Failure of New Orleans Levee System during Hurricane Katrina

Kevin Main
9 min readMar 1, 2019

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Kevin Main
University of South Carolina Aiken

Paper written for Ethics of Engineering
Spring 2018
Dr. Dillard-Wright

https://news.wttw.com/2015/08/27/hurricane-katrina-remembering-storm-10-years-later

On Monday, August 29, 2005 Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Louisiana and its effects were felt across the state. But it was most remembered by the damage it made to New Orleans metropolitan area. Katrina’s winds were consistent with a Category 2 hurricane, and by the next day it was clear that the failure of the levees aggrandized the humanitarian crisis for the city.[1] As a result of the levee failure a wall of water 20 feet high surged into the surrounding neighborhoods starting at the Lower Ninth Ward.[2] Subsequently, Governor Kathleen Blanco ordered a complete evacuation due to the widespread flooding. The local and federal emergency response forces were overwhelmed due to the logistics of the disaster response and this led to a humanitarian catastrophe that the state and nation were not prepared for deal with. The Louisiana Governor said the following month on Sept. 14, 2005 “We must take a careful look at what went wrong and make sure it never happens again. I take full responsibility.”[3]

The loss of life was unfathomable and totaled nearly 2,000 American lives. Additionally, the hurricane left in its wake 100 billion in damage effecting 90,000 square miles of the country and is remembered as one of the most devastating natural disasters in recent history.[4] Nobody seemed prepared to deal with the disaster and this led to heavy criticism of the Bush administrations slow FEMA response. Much was said about the levee failure which triggered the disaster. If the levees had never failed, then perhaps the disaster could have been mitigated or avoided entirely. What is strange is that it seems we should have been prepared to deal with a Hurricane disaster, since they are nothing new to Americans. The ex-FEMA chief Michael Brown is quoted as saying “In every disaster, there are mistakes, and it’s not always smooth and pretty.”[5]

It also did not help FEMAs optics or the President’s reputation when the famous photo of George Bush looking down at New Orleans after the levees broke, which became to symbolize the failure of the FEMA emergency response, and the failure of the engineers in building a resilient levee structure.[6]

The polder levee failures were a clear failure point that people could look at. Van Heerden et al. showed that the Hurricane Protection System (HPS) could not accomplish what was set out in the 1965 Congressional mandate which sought to protect against “the most severe combination of meteorological conditions reasonably expected.”[7] They discovered that incomplete and outdated hurricane science was used in order to expediate the design process and reduce costs.[8] Even though the hurricane data was obsolete, it seems this data was still used in design considerations when building levees. Surge analysis using oceanographic analysis was based on the 1959 US Weather Bureau (now known as the National Weather Bureau (NWB)). The surge analysis provided for a minimum height above mean sea level to resist overtopping by a surge.[9] Further, the organization charged with maintaining a levee database, USACE, missed an opportunity to update the Standard Project Hurricane analysis after NWS revised the Standard Project Hurricane (NPH) template in 1972 and 1979.[10] Surge analysis data was updated using historical data and hypothetical assumptions to surge height. Factors taken in account ranged from pressure, size, and forward size.[11] Additionally, the levees were built 30–60 cm lower than specified by the HPS data, USACE failed to follow existing engineering practices or its own guidance. This guidance would have identified weak soil strength, potential for seepage, and thick porous sand layers that would undermine the effectiveness of the levee system. Van Heerden et al., lays out what seems to be a systematic failure from an engineering standard, to an emergency response, as being responsible for the chain of events leading towards billions of dollars in damages to Louisiana. The Katrina disaster is one of the worst civil engineering disasters in United States history, the failure of >50% of the New Orleans levees serves as a grim reminder of the need to follow engineering principals when designing and maintaining levee systems.[12]

There is a real need to ensure future designs offer long-term protection. Van Heerden et al., offers solutions such as: Dutch-style floodgates, pile-supported barrier levee structures at key locations, using high quality instead of substandard soil building-material for levees, and by building and restoring wetlands to serve as a hedge against rising sea levels and climate change.[13] The wetlands should serve as an outer defense and the hard structures such as levees should serve as an inner defense in the event the wetlands get overwhelmed by flooding.

