Notes from the Sidelines, №29: Whither the Opposition?
I. The Age of the Supermajority
Politically speaking, we are in the Age of the Supermajority. Two successive Presidents- Rodrigo Duterte and Ferdinand “Bongbong Marcos”- have enjoyed supermajorities in the Senate and the House of Representatives.
On one hand, President Duterte enjoyed a 300-member majority in the House of Representatives. In the Senate, he was briefly opposed by a three-member minority (Recto, Escudero, Trillanes) which later reconfigured to five (Drilon, Pangilinan, Hontiveros, Trillanes, Aquino). But then it was reduced to three again (Drilon, Pangilinan, Hontiveros) when Trillanes’ term ended, and Aquino lost his reelection bid in 2019. In that same election, the opposition’s “Otso Diretso” slate suffered a resounding loss in the 2019 midterm elections.
On the other hand, incumbent President Marcos Jr. is currently supported by a 283-member majority in the House of Representatives. In the Senate, he is opposed by a measly two-member majority (Pimentel Jr. and Hontiveros). Similar to 2022, the opposition failed to add new members to the Senate. Only re-electionist Senator Risa Hontiveros was the only member of the official opposition slate to make it into the Senate. Ostensibly, Pimentel Jr.- who was briefly Senate President during the Duterte administration- opted to become minority leader due his family’s long history of opposing the Marcoses.
The super-majorities in the House of Representatives are not surprising. Due to rampant party switching, most representatives join the President’s party. In President Marcos’ case, representatives flocked to Speaker Martin Romualdez’s political party, Lakas-CMD. Romualdez is President Marcos’ cousin.
However, the inability of the opposition to recruit and elect new members to the Senate is puzzling. It is a dramatic reversal of fortunes for a group that was associated with the dominant majority party (the Liberal Party from 2010–2016).
II. It’s Our Weak Party System, Stupid.
What explains the weakness of the political opposition? I believe it’s a combination of two factors- the at-large election of the Senate, and our weak political party system.
The first of these is easily explained. Under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the Senate is composed of 24 nationally elected Senators. Each Senator is elected for a six year-term and after which they are eligible for reelection for another six years term. 12 Senators are replaced every election.
This combination of a small number of seats and a national-level election makes it difficult, organizationally and financially, to run for the Senate. In effect, a candidate for the Senate is running the same campaign as a President or Vice-President, except for one of twelve seats.
Consider, for example, the case of the 2022 Senatorial elections. The ruling PDP-Laban Party fielded a slate of seven candidates (excluding other candidates endorsed by President Duterte). Of these candidates, only Robin Padilla won.
Consider the amounts spent for those losing campaigns: Marcoleta (P63.06m); Roque (P49.43 million), Belgica (P13.41 million), Panelo (P10.83 million). Those amounts are outside the reach of ordinary Filipinos.
This is further compounded by the well-known weakness of the Philippine political party system. In our country, political party ideologies are shallow if not non-existent, and party-switching is frequent and unpunished. Especially on the national level, where elections are often personality based.
However, the weakness of our political party system has grave consequences. These are explained below:
III. Why Political Parties Matter:
Political parties are the primary route for the recruitment of potential new leaders. The article below by Wellhofer and Hennessey argues that ambition for public office is the primary driver of politics. And in most countries, the main way to gain power is to join a political party.
As Wellhofer and Hennessey write: “Opportunities for (public) office do not depend entirely on the electoral market; posts in the political party also act as important incentives for ambitious party members”.
As such, political parties serve an important function. They are supposed to be the primary, if not only way into elected or appointed public office (excluding the civil service, which should have its own career path).
Thus, Wellhofer and Hennessey argue that political parties have three stages of development: selection of a social base (where a political party builds its constituency); building an institutional core (which includes ideology and party rules); and formalization (through continuous recruitment of new talent and enforcement of party rules).
You can see this working in the United Kingdom. Whenever the prime minister (or the leader of the opposition) steps down, the party is immediately able to field replacements.
With the election of Donald Trump as an exemption, every U.S. President has had to secure the support of their party at some point. You can see this in the battles for party supremacy, like Ford vs Reagan, Carter vs Kennedy, etc.
IV. Philippine Political Parties
Philippine political parties fail to comply with all of Wellhofer and Henessy’s standards. First, political parties never have a social base and have never been able to maintain a sustained constituency. Consider Miriam-Defensor Santiago’s People’s Reform Party; Dick Gordon’s Bagumbayan; and Raul Roco’s Aksyon Demokratiko. Most are minor parties and have been unable to exert influence on political affairs without their standard bearers.
