Orthodox ISIL, Not Yet Banned in Russia
September 12, 2017
Having exhausted the theme of the film Matilda, religious extremists will not rest
By: Alexander Soldatov, Novaya Gazeta
With the beginning of the new political season in Russia, passions surrounding Alexander Uchitel’s film Matilda* have become bitterly heated. They have flatly replaced all other subjects from the current church community agenda, including processing lessons from the 100 year anniversary of the revolution.
And if previously these passions were only simmering on paper (or on the Internet), then since the end of August they have blazed up — in the literal sense of the word. The first was the unsuccessful arson attempt at Uchitel’s ROCK studio in St. Petersburg, and then the relatively “successful” arson of a movie theater in Ekaterinburg, and, finally, cars burning at the Moscow office of Uchitel’s attorney. Each time, opponents of Matilda claimed responsibility for these crimes.
Activists from the semi-autonomous Christian State of Holy Rus’ (the name was clearly copied from Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, which is banned as a terrorist organization in Russia) have warned of the inevitability of a “fiery purification” of the Russian land from “the contamination of Matilda”. But law enforcement, sensitive to any hint of extremism on social media, pointedly “overlooked” such clear incitements of violence and warnings about impending crimes.
This conspicuous omission forces us to make an unpleasant conclusion: that we are witnesses to a political strategy aimed at “neutralizing the risks of 2017”, implemented by a method of “controlled chaos”.
Natalya Poklonskaya, whom the Kremlin, at “Bolshevik speed”, first made the prosecutor of Crimea and then a federal politician, has taken on the role of the “campaign identity”. In anticipation of her move to Moscow, Poklonskaya started to demonstrate some exaggerated love for the Tsar-martyr Nicholas II.
“Careless” work methods had already pitted the deputy against the leadership of the Moscow patriarchate: the first time when she proclaimed the “myrrh-streaming bust” of the Tsar at the prosecutor’s office in Simferopol, and the second time when she declared excommunication from sacraments of the head of the presidential administration of the Russian Federation, the speaker of the state Duma, and other officials present at a private screening of Matilda in the beginning of June. In the opinion of the patriarchate, there was no “myrrh-streaming”, nor would there be an excommunication.
Poklonskaya likes to emphasize her relationship with her spiritual father, one of the leaders of the “tsarebozhnik”** movement in the Russian Orthodox Church, schema-archimandrite Sergei (secular name Nicholas) Romanov from the Sredneuralsk Monastery of the Yekaterinburg Diocese (Novaya Gazette wrote more on the topic on August 15).
Once in this environment, the neophyte Poklonskaya, slightly familiar with the Orthodox doctrine, trustingly imbibed the basic tenets of “tsarebozhiye”, which distinguish it from traditional orthodoxy: it is the doctrine that Nicholas II was the “Lord Jesus” who redeemed the sins of the Russian people, that for this reason he possessed a special nature, pure of sin, and Russia is the Kingdom of God on earth, “restraining” the whole world from acceptance of antichrist and ruin. While for the majority of Russians, traditional Orthodoxy is associated with Patriarch Kirill and the hierarchy, steeped in luxury and fulling supporting the regime, the “tsarebozhiye” appears a healthy and extremely patriotic “national faith” that opposes the hypocritical church officialdom.
Of course, the aggression and xenophobia have always found a place in Russian Orthodoxy, along with the love and mercy.
Archdeacon Andrei Kuraev, the chief disgraced theologian from the ROC, believes that Patriarch Kirill planned on aggression in 2012.
It was the patriarch who organized the mass campaign “in defense of the patriarch” against Pussy Riot, achieving the most severe punishment for the “woman blasphemers”, introducing the criminal article on “insulting the feelings of religious believers”, inciting his flock to seek out these “insults” and prosecute guilty parties at every opportunity.
Many “Orthodox activists” made their “insulted feelings” their business. Combative Orthodox brotherhoods appeared, like “Sorok Sorokov”, glorifying the cult of power and ready to “beat for the glory of God” any “enemies of Orthodoxy” — for instance, those defending Moscow’s parks from “church-building”.
What has taken place is a transformation of the official Orthodoxy that has become a part of new Russian ideology: from the gospel of love and repentance into a “spiritual bond” that delivers a degree of aggression and justifies repression against dissidents. “Tsarebozhiye” was always more radical than official church ideology, and in the process of the recent radicalization, “tsarebozhiye” is changing, too. The more reckless the blessings a monk gives, the higher his rating within the Orthodox community.
Along the streets of Sergiev Posad, directly under the walls of the monastery, whose founder urged “to overcome the hateful dissension of this world”, Cossacks march, raising their right hand in the Nazi salute.
Monks walk among them, too, Kornily (Radchenko) for instance. The recognized centers of “tsarebozhiye” are Diveyevo and Bogolyubsky monasteries near Vladimir.
It would seem that no one is hiding, and it wouldn’t be difficult for authorities to restrict the “tsarebozhiye” using the catchphrase “fight against extremism”. This is the approach they successfully use toward Muslims: rigidly pursuing “Islamic fundamentalism”, the Kremlin strongly supports “traditional Islam”, the figures from which even help agencies in pursuing their Salafists brothers. Why can’t they declare the same incompatibility of “Orthodox radicalism” and “traditional Orthodoxy”?
The answer, in our view, lies in the fact that “Orthodox radicals” are beneficial to the authorities: their “zeal without knowledge” and scandalous actions are the best way to switch society’s attention from serious issues about the relevance of the revolutionary experience of 1917, to a sham — about the affair between Nicholas II and Matilda Kshesinskaya.
The patriarch’s silence is another argument in favor of this version. He is unable to sympathize with the “tsarebozhniks” who are cheerfully shaking his throne, but does not dare to condemn them, aware of the high patronage that they have.
The technique of “controlled chaos” is extremely dangerous. At the slightest weakening of control the chaos breaks the will and absorbs its creators — that is its nature. The coming year 2018, which will take place under the banner of the 100th anniversary of the “ritual murder” of the royal family, threatens to become the apogee of “tsarebozhiye” as the new Russian “people’s faith”.
Supporters of Alexei Uchitel, clearly not as well organized as their opponents, are showing signs of weakness: the premier of Matilda was canceled in Moscow, there was a statement about intentions to not show the film in Sverdlovsk region… Of course, the film, will be released. They say that Putin himself, who many times has spoken negatively about Nicholas II, insists on it. But, obviously, the “tsarebozhniks” will have more than one more opportunity to demonstrate their growing strength.
You can be sure that this movement will not lose energy, even after Matilda has been exhausted. The shadow of the “Orthodox caliphate” is hanging over Russia…
**Believers that the tsar was God and that Russia is, therefore, the kingdom of God.
Translated by Linden Marno-Ferree