The Great Political Shift: Analysis of the New Political Realignment
No one wants to see a rise of a far-right party in the heart of Germany. If we consider the AfD a far-right party, and there are good reasons why we should (Cas Mudde 2016), then we should worry about a far-right party in the German Republic. While it started out as a more moderate party, since 2015 there has been a dramatic rightward shift within the AfD. In 2013, the AfD received 4.7% of the vote in the German federal election; in the next elections, in 2017 and 2021, they received 12.6% and 10.1% respectively. But if the latest opinion polls are to be believed, this support may double in the next election.
One reason given for the growth of the AfD was Angela Merkel retiring and that no one has replaced her. “The departure of Merkel after almost two decades at the top left a pair of sensible brogues that no successor has been able to fill. While her CDU/CSU remains the most popular, its support has certainly been slipping since 2020. As a result, some conservatives susceptible to economic populism have been left to the AfD in recent months” (Debinski 2023). While Angela Merkel was the most influential statesman in the European Union during these last couple of decades, this reasoning does not appear to be upheld on either a superficial or more profound level. Looking at polls over the past year, we have not seen a drop-in support for Merkel’s party, the CDU/CSU. We also do not see a major shift of support in their main opponents, the SPD. Over the past year, there have been two major shifts in political support. The AfD increased its support from 10% to 19% and the Greens support decreased from 23% to 14%. It seems likelier that the new supporters of the AfD were former supporters of the Greens. This phenomenon is not new. If we look at the National Populist Parties on the old continent, their bases of support are not from the conservative homelands but old industrial centers that used to be labor fortresses. When there were factories, they were the bastions of left-wing parties; when there are no longer any factories, they seek a new political home (Hainsworth 2004).
This poses a fundamental question, why would left-wing supporters seek out parties from the opposite side of the political spectrum, whether they are flocking to either far-right parties/leaders or conservative parties/leaders? We can look upon when Trump won communities left behind, Boris Johnson smashed the red wall, or the AfD rising in East Germany; the voters are seemingly defying the political spectrum in order to make their voices heard. Are we seeing a new model of politics?
In traditional politics, we will describe the political spectrum as a linear line from left to right wherein the voters fit on this line as a normal population curve. Regardless, of whether we believe that the political spectrum is unimodal, bimodal, or trimodal, the voters make decisions based on how they fit on this statistical plane. If we ask people a hundred questions, based on the answers we can put them on this line where either the respondent is in, or near, the center and becomes a swing voter or the respondent aligns better within either pole at the more extreme ends of this model. The map is linear, the map is predictable, and this map is wrong. We will argue that in the West, there are now three poles that are pulling voters.
With much gratitude to Electoral Calculus for the graphs they have created, we are able to see the data of the three poles. In Chart 1, we see that the British people were listed in eight “tribes” based on their views on economic issues and their views on international/national issues. Based on their responses, Electoral Calculus then mapped all eight tribes on this graph to see where they are located. From this graph, we notice that politics based on a linear model does not exist and that we see the three poles. I will define these poles as Social Democratic, National Populist/Conservative, and Neo-Liberal.
If a linear model were to exist, we will see linear regression between these three poles. If economic interests did not dictate tribes, the regression would be vertical, if national/international issues were not important, the regression would be horizontal, and if both issues were important, the regression would be that of a diagonal. We do not see any of these regressions in this model. What we see is a triangle between the three sides, a Mexican standoff of politics.
Not only can we map this in theory, but we can see it in action; particularly looking at France in their 2022 elections. In the presidential elections, we saw three main candidates take center stage. Macron was running as the neo-liberal incumbent against the far-right Le Pen and the far-left Melenchon. All three of these candidates won over 20% while no other candidate reached double digits. Alas for the supporters of Melenchon, he did not make the runoff. Instead of making an endorsement of the more “moderate” candidate for the runoff, he simply said, “not vote for Le Pen” (De La Baume 2022). Despite this, opinion was highly split among Melenchon voters in preference for voting for Macron, voting for Le Pen, or abstaining. While Le Pen would lose in the runoff, she won an unprecedented 41.5% of the vote. This means a member of a far-right party nearly doubled her support compared to the first round. Compared to 2017, she was only to increase her support by about 50% in the runoff; which at the time was unprecedented when she received 33.9% of the votes. To put this in perspective, before the 2017 French election, there was only one case a far-right candidate moved on to the runoff. Due to such a divided field, Le Pen’s father made it into the second round but only managed to increase his vote by about 10% between the two rounds. In a field of two, he received only 17.8%. In 2015, it was possible to believe that the national front/rally had a ceiling that may prevent them from reaching over a quarter of the vote. Since then, they have accomplished this feat twice and are quickly approaching a majority. Whether they can cross this threshold is unknown at this time.
In the legislative election, we saw similar results except there was a moderate conservative party that seem to attract supporters from Le Pen and Macron. Overall, the three-polar model seems to work well in a multiparty such as France. But even in a two-party system, we also see the impacts of this model; its effects are a bit different. In the UK and USA, we see the traditional parties still have elements of multiple spheres within them, see Chart 2. We saw Trump have rivals from “moderate” Republicans and Corbyn had tension from “moderate” Labour members. We can even see Congressman Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez saying, “In any other country, Joe Biden and I would not be in the same party, but in America; we are” (Forgey 2020). Regardless of how we feel overall about the Honorable Lady from New York, if we had a proportional electoral system, she would be correct.
In this model, we are seeing a new picture of politics. First, the term “moderate” needs to be re-examined. When the media uses the term “moderate”, it usually means neo-liberal. Placing neo-liberal in the center of the political spectrum only works if the political model we use accepts fiction as if it were fact. We may also see a reorganization of political parties. If a political operator saw that a reasonable candidate in the center of our map can rally this base, this support could be enough to win elections. Or instead of seeing neo-liberals as the moderate center, those within the National Populist/Conservative and Social Democratic camps could try to either work together or gain support from the other’s base. While neither of these groups has power within the traditional institutions or structures, if a political operator could figure out a compromise between these spheres, they may become the most indomitable force in politics. Even if these spheres do not combine in support for a single candidate, it may be wise, depending on demographics and geography, to try to earn votes not based on the traditional model of politics but on this new model. To gain voters, the new model allows one to shift diagonally in either direction to win voters. This would be impossible in the older model wherein the Neo-Liberals would be seen as the swing voter. Despite being the smallest of the three groups, this group seems to yield the most power. Even if they do not win, they are able to force out leaders not agreeable to them, Corbyn, or achieve legislative victories from leaders that are not neo-liberal in nature, Trump and his tax cuts.
While I gave an earlier example about how France was divided between three groups, this is not the only country where this sort of politics is occurring. In Eastern Europe, we see elections wherein parties with nationalist tendencies who are not right-wing on economic issues are able to become very successful. Whether it is Fidesz in Hungary, PiS in Poland, or the AK Party in Turkey, we see national, populist parties that are not afraid of economic interventions become successful. While these countries may be unique due to their economic and political histories, it is not hard to imagine such a template transferring over to other countries in the West.
Party systems evolve and change over time. There is no doubt that in the future, this article will be outdated. However, the current political system does not match the political system that is espoused by the political, economic, and media elite. Due to this, another shift is due to realigning the political players. The more time goes on with no significant changes made, this shift will not be orderly but be tectonic in nature.
