John Howard did not slay the One Nation dragon, and Turnbull should be careful in following his example
This piece appeared in The Sydney Morning Herald, responding to an earlier piece by the excellent academic and broadcaster, Tom Switzer. Very much worth reading his take first: http://www.smh.com.au/comment/reemergence-of-pauline-hanson-brings-to-mind-john-howards-wisdom-in-dealing-with-her-20160904-gr8986.html
Two days ago, Tom Switzer wrote in The Sydney Morning Herald in praise of John Howard’s handling of One Nation 1.0, arguing that by refusing to either demonise or court Pauline Hanson, he defused the party’s political potential. Switzer is right to claim that Howard never really denounced One Nation’s anti-immigration message, or the racist overtones with which it was delivered. However, his account involves some historical revisionism — or at least some serious omission. If we forget the full details of Howard’s response and One Nation’s downfall, we may learn entirely the wrong lessons from our political past.
Firstly, Switzer argues that Howard made the right call by taking a middle road– neither making overtures to Pauline Hanson, as Turnbull and Abbott have since this year’s election, nor joining with the “pompous editorials” which depicted One Nation’s message as unfit for civilised political debate.
While Howard may not have explicitly endorsed Hanson’s message or made an alliance with her, he was increasingly concerned with making in-roads into her voting base, especially as the 2001 federal election approached. With Labor looking set for victory, the combination of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (just two months before Election Day) and the Tampa scandal provided the opportunity Howard needed to co-opt elements of Hanson’s message.
Howard was able to channel voters’ fears about immigration and national security into an appeal built on ‘border protection’ — the famous promise that “we will decide who comes to this country, and the circumstances under which they come”. Hard as it is to believe given Hanson’s anti-Muslim rhetoric today, her message about the Asian invasion was a little out of step in late 2001, and Howard’s strongman routine worked well enough to swing the election.
Hanson said later that “John Howard sailed home on One Nation policies. In short, if we were not around, John Howard would not have made the decisions he did”. Well — she would argue that, of course. But it’s not a minority opinion. As Tim Flannery writes, “[u]p until the Tampa, One Nation had been a focal point for disaffected Labor and conservative voters. John Howard swallowed up that latter lot in one gulp… voting Liberal was the natural result after the destruction of One Nation”. The journalist Peter Mares concurs, recording that “there was no longer any need for Coalition parties to debate unseemly preference swaps… In the wake of the Tampa, the second preferences of One Nation supporters, if not their primary votes, were in the bag”.
To depict Howard as the principled yet savvy strategist who led the country safely through the choppy waters of Hansonism is to misread history. He got lucky, and his political opportunism transformed asylum seekers into the wedge issue we know today.
Switzer also seems to give Howard substantial credit for One Nation’s subsequent electoral demise. Borrowing from sections of the One Nation hymn book did peel off some of its voters. But we also shouldn’t forget the impact of internal party factors in the decline. After hitting its electoral peak around 1996–97, One Nation had near-continuous problems with infighting, including a lawsuit over the centralisation of control within the party. These culminated in the 2000 expulsion of NSW Legislative Council member David Oldfield, and his formation of the breakaway party One Nation NSW in 2001. This is not to mention the lingering allegations of dodgy use of public electoral funding; Hanson’s 2003 conviction and jailing for electoral fraud was later overturned, but the political damage was done.
Reassessing Howard’s role matters because it changes the present-day prescription for Malcolm Turnbull’s government. If they can wait long enough for Hanson to trip herself up, they should (with four times as many Senators, it’s looking good). And if they can’t ignore One Nation, they face an immediate choice about whether to co-opt or go on the offensive.
They should take the high road — not just because it would be disappointing to see a major party aping One Nation’s racist, insular rhetoric. It also happens to make political sense. One argument is that failing to criticise One Nation carries a higher cost now than it did twenty years ago, with the growth of support for left-leaning minor parties like the Greens in both the Senate and the wider electorate. However, Turnbull’s cross-over appeal to those groups has faded, if it was ever that solid to begin with.
The real reason is that winning back One Nation voters is more difficult than it used to be. One Nation’s 2016 gains were built partly on adopting the anti-establishment-party sentiment which has developed in other Western democracies. Many of One Nation’s voters came from the Palmer United Party, and will likely flock to other anti-establishment politicians if it collapses. Turnbull in particular faces an uphill battle with anti-elitist voters. It’s an easy choice this time around.
