Human Cloning: God in the Hands of Man
The bioethical debate on human cloning is one of the most important modern day debates of the twentieth century. With new advances in genetic engineering technology such as Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR), human cloning is becoming a very feasible biotechnology of the future. It was the cloning of Dolly the sheep, however, that revolutionized and made the topic of cloning a feasible reality , while putting it on the public agenda. To expand, there are three main procedures that encompass human cloning (Somerville):
1) Somatic cell nuclear transfer — Dolly method: transferring the nucleus of an adult cell into an enucleated human ovum to create an embryo
2) Embryo splitting: dividing embryos in the laboratory — occurs naturally with identical twins, triplets, and quadruplets
3) Human embryo stem cells: using primordial cells capable of forming any part of the body (pluripotent and totipotent)
More specifically, human cloning is divided into two components: human reproductive cloning and human therapeutic cloning. In particular, human reproductive cloning is done to produce children who are genetically identical to the cell donor, whereas human therapeutic cloning is done to produce embryos for research or to manufacture therapeutic products, including tissues or organs for transplantation (Somerville). Furthermore, human therapeutic cloning alone has led to separate, yet closely related discussions on the possibilities of genetic enhancement that would result if human therapeutic cloning were made possible, in addition to debates about the source of embryos for use for such cloning. As such, the modern debate on human cloning has sparked much interest and will likely be one of the most controversial debates to exist in history as much is still to be learned on the concepts behind such technology. Thus, I will be noting the differences in arguments based on their ethical roots from either deontology or consequentialism(also known as utilitarianism). Hence, deontology focuses directly on actions, and denies that rightness and wrongness are merely based on consequences, as argued by consequentialism. Accordingly, I will argue that if human cloning were made feasible that human reproductive cloning is non-ethical and should be prohibited, that human therapeutic cloning is ethical in regards to gene therapy, but not genetic enhancement, and that it is ethically permissible to derive stem cells from spare embryos, and embryos created solely for their stem cells.
(1) Deontological argument: Human reproductive cloning should be prohibited because it is inherently evil in the sense that it involves “Playing God” by creating humans, specifically clones, in the image of man. By using human reproductive technology, we are removing the phenomenon of being begotten by chance in relation to genetic inheritance. Consequently, clones would come into existence through replicative, rather than reproductive means by humans. Likewise, unlike God, humans are not omniscient (all knowing). Thus, to create clones in the image of man is to volitionally impose false knowledge of what the future may hold for human genetic structure. This is the “Playing God” deontological argument which is a strong con-human reproductive cloning argument that aims to answer the question, “Does human reproductive cloning infringe upon the fundamental reverence for human life?”
Contrarily, advocates of human reproductive cloning propose the strong deontological argument of reproductive rights. Those allied with human reproductive cloning argue that reproduction is a private matter involving only individuals and their choices, and these choices must not be interfered with by others (Somerville). Hence, human reproductive cloning may be justified as a reproductive means for individuals who are competent and aware of the risks involved. This inference is based on the doctrine of informed consent which is rooted in the fundamental principal of autonomy or self-determination in medical ethics. Additionally, on the basis of reproductive rights, advocates find it ethically unacceptable to withhold available reproductive technology from those who cannot conceive a child due to the failure of other means of assisted reproductive technology. To expand, advocates emphasize that the majority of individuals who want to partake in human reproductive cloning desire to do so on the basis of receiving a genetically related child, a socially important component of parenthood.
