Mind-Body Problem and Free Will

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In this article, I want to discuss the relationship between two different problems: the mind-body problem and the problem of Free Will. My idea is that the problem of free will needs to be discussed only after the mind-body problem, and I will try to demonstrate that in this article.

The mind-body problem is the discussion around the nature of the mind in relationship to the body. Usually, people fall under two main categories in regard to this problem: monists and dualists. The first one state that the mind and body are the same things, whereas the second ones state that the mind and the body aren’t the same things. Now, there are many nuisances to this category, the monists aren’t all determinists and physicalists and the dualists aren’t all compatibilists. I won’t list all the possible subcategories now, because that’s not what we are interested in.

For the free will problem, people usually have two different routes: it exists or it doesn’t. Now many think that we need free will for practical purposes, but this is only a behavioral choice, not a choice that came from reasoning and logic, so I won’t take any of that into consideration here.

Now that we have a short introduction of the two problems I want to prove something: solving the free will problem will solve the mind-body problem, but solving the mind-body problem won’t solve the free will problem, so the mind-body problem contains the free will problem. Why this statement? Usually, we would state the opposite if we were in a mathematical set, but here what I mean is that the free will problem assumes a possible solution to the mind-body problem. This is why we need to solve it before going to the problem of free will.

I’ll try to make some examples. From what we know about the brain it is considered a deterministic entity that is in the physical realm. Consciousness isn’t exactly defined but we usually say that it is reducible to the brain or not, these are the positions regarding the mind-body problem. Now that we have this we can have four possible outcomes if we take into consideration the free will problem. Now before listing them I want to say that it’s not a logical position but a methodological one. It is something that might be better to do and not the path that needs to be taken.

1. we answer free will and find out we are free, this sounds strange in an ontological view that is deterministic and physical, such as the neurosciences and the view of mind equal brain.

2. we see that we are free and that, for the first, would likely imply that we are indeed mind and body.

3. we find we are bodies and hence it is likely we are not free.

4.we are mind and body but yet we don’t know if we are free.

Now from the fourth, we find out that solving the mind-body problem doesn’t imply the free will problem to be solved, and from the first, we only likely assume to solve the mind-body problem. We see that the solution of the fourth is not the solution of free will, but free will could solve the mind-body. Free will is now a set in the set of the mind-body problem, because as I said earlier we assume a sort of solution to the mind-body problem by solving the free will problem, hence we should before solve the general one and then go into the more specific one. This is why I think that for an optimal solution we should discuss the mind-body problem and then talk about the other one.

Again this all came from the idea that free will when discussed assumes a possible solution to the mind-body problem. When discussing it we assume for example that we have a brain and a mind is reducible to it, or that we create a world by interpreting the stimuli that come from the world, and thus we use a certain view of the world, brain, and mind. The best take in my opinion is to discuss the assumption before. Before discussing the free will problem we should discuss the mind-body one or else we will assume many things that are yet to be cleared. This will surely take more time, but we will be sure to remove many errors and assumptions.

Another possible explanation for this is that from an ontological perspective the substrate where the free will problem lies is the mind-body problem. Free will is something more of an act, and it needs something to lie on, mind or body. So like it is better to discuss first the reality of something and then the activities that take place in it, it is better to discuss first the mind-body problem and then the free will problem.

That’s my take on it, and again this is only a methodological position, not a clear solution to what is the sub-problem and if it truly is. I talk only from the standpoint of the possible solution not from the inherent logic of our reality.