Locke on Personal Identity
What is Locke’s Account of Personal Identity? What is Wrong With It? Is There Anything Right About It?
Introduction and Outline of Locke on Personal Identity
In his enormously influential work, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), John Locke takes on the daunting task of critiquing the work of his predecessors, as well as developing his own theories to replace or refine them. His discussions touch on many metaphysical and epistemological conundrums, from the primary and secondary qualities of physical objects, to empiricism and notions of innate knowledge. Perhaps the most interesting and controversial of the topics covered in the Essays are the chapters devoted to Locke’s account of personal identity. In this section of the Essay, Locke puts forward a thesis that suggests psychological continuity is what constitutes personal identity[1]. This account quite drastically differs from the concepts of identity put forward by Descartes and the Cartesians, whereby the soul is the bearer of personal identity[2]; There have been countless objections to Locke’s theory and its integral arguments since the Essay was published, with several philosophers criticizing Lockean personal identity theory as ‘circular’ and ‘illogical’[3]. In this paper, I will attempt to argue for the stance that Locke’s memory theory, whilst hugely influential and revolutionary, does not hold up to the objections given by his contemporaries. In order to examine the flaws in Locke’s theory, I will first establish a foundation of how Locke views personal identity, with some examples which he offers to support his claims. I will then postulate the rebuttals of three prominent philosophers, William Molyneux, Thomas Reid and Joseph Butler, in an attempt to show some fallacies in Locke’s theory of personal identity.
[1] Mackie, Problems From Locke. pp. 173
[2] Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (II. XXVII. 12) pp. 116
[3] Nimalkar, John Locke on Personal Identity (2011)
Distinctions
To begin, Locke declares a distinction must be made between the identity of a mass of matter and the identity of a living thing. In chapter 3 of Book II, Locke discounts the importance of atomic identity, insisting that atoms are the same at any one point in time, and remain the same over time. It is assigning a meaning of identity to living things which is more difficult. Constituted by its collection of atoms which are the same at any one point in time, living things can maintain their form over time, despite any changes in their atomic structure. However, living things are also aware of present mental states at any given point in time. For this reason, Locke maintains an account of identity for living things that is unique, emphasising the “continuity of the same functional organisation… [as] the criterion of identity for sameness”[1]. Locke then begins to build to his first premise, being that consciousness is what gives a living thing an identity. He starts by differentiating what is meant by ‘man’, a living thing, and what is meant by ‘person’, a particular type of consciousness[2]. A man, according to Locke, refers to the body of a human being, our physical presence in reality. A person on the other hand, is first and foremost a human being, but more importantly, a living, thinking, intelligent being, capable of reason, reflection, and introspection, and “the same thinking thing at different times and places” [3]. In essence, how I know where I am, what I am, and what has happened in my past means that I know I am me, and can separate myself from other living things. This experience of current mental states, self-awareness and awareness of times past is what Locke constitutes as consciousness, and that it is inseparable from thinking. It is clear to me that this distinction between man and person is important to personal identity, because it offers a clear terminology upon which Locke can build his thesis.
[1] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Immateriality of the Soul and Personal Identity.
[2] Locke, Essay (II. XXVII. 6) pp. 114
[3] Locke, Essay (II. XXVII. 8) pp. 115
Psychological Continuity
It is here that we are left with the question of what it means for a ‘person’ to be identical through time. Whilst Locke has given us a definition of personal identity, he proceeds to say that our identity is dictated by our ability to extend our consciousness “to any past action or thought”[1]. In other words, our identity can only exist as far back as we can remember. As previously mentioned, Locke’s criterion for sameness lies in the continuity of the same functional organisation between two points in time, then consciousness becomes the continual link between the past and present self. This becomes Locke’s third premise, being that we derive our identity not just from being a conscious being, but by being able to remember what our past selves experienced. This premise immediately raises a problem, which Locke attempts to address; consciousness is not constant, for “consciousness is often interrupted by forgetfulness”[2] and sleep. Furthermore, we spend much of our lives living in the present moment without a thought given to the past events of our lives. At first glance this may throw a considerable spanner in the works of Locke’s thesis, but is easily remedied by Locke’s quick counterargument. When consciousness resumes, says Locke, it regains its memory of past events, thus re-establishing the continuity between past and present experiences.