Institutional cores of Philippine political parties, as mentioned above, are non-existent. This refers not only to the rampant party-switching every election, but also to the outright occupation of key leadership positions by newcomers. The most recent case was of the PDP-Laban, which had an internal schism in 2021. It started because an outsider (Sen. Manny Pacquiao) was elected to a leadership position (Party President). The party eventually broke up into the Pacquiao and Cusi wings.
And sometimes, political parties will even abandon their own members for the sake of “political dynamics”- e.g., alliances with political dynasties, which act as powerbrokers.
These three factors- selection of a social base, construction of an institutional core and formalization through successive elections- are especially crucial in the selection of Cabinet appointees who might potentially become candidates for the Senate later on. As Steven Rood writes in this article, being appointed to a national office has been a common springboard into the Senate:
Miriam Defensor-Santiago was catapulted into national fame as a crusading judge and later Commissioner on Immigration. Juan Flavier was an NGO worker in the health field of international stature who was appointed Health Secretary by President Ramos and parlayed his impish humor (poking fun at the Catholic Church’s stance on birth control) into a senate seat. Mar Roxas, grandson of a president (and unsuccessful candidate for vice president in 2010) was twice Secretary of Trade and Industry (under both Presidents Estrada and Arroyo) after having been a member of Congress. Richard Gordon, successful chair of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (after the U.S. bases were removed) became Tourism Secretary (and was chair of the Philippine National Red Cross, active in emergencies) before his election to the Senate in 2004 (and unsuccessful presidential bid in 2010).
Other examples come to mind: Franklin Drilon, Joker Arroyo, Rodolfo Biazon, etc.
V. From Administration to Opposition
Many of the faces of what we know today as the political opposition (at least in the context of the 2016, 2019 and 2022 elections) were once associated with the Aquino administration, which was in power from 2010–2016. How they failed to recruit and retain a new core of talent for the post-Aquino era can be seen in their selection of Senatorial candidates from 2010 to 2016.
A. 2010
The list above identifies 10/12 of the candidates as members of the “Liberal Party”. In reality, only Guingona had been a member of the Liberal Party prior to 2010. Drilon, a veteran politician first elected in 1995, only joined the Liberal Party in 2003. Recto, first elected to the Senate in 2001, only joined the Liberal Party in 2009.
Martin Bautista- brother of COMELEC Commissioner Andy Bautista- was previously a member of Ang Kapatiran. Ruffy Biazon, like his father former Senator Rodolfo Biazon, was a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino party before his bid for the Senate in 2010.
Danilo Lim originally planned to run under the Magdalo party. Sonia Roco was the leader of Aksyon Demokratiko, which was founded by her husband, former Senator Raul Roco.
Alex Lacson was a writer and columnist who had never run for public office before. Same with Yasmin Lao, who had shown no interest in public office before this election. Finally, Risa Hontiveros remained- and remains to this day- a member of Akbayan.
Only 4 members of this Senate slate were elected to the Senate: Guingona, Drilon, Osmena, and Recto. Of the losing candidates, Acosta, Biazon, and Lim were eventually recruited into the government.
Acosta was appointed to a low-key position as Presidential Adviser for Environmental Protection and General Manager of the Laguna Lake Development Authority and never sought election to the Senate thereafter. Biazon and Lim were appointed to the infamously corrupt Bureau of Customs (BOC). Not exactly a great place to build a national image. Both were eventually phased out.
B. 2013
The Aquino administration was riding high in the 2013 midterm elections. President Aquino had sky-high approval ratings and the main plan of the Liberal Party was to get those ratings to rub-off on their Senate slate. A 2015 paper by David and Legara would later find that to be an effectiv strategy:
As it stands, the best chance a noncelebrity and nondynasty politician may have at winning a national-level office, regardless of experience and competence, is to join a Senatorial ticket that is pushed by the same political party of a popular Presidential candidate.
The administration fielded a broad coalition simply entitled “Team PNoy”:
But here’s the rub: at least three of these names (Cayetano, Escudero, Legarda) were fundamentally electable without President Aquino’s endorsement. Cayetano and Escudero had been active in the post-2001 political turmoil and risen to fame in the 2007 midterm elections. Legarda, a former journalist, was already a household name as well. Angara, Pimentel and Villar were established but struggling political names.
Of the other candidates, not a single member had been organically recruited by the Liberal Party. The fielding of only three Liberal Party members in the slate was a “move surprising to some”:
“There was some disagreement about the low number of LP members the slate was ultimately fielding — especially given the President’s popularity.”
