Subverting dogmatism in modern football.
When you think of the modern English footballing landscape, the top dogs, the finest managers, who do you think of? Pep Guardiola? Jurgen Klopp? Go further back, even, and Sir Alex Ferguson and Arsene Wenger spring to mind. Managers who intended to control possession, or create beauty with the ball. Pass maps that look artistic, and symmetrical, and football that is ultimately played with a sense of assuredness and certainty of timely brilliance. Dogmatic. The methodology, and approach, of at least three of the four aforementioned coaches, stayed nigh-on the same, regardless of opposition and game, bar unique tactical tweaks. It shows a level of confidence, even arrogance, from billion pound teams to oft ignore potentially different approaches to matches which could require these ideas.
Why is this? Simply put, it’s because it works. If you have decidedly the best vision, and can afford the best players to complete that vision, then why wouldn’t you? It’s a very fair question. Pep Guardiola’s been able to do it since managing Barcelona, Bayern and Man City. Klopp managed to do it by identifying appropriate profiles, and spending big on Van Dijk, and Alisson, when required. It’s very doable when managing the top teams.
It’s not just that simple, however. Without going deep into detail surrounding minor tactical tweaks dependent on game state, even the most dogmatic managers choose to be pragmatic. Guardiola, for example, has typically had issue correctly using large, target-man type strikers. We’ve seen that this season with Haaland, who has personally exploded in his campaign, but looking at tough losses to Man United and Brentford, coupled with draws to Aston Villa and Everton, has left Man City fans scratching their heads wondering why they were unable to take a closer step to being untouchable.
One of the most unrecognised facets of modern football during transfer season is the need to change. This should not be equated to the need to improve, which is something entirely different. Had Man City entered this season with an unchanged side, it’s very plausible that they get a deep-run into the UCL and likely challenge, if not outright win the Premier League as usual. They could have, maybe, improved upon their false nine system, by buying a like-for-like player to Jesus or Foden, but Pep recognises this need to subvert expectations. Entering the next season with similar personnel, and similar tactics and patterns is naïve.
It was naïve of Klopp this season to do something like that. It isn’t entirely his fault, with limited funds and the (for now) disappointment that is Darwin Nunez. But attempting to strengthen the front line which could have operated well without this change was an oversight of their midfield needs. Oxlade-Chamberlain and Naby Keita have struggled with injuries since, well, forever. Elliott and Carvalho aren’t necessarily 8’s, and could hardly be expected to arrive in the Premier League and play at the highest level for ninety minutes a week. Thiago is a brilliant player but his struggle for fitness and ultimately mobility can cost Liverpool at times, and finally, the aging Henderson and disappointing Fabinho have entirely looked off their game this season.
Could Klopp have avoided this though? Without trying to name any specific player that Liverpool could have targeted, the footballing world is hardly bereft of talent at the six and eight positions. Requiring mobility and high-level technical ability narrows things down, but the options aren’t zero. Purchasing players who still have room to grow at their age would have allowed Klopp and Ljinders to mould them into exactly what’s then required to create a new, younger and, crucially, functioning system. Such was the dogma (or maybe it was sentimentality) of Klopp that he opted to stick with what he knew; the reliable old-heads of Fabinho, Henderson and Milner.
This isn’t the sole example of dogmatic thinking in the Premier League, nor is it the most extreme. Enter, Marcelo Bielsa. The Italian is a manager who is divisive at the best of times, and stubborn at the worst. When he arrived at Leeds, he opted for the football that he knew, that was guaranteed to work, especially with a strong and hungry side in the Championship as Leeds had. It did work. for about three quarters of each season. Losses to QPR, Sheffield United and Ipswich Town at the end of the 18/19 season saw Leeds fall out of the promotion spots and into 3rd to the playoffs, where they got hurt at home against Derby 4–2 in the second semi-final leg. Bielsa’s style encourages an extreme work ethic in both training and match and produces a ridiculous press that many Premier League sides struggled to figure out when he had brought Leeds up. In his second season in the top flight, however, Bielsa got found out in a big way. From gameweek 17 to gameweek 19, they conceded 17 goals to three sides, and scored only once, which was enough for the Leeds board to show him the door. A dogmatic approach from Bielsa was met with a far more pragmatic one by the Leeds board.
Bielsa is a fair example of how difficult it can be for clubs that aren’t flush with cash to produce results every week with minimal change. But dogmatism isn’t an easy ride at the top, either. Jose Mourinho got sacked at Spurs for being fairly unwavering in approach and leading them to some poor results. Same could be said for Thomas Tuchel, or even Arsene Wenger further back. Is there even any evidence to suggest, however, that a pragmatic approach could have fixed things for these managers? Well, yes. Yes there is.
When Mikel Arteta arrived at Arsenal after the tenure of the ever pragmatic Unai Emery, it was fairly doom and gloom at the Emirates. Chelsea’s 4–1 humiliation in the Europa League final had only been the beginning, and when Arteta had arrived they sat in 11th, hopeless for Europe but hopeful for Arteta. Well, that hope seems (now) to be well placed, and his first season was capped off brilliantly by an FA Cup run which saw wins against Man City and Chelsea. Arteta likely always had intended to play a four back, not dissimilar to his former senior’s at Man City, Pep Guardiola. But, having seen it’s fairly ineffective results up until gameweek 30, Arteta made a bold switch to the three back, allowing easier build-up in the first two phases and opting to rely on ‘automatisms’ across the pitch more often. Sure, the same concepts can’t be relied on for a full season without teams figuring it out, but on arrival, the idea made complete sense. Arteta’s reign overall may have been tenuous at times, but it appears now to be in the clear.
Not to be outdone by Arteta, Eric Ten Hag has shown brilliantly to be pragmatic on a more game-by-game basis, opting to play a complete counter-attacking style in games against possession dominant and elite teams, but preferring to play in a fast-approached, but far more controlled manor when the right opposition appears. Ten Hag isn’t a complete pragmatist, however, with his transfer targets at the start of the season being his ex squad members at Ajax. Even the most pragmatic managers understand that it can be good to rely on what you know.
Unai Emery might be a clear example of a manager gone too far in this pragmatic direction, however. In his last year, he played everything from a three back to a 4–4–2. With this approach, you lessen the understanding, time and care in training you can give to any one concept, or idea, knowing that your plan is to effectively stop and counter the oppositions idea. This has often lead to Emery being criticised for poor league form. A double-edged sword, certainly. It’s also one of the reasons why he’s had great European success. Three time UEL winner with Sevilla, and one time winner with Villareal, His pragmatism allows him a greater scope to upset teams in Europe, playing against teams they would scarcely play otherwise.
Emery truly represents the pros and cons of bending your wills to suit the game. Maybe the best managers, however, understand that somewhere in between pragmatism and dogmatism lies the most perfect, and most sustainable method of winning.