This approach to reproductive rights, however, maximizes individual liberty in a form of hyperindividualism that lessens other important values such as caution towards technological advancements. To expand, there exists a dangerous imperative in regards to technology in the sense that available technology must be utilized to its fullest extent. This technological mentality is particularly dangerous as it overlooks the intrinsic moral transgression of human reproductive cloning. Likewise, human reproductive cloning may be compared to the discovery of nuclear fission and the development of the atomic bomb in order to further understand its iniquitous nature. Margaret Somerville proposes such a comparison when quoting one of the scientists who developed the atomic bombs that were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki: “In some sort of crude sense which no vulgarity, no humor, no overstatement can quite extinguish, the physicists have known sin; this is knowledge they cannot lose”. As such, we must ponder on whether human reproductive cloning is evil in its nature. In doing so, however, we must not fall into the functionalization of evil, a concept proposed by jurist and human rights activist, Professor Upendra Baxi: a sense of evil is lost when evil occurs because people tend to solely focus on the good that comes out of the situation, while losing a sense of the evil that was involved (Somerville). Therefore, even if good comes out of human reproductive technology, for example, by allowing individuals to reproduce when no other means allowed for reproduction, it would nonetheless be morally non-permissible to do so on the basis of the inherent evilness associated with human reproductive cloning.
(2) Consequentialist argument: Furthermore, human reproductive cloning is inherently wrong because it denies respect for human diversity, and ultimately deprives clones of their distinctive genetic identity. As such, a loss of uniqueness would infer a loss of value and dignity in humanity as a whole. Ergo, human reproductive cloning eliminates a clone’s ability to answer the question, “Who am I?” This is the lack of genetic identity consequentialist argument and is a strong argument against creating clones through human reproductive cloning.
In contrast, those who deny the inherent wrongness of human reproductive cloning believe that genetic identity — the composition of one’s genome — is not the mere vital determining factor of individual uniqueness. Additionally, advocates of human reproductive cloning propose a strong argument by referring to the fallacy of genetic determinism: “the mistake of supposing that all characteristics of a living thing are fully determined by its genes” (Russell and Irvine). Specifically, advocates support that the environment plays an imperative role in determining individuality, meaning that the clones and their “parents” would inevitably have many differing characteristic traits. Russell and Irvine prove this point through the following notable example:
All varieties of commercially reproduced roses are exact genetic copies. But we all know that the genetically identical roses in our gardens look and behave quite differently from those in Martha Stewart’s garden. Such differences are due to environment. Stewart, we assume, is simply a better gardener than we are. And her garden is a better place for roses.
Therefore, such an example is symbolic of the unavoidable differences that would be present in a clone and their “parent” due to each separate environment they were reared in. Contrasting factors such as culture, entertainment, healthcare, and education would play an imperative role. Thus, advocates argue that human reproductive cloning does not deprive clones of a sense of value and dignity that encompasses individuality.
In the novel Twins: And What They Tell Us About Who We Are, however, author Lawrence Wright explores the debate on nature versus nurture and comes to the conclusion that despite differences in environments, genes play a much larger role than originally thought on individuality. This inference was formed when identical twins were reared apart at a young age and reunited much later in life, revealing that many identical twins share much of the same personality characteristics that make up individuality, ultimately concluding that nature (genes) are the dominating factor. This is just one example on the continuing debate of nature (genes) versus nurture (environment). Nonetheless, cloned children may suffer psychological harm as a result of a diminished sense of individuality and personal autonomy caused by the unrealistic expectations “parents” of the clone might have on them. Arnold Schwarzenegger's clone, for example, may be forced to live up to the expectation of becoming one of the greatest self-actualized bodybuilders and winning the Mr. Olympia contest several times. Although this is a hypothetical problem, it is still a realistic oppressive struggle that a clone might battle, and one that should be carefully considered before permitting human reproductive cloning as an available reproductive aid.
(1) Consequentialist argument: Moreover, human therapeutic cloning is a scientific intervention that is ethically permissible in relation to gene therapy, but is problematic if the same technology is used for genetic enhancement. The major advantage of using human therapeutic cloning is that it holds great potential at saving the lives of dying individuals. To expand, human therapeutic cloning would provide life saving opportunities through organ and tissue transplantation, repairing severed nerves, and treating genetic disorders such as multiple sclerosis, cancer, diabetes, Parkinson’s, and Alzheimer’s (Somerville). This branch of human therapeutic cloning is considered gene therapy, the “intervention aimed at treating disease and restoring physical and mental functions and capacities to an adequate baseline” (Glannon). Hence, this is the beneficence prima facie consequentialist argument which is the strongest pro-human therapeutic cloning argument aimed at preventing or treating disease in order to maintain or restore “normal” functioning.