[1] Locke, Essay, (II. XXVII. 9) pp. 115
[2] Locke, Essay (II. XXVII. 10) pp. 115
The Prince and the Cobbler
Having established that personal identity lies in consciousness, and that in order to be the same person over time one must remember their past experiences, Locke tells us the story of the Prince and the Cobbler, a claim based on a theoretical transference of consciousness between bodies[1]. Locke uses the story to support his argument that a personal identity would remain intact if two people were to swap bodies, “as long as the same consciousness stays with the soul that inhabits the body”[2]. It seems that Locke means that as long as someone knows they are in a different body and remember their past experiences, then they are the same person in a different body. To illustrate, Locke articulates that if the consciousness of a prince’s past life was somehow transferred to the body of a cobbler whose body had been “deserted by his own soul”[3], then he would be the same ‘person’ despite not appearing to be the same ‘man’. Locke then goes on to illustrate the contrary experience of the cobbler’s consciousness inhabiting the prince’s old body. Though the prince may remember his past experiences and be the same person in a different man, the cobbler does not recall his relevant thoughts and experiences and therefore, is not the same person once his consciousness is transferred to the prince’s body. Locke also holds that if a person’s consciousness was moved to the body of an animal, they would no longer be a man, but they are still the same person. For example, if the soul of Donald Trump was transferred to a flea, he would remain the same person, but a different man[4]. This example, and the case of the Prince and the Cobbler, shows that Locke is essentially saying that the physical nature of a man has no relevance to being a person.
I would briefly like to mention an incredibly short, but perhaps valid argument against Locke’s use of the Prince and the Cobbler. If, according to the logical positivism posited by members of the Vienna Circle, any meaningful statement must be able to be analytically or conclusively verifiable through observation and experiment[5]. Since, even in our age of technology, there is no way to transfer consciousness from one vessel to another, I would argue that any metaphysical argument Locke has for the transference of consciousness between bodies is meaningless.
[1] Uzgalis, The Immateriality of the Soul and Personal Identity (2017)
[2] Locke, Essay (II. XXVII. 15) pp. 118
[3] Locke, Essay (II. XXVII. 15) pp. 118
[4] DeLancey, Locke on Personal Identity
[5] Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Logical Positivism
William Molyneux
Further along in the Essay, we encounter an unavoidable problem proposed by Locke’s account of personal identity. If, as Locke says, personal identity is based solely on consciousness and that only I can be aware of my own consciousness, then other people have no way of knowing whether they’re judging the same person, or merely the same body. Therefore, if someone commits a crime while they are intoxicated, and claim that they have no memory of the incident, then that person is “only responsible for the acts for which [they] are conscious” [1]. It is worth noting that Locke does not actually provide any hints as to how we are to judge the verity of a person’s account of their memories in this scenario, instead placing his faith in the judgement of God[2]. William Molyneux makes an objection to Locke’s erasure of accountability for the drunkard, saying instead that the intoxicated person with no memory of their crime should be punished regardless. He claims that the person in question chose to get drunk, and being in that “voluntarily induced state of mind”[3] therefore makes them responsible for their actions. Molyneux’s counterclaim does not pose serious threat to Locke, as his argument is more centred around his assertion that any voluntary action and all of its possible outcomes are liable, rather than on the principal of personal identity itself. It does, however, highlight Locke’s commitment to the linking of one’s memory to moral responsibility. I believe Molyneux’s objection to be an affective one, as rather than appealing to identity to dictate personal responsibility, it appeals to morality instead.
[1] Nimbalkar, John Locke on Personal Identity (2011)
[2] Locke, Essay (II. XXVII. 22) pp. 120
[3] Molyneux, Some Familiar Letters Between Mr. Locke, and Several of His Friends (1708) pp. 66
Thomas Reid
Perhaps the biggest critic of Locke’s work on personal identity was Thomas Reid, who published his objections in his 1785 work, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Reid attempted to reduce Locke’s theory to absurdity, and for two primary reasons. His first objection is that memory merely provides evidence for personal identity, rather than being constitutive of personal identity. Reid accused Locke of “confusing evidence of something with the thing itself”[1], and that however it may be that memory may be evidence of personal identity, we simply cannot use memory to explain personal identity[2]. In other words, Reid took Locke’s premise of memory linking our past and present selves as a circular argument, and that memory merely presupposes identity rather than explaining it[3]. On a related note, I believe Locke’s assumption that our own recollection is our only evidence of past actions is false, as there are other types of evidence of our past identities, such as the testimony of other people, and in modernity, photographs and video records.
[1] Nimbalkar, John Locke on Personal Identity (2011)
[2] Speaks, Thomas Reid on Personal Identity (2006)
[3] ibid
Brave Officer and the Schoolboy
Another objection Reid offers to Locke potentially invalidates his entire theory of personal identity over time, in what has come to be known as the ‘Brave Officer and the Schoolboy’ paradox. He asks us to imagine a brave military officer in his fourties, who was stealing the provisions of the enemy. As a forty-year-old, he also remembers a time when he was ten years old and stealing apples from a neighbouring orchard. Reid then asks us to imagine this same brave officer as an eighty-year-old retired general; he remembers stealing the enemy’s supplies, but does not remember stealing apples from the orchard when he was ten. Thus, says Reid, we arrive at a paradox in Locke’s theory; The retired general is both the same as the ten-year-old boy — “because of the transitivity of the identity relation”[1] (he has psychological continuity with the brave officer, who also has psychological continuity with the ten-year-old) — and at the same time is not identical to the ten-year-old boy, as he has no memory of stealing apples as a ten-year-old. I find Reid’s objection a considerable obstacle for Locke’s theory, as it clearly leads to a paradox, and there are no clear ways in which Locke could amend his theory to account for Reid’s counterargument. If a continuity of consciousness is necessary for Locke’s theory of identity, then to counter Reid’s claim Locke would have to admit that memory is not the glue that holds past and present identities together.
