Notes from the Sidelines, №12: A Pit stop in Davao City

[Note this is Part 1 of a Mega-Thread on the Rody-Sara-Go-BBM schism]

I argued in my previous article that the Solid South is the key to BBM’s path to the Presidency. Naturally, recent events have challenged this assessment. But as I began to consider possible impact of the Rody-Sara-Go-BBM schism on 2022, I realized something was missing.

While those four are the main subjects of analysis, there is a fourth character who ties everyone together. Not Ferdinand Marcos, but Davao City. Davao is not just the mise en scene. Like New York in Sex and the City, Davao is the fifth character in this political drama.

It’s obvious that Davao City is essential to the rise of Rodrigo Duterte. And yet we know so little about it. Davao contradicts much of what we think we know about Mindanao’s role during national elections.

For one, most analysts would lump Duterte as another example of “those Mindanao warlords” like the Dimaporos, Adiongs, and Ampatuans. However, Duterte has never claimed lineage to the Datus of the past. His rise really began post-EDSA.

And if I’m correct, Davao is predominantly Christian. And while he regularly curses God and invokes Allah, the President himself was raised as a Catholic.

And so, I dug very deep to answer a simple question: Why is Davao different? The path to the answer led me deep into Mindanao’s pre-colonial history.

Our first pit-stop is the pre-colonial Davao Gulf. The first explorers who went here found an abundance of tribes- up to 14 according to Rizal’s friend, Blumentritt.[1] The Davao Gulf then was a mezclar las razas, or “mix of races”.

These indigenous peoples where then a tributary of the Maguindanao Sultanate. Specifically, the tributary was defined as “the Saranganies and all the coastal peoples of the Davao Gulf and the East Coast of Mindanao up to Caraga.”[2]

Just to show you how massive the “Davao Gulf” bloc would be today, it would encompass the entire coastline of what is now Sarangani, the Davao Region, all the way up to Surigao del Norte.

Due to the Spanish inability to “pacify” Mindanao, the local systems remained and the Sultanate was able to independently engage in trade, specifically with the Dutch. As a tributary, Davao at this time, provided wax and other commodities to the Sultanate.[3]

We’re skipping a few centuries here; near the end of the Spanish regime, the colonizers’ steam ships were able to make headway into Mindanao. By 1845, the Sultanate was so weakened that they had to cede Davao. And by 1848, Datu Bago of Davao was dislodged.[4]

The Spanish started in earnest to colonize Davao, starting with the reduccionies. Then came the conversions, first by the Recollects, the the Jesuits upon their return in 1859 (which is probably why the Jesuits have a presence in Davao to this day).[5]

But growth was slow and the Spanish regime had reached its nadir. Soon, the Americans would take over. First, they administered the “Moro Province” as a military zone which was politically and economically autonomous from the national government.[6] Second, the national government expanded the Public Land Law to Mindanao, thereby opening up the island group up to American frontiersmen. The crop of choice was abaca, and there was an Abaca boom up until 1909.[7]

Davao was different because the Americans didn’t have to make alliances with local datus. Unlike in Cotabato, the Americans were the dominant group and were essentially given free reign. Mindanao thus entered a “gold rush” period.[8]

The Abaca bubble popped in 1909. But another migrant group, the Japanese, took over. With help from the Japanese state, Davao boomed. And the Japanese became an all-powerful group, consolidating power in the province.[9]

The boom in Davao generated massive in-migration. From 1901 to 1939, Davao absorbed 144k migrants. President Manuel Quezon (post-1935), in particular, used Mindanao as a safety valve. As the Sakdals grew, Quezon responded with his social justice program. But as the land reform component was not feasible, Quezon instead opened the floodgates of Mindanao for migration.[10]

The migration to Davao further hastened in the post-war period (1948 to 1960) During this period, the province received a whopping 379k migrants, just behind Cotabato’s 410k. Migrants from the Visayas (particularly Cebu and Bohol) were significant.[11] Ilocanos also migrated to Mindanao, albeit to Cotabato. That’s why Bongbong Marcos won in some areas of Mindanao in 2016.[12]

1948 marks an inflection point in our history. Just one year later, in 1949, the Ilocano diaspora would manifest its potency as an electoral bloc when it brought Elpidio Quirino to power[13]

But 1948 is crucial for another reason. That year, a family with roots in Leyte and Cebu would first move to Mindanao. 1948 is when Vicente Duterte and his 3-year-old son named Rodrigo would first move to Mindanao. They would settle in 1950. Said Candidate Duterte in a campaign sortie in Danao: “We are really from Danao. We left and went to Mindanao in 1948.”[14]

How strange history can be: just one year apart, the Solid North which would bring Ferdinand Marcos to power and the Bisaya migration which would give Rodrigo Duterte a regional bailiwick in Mindanao, Cebu, and Leyte were both in formation.