It should also be noted that it’s not only the levees that need to be upgraded, but that attention needs to be given to restoring the coastline. Van Heerden et al., explains that steps need to be taken because the barrier islands protect the wetlands, and the wetlands protect the levees.[14] There is a term for this in the military, it’s called Defense-in-Depth. This is described as layering security so that the base does not have a single point of failure that could the entire base security. In a recent article written by Mark Schleifstein at NOLA.com of The Times-Picayuna, he laments that the newly rebuilt New Orleans area hurricane levee system is “inadequate” for protecting the metropolitan area.[15] Mark notes nothing has changed since 2015 to address this perceived inadequacy. Engineers had designed the levee system to protect against everything except the “so-called 100-year flood event.” which is characterized by the 1% chance storm surges from a hurricane can overwhelm the levee system. Ironically, the storm surge caused by the Katrina disaster was considered a 200-year storm.[16] Engineers at the USACE say the new levee system is “resilient” meaning that in the event of a surge over the levees they will no longer wash away or topple over;[17] which essentially gives the message that at least the next one won’t be as bad as Katrina.

The Picayuna Editorial board wrote about the levee system upgrades again on February 25, 2018. In it the Editors issue the same sentiments that Mark Schleifstein did in 2015. After the Katrina disaster engineers at USACE went about fortifying the area by putting in 350 miles of levees, floodwalls, and storm gates and pumps. Billions were spent to revamp the flood protection system to ensure something like this would never happen again. However, levees were built to protect against a 100-year flood, despite Congress telling USACE to design the flood protection system to protect against a Category 5 storm to go beyond the 100-year flood design.[18] This has yet to be accomplished due to costs, time, politics, and challenges posed in the surrounding wetlands. New Orleans serves as the most visible symbol of the failures of the flood systems; and despite this there are still surrounding areas like Houma and New Iberia that have zero protection or at a minimum 10-year protection. The Picayuna Editorial board thinks lowering expectations of flood protection should not be acceptable and despite the challenges posed by upgrading the levees that government should appropriate money to fund levee upgrades.[19]

The levee system that isn’t as robust as it should be according to these Picayuna reports. Climate Scientists predict rising sea levels will displace thousands of Louisiana residents.[20] In a study published by the journal Natural Climate Change it’s predicated that sea level rise will displace hundreds of thousands of people from U.S. coastal cities.[21] The University of Georgia also estimates that over 500,000 by the year 2100 will could be displaced due to rising sea levels.[22] These changes in climate pose challenges to engineers tasked with building the floodwater systems in Louisiana emphasize the importance to not become complacent when it comes to preparedness.

In 2009 the US National Academy of Engineering (NAE) concluded that “even the strongest levees and flood walls cannot be guaranteed to save New Orleans from another hurricane like Katrina.”[23] The panel at NAE further concluded that the 100-year flood approach is “not acceptable” and that in populated cities like New Orleans the residents, hospitals, and nursing homes should be given a voluntary relocation notice as they are in a flood vulnerable area.[24] Beyond this recommendation if people do not want to move then they should raise buildings so the lowest floor meets the expected flood levels.[25]

These studies and reports paint a grim picture of the situation facing coastal areas like New Orleans that live in hurricane-prone areas. A lack of motivation and national interest is stagnating disaster preparedness and is making people complacent. As the media moves on from Katrina to cover the next crisis, sustained interest is difficult for most people.

It’s clear that tragic disasters such as Katrina serve as reminders of important lessons engineers should use when designing the future flood protection systems. However, the burden is not simply placed solely on the engineer’s shoulders, but also on politicians who become complacent when it comes to disaster and emergency preparedness. The troubling revelation that New Orleans levees are still inadequate should be addressed and not simply used as a political talking point around elections. Levee systems are inherently vulnerable to natural disasters, and it should also be noted that engineers are constrained by politics and budgets. Engineers have a great burden when it comes to ensuring resilient levees for the future. All Hurricane data available for design should be kept up-to-date. Politicians in an ideal world should provide engineers all the tools needed when designing national flood protection systems. Now that Katrina has passed, and the area is recovering, this is the best time to address these concerns rather than responding to future crises.

