Eclipse of Reason
This 1947 work by Max Horkheimer on the nature and history of human rationality has a number of related themes. For one, it intends to illustrate not only that Enlightenment thinking was the driving force behind our gradual preference of subjective reasoning over objective reasoning, but also that reason itself arose out of man’s desire to dominate nature. Another salient theme is that industrial society has led to intellectual decay: a decline of philosophy evidenced by the widespread acceptance that contemplation is beneficial only to the extent that it benefits industry, and a decline of the individual under Liberalism (which, he says, presupposes a false conception of individualism and freedom, leads to increased passivity and conformity, and to a decrease in independent thought, among other things). He also spends a bit of time critiquing other modern philosophical movements — positivism and pragmatism — and ultimately attempts to describe the proper role of philosophy.
Objective versus Subjective Reasoning
The distinction in question is roughly similar to the distinction between Rationalism, which asserts that we can obtain objective insight into the structure of reality, the nature of God, and human destiny a priori; and Empiricism, which insists that alleged a priori knowledge is fictitious and reducible to mere permutations of empirical knowledge. Aside from these epistemological — and potentially ontological — differences, Horkheimer attributes to these competing conceptions of rationality a difference in how they attempt to answer ethical or pragmatic questions (questions pertaining to life, to action). Those who have adopted the objective model of reasoning consider themselves to be determining ends; that is, they believe that human reason has scope over teleological concerns. The responsible application of pure thought can allow us to discern that which is good, and what some particular goal ought to be. Subjective reasoning, on the other hand, is more limited in scope; rather than identifying ends, it merely “coordinates” the appropriate means with some given ends. In other words, the question turns from “What constitutes a good life?” to “If I wish to accomplish x, what line of action must I take?”
The shift from objective reason to subjective reason is a historical phenomenon, according to Horkheimer. Societal trends associated with the Enlightenment and Liberalism — Capitalism, individualism, freedom, industrialism, and appreciation of science — have elevated subjective reasoning to prominence. This antagonistic relationship between these historical incarnations of human rationality appears to be a thesis independent of Horkheimer’s view of the origin of rationality (as arising out of our desire to control nature). It’s part of the same picture, no doubt, but the former is a thesis concerning the effect that certain philosophical trends, historical events, and technological advances have had on our conception of our intellectual ability, while the latter is a thesis about the nature of human reason itself — independent of our fluctuating conception of it.
Horkheimer’s critique of Subjective Reasoning
While he critiques both forms, Horkheimer exerts more energy attempting to undermine the validity of subjective reason (that is, the “instrumental” or formalized nature of subjective reasoning). He writes:
The present crisis of reason consists fundamentally in the fact that at a certain point thinking either became incapable of conceiving such objectivity at all or began to negate it as a delusion. This process was gradually extended to include the objective content of every rational concept. In the end, no particular reality can seem reasonable per se; all the basic concepts, emptied of their content, have come to be only formal shells. As reason is subjectivized, it also becomes formalized.
In a footnote, he adds this: “The terms subjectivization and formalization, though in many respects not identical in meaning, will be used as practically equivalent throughout this book.” The term “formal” has been used in a variety of ways in philosophical literature (e.g. as a way of describing the substitutability of non-logical terms in systems of formal logic or by Kant in his classification of space as a formal precondition of intuition and therefore of appearances). However, perhaps we can introduce a bit of clarity into the connection between subjectivization (and the accompanied relativization) and formalization by drawing attention to a comment on pragmatism and logical positivism:
Having given up autonomy, reason has become an instrument. In the formalistic aspect of subjective reason, stressed by positivism, its unrelatedness to objective content is emphasized; in its instrumental aspect, stressed by pragmatism, its surrender to heteronomous contents is emphasized.
Without getting too deep into his analysis of these schools, the takeaway is this: when reason is emasculated, formalized, subjectivized, instrumentalized — as it is under the influence of Enlightenment thinking — it becomes a mere tool for subjective gain, one which can be wielded to exploit nature and human beings alike, and to maintain the status quo, rather than to gain insight into the nature of reality. Horkheimer’s critique of the Enlightenment and philosophical Liberalism go hand-in-hand with his critique of subjective reasoning. He imagines supporters of capitalism, individualism, science, and tolerance as preferring the status quo and therefore the instrumentality of subjective reasoning. These are Liberals. Another group is comparatively more romantic and wish to revive the old trend of objective reasoning. These are conservatives. So how might we go about classifying Horkheimer in all of this?
