Notes from the Sidelines, №8: Greater Manila and Isko Moreno’s (Precarious) Path to the Presidency.

I can’t find the source, but Mayor Isko had an interview where he said he’s not abandoning Manila, “lilipat lang siya sa kabilang bakod”. Indeed, reconstituting and expanding the Greater Manila vote of 2016 is crucial to his Presidential campaign.

See, something strange happened in 2016. Generally, that stretch of provinces from Pampanga through NCR to Batangas and Quezon is one huge bloc of votes. But in 2016, Greater Manila broke away, almost as if Duterte carved out the urban heart of Luzon.

Generally, that stretch of votes from Pampanga through NCR to Batangas, Quezon, and even MIMAROPA is one large market vote. This is because the Tagalog ethno-linguistic group dominates this area. And yet, Tagalog-speakers do note vote based on an ethno-linguistic basis. And so this entire stretch of votes is essentially a large market vote. See the maps from 1998 to 2010 below:

Indeed, Greater Manila was crucial to Duterte’s 2016 win. Had he not won Greater Manila, he would have remained a regional candidate, winning in most of Mindanao, Cebu, and parts of Leyte and Samar. Even GMA’s Visayas and Mindanao-centered strategy in 2004 had to win a few Luzon provinces to keep the race close.

This is why crime, drugs, and corruption were such crucial issues to the Duterte campaign in 2016. It enabled him to build upon his regional base in Mindanao and Visayas and cut out a huge chunk of Poe’s market vote in Luzon

While Duterte’s ratings are still phenomenal for an outgoing President, his ratings in NCR and Balance of Luzon have dipped. Perhaps the Mayor from Davao has begun to wear out his welcome among lockdown weary Luzon residents.

Back to Isko. His path from Manila City Hall to Malacañang hinges on piecing back together the electoral puzzle that Duterte smashed. He has to reconstruct that bloc that stretches from Pampanga through NCR to Quezon. In other words, Greater Manila and its exurbs.

On paper, Metro Manila is comprised of the 16 cities and 1 municipality under P.D. 824, 1975. However, the influence of Metro Manila now expands to Bulacan, Cavite, Laguna and Rizal; and perhaps as far as Pampanga, Batangas Bataan, and Quezon. Through demographic movements starting post World War II, Greater Manila has become a massive market vote.

From 1948 to 1970, there was massive out-migration from the core city of Manila, to the “inner ring” (see below) cities of Navotas, Malabon, Caloocan, Quezon, San Juan, Mandaluyong, Pateros, Makati, and Pasay.[1] Eventually, the out-migration reached as far as as Bulacan, Cavite, Laguna, and Rizal.[2]

Meanwhile, in-migration for people form the provinces looking for jobs created massive urban poor communities in the slums of Metro Manila; and when Metro Manila was saturated, migrants began to settle in the bedroom communities of Bulacan, Cavite, Laguna, and Rizal as well.[3]

Think about it. Pre-pandemic, siguro may kilala kang nagco-commute galing Ayala to Bacoor, Trinoma to SJDM or who relies on the expressways to drive from Alabang to Makati daily. Ganiyan kalaki ang saklaw ng Greater Manila. And 2016 was the first time it became an electoral force.

Some would even argue that “functional” Manila reaches as far as Bataan, Pampanga, Batangas, and even Quezon.[4] The presence of key ports and economic zones in these provinces technically qualifies them as “exurbs”, defined as “area outside the typically denser inner suburban area of a metropolitan area, which has an economic and commuting connection to the metro area.” It is this “belt” of urbanized and urbanizing provinces from Pampanga to Quezon via NCR that may constitute a new “Luzon belt” to replace the much-vaunted “Lingayen-Lucena”.

The effect of the demographic shift from 1903 to 1970 and beyond on individual and social life can only be imagined. The sociologist Georg Simmel (1903), in “The Metropolis and Mental Life” wrote that life in cities is faster and more calculating, compared to the slower and familial rural life.[5]

Sa probinsya, lahat magkakilala at magkapamilya; everyone is welcome at parties, and stores close by 9 pm. Pero sa Manila? Pre-pandemic, some parties reach into the first light of the morning; and for those of us who sleep, we keep our doors and windows closed and locked.

