Notes from the Sidelines, №7: Much Ado About Vote Buying
Occasionally, there are some legal and political concepts that make their way into the popular political discourse. During our two impeachments- Corona and Estrada- that word was “Subpoena”.
An anecdote I read from the Estrada impeachment was that some families integrated “subpoena” into their daily language e.g. “Paki subpoena nga yung ketchup” while having dinner. During the Sereno saga, it was “quo warranto”, although I can’t remember the jokes of the time.
Recently, “vote buying” has cropped back into the popular consciousness because of a recent statement by one of the Presidentiables. Before we dig deeper into the messy morality of accepting the bribe but voting according to conscience, we should first ask a few questions:
What is vote buying? More importantly, why does it persist, despite existing legal barriers and its detrimental impact on democratic practice? Lagi sinasabi ng polsci prof (and one of my mentors), “Always look for the the WHY”.
First, we start with the legal definition. Vote buying- as COMELEC Spox rightly reminded us- is an offense under the Omnibus Election Code, as provided below:
What purpose does vote buying serve during elections? According to Teehankee (2010), there are two types of votes: market votes and command votes. A market vote is gained by targeting segments of the electorate- through ads- and the specific image and issues of the candidate.
A command vote, on the other hand, is a vote which is gained purely through organizational means. There are three types: the bailiwick or the vote based on the ethno-lingustic origin of the candidate and machinery, which includes party, government resources, and yes, vote buying.
Think of market and command votes as part of a “portfolio”: candidates will try to build a winning portfolio, through a combination of market and command votes; they can also “steal” elements of another candidate’s portfolio.
Post-1998, market votes have been the predominant factor due to the rise of trimedia. But as seen in 2004, you still need a strong machinery to protect your votes. It’s never over until the inaugral address.
There are very few empirical studies on vote buying in the Ph setting. This is the most recent, published after the 2016 elections:
Some key findings: (1) vote buying is predominantly targeted towards the poor; (2) there are two types- in kind (food and clothes) and cash; (3) when the winner of the election is clear from the start, the bribe is usually “in kind”; but if the election is close, cash is given.
Sidenote: my father was a bank employee during the 1992 election, which was the last machinery-heavy election. He said that one of the candidates withdrew millions of pesos which were broken into 20 and 50 peso bills. Nasira yung money counting machines because of the sheer volume. Naduling daw yung bank tellers sa kaka-bilang. The kicker is that the candidate lost, and the money was re-deposited and had to be counted again.
Back to the paper. Usually, may specific “tao” yung kandidato who controls a certain area. Siya yung taga-abot, usually through a number of henchmen. But do poor Filipinos accept the bribes? Yes, according to the 2016 “Vote of the Poor” study of the Ateneo Institute of Political Culture. But only 2/3rds actually voted for the candidate.
This points to a weak “enforcement” mechanism. Mas madali panagutin yung tumanggap pero di bumoto sa lokal na halalan. How does “enforcement” happen? In my hometown, a former local pulitiko allegedly refused to turn on the street lights for a far-flung barangay which voted for his opponent.
Going back to the 1st study: “Most (94 percent) of those who said that they voted for the candidate did so because of the candidate’s qualifications and only 17 percent because of the offer, indicating that they probably would have voted for the candidate anyway.”
On the other hand, “Among those who did not vote for the candidate who made the offer, 62 percent said this was because of the candidate’s lack of qualifications, and 31 percent because of the vote buying.”
Study #2 found that the the conflict-poor from Zamboanga City and the urban poor in QC classify vote buying for what it is; the disaster-poor of Tacloban and rural poor of Camsur were more likely to see it as “helping the poor”.
Another point: poor Filipinos have their own justifications for accepting bribes offered for their votes.
The “Rightful money” approach to vote-buying appears to be in line with what the Vice President said:
One can also surmise that accepting the bribe but not voting for the candidate is a form of “everyday resistance”; or that accepting the bribe of a candidate they were eventually going to vote for is a form of folk pragmatism- “mananalo rin naman, might as well”.
Even in 2016, vote-buying was still common: a Pulse Asia survey found that 1 in 5 voters were offered money; about half of them said they voted for the candidates who paid them; and most of them used the money to buy food or to pay their bills. [1]
Finally, going back to the issue of enforcement, it seems absurd to expect COMELEC to prosecute each and every case of vote buying (and selling). Especially since they would still have to go through our overloaded justice system. The purely criminal law-based approach to vote buying and selling contained in the Omnibus Election Code appears to be entirely unenforceable.
So this is where we stand: vote buying is illegal, but the prohibition is unenforceable; in theory it is immoral, but in context it is understandable. Our rage towards vote buying is the result of democratic ideals confroting unglamorous reality.
Basta, alam ko sa Australia, voting is mandatory ($20 fine if you don’t) and you get a free sausage on a piece of bread after. If we want hunger to not be manipulated for political gain, then dapat siguro nakakain talaga ang demokrasya.
[1] http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/08/17/Vote-buying-2016-elections.html