Opponents of human therapeutic cloning, however, argue that advocates may face a companion phenomenon of the functionalization of evil. To expand, advocates of human therapeutic cloning may be blinded to its risks and dangers by having too narrow of a focus on the good that they are trying to achieve. As a result, many harms may ensue, the main threat being that human therapeutic cloning makes human reproductive cloning, enhancement, and disenhancement more likely, and ultimately more difficult to prohibit (Somerville). This is known as the slippery slope argument, and is thought to be the strongest consequentialist argument for those who view human therapeutic cloning as inherently wrong. To note, this argument, although strong, only holds true if we are to believe that enhancement, disenhancement, and human reproductive cloning should not be pursued.
Rather than prohibiting human therapeutic cloning in fear that it might lead to undesirable practices, ultimately causing those individuals who would truly benefit from gene therapy to be forced to suffer intolerably, such a practice should only be provided to individuals seeking to restore or maintain normal functions. For someone like myself who has thalassemia, let us say that my thalassemia is so severe that it greatly increases my risk of bone abnormalities and heart failure, for example. Intervening measures of raising my hemoglobin levels to a normal baseline to treat my thalassemia would be a sufficient use of human therapeutic cloning as it would be regarded as gene therapy. Comparatively, if my hemoglobin levels are already near the normal baseline and I decided to use the same intervening measures to raise my hemoglobin levels to provide me with a competitive edge as a weight lifter, it would be an inappropriate use of human therapeutic cloning as it would be regarded as genetic enhancement.
As such, genetic enhancement can now be defined as the “intervention aimed at improving functions and capacities that already are adequate with the goal to amplify entirely “normal” genes for certain functions and capacities to make them better” (Glannon).
(1) Consequentialist argument: The use of human therapeutic cloning for genetic enhancement is morally wrong as it would further contribute to the social gap in society. Genetic enhancement will likely be economically expensive and limited for use by the rich in society. Consequently, those who can afford genetic enhancement technology will utilize it, whereas those who cannot afford such technology will fall behind on the genetic ladder of self actualization. If wealthy parents with children, for example, invest in expensive genetic technology to enhance their children on the basis of cognition, beauty, and athletics, such privileged children will outcompete the non-privileged children in education, careers, and income (Glannon). Hence, the ability to utilize human therapeutic cloning technology for enhancement would not be fair to those who could not afford such technology due to income, a variable that may be beyond a parent’s control. As a result, genetic enhancement technology would separate society into two divisions: the gene rich and the gene poor. In a similar scenario created by Aldous Huxley in his novel A Brave New World, relating to genetic engineering, we would be creating a division of Alphas (higher ups — superiors), and Epsilons and Deltas (lower downs — inferiors). This is the inequality and unfairness argument which is a strong consequentialist argument aimed at proving that genetic enhancement technology would result in further detrimental increases in the societal gap between classes.
Advocates of genetic enhancement, however, argue that the equality and fairness problem may be resolved without banning the technology as a whole by making genetic enhancement available to all. Advocates propose that this proposal will resolve the fairness problem due to the less-privileged individuals not being able to financially afford genetic enhancement technology. Further, it is argued that fairness is concerned with meeting people’s physical and mental needs, and once such needs are met, inequalities in regards to possessions of goods are not morally significant. In the case of Ritalin, for example, it is a drug used to intensely enhance an individual’s ability to focus their attention for certain lengths of time. Although Ritalin would provide a competitive advantage when one is working, it also increases an individual’s ability to enjoy listening to music, for example, a non-competitive factor that does not necessarily leave anyone else at a disadvantage.
