Will busting big myths about terrorism help confront it in our communities?
Experts say that changing the discourse on radicalization is important — an area where nonprofits play a critical role.
After a series of deadly attacks in the past week, the BBC ran the headline on its website: Pakistan’s bloody week: Who is really to blame? The piece explored militancy on both sides of the border. But as a journalist who works in the non-profit sector, another question bothered me: why has the development sector been slow in responding to radicalization within local communities?
Like most people, my own knowledge on global terrorism comes from the media I consume and the books I read. And this rather limited understanding is filled with questions I don’t know answers to. Last week, I attended a session called “The Making of an Extremist” at the World Government Summit which opened my eyes to some unique perspectives from academics and Arab leaders themselves.
Note: Since this is only a short blog and not a thesis, I have included below only three general points from the session. Online social media spaces tends to be volatile, so I reiterate: These are perspectives may or may not challenge what you already know (or what you think you know). What it will offer is a chance to reflect.
Myth #1 — “Radicalization and terrorism are the same”
It’s crucial to differentiate between the two, says Abdulla Bajad Al-Otaibi. Al-Otaibi is a Saudi researcher from the Al Mesbar Studies and Research Centre who has written extensively about radicalization in the Middle East and Wahhabism. He points out that the key difference is that terrorism is a systematic, planned attack with an intent to cause harm whereas radicalization is a process associated with an emotional state of mind. He says that much of what causes radicalization is the language of speech (political and religious). For example, he pointed out that proponents of political Islam have often contributed to radicalization by manipulating young people through the language they use to preach. He adds that through radicalization, political Islam intends to achieve two main goals 1) To incite anger against any form of government 2) To propagate the idea of Jihad to attack the idea of a modern state. He uses the case of Sultan Abdul Hamid II and Ali Sauvi from the nineteenth century as examples to illustrate his point.
What can governments and non-profits do?
Al-Otaibi says the way to check this (at the policy level) is to push for a comprehensive strategy to alter the language of religious speech. He recommends strong legislation will check religious speech that targets vulnerable populations and exploit the emotions that young people do. At the community level, he says that it’s important to ensure that religious speech doesn’t find a way into classrooms or communities. Several countries have experimented with de-radicalization programs. Germany, for instance, has introduced a series of programs that target youth who have some kind of ‘cognitive opening’ or crack in their beliefs that allows them to be responsive to intervention.
Myth 2 — “Education will easily address youth radicalization”
Ibrahim Al Buleihi says that the short answer is, it won’t. Buelihi is a critic of political Islam and says that to understand radicalization, it is important to understand the way our minds work. He says ― (as is common knowledge) ― that our belief systems are products of the social environment we grow up in. The only thing that is different, he says, is that practicing Muslims are reminded of their religion identity throughout of the day. Since Muslims remain more present in their religious identity (praying five times a day), young people need spaces to separate cultural and religious identity. Without this, they become vulnerable to “religious programming” where no matter what education is imparted to them, children are unable to comprehend or develop an understanding outside religious knowledge. Like most teaching, he says the mind responds to the information that reaches it first. Which is why when religious teaching happens, it intentionally or unintentionally begins indoctrination.
Finally, he says that the fundamental thing to remember is that humans are ideological beings. Change doesn’t happen because new information is thrust upon us all the time. It happens because we have room in our minds to respond to the information we receive.
What can governments and non-profits do?
Buelihi recommends that there should be a strong measure to check preaching or imparting religious and political thought to children within classrooms. A math lesson doesn’t need to be delivered as a sermon, he says. Advocating objectivity and developing an openness to learn different perspectives. In Saudi Arabia, where Buelihi is from, this is easier said than done. However, a number of reformist thinkers have been successful in starting the conversation.
