CVE-2017–18350 is a buffer overflow vulnerability which allows a malicious SOCKS proxy server to overwrite the program stack on systems with a signed `char` type (including common 32-bit and 64-bit x86 PCs).
The vulnerability was introduced in 60a87bce873ce1f76a80b7b8546e83a0cd4e07a5 (SOCKS5 support) and first released in Bitcoin Core v0.7.0rc1 in 2012 Aug 27. A fix was hidden in d90a00eabed0f3f1acea4834ad489484d0012372 (“Improve and document SOCKS code”) released in v0.15.1, 2017 Nov 6.
To be vulnerable, the node must be configured to use such a malicious proxy in the first place. Note that using any proxy over an insecure network (such as the Internet) is potentially a vulnerability since the connection could be intercepted for such a purpose.
Upon a connection request from the node, the malicious proxy would respond with an acknowledgement of a different target domain name than the one requested. Normally this acknowledgement is entirely ignored, but if the length uses the high bit (ie, a length 128–255 inclusive), it will be interpreted by vulnerable versions as a negative number instead. When the negative number is passed to the recv() system call to read the domain name, it is converted back to an unsigned/positive number, but at a much wider size (typically 32-bit), resulting in an effectively infinite read into and beyond the 256-byte dummy stack buffer.
To fix this vulnerability, the dummy buffer was changed to an explicitly unsigned data type, avoiding the conversion to/from a negative number.
Credit goes to practicalswift (https://twitter.com/practicalswift) for discovering and providing the initial fix for the vulnerability, and Wladimir J. van der Laan for a disguised version of the fix as well as general cleanup to the at-risk code.
- 2012–04–01: Vulnerability introduced in PR #1141.
- 2012–05–08: Vulnerability merged to master git repository.
- 2012–08–27: Vulnerability published in v0.7.0rc1.
- 2012–09–17: Vulnerability released in v0.7.0.
- 2017–09–21: practicalswift discloses vulnerability to security team.
- 2017–09–23: Wladimir opens PR #11397 to quietly fix vulnerability.
- 2017–09–27: Fix merged to master git repository.
- 2017–10–18: Fix merged to 0.15 git repository.
- 2017–11–04: Fix published in v0.15.1rc1.
- 2017–11–09: Fix released in v0.15.1.
- 2019–06–22: Vulnerability existence disclosed to bitcoin-dev ML.
- 2019–11–08: Vulnerability details disclosure to bitcoin-dev ML.