[1] Nimbalkar, Locke on Personal Identity (2011)
Joseph Butler
Joseph Butler makes similar claims to Reid, and also attempts to reduce Locke’s arguments to absurdity on the grounds that they are viciously circular[1]. According to Butler, memory is not the essence of personal identity, but merely a test of it. He also makes the argument that recollection of past events presupposes personal identity, referring to Locke’s assertion of the contrary as a ‘wonderful mistake’[2]. Butler’s argument can be neatly summarised by the following; though consciousness of the present is necessary to being the person we are now, “present consciousness of past actions… is not necessary to our being the same person who performed those actions”[3]. In other words, my having a recollection of a past action includes the assumption that I was the one who did it. It is therefore my belief that memory self-evidently presupposes personal identity, and hence cannot constitute it. Butler did make another key objection to Locke’s theory, pointing out that a collection of disconnected memories is not a sufficient ‘substance’ to link our experience of the past and present. Whilst Locke’s claimed the ‘string of memories’ of our past experiences constituted our personal identity through psychological continuity, Butler argued that there must be some kind of continuous substance that did have, and still has conscious experiences[4]. Without this ‘metaphysical glue’, our past experiences cannot be unified and thus cannot provide a single source of personal identity[5]. This simple argument is incredibly effective against the Lockean account of personal identity, as it appeals to a fairly commonsensical belief that we are a continuous person with a continuous and substantial identity.
[1] Sheridan, Locke: A Guide for the Perplexed pp. 77
[2] Butler, The Analogy of Religion (1897) pp. 318
[3] Butler, pp. 319
[4] Sheridan, Locke: A Guide for the Perplexed pp. 77
[5] Sheridan, pp. 77
Conclusion
It seems clear to me that whilst Locke’s thesis of personal identity put forth many interesting and logically sound arguments, there are some which fall prey to the scrutiny of other philosophers. Though Molyneux’s objection did not raise any serious concerns to Locke’s theory, it did highlight a bizarre and nonsensical link that Locke was making between one’s memory and taking responsibility for their actions. I showed, through Reid, that Locke’s insistence that memory constitutes identity is seemingly false, and could be nothing more but evidence of personal identity. However, it is, I believe, Reid’s Brave Officer and the Schoolboy example that struck the most formidable blow against Lockean memory theory. Through this simple counterargument, Reid reveals a paradox that could not be avoided unless Locke was to discount his thesis that memory and personal identity are inextricably linked. Though Reid and Butler proposed many objections to Locke that were similar in nature, Butler made a case for sporadic memories not being sufficient to constitute a continuous substantial personal identity. Having argued from a standpoint which opposed many of Locke’s arguments, there is no denying that Locke’s account of personal identity in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding set the bar for any wishing to discuss personal identity in the times that followed. Despite his many critics charging that memory couldn’t possibly be the sole source of personal identity, the theory still garnered many adherents, even in the present day, and modern identity theory owes a great deal to the psychological continuity thesis which Locke introduced.
Bibliography and Cited Sources
Butler, Joseph. “Dissertation I: Of Personal Identity.” Vol 1. of The Analogy of Religion (Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1897) pp. 317–325. Online source accessed 13th of October, 2017: https://ia601409.us.archive.org/16/items/worksofjosephbut00butluoft/worksofjosephbut00butluoft.pdf
DeLancey, Craig. “Locke on Personal Identity.” from Miscellaneous Lecture Outlines and Other Materials for PHL471, Philosophy of Mind. Online source last accessed 15th of October, 2017: http://www.oswego.edu/~delancey/471_DIR/471_LECTURES/PI.html
Locke, John. “Of Identity and Diversity.” Book II, Chapter XXVII of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), 2nd Ed. Early Modern Texts. Online source accessed 14th of October, 2017: http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/locke1690book2.pdf
Mackie, John L. Problems From Locke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976)
Molyneux, William. “Letter of December 23, 1693” in Some Familiar Letters Between Mr. Locke, and Several of His Friends (London: For A. and J. Churchill, 1708)
Nimbalkar, Namita. “John Locke on Personal Identity” Mens Sana Monographs, Vol. 9 Issue 1 (2011), pp. 268–275. Online source last accessed 14th of October, 2017: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3115296/
Sheridan, Patricia. Locke: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010) pp. 65–80
Speaks, Jeff. Thomas Reid on Personal Identity (2006) from University of Notre Dame portal page. Online source accessed 15th of October, 2017: https://www3.nd.edu/~jspeaks/courses/2006-7/20208/reid-personal-identity.html
Uzgalis, William. “The Immateriality of the Soul and Personal Identity” from Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2017) Online source accessed 16th of October, 2017: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke/supplement.html
