Exclusive Footage: Inside the Battle of Halen Madness!

On August 3, the Belgian government rebuffed a German ultimatum, leading the British government to pledge military support to Belgium in the event of a German invasion. Consequently, Germany declared war on France, prompting the British government to issue a general mobilization order. Italy, however, declared neutrality in the unfolding conflict. By August 4, the British government, responding to Belgium severing diplomatic ties with Germany, presented an ultimatum to Germany, officially announcing the commencement of war at midnight on August 4/5, Central European time. In retaliation, Germany declared war on Belgium and swiftly crossed the Belgian frontier, launching an assault on Liège.

One week into the German invasion, German cavalry advanced towards Hasselt and Diest, posing a direct threat to the left flank of the Belgian army stationed on the Gete. In a strategic move to impede the German progress and facilitate an organized retreat to the west, the Belgian general headquarters designated Halen as a crucial location. The Belgian Cavalry Division was swiftly dispatched from Sint-Truiden to Budingen and Halen, with the objective of extending the Belgian left flank.

The German II Cavalry Corps (Höhere Kavallerie-Kommando 2 [HKK 2]), commanded by General Georg von der Marwitz, was tasked with reconnaissance missions toward Antwerp, Brussels, and Charleroi. By August 7, German scouting parties noted the absence of Belgian and Allied forces in the area from Diest to Huy. Reports indicated the presence of Belgian and French troops between Tienen and Huy, prompting Marwitz to shift northward, encountering Belgian cavalry that had retreated towards Diest.

On August 11, substantial German cavalry, artillery, and infantry contingents were observed by Belgian scouts in the Sint-Truiden to Hasselt and Diest region. In anticipation of a German advance towards Hasselt and Diest, the Belgian Cavalry Division, led by Lieutenant-General Léon de Witte, was dispatched to safeguard the bridge over the River Gete at Halen. Belgian headquarters persuaded de Witte to engage in a dismounted action to counter the German numerical superiority.

Strategically, de Witte positioned garrisons at the Gete crossings in Diest, Halen, Geetbets, and Budingen. Halen, situated on the left bank of the Gete River, was designated as an outpost, with a battalion of cyclist infantry and dismounted cavalry concentrated behind the village, forming a line of resistance if Halen were to be captured. The village housed crucial bridges across the Gete and Velp rivers, its tactical significance duly acknowledged by both Belgian and German commands.

The German deployment strategy, aimed at subduing France, hinged on a rapid incursion through Belgium to circumvent the French fortifications along the German border. The swift capture of Liège, a vital railway junction, stood as a key objective. Despite the fall of Liège on August 7, the surrounding forts held out until August 16. The resilient defense around Liège prompted a redirection of German focus to East-Brabant and the Gete River. A successful German penetration between Diest and Sint-Truiden would pave the way to Brussels, creating a division between the Belgian army divisions to the north and south.

Battle.

11 August.

Since the onset of the war, General De Witte had been assigned reconnaissance duties in the provinces of Liège and Limburg. Additionally, his cavalry division bore the responsibility of safeguarding the extensive and vulnerable eastern flank of the Belgian army. On August 11, an exchange of gunfire occurred between scout groups near the Halbeek River at Herk-de-Stad and at the bridge over the Gete at Halen.

As the conflict for the fortifications around Liège persisted, it became evident that General Georg von der Marwitz’s cavalry corps would be positioned near Halen to cross the River Gete and rapidly advance towards Brussels. Marwitz’s diary entries hinted at the intention to reach Brussels, and despite the setback at Halen, logistical challenges in the challenging circumstances hindered the Germans from an immediate advance to the Belgian capital.

During the night of August 11/12, General De Witte and his staff made the crucial decision that, on the following day, lancers and scouts would engage in dismounted combat utilizing their carbines. This departure from conventional battle tactics was inspired by two young officers, Commander Tasnier and Lieutenant Van Overstraeten.