To be clear, we’re not referring here to some kind of geographically-connected self-identification. A Caviteño will never refer to himself or herself as a Manileño. Instead, we are speaking here of the Marxist concept of “class in itself” as opposed to “class for itself”, as elucidated in the 18th Brumaire:

“Insofar as millions of families live under conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests, and their culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. Insofar as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interests forms no community, no national bond, and no political organization among them, they do not constitute a class.”[6]

To borrow from Marx, the “great mass” of Greater Manila and its exurbs, “is formed by the simple addition of homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes”

Imagine an entire belt of urban-minded, calculating- and as per Simmel, not necessarily empathetic- voters. Duterte already assembled NCR + BLCR in 2016; now Tondo-born, Manila Mayor Isko, with former Duterte consultant Lito Banayo and supposedly Serge Osmeña, by his side, will try to get the whole cake.

In fact, the Isko strategy may be Duterte in reverse. Pin down the Super Manila vote, then a few provinces in Visayas (Cebu, Samar) and cities in Mindanao (cities of Zamboanga City and Cagayan de Oro. Wouldn’t be surprised if this is how Lito Banayo is thinking of it.

How did Duterte win Greater Manila in 2016? He focused on latent anxieties- “a shared sense of distress among communities, but one that remains in the background” like drugs, crime.[7] At this point in 2016, crime was far from everyone’s minds- the discourse of the day was Binay’s Corruption, Poe’s inexperience, and Mar Roxas’ elitism and indecisiveness.

Perhaps this is why Duterte, upon assuming power, hammered so forcefully on the issue of traffic. He was trying to undercut a possible rival in Grace Poe, who was the chair of the powerful Senate Committee on Public Services.

In this context, the redscare last year can be interpreted as an attempt, (similar to the last pre-martial law election) to prey upon the latent anxiety towards communists. But it was not as successful.

In relation to the latent anxieties towards crime, Duterte created an atmosphere of hope and empowerment amidst the chaos:

“In popular media, Duterte’s supporters are often caricatured as angry citizens resentful of the political establishment. However, equally as resonant as the resentment that goes with penal populism is a reclaimed sense of democratic agency. It overcomes sentiments of abandonment, for populism broadens the space for political action”[8]

I really think it was a genuine and powerful wave, something that the Iskoverse and Leniverse can learn from. In the case of Isko, that sense of being part of something bigger was targeted in his first advertisement: “Ako si Isko! Tayo si Isko!” It’s a message that his campaign since appears to have forgotten.

But here’s the catch- Greater Manila has never been a “bailiwick” or “balwarte”. It is not an ethno-linguistic vote, but a market vote that must be targeted based on a candidate’s image and issues. Isko’s entire run hinges on Greater Manila and its exurbs voting as a conscious bloc of urban-based voters, similar to 2016. It’s all or nothing for the Isko campaign.

This is how precarious Isko is in Greater Manila; in the last Pulse survey this year, Marcos was the leading candidate in NCR and Balance of Luzon. And this was before Leni declared. It’s possible she will get a 2 to 5% boost since uncertainty has been cleared since she declared.

Isko must be feeling the squeeze, with BBM coming from the north and Leni from the south of Luzon plus a possible Ilonggo revenge vote. It is a classic two front war for a very finnicky electorate- which also happens to be his base.

And so, in summary: Isko’s base in Greater Manila can either be a fortress, or like the biblical parable, a house built on sand. In the latter case, if BBM or Leni make inroads to Greater Manila as election day approaches, then all of Isko’s base will belong to them.

[1] Stinner, W. and Bacol-Montilla, M. “Population Deconcentration in Metropolitan Manila in the Twentieth Century” The Journal of Developing Areas Vol. 16, №1 (Oct., 1981), pp. 3–16. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/4190969

[2] Hollnsteiner, M. R. “The Urbanization of Metro Manila”.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Yves Boquet. “The Growth of Greater Manila”. Chapter in The Philippine Archipelago. Springer International Publishing: United States, 2017.

[5] It its serendipitous that Simmel’s article was written in 1903, just when the demographic shift from the core city of Manila to the “inner ring” cities was just starting.

[6] Marx, K. 1852. The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.

[7] Curato N. Politics of Anxiety, Politics of Hope: Penal Populism and Duterte’s Rise to Power. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs. 2016;35(3):91–109. doi:10.1177/186810341603500305

[8] Ibid. See also: Arguelles, Cleve. (2019). “We are Rodrigo Duterte”: Dimensions of the Philippine Populist Publics’ Vote. Asian Politics & Policy. 11. 417–437. 10.1111/aspp.12472; Antazo, Benedict G., and Nancy M. Felipe. “Rise of the Duterte Phenomenon: An Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis.” PsyArXiv, 9 July 2020. Web.