Baurick, Tristan. 2018. Rising sea to displace 500,000 New Orleans area residents, study says; see where they might go. Oct 20. Accessed Mar 26, 2018. http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2017/04/study_predicts_mass_inland_mig.html.

Board, The Times-Picayune Editorial. 2018. How can New Orleans turn back the Gulf? | Editorial. Feb 25. Accessed Mar 26, 2017. http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2018/02/new_orleans_flooding_8.html.

Cugnon, Marc, Cara Richardson, Brittany Cheng, and Ramon Padilla. 2015. USA Today. August 25. Accessed March 25, 2018. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2015/08/21/looking-back-quotes-hurricane-katrina/31911813/.

Department of the Interior. 2009. “No wall is strong enough to prevent another Katrina, says panel.” NewScientist, April 29: 5.

Hauer, Matthew E. 2017. “Migration induced by sea-level rise could reshape the US population landscape.” Nature Climate Change 321–325.

Heerden, Ivor L. van. 2018. Chapter 6 — Setting the Stage for the Katrina Catastrophe: Environmental Degradation, Engineering Miscalculation, Ignoring Science, and Human Mismanagement. Accessed 3 25, 2018. https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/b9780128095577000065.

Schleifstein, Mark. 2018. New Orleans area’s upgraded levees not enough for next ‘Katrina,’ engineers say. Jan 10. Accessed Mar 26, 2018. http://www.nola.com/futureofneworleans/2015/08/new_levees_inadequate_for_next.html.

Walsh, Kenneth. 2015. The Undoing of George W. Bush. August 28. Accessed March 25, 2018 . https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2015/08/28/hurricane-katrina-was-the-beginning-of-the-end-for-george-w-bush.

Zakour, Michael J., and Kayla Grogg. 2018. Three centuries in the making: Hurricane Katrina from an historical perspective. Accessed 3 25, 2018. https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/b9780128095577000077.

[1] Zakour, Michael J., and Kayla Grogg. 2018. Three centuries in the making: Hurricane Katrina from an historical perspective, 160.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Cugnon, Marc, Cara Richardson, Brittany Cheng, and Ramon Padilla. 2015. USA Today. August 25. Accessed March 25, 2018. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2015/08/21/looking-back-quotes-hurricane-katrina/31911813/.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Cugnon, Marc, Cara Richardson, Brittany Cheng, and Ramon Padilla. 2015. USA Today. August 25. Accessed Marc5h 25, 2018. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2015/08/21/looking-back-quotes-hurricane-katrina/31911813/.

[7] Heerden, Ivor L. van. 2018. Chapter 6 — Setting the Stage for the Katrina Catastrophe: Environmental Degradation, Engineering Miscalculation, Ignoring Science, and Human Mismanagement. Accessed 3 25, 2018, 149.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid, 151.

[13] Ibid, 151.

[14] Ibid, 152.

[15] Schleifstein, Mark. 2018. New Orleans area’s upgraded levees not enough for next ‘Katrina,’ engineers say. Jan 10. Accessed Mar 26, 2018. http://www.nola.com/futureofneworleans/2015/08/new_levees_inadequate_for_next.html

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Board, The Times-Picayune Editorial. 2018. How can New Orleans turn back the Gulf? | Editorial. Feb 25. Accessed Mar 26, 2017. http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2018/02/new_orleans_flooding_8.html.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Baurick, Tristan. 2018. Rising sea to displace 500,000 New Orleans area residents, study says; see where they might go. Oct 20. Accessed Mar 26, 2018. http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2017/04/study_predicts_mass_inland_mig.html.

[21] Hauer, Matthew E. 2017. “Migration induced by sea-level rise could reshape the US population landscape.” Nature Climate Change 321–325.

[22] Baurick, Tristan. 2018. Rising sea to displace 500,000 New Orleans area residents, study says; see where they might go. Oct 20. Accessed Mar 26, 2018.

[23] Department of the Interior. 2009. “No wall is strong enough to prevent another Katrina, says panel.” NewScientist, April 29: 5.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

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