Just Before Gettysburg: The High Tide of a Great War
No serious discussion concerning the many battles of the American Civil War can be had without mention of the Battle of Gettysburg. Beside being one of the bloodiest battles in American history, it is also thought of by most to be the turning point of the Civil War. Prior to Gettysburg, Confederate forces had lost significantly fewer battles than the Union Army. Bull Run, Fredericksville, Chancellorsville and other Confederate victories bolstered their position as a powerful fighting force and were far more impressive than Union victories like Shiloh and Antietam, which occurred with heavy losses and a constant change in Union leadership. Gettysburg, however, did not simply change the tide of the Civil War merely because it was a decisive victory. The Battle of Gettysburg changed the tide of the Civil War because it cut short the Confederate plan to invade the North and strengthen Southern sympathizers in that area. Failure to carry out this plan forced the South on its heels for the duration of the war and prevented them from developing any other strategy that was both effective and achievable. In this way, the events just prior to the Battle of Gettysburg proved to be the most pivotal time in the Civil War.
In early 1863, the newly founded Confederate States of America was not by any definition a prosperous nation. In April of that year, women rioted in Richmond for want of food (Tucker 15). This mob quickly grew in size and pillaged local stores of food, shoes and other clothing. No doubt, the Union’s blockade of Confederate ports was a significant contributor to this impoverished condition. There was also significant disagreement on what course of action this fledgling nation of rebels should pursue next. In Vicksburg, Union Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant held the army of Confederate Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton under siege. A Union garrison of 20,000 men had also converged upon Suffolk, threatening the security of Norfolk and possibly even Richmond itself (Reardon and Vossler 9). These and other problems forced Jefferson Davis, Robert E. Lee and other Confederate leaders to decide what course of action would produce the greatest benefit to their independence, despite the limited resources. For a time, Jefferson Davis believed that Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia needed to travel to Vicksburg to liberate Pemberton, he was ultimately convinced by Lee himself that a northern campaign was more prudent (Reardon and Vossler 9). Lee saw the victory at Chancellorsville as merely a postponement of the inevitable and described the Confederate predicament as one that “resolved itself into a choice of one of two things: either to retire to Richmond and stand a siege… or to invade Pennsylvania” (Clark 12). Immediate action had to be taken, and an invasion of the North soon became the plan of both Lee and Jefferson Davis.
The invasion of Northern states was not an action made purely out of desperation for the Confederates. Lee’s plan was to encourage more Southern sympathy in Northern states and ultimately, make the war increasingly unpopular in the North. He asked that the Confederate government and press “abstain from measures or expressions that tend to discourage any [Northern] party whose purpose is peace” (Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, XXVII, Part III, 882). This was a change in attitude for the Confederates, most of whom sought to carry the war out until an unconditional surrender from the North was achieved. Alexander Hamilton Stephens, the Confederate Vice-President and old friend of Abraham Lincoln, even waited in Norfolk for the purpose of presenting a peace treaty to President Lincoln after the Confederate’s sure victory in the North (Tucker 26). The seemingly unbeatable Confederate Army was ready to sway public opinion over the Civil War by moving it into Union territory for the first time since Antietam, while Confederate political leadership was ready to extend an olive branch to Union leadership.
For this Confederate plan to work, it needed to inflict just enough damage in Northern states to sway public opinion, but avoid a conflict that would put its entire Army in jeopardy. When Confederate forces initially crossed the Potomac River and into Union territory, they spent much of their time foraging the area for food, livestock and materials (Brown 16). While this pillaging was certainly out of necessity, it also struck fear in the hearts of Pennsylvania locals, who had not seen the rebel army so close to home. For most of the month of June 1863, Robert E. Lee struck the balance that the Confederate Army needed between terrorizing local Union civilians, while avoiding an all-out conflict that could force his entire Army back into Virginia and prevent serious peace talks from occurring between his superiors and President Lincoln. Lee needed to hold on just a little longer, and the American people would demand peace between the divided factions. This balance proved impossible at Gettysburg.
As the Confederate Army plundered the southern Pennsylvania countryside, Union General Joseph Hooker considered how to respond. On June 5, Hooker suggested that should Lee continue North, he should turn South toward Richmond, which Lincoln promptly ordered him not to do (Tucker 68). Then, when Hooker’s request for an acquisition of troops stationed at Harper’s Ferry was denied, Hooker resigned his post. George Meade was selected to replace him (Tucker 72–73). It was around this time that Gen. Lee ordered Jeb Stuart to direct the Confederate calvary to scout out the position of the Union Army. Stuart, notorious for stretching the limits of the orders given him, read this as permission to travel all over the countryside with little consideration for the position of his own Army (Clark 26). When Confederate forces ultimately met Union forces in Gettysburg, they were now entirely without their own calvary.
The events prior to the Battle of Gettysburg demonstrate just how pivotal a battle it really was. Despite a number of important victories prior to Gettysburg, the South was struggling under a shortage of resources and invasion on multiple fronts. Invading a Northern state would keep the Confederacy on the offensive and provide a pathway to peace, with terms they could dictate. For this to work, a balance had to be struck in asserting enough power to intimidate the citizenry, but not enough to provoke a direct head-to-head conflict that could force the Confederates back to Virginia. Ultimately, the delicate balance that Lee attempted to strike proved too difficult to keep and the Confederate Army, the Union Army and America itself would never be the same.
Works Cited
Brown, Kent Masterson. Retreat from Gettysburg. The University of North Carolina Press, 2005.
Clark, Champ. Gettysburg: the Confederate High Tide (The Civil War). Time-Life Books Inc., 1985.
Lee, Robert E. “His Excellency Jefferson Davis, Richmond.” 10 June 1863. Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, XXVII, Part III, Cornell University Library, Pages 881–882.
Reardon, Carol; Vossler, Tom. “The Gettysburg Campaign.” The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War, Center of Military History for the United States Army, 2013, https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo37413/CMH_Pub_75-10.pdf. Accessed 8 October 2018.
Tucker, Glenn. High Tide at Gettysburg. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1958.
