Game Theory and International Conflict

At this moment in history, it seems as if international conflict is omnipresent. In the spring of 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, sparking a conflict that has yet to be resolved. This past summer, the conflict between Israel and Hamas came to a head, reigniting a long-held conflict in the Middle East. Just a few days ago, the U.S. and Israel intercepted Iranian drones and ballistic missiles sent toward Jerusalem, Israel’s capital. Looming over all of these threats is the specter of China and its seemingly imminent invasion of Taiwan.

The key to winning a war, or perhaps avoiding one, is to know the opponent’s next move or potentially what they are thinking. If each “player” knows the objective of the other and there is some level of transparency, oftentimes these conflicts could be avoided. Perhaps the most rigorous method of understanding or even predicting the next move of each “player” is one based on game theory — the field of mathematics that combines scientific thinking with the social sciences.

Game theory can be easily applied to many situations in international conflict. For example, the prisoner’s dilemma can be applied to an arm’s race. Each player, or country, has the option to either increase or decrease their nuclear arsenal. As game theory tells us, the dominant strategy for each player is to defect and increase their nuclear capabilities. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium is both countries increasing their spending on their respective militaries. Such was the case during the Cold War, in which both the U.S. and the Soviet Union tried to outdo the other.

Another application is the so-called “peace war game”, in which each country is given the choice between war or peace in iterated games. Studies have shown that the dominant strategy in this game is to make peace until being provoked. Moreover, iterations of this game have shown that the costs of war are perhaps even greater than originally expected. These costs show that maintaining peace is much more favorable than waging war.

These games are perhaps oversimplified. After all, some “players” are not exactly rational — for example, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine could be based on any number of rationales. It is impossible to know whether he took this drastic action to strengthen his own country’s security or that of his legacy as Russia’s president. Perhaps, which would be most alarming, he chose to invade because he is hell-bent on causing chaos. Game theory isn’t able to solve these problems alone. But assuming the United States is a rational actor (which is perhaps a mistaken assumption), basing our actions on the research in game theory is our best option for navigating these conflicts.