12 August: morning.

In the early hours of August 12, the Belgian army command in Leuven received intelligence indicating the convergence of substantial German infantry and cavalry forces on Halen. The German cavalry, specifically the 2nd Cavalry Division under Major-General von Krane and the 4th Cavalry Division under Lieutenant-General Otto von Garnier, commenced their advance through Hasselt to Spalbeek and Alken to Stevoort, respectively. Due to the oppressive summer heat and a shortage of oats, the German cavalry didn’t initiate their movement until August 12.

At 7:00 a.m., intercepted wireless messages disclosed to the Belgian Headquarters the approach of German troops toward General De Witte’s position. In response, the 4th Mixed Brigade was dispatched to reinforce the Cavalry Division, but logistical constraints delayed the reinforcements’ arrival until 2:00 and 3:00 p.m.

The majority of Belgian troops positioned themselves near and south of the IJzerwinningshoeve, with only one company of carabineer-cyclists (approximately 150 men) tasked with guarding the bridge across the Gete. Major-General Marwitz directed the 4th Cavalry Division to cross the Gete, and by 8:45 a.m., the 7th and 9th Jäger battalions initiated their advance. German infantry, bolstered by artillery support, launched an assault on the bridge around 8:00 a.m., rendering the defenders’ position untenable. A decision was made to demolish the bridge, but due to the subpar quality of Belgian gunpowder, the explosion only partially damaged the bridge.

The Belgian troopers endeavored to establish a fortified position in the old brewery in Halen but were compelled to withdraw when the Germans brought in field artillery and entered the center of Halen. The German command was pleased to learn that the vital bridge had been swiftly captured and was nearly undamaged. German cavalry units infiltrated Halen, and a pontoon bridge was erected near Landwijk Castle at Donk to facilitate the transfer of more troops across the Gete for a flank attack on the Belgians.

The Belgian carabineer-cyclists, defending the Halen station and the railway dam, initially resisted German assaults with rifle and machine-gun fire. However, the relentless pressure from German infantry attacks rendered their position untenable, and around noon, the soldiers retreated on foot through fields to join the main force of the division. Well-positioned on the Mettenberg hill, Belgian artillery opened fire, inducing panic among the substantial number of German troops in the center of Halen. Initially, the Germans mistakenly believed that the artillery fire emanated from the Bokkenberg hill.

12 August: afternoon.

Shortly after noon, two squadrons of the 17th Dragoon Regiment pressed forward along the Diestersteenweg toward the Bokkenberg. In Zelk, they faced resistance from troops positioned behind a barricade. The road, flanked by hedges and cordoned off with barbed wire, compelled the dragoons into a frontal assault, resulting in significant casualties. The Belgian guns maintained their barrage, followed by another charge by the dragoons across the railway dam toward the Mettenberg.

As the Belgian carabineer-cyclists were withdrawing through the fields and had already traversed the Betserbaan, Lieutenant Van Overstraeten became concerned that they were retreating too rapidly. He directed the carabineer-cyclists to return to the sunken road and establish new positions there. However, the German cavalry was advancing through the fields, and over the subsequent two hours, regiments of dragoons, cuirassiers, and uhlans appeared on the battlefield in the same sequence as their crossing of the Gete river. They launched charges with lances and sabers.

The carabineer-cyclists found themselves exposed in the open between the Betserbaan road and IJzerwinning farm. The sunken road ahead of them acted as an impediment for the charging cavalry, and the precision of the Belgian artillery dispersed the German cavalry. Despite their valiant defense, the sheer force of the German onslaught overwhelmed the carabineer-cyclists, leading to the fatalities of Captains Van Damme and Panquin. Once their position was overrun, they became ensnared in crossfire when the Belgian lancers in IJzerwinning farm opened fire. The repeated charges by the German cavalry were eventually halted by small-arms fire.

The German assaults on the Belgian guns positioned on the Mettenberg proved unsuccessful, and an immediate advance to IJzerwinning farm was unattainable. Backed by their artillery near Halen station and in the village of Velpen, the German infantry assailed the farm and eventually subjugated the defenders. The information about this setback reached the Belgian headquarters in Leuven with considerable delay.