Myth 3 — “Terrorists are psychopaths or people who are mentally ill”
Professor Arie Kruglanski says that this is a popular misconception. An academic who has been studying violent extremism for decades, he says the belief that all people who conduct acts of terror are psychopaths is untrue because empirical evidence doesn’t support this conclusion. He says, instead, that the psychosis of a violent extremism can be traced to one’s feeling of a complete ‘lack of significance’. A good way to understand this is to assess what the term means. Extremism is merely to “willfully deviate from a general code of conduct”. For instance, take extreme adventure sports, extreme gaming etc. But where violent extremism differs is that there is a ‘motivational imbalance’ where a person does not have or feel any constraint to achieve what is needed. Kruglanski says that human needs often conflict and constrain which determines how humans choose. For example, the motivation to be successful in one’s career might be overcome by the need for love, which is why people focus on families. But if one need becomes the focus, the sole point of motivation, all other needs tend to get pushed out of the picture. This is a recipe for extremism.
He also points out that this imbalance is difficult to sustain because the quest for significance becomes a dominant force in a person’s life. In his research of neo-nazis in Germany, Black Tigers, Daesh and other groups, he says, there are glaring similarities in recruitment. He shares an example from an interview he conducted with a member of BT. The BT invited potential recruits for an interview. This interview involved the potential recruit sitting in the foyer. They went on to recruit the person who remembered or observed nothing about his surroundings while seated in the foyer. Their intention was to recruit a person who has no motivation or significance in life, for the less you remember, the more you focus on your mission.
Immigrants and refugees, when moving from one environment where they feel significant, to another where they experience a loss of significance tend to look for meaning in their surroundings. The more they feel marginalized or insignificant in their social environment, the more they become prone to fall victim to radicalization, he adds.
What can governments and non-profits do?
Kruglanski argues that there is an urgent need to reduce the feeling of insignificance. He says that building an anti-violence network to counter terrorist activity is important because offering alternative routes to significance can help young people find a way out. In Minneapolis, the Somali American community became a target for terrorist recruits. In response, the community began to focus on strengthening their partnership with law enforcement to work on local programs. Now, non profits like Confederation of Somali Community in Minnesota and Average Mohamed are actively working with young people to address radicalization.
Myth 4— “Young people are brainwashed into becoming terrorists”
Actually, it’s quite the opposite, says Scott Atran. Atran is a french anthropologist at France’s National Center for Scientific Research, Oxford University, John Jay College and the University of Michigan. According to Atran, dismissing ISIS merely as “violent extremism” (and its behaviour as nihilistic) is a dangerous avoidance of trying to comprehend its purpose and mission. In a piece in the Guardian, he argues that ISIS is actually seeking to fill a void. He argues that most young people actually turn to terrorist groups to find a sense of significance and dignity in their lives. Above all, Atran says, it’s important to understand what ‘sacred values’ define a group. What people are willing to exchange in return for sacred values or moral imperatives really surfaces when a person loses his or her personal significance, Atran says. He says, in terms of ISIS, the more one’s sense of self is lost, the more one becomes in tune with the group’s singular message and mission.
What can governments and non-profits do?
Atran says that it’s key to have avenues for young people where they might be able to realize their potential. He recommends that a better counter-engagement strategy — not just a counter-narrative — will help in mitigating the problem. For instance, a person who is willing to give up his or her life in complete totality of their self interests will not readily move away from their mission simply by material incentives. ‘Scared values’ can only be best opposed with other ‘sacred values’. So the goal should be to introduce personalized counter engagement that harness fellowship, passion and a sense of purpose within their social contexts. One of the organisations that has done a lot of work in this area is Aware Girls, which addresses extremism among youth in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Since 2009, the organisation has worked with around 1500 youth, who in turn have influenced close to 10,000 people in their communities positively.
Counterview:
My colleague, Lovisa Fhager Havdelin, who is a human rights epxert working with The Order of the Teaspoon — Teskedsorden, offered some great counterpoints to what this session missed. First, the session was an all-male panel that did not not have female perspectives at all. Second, the session did not explore solutions enough. All the panelists explored the topic of radicalisation and terrorism but offered few solutions despite years of research and work in the field. There was also a lack of focus on people who have left extremism and little or no effort to discuss if prevention from early years has worked.
This piece is written for the +SocialGood, which unites a global community of innovators around a shared vision for a better world in 2030. For more information, please visit the Plus Social Good website.