For example, Bam Aquino had never held an elective post and was not a member of the Liberal Party until his candidacy. He was, however, previously appointed by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the National Youth Commission from 2001–2006. Similarly, Madrigal and Magsaysay were veterans seeking to return to the Senate. They had been members of other political parties. Magsaysay, in particular had been retired for five years. In any case, both Madrigal and Magsaysay faded away from the political scene following the 2013 elections.
Special attention should be paid to two candidates: Antonio Trillanes and Grace Poe. On one hand, Trillanes- a former coup-plotter elected Senator in 2007, who received amnesty from President Aquino in 2011- never joined the Liberal Party, remaining a member of his home-grown Magdalo Party. However, he did remain a member of the political opposition from 2016 until his term ended in 2019. However, he lost his comeback bid in 2022.
On the other hand, Grace Poe- daughter of beloved action movie star and 2004 Presidential candidate, Fernando Poe Jr.- was appointed by President Aquino to the MTRCB in 2011- came out of nowhere to place 1st in the 2013 elections. However, she was not a full-fledged member of the Liberal Party. In 2016, she split from President Aquino and ran as a “third force” candidate. President Aquino endorsed party stalwart Mar Roxas as the administration candidate. Both lost to Rodrigo Duterte in the 2016 elections.
Of the losing candidates, only Risa Hontiveros was elected to a government position. She was appointed to the PhilHealth Board in 2014.
C. 2016
In 2016, the Liberal Party fielded a 12-member slate for the Senate. Again, a quick glance makes it seem that it’s dominated by Liberal Party members. However, only Guingona and Pangilinan were “organic” members of the party. Pangilinan had been a member since his first Senate election in 2001.
Meanwhile, Jericho Petilla was a member of Lakas-CMD before his appointment to the Aquino cabinet. Villanueva, who had been appointed as Director-General of TESDA (with Cabinet rank), previously served in the House of Representative for the CIBAC Partylist.
Even Leila de Lima, before serving as Secretary of Justice under Aquino, was a non-political appointee of President Arroyo to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR).
It is unknown if Ambolodto had been a member of the Liberal Party before 2016. However, she was a virtual unknown on the political scene before their Senate campaigns.
Of the non-LP members, Lacson was the most familiar, having been a well-known PNP Chief turned Senator, opposition stalwart and eventually Presidential candidate in 2004. He was appointed by by Aquino as Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (PARR) from 2013 to 2015. However, Lacson would eventually align himself as an ally of President Duterte in 2016, before running for the Presidency in 2022.
Hontiveros was finally elected to the Senate in 2016.
D. 2019
In the 2019 Senate elections, the decimated remnants of the Aquino coalition campaigned for a slate of eight candidates (hence the name Otso Diretso):
A quick glance would make it appear that 6 of the 8 members were members of the Liberal Party. In reality, only 3 were established members of the party. Aquino had been a member since 2013. He lost his reelection bid.
Mar Roxas, of course, had been the party’s bet for Senate in 2004, Vice President in 2010 and President in 2016. He lost both his 2010 and 2016 bids and his 2019 comeback bid as well.
But the most painful loss was that of Tañada. Tañada- who was the grandson of pre-martial law Senator Lorenzo Tañada, and son of post-1986 Senator Wigbert Tañada- had been a member of the Liberal Party since 1993. He was also “….a driving force of the party when its membership in the House of Representatives dwindled to less than 20 after a bitter split during the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.”
He was unceremoniously dropped from the Liberal Party’s Senate slate in 2013. It did not help that he did not have a close relationship with President Aquino. Reportedly, Tañada had isolated himself from the President Aquino on two counts: he criticized the President for not supporting the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act, and he did not support the reelection bid of Liberal Party’s gubernatorial candidate for Quezon in 2010, the late Rafael Nantes.
The remaining candidates had never been active on the political scene prior to 2019. Alejano- a member of Magdalo- never quite rose to the same level of popularity as party-mate Trillanes, who himself had become extremely unpopular as a critic of President Duterte. Diokno, like Tañada, was related to a pre-martial law politician, Senator Jose Diokno. But by 2019, Diokno was not a familiar face or name to the electorate. Hilbay had been President Aquino’s solicitor general from 2014–2016 but returned to the academe thereafter. Otso Diretso had not- or rather, could not, due to lack of resources, and a hostile electorate - build these names into winnable candidates.
E. 2022
In 2022, the remnants of the Aquino coalition again- this time coalescing around the tandem of Vice-President Leni Robredo and Senator Kiko Pangilinan- fielded a 12 member Senate slate, with 5 guest candidates. Migs Zubiri was later dropped and unofficial replaced with Neri Colmenares. Aside from Gordon, the guest candidates never appeared in the Robredo-Pangilinan sorties.