Critical Philosophy
I initially assumed that Horkheimer was advocating a shift back to objective reasoning, since he had so many negative things to say about subjective reasoning, but this turned out to be quite false. He critiques both objective and subjective reasoning in present day systems. This is where his conception of philosophy plays an important role. He says:
The task of philosophy is not stubbornly to play the one against the other, but to foster a mutual critique and thus, if possible, to prepare in the intellectual realm the reconciliation of the two in reality.
Horkheimer (not hiding his influence from Kant) suggests that, since both poles arise out of the same diseased infrastructure (human reason itself), rather than choosing one side, we must critique the antagonistic relationship between subjective and objective forms of reasoning, and between mind and nature. We must supersede subjective reasoning’s aim of merely pursuing aims instead of attempting to revive, artificially, the objective conception of reasoning. This “progressive” alternative is Marxism. However, progress can only be secured if we assume a “critical” stance toward philosophical investigations, i.e. if we are committed to applying a dialectical approach to superseding power-adoring ideologies of reactionaries and those who wish to preserve the status quo.
So what form does human reason take under this “critical” phase? Well, in addition to striving to avoid instrumental reasoning of all kinds (including the use of propaganda), to avoid the urge to dominate, the urge to simplify, and the urge to abstract, the faculty of human reasoning is thought to concern itself not with discovering the objective structure of reality, and certainly not with the mere coordination of ends with means, but instead with a kind of conceptual historicism where objectivity is allegedly retained within a relativized structure where we reject “eternal systems” and “false ultimates”. This is the result of applying the Fichte-Hegel-Marx model of dialectic; the critical analysis of “objective reason” (thesis) and “subjective reason” (antithesis) gives rise to a synthesis rather than a simple negation of one pole or the other.
Summary
Human rationality was flawed from the outset. In order to avoid dogmatism and the inclination to dominate nature and other human beings, we ought to adopt a “critical” methodology which would enable us to supersede those forms of reasoning which support the status quo or rely on artificial revivals of old ideals. This applies especially to the instrumentalized forms of reasoning, which, devoid of objective content, can be used as tools of oppression and subjective gain. The best example of the oppressive nature of reason can be seen in philosophical Liberalism, which tolerates the dehumanizing effects of industrialism, Capitalism, a false sense of individualism, and complacency toward the degradation of philosophical thinking as evidenced by modern society’s disdain for leisurely contemplation and by the prevalence of scientistic philosophy.
Criticism
The most striking feature of this book is Horkheimer’s willingness to paint a picture without justifying it. Why should we assent to his description of human reasoning? Why consider his model to be an accurate one? He simply does not say. Instead of presenting an argument, he merely strings together a series of assertions. Either he is unaware of this or he is hoping that his readers fail to notice.
Perhaps the lack of justification ought to lead us to believe that Horkheimer himself is reliant upon instrumental reasoning. His primary goal might be to mask his lack of effort with picturesque Hegelisms in order to build a seemingly successful critique of the Enlightenment, without ever really critiquing it at all. Or rather, perhaps this lack of justification, along with his gratuitous mimicry of Marx (conceptual and terminological), is evidence that he is less interested in accurate description and honest inquiry than he is in presenting a shallow, anti-Liberal picture to gullible students.
The most devastating issue is that the “critical method” which is meant to allow for the supersession of both objective and subjective modes of reasoning — not by negating one side or the other, but through synthesis — is entirely self-defeating. Instead of imagining Horkheimer’s conception of reason as being the progressive synthesis in this three-part dialectical model, we might instead regard subjective reason to be the thesis and Horkheimer’s so-called progressive, post-Liberal, historicist, emancipatory view of reason to be the antithesis. This would allow Horkheimer’s conception of reason to be superseded too. The pattern would then continue ad infinitum, with the rightmost perspective feigning superiority and flaunting its momentary possession of the most advanced progressivism ever conceived.
I also find it extremely troubling that Horkheimer spends no time whatsoever evaluating existing alternatives to his critique. For example, many thinkers from many disciplines have questioned the legitimacy of “false ultimates” and “eternal systems”, of relativism, of scientistic outlooks, of oversimplification, and of instrumental reasoning. Many have come to the conclusion that society is intellectually impoverished, that success often requires mimicry and submission, and that we may have collectively accepted a deformed conception of progress. Acknowledging these things does not necessitate a critique of the Enlightenment or of Liberalism and it certainly doesn’t force us to accept Horkheimer’s model of reasoning or the conclusions he has drawn from that model. Apparently there is a reason that we ought to accept his vision over one of the many alternatives, but sadly, not one is given.
In the end, it appears that we are left with a series of unjustified assertions concerning the nature of human reasoning, and a series of attempts to connect the ills of society to Liberalism which are tenuous at best.