In 1948 as well, the first wave of out-migration from the inner City of Manila to Navotas, Malabon, Caloocan, Quezon, San Juan, Mandaluyong, Pateros, Makati, and Pasay was happening as well. Greater Manila- which was central to Duterte’s “law and order” candidacy- was forming.[15]

Davao and rest of Mindanao soon became a potent source of votes when the Nacionalista and Liberal party machines were established. By 1953, Davao was one of the top 15 vote-rich provinces. In those halcyon days of party politics, the national parties eagerly sought alliances with the local warlords- a pattern which persists to this day. In religion as in elections, there was a perception that Muslim voters would follow the command of their datu leaders.[16]

The link between national and Davao politics- and coincidentally, from Ferdinand Marcos to Rodrigo Duterte- passes through Alejandro “Landring” Durano Almendras.

Landring settled in Sta. Cruz, one of a series of municipalities in Davao which were dominated by Cebuanos and Boholanos. He came to the scene just in time. From 1935 to 1969, Davao was firmly an NP stronghold. Congressman Ismael Veloso was the NP’s point-man.

But in 1948, the LP began winning local seats in Davao.[17] To bolster his ranks, Veloso drafted Almendras- who was known to have ties with Boholano and Cebunao residents of Davao- to join his slate of candidates for the provincial board. Through a messy sequence of events, Landring ended up running for- and winning!- the governor’s seat in Davao.[18]

The Veloso-Almendras alliance ruled Davao for a while. Veloso kept his ties with the national government, while Almendras focused on his role in the province. But this did not stop Landring former from making his own moves. Almendras reached out his natural allies- the Osmeñas and Kintanars. Locally, Almendras nurtured and groomed two proteges: Gabino Sepulveda and Vicente Duterte. Vicente was a cousin on the Durano side. [19]

In 1957, Almendras broke away and fielded Sepulveda against Veloso during the Congressional elections. Sepulveda deposed Veloso and Almendras’s candidates swept the elections.

By 1959, Almendras was elected Senator. Vicente Duterte took his place as governor. Almendras joined a Senate presided by Eulogio Rodriguez, who had tried- and would continue to undermine Landring in Davao. But no matter, Almendras had a more viscious ally: the ascendant Ferdinand Marcos. Image

Landring and Ferdinand helped each other.[20] Marcos protected Landring from being pressured by Macapagal. In return, Almendras helped Marcos reach the Senate Presidency. One interesting episode in the Marcos-Almendras relationship was recorded by Nick Joaquin- writing in his Quijano de Manila pseudonym- in his article “13’ o’Clock”.[21]

To summarize: in the older days, the Senate was supposed to adjourn sine die (adjourn without resumption) by midnight. To work around the loophole, the clocks in the Senate were unplugged a few minutes before midnight. Thus, the sine die adjournment would not trigger.

But on the night of a sine die adjournment, Senate President Ferdinand Marcos suddenly found himself in the midst of a coup. His solution? Have an ally restart the clock and hold on until the session adjourns sine die by midnight:

“Unnoticed by most people in the chamber, the stopped clock on the dais had been set running again (it had been stopped twice that night) and was moving toward a mythical midnight. Suddenly, Senator Almendras stood up and advised the chair that the time by the Senate clock was five minutes past twelve: “I move that the session be adjourned.” Without ado, Marcos banged down the gavel and declared the session closed.”[22]

[And before you ask, yes the Senate still does this clock suspension brouhaha. You can read it in Notes to the Sidelines №1.]

Landring won re-election in 1965, with the second highest vote. But the longer he stayed in the national scene, the more his grip on Davao slipped. By 1967, Davao was split to divide his opponents.[23] That’s why “Davao Province” no longer exists: there is now only Davao City and the adjacent provinces. Vicente Duterte was appointed by Marcos as Secretary of General Services from 1965 to 1968.

Vicente Duterte ran for Congress. But Almendras, the sly dog that he was, supported Vicente’s opponent, Artemio Loyola- then switched back to Duterte at the last moment. But according to Earl Parrenas- in his unauthorized biography of Duterte- Ferdinand Marcos was part of the plot as well.

But here’s the rub. None of these high-level political movements benefitted the province. Like most of Mindanao- due to land conflict and land grabbing- Davao was a “social volcano” (to quote Marcos).

By 1973, most jobs in Davao City were “the heritage of ancient times, essentially unchanged by the industrial revolution”. Most kids dropped out after elementary.[24] Most importantly, the CPP had by this time started what would become a long and bloody engagement in Davao.[25]

By the 80’s the NPA turned Davao City into a laboratory for urban guerrilla warfare. NPA “Sparrow units,” (kill squads) doubled the murder rate in the city to eight hundred in 1984.[26] Meanwhile, the AFP began to inflitrate NPA ranks with “deep penetration agents”. The NPA grew more worried and began its bloody internal purges.[27]

After the fall of Ferdinand Marcos, a paramilitary group called “Alsa Masa” was formed from former NPA members. Alsa Masa began to commit extrajudicial killings on suspected communists.[28] When McCoy personally visited Davao City in the 80’s, he noted that an “air of despair”.