Of the “core” Robredo-Pangilinan slate- Baguilat, de Lima, Diokno, Hontiveros, Lacson, Matula, Trillanes- only Hontiveros won her bid for the Senate. Similar to the 2019 debacle, the Robredo-Pangilinan Senate candidates had simply not been built up. But then again, should we be surprised, considering that Robredo and Pangilinan’s candidacies for President and Vice President had both been sudden decisions?
VI. 2025: Whither the Opposition?
The upcoming midterm elections of 2025 represents the next opportunity for the opposition to return to national politics. 12 seats will be up for contention in that election. Of these, only five are open due to term-limited incumbents (Cynthia Villar, Grace Poe, Sonny Angara, Koko Pimentel, and Nancy Binay). The remaining seven are re-electionists (Bong Go, Pia Cayetano, Ronald dela Rosa, Lito Lapid, Imee Marcos, Francis Tolentino, and Bong Revilla).
The opposition must begin work on the 2025 elections. Wellhofer and Hennessey provide a possible template: identify a social base and build an institutional core. As I have written elsewhere the kakampink movement of 2016- as fractured as it may be- presents a possible social base for the opposition to build on. For many kakampinks, 2022 was their first exposure to the rigors of campaign politics.
And if national politics is out of reach, aiming to build Pink Republics on the local level, or electing new voices in Congress (ala the Spice Boys and Bright Boys of Escuderos, Cayetanos, and Teodoros past) is another option.
Whichever option is chosen- national or local- the preparation must begin soon.
VII. Addendum
Presented below is an unrolled series of tweets by “The Explainer”, Manuel “Manolo” Quezon III in reply to my article. I have made some edits for clarity:
There are two factors missing in your review. First, what replaced parties for many reasons was the national media. This was a process that began in the 1955 Senate elections with the abolition of bloc voting. Bloc voting was the basic building block of the national senate scheme at the time.
The erosion dated that far back. What disguised it was changing of the rules in the 1987 Constitution, abandoning the 8 at a time to make it 12 at a time. This change was instigated by premartial law losers who wanted a chance post-martial law. Incidentally this decision abandoned the Senate's status as a continuing body. And it also created opportunities for "dagdag-bawas" as surveys have since revealed that voters tend to vote for a slate of eight candidates for the Senate.
So long as the national media was strong, new personalities could gain national recognition. Eventually the advantage shifted to media and showbiz personalities.
But by the 2013 midterms, it was beginning to be clear what would become obvious come 2016: both media and showbiz were losing their outsized, kingmaking influence. At the same time the political class found itself stymied. There had been a systematic failure since 1987 to groom leaders for national prominence. This was particularly devastating to those who were not part of the Marcos-Arroyo-Estrada Coalition which had its own equity of the incumbent, name recognition etc.
Civil Society itself was getting old with no successor generation. The same could be said for
the mainstream political players. They started running out of viable Senators when even reform oriented and established names like Magsaysay and Osmeña found that they had fallen off a demographic cliff.
Parties had given up the ghost even prior to martial law. Regional parties were born of martial law. Post-martial law, media was the key and the cult creations since are what replaced parties.
The collapse of the Aquino coalition was accompanied by cultists in clever projection. Post-2016, it was cults that united, won out, and have mastered creating their own post-mass media, social media ecosystems for electoral purposes.
This is why President Marcos Jr. hasn’t even bothered growing his extremely nominal vestigial party; why Vice-President Sara Duterte is content with her regional party, and why Former President Rodrigo Duterte has latched on to the strategy of post-Edsa moguls: parties can and do remain cohesive if kept small to maintain blocs for coalition-building.
Which is the point: all senate slates are coalition slates. The dynamics changed when slate formation changed with the abolition of bloc voting. The formation of Senate slates since then have called on balanced slates to attract ticket voting: every man for himself.
Residual party cohesion and media spotlight papered that over until 1971. It was further papered over in post-EDSA due to the residual name recall for pre-martial law and Marcos-era veterans, the importance of the national media, and tinkering with the last slots through dagdag-bawas.
Eventually, there was no viable way to build name recall after automation was introduced (limiting dagdag bawas), and after the influence of the national media declined and national parties were overtaken by regional parties. These developments made it even more difficult for “centrist” coalition types to remain competitive against cult candidates.
Which is why 2022 revealed the utter demise of the old center which was gutted by age. Through the emergence of the kakampink wave, a new center was born. But it has a long long way to go, not least because its up against traditional behaviors and notions more skillfully deployed by the cult machines.