Although making genetic enhancement available to all may seem to solve the fairness problem, it is nonetheless a weak argument in the sense that it devalues any competitive advantages that were sought after when individuals initially invested in genetic enhancement technology. The following aphorism may help clarify the previous point: “If everyone stands on their tiptoes, no one sees better” (Schafer). Hence, it is meaningless to provide genetic enhancement to everyone in society as it would cancel out any competitive advantages some people had over others. For example, if I opt for genetic enhancement to build muscle at a significantly faster rate than other bodybuilders, yet that same genetic enhancement becomes available to all the other competing bodybuilders, my competitive edge is ultimately diminished. This is the futility argument which is a strong consequentialist counter argument against those who propose to make genetic enhancement available to all rather than banning it as an available technology altogether.
Moreover, both human reproductive and therapeutic cloning rely on the use of embryos for their stem cells. As such, a central ethical question has emerged on the basis of whether the derivation of stem cells from embryos is a morally permissible act as it involves the sacrifice of human life. Further from this, there is much debate on the extraction of stem cells, whether it be from spare abortion or in-vitro fertilization (IVF) embryos, or from embryos created solely for the purpose of their stem cells.
(1) Deontological argument: In my view, it is morally permissible to extract stem cells for embryo stem cell research from both spare embryos, and embryos created solely for derivation of their stem cells. To begin, both methods of stem cell derivation are meant to extract stem cells from embryos for research purposes and both ultimately result in the death of the embryo. Hence, the basis for such an argument exists on the significant deontological argument that the ends justify the means. Since both methods result in the same consequences, both methods either have to be accepted or denied together.
In contrast, opponents of extracting stem cells from embryos argue that deriving stem cells from embryos, which inevitably leads to their death, damages respect for human life. Opponents propose that the embryo is a wondrous and symbolic being of human life and spirit as a whole. As such, by killing embryos for their stem cells, advocates of embryo stem cell research transform the essence of human origin — the embryo — into an object of replaceable commodity. Further, opponents of deriving stem cells from embryos often refer to Kant’s deontological categorical imperative which states to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in another, always as an end, and never as only a means (Britannica). To clarify, Kant’s categorical imperative is significant in the debate on the use of stem cells in the sense that it proposes that one should never use another person solely as an instrument in reaching one’s objective, but rather use should be done to help both persons, while keeping respect for the other’s dignity.
Yet, Kant’s categorical imperative may only hold true for issues between people. Although the embryo is considered the origin of human life, it is not actually a person in the sense of available capacities and characteristics that makes up personhood. Additionally, the destruction of the embryo due to extracting its stem cells does not necessarily mean that the “original” embryo is actually destroyed. If the derived stem cells are used for organ and tissue generation, for example, the DNA of the “original” embryo still survives through the creation of cell lines from the pluripotent stem cells. As such, if DNA is the only unique feature of the embryo at the time of its destruction for its stem cells, its genetic uniqueness is not actually lost due to the pluripotent nature of the stem cells. Thus, this is an interesting consequentialist approach that values the genetic uniqueness of embryos more than the embryo itself, ultimately justifying the use of stem cells as a morally permissible act.
Accordingly, the debate on human cloning is one that is very complex with many factors to keep in mind from moral theory to various societal implications. I have made my arguments for the time when human cloning is a safe technology with little implications. Nevertheless, we should always question the ethics of controversial discussions such as human cloning under both a deontological and consequentialist mind set.
References:
D.W. Brock. Bioethical Ethics a Canadian Focus: “Genetic Engineering”
J.D. Russel, A.S. Irvine. Bioethical Ethics a Canadian Focus: “A Rose is a Rose, but Clones will Differ”
M.Somerville. The Ethical Canary: “Immortalizing Our Genetic Selves: The Ethics of Human Cloning”.
W. Gallon. Bioethical Ethics a Canadian Focus: “Genetic Enhancement”
