The SEALS escaped with a “treasure trove” of intel and bin Laden’s body. He was buried at sea.

The Body

“In his address announcing the raid, Obama said that after killing bin Laden the Seals ‘took custody of his body’. The statement created a problem.”

The commandos had no reason to assume the cover story would change. They never imagined their mission would be made public within a few hours.

“Some members of the Seal team [later] bragged to colleagues and others that they had torn bin Laden’s body to pieces with rifle fire. The remains, including his head, which had only a few bullet holes in it, were thrown into a body bag and, during the helicopter flight back to Jalalabad, some body parts were tossed out over the Hindu Kush mountains — or so the Seals claimed.”

The public was told that bin Laden had been immediately buried at sea.

“‘It’s the classic unraveling of a poorly constructed cover story — it solves an immediate problem but, given the slightest inspection, there is no back-up support. There never was a plan, initially, to take the body to sea, and no burial of bin Laden at sea took place.’ The retired official said that if the Seals’ first accounts are to be believed, there wouldn't have been much left of bin Laden to put into the sea in any case.”

When Hersh’s story was published, several writers found this section particularly outrageous, that it was part and parcel to the unlikely veracity of the entire article. Those details, however, are corroborated by the managing editor at SOFREP, a website owned by special forces veterans who have close ties to the SEAL community.

One of the SEALS on the raid, Robert O’Neill, who has since left the Navy, dismissed Hersh’s story as “ludicrous.” It should be noted that O’Neill has credibilty issues. He and another former team member are the only participants who've spoken publicly about the operation. Both men claimed to have shot bin Laden first, and they profited from it. In so doing, they’ve been ostracized by other teammates. They’re also in legal trouble with their former employer.

Cold Shoulder

“‘We've had a four-year lapse in co-operation,’ the retired official said. ‘It’s taken that long for the Pakistanis to trust us again in the military-to-military counterterrorism relationship — while terrorism was rising all over the world …They felt Obama sold them down the river. They’re just now coming back because the threat from Isis, which is now showing up there, is a lot greater and the bin Laden event is far enough away to enable someone like General Durrani [a former head of ISI who also spoke to Hersh] to come out and talk about it.’”

Sources

Hersh’s scoop depends, almost entirely, on the word of one high-ranking source. That is not an ideal situation for a major story with major claims. Hersh has insisted that the details have been vetted by many others in the military and intelligence community, not to mention his editors.

“Such is the difficulty of reporting on covert operations and intelligence matters, says Carlotta Gall. “There are no official documents to draw on, few officials who will talk and few ways to check the details they give you when they do. I do not recall ever corresponding with Hersh, but he is following up on a story that many of us assembled parts of. And Hersh appears to have succeeded in getting both American and Pakistani sources to corroborate it.”

In the Columbia Journalism Review, Trevor Timm writes about the media’s reaction to Hersh’s article, “It has been rich watching journalists fall over each other to see who can more vehemently criticize Hersh’s use of anonymous sources, despite the fact that using anonymous sources is a tried-and-true Washington ritual that receives almost no criticism in day-to-day reporting.”

Timm continues, “Indeed, anonymity is sometimes warranted, and the idea that Hersh’s sources were anonymous should not come as a surprise. These are highly classified operations. The Defense Department has openly threatened to prosecute people for talking about the bin Laden raid, even as the CIA leaks its own version of events to friendly reporters and movie producers.”

Weaknesses

Timm isn’t suggesting Hersh’s article shouldn't be questioned or criticized, only that it be the result of balanced reporting. And the story does have soft spots. During their interview, Isaac Chotiner asked why the Pakistanis insisted on a raid over other options. Hersh responded that he only had a theory because he hadn’t “talked to any of the principals.” In lieu of their statements, he wrote “what the people who were [involved] in the process believed” to be the reason. Chotiner also challenged Hersh’s claim that the SEALS never found a “treasure trove” of intel.

Curiously, Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti is mostly ignored in the write-ups about Hersh’s story. Hersh mentions the shadowy courier in passing. He focused on telling his source’s story, not the government’s. That’s not good enough. The official version of events hinges on al-Kuwaiti. As news of bin Laden’s death was breaking, Reuters purchased photos of three dead men from an anonymous Pakistani security official, who claims they were taken about an hour after the assault. It’s assumed one of the men is the courier. That’s never been confirmed.