Enter Duterte. In 1988, Rodrigo Duterte ran for Mayor of Davao City. Upon winning, he swiftly co-opted Alsa Masa and forged a compromise with the NPA.[29] The co-opted Alsa Masa was likely the root of the much-rumored “Davao Death Squad”, the evidence of which is now before the International Criminal Court.[30] Meanwhile, order was restored in Davao City, and its grateful residents rewarded Mayor Duterte by repeatedly electing him. No one has ever come close to beating him.

And while McCoy[31] points to certain “economic reforms” in Davao, the crux of Duterte’s governance has always been law and order first. After his first meeting with then-candidate Duterte, future NEDA Secretary said that the then-Mayor “spoke animatedly” about why law and order is the most important priority in the grand scheme of things. [32] However, Pernia also noted in the same breath that Duterte did not “internalize” the economic issues: “There is a need for an intensive discussion and he needs to think about these deeper.”[33]

This is probably why the administration’s response to everything- particularly COVID- has been “law and order” and can be summarized in this statement: “sumunod ka na lang” (“just follow what you’re told”). Everything, from the eyes of Rodrigo Duterte, is foremost a law-and-order problem.

So, let’s go back to the original question posed by this article: Why is Davao unique? Historically, it’s because Davao (like Cebu) has had long periods of relative autonomy from the National Government. It has thrived as a purely regional center. Culturally, it is a catch basin of influences: Mindanao, Bisaya, Catholic, Muslim, Indigenous, and also Metropolitan.

But underneath this multi-culturalism, there is a deep skepticism towards “traditional rule” and a deep belief in the pre-eminence of law-and-order. There’s trauma there as well- of how the elites played politics at the expense of development; how this led to the bloodbaths of the 70’s and 80’s; and how it took the Duterte style of violence to restore peace and order and lead Davao City out of the dark ages.

And curiously that “law and order” mentality developed just as another “law and order” regime was ending on the national level. Just as Marcos fell, Duterte rose. And those who supported the former would gravitate towards the latter.

Rodrigo and Ferdinand: so similar, and yet so distinct. The northern and southern versions of “law and order”. The link would have been electorally perfect- the Solid North and the Solid South together- had the son not had to see his father (Vicente) get played by Almendras and Marcos. That is, if the stories are to be believed.

In a strange twist of fate, the sins of Father Ferdinand appear to have prevented Ferdinand Jr. from entering into a new historic bloc. Now, his fate rests on a proxy war for the Solid South- Bongbong Marcos through Sara Duterte and Rodrigo through Bong Go. How they can prevent their similar constituencies from breaking apart like Davao in 1967 is really a puzzle.

[1] Dacudao, P. “Abaca: The Socio-Economic Transformation of Frontier Davao, 1898–1941. Thesis submitted to Murdoch University.

[2] Laarhoven, R. “We Are Many Nations: The Emergence of a Mult-Ethnic Maguindanao Sultanate”. Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society. Vol. 14 (1986): 32–53.

[3] Op. Cit.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Abinales, P. and Amoroso, D. 2017. State and Society in the Philippines. Ateneo de Manila University Press.

[7] Abinales, P. 2017. Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State. Philippines: Ateneo de Manila Press.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Abinales and Amoroso, 2017.

[11] Wernstedt, F. and Simkins, P. “Migrations and the Settlement of Mindanao”. The Journal of Asian Studies. Vol. 25, №1 (Nov 1965), pp.83–101.

[12] Pasion, P. “Marcos Consolidates ‘Ilocano Vote’ in North Cotabato. Rappler (10 March 2016). Retrieved from: https://www.rappler.com/nation/elections/marcos-ilocano-vote-north-cotabato

[13] Refer to Notes from the Sidelines №10.

[14] Corrales, N. “Duterte returns to his roots in Davao City, Cebu for campaign activities.” Philippine Daily Inquirer (25 February 2016). Retrieved from: https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/768534/duterte-returns-to-his-roots-in-danao-city-cebu-for-campaign-activities.

[15] Refer to Notes from the Sidelines, №8.

[16] Abinales, 2017.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] https://mlq3.tumblr.com/post/17311774433/13-oclock-by-quijano-de-manila-june-1963

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Hackenburg, R. 1973. A Developing City in a Dual Economy. Davao City Information Center.

[25] Op.Cit.

[26] McCoy, A. “Global Populism: A Lineage of Filipino Strongmen from Quezon to Marcos to Duterte.” Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies. Vol. 31, 1–2: 2017. 7–54.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Kusaka, W. “Bandit Grabbed the State: Duterte’s Moral Politics” Philippine Sociological Review. Vol 65, 2017: pp. 49–75. See also

[30] _____. “Duterte as ‘Superman’: Lascañas details Davao Death Squad operations” Rappler (16 November 2021). Retrieved from https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/duterte-superman-arthur-lascanas-details-davao-death-squad-operations

[31] McCoy, 2017.

[32] Danguilan, M. “The Scrum: The unlikely supporters of Rodrigo Duterte” Rappler (13 February 2016). Retrieved from https://www.rappler.com/voices/rodrigo-duterte-unlikely-supporters

[33] Ibid.