12 August: evening.

Belgian forces found themselves in a precarious situation, steadily conceding ground, and the prospect looked grim. Between 2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m., the initial troops of the Mixed Brigade arrived on the battlefield after covering a distance of 17 km (11 mi) from Tienen. Their artillery took positions on the Molenberg (“Windmill Hill”) and in the heart of the village of Loksbergen. Machine-gun sections from the brigade promptly unleashed fire on the advancing Germans, with additional support emanating from the nearby town of Diest.

Around 5:00 p.m., Colonel Dujardin organized a combat unit that traveled from Diest to Zelk in six cars. Despite Colonel Dujardin sustaining severe injuries at Zelk, Lieutenant van Dooren of the 4th Regiment of Mounted Chasseurs, with a small contingent, managed to silence the German artillery along the road to Halen. By 7:00 p.m., IJzerwinning farm was retaken, prompting De Witte to issue a directive for a counterattack on Velpen and Halen with the aim of forcing the enemy back to the right bank of the River Gete.

In contrast to the cavalry division, the 4th Mixed Brigade comprised mostly conscripts and lacked experienced officers. The inexperienced infantry launched a blind assault toward the village of Velp, where German machine-gunners had entrenched themselves in various houses and farms, resulting in their repulsion. As darkness descended, a temporary lull settled over the battlefield. Impressed by the tenacious Belgian resistance, limited territorial gains, and the arrival of Belgian reinforcements, the Germans opted to discontinue their assault and withdraw. At 11:00 p.m., a telegram from General De Witte reached King Albert’s headquarters in Leuven.

Aftermath.

In thwarting the incursions of the Teutonic cavalry, General De Witte adeptly commanded his mounted forces, including a contingent of cyclists and pioneers, to engage in foot combat and counter the assault with concentrated rifle volleys. This stratagem led to considerable losses suffered by the German forces. Despite the German cavalry managing to obfuscate activities on their right flank, establishing a front parallel to Liège, and uncovering the positions of the Belgian field army, they remained unsuccessful in breaching the Belgian frontline and conducting reconnaissance into Belgian dispositions beyond.

Maximilian von Poseck, a German military officer, bemoaned the aftermath, expressing, “The brigade is decimated… Charged against infantry, artillery, and machine-guns, entangled in the wire, descended into a sunken road, all felled.”

While the outcome of the Battle of Halen concluded favorably for the Belgians, its repercussions were circumscribed, as the Germans subsequently besieged and seized the fortified strongholds of Namur, Liège, and Antwerp, constituting the crux of Belgian strategy. The German advancement was ultimately arrested at the Battle of the Yser towards the close of October 1914, at which point the Germans had expelled Belgian and Allied forces from the majority of Belgium and imposed a martial administration.

The Battle of Halen also served as an early harbinger of the obsolescence of cavalry in contemporary warfare. The fact that Belgian cavalry engaged in dismounted combat and effectively overcame still-mounted German cavalry presaged the transformative nature of warfare. As the conflict unfolded and transitioned into trench warfare, all belligerent armies acknowledged the profound shift in the role of cavalry.

Regarding casualties, the German 4th Cavalry Division sustained 501 personnel and approximately 848 equines, with casualty rates of 16% and 28%, respectively. The collective casualties of the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Divisions encompassed 150 fatalities, 600 injuries, and 200–300 captives. The Belgian military incurred 1,122 casualties, including 160 fatalities and 320 injuries.

Post the Battle of Halen, the 2nd Cavalry Division maintained its position near Hasselt to safeguard the vicinity around the Gete, while the 4th Cavalry Division traversed southward and subsequently partook in additional operations. General Marwitz led the two divisions to Opprebais and Chaumont-Gistoux, where skirmishes involving cavalry and artillery ensued before encountering well-entrenched infantry. The cavalry then gradually withdrew towards Hannut.