It’s a good year to invade Ukraine
How Russia is exploiting the EU’s instability to gain territory
Over-optimism that the world does not change is now leading Europe and the world into a spiral of decades of disorder. From a realist standpoint, it is a perfect year for Russia to invade Ukraine. Current developments of the EU towards an enforcer of democratic norms threaten to spread renewed vigor for the European project and a reduction in Russia’s sphere of influence. Russian occupation of Ukraine enables a further rise of nationalism in eastern member states. Thereby retaining disorder and political instability in Eastern Europe which Russia can leverage for power and influence.
Uncertainty and weariness of foreign wars mark US foreign policy. For Europeans living inside the European Union discord over democratic standards and the exit of the UK means the ship is unstable and tilted. Combine this with Russia’s fossil fuel supply to the world and anxiety over the boisterous populace that still wants transparency and democracy, like in the West, means insecurity is marking the status of the world, rather than a secure order.
The new security order that will be established by summer 2022 is long in the making. In all likelihood, Russia will invade and take either the large eastern hunk of Ukraine or take the whole country. Probably it will take the whole thing, and then decide which parts to keep or ‘bargain’ over. Russian occupation of Ukraine will demonstrate the weakness of NATO and the weakness of the EU.
On the surface, Russia’s goal may appear the physical security parameter it gains by taking over Ukraine. Likely in the process, it will be able to supplant the independence of Belarus, thereby gaining an extreme amount of new territory with limited effort. But more broadly it plants the seeds of discord and disunity amongst EU and NATO member countries.
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 brought about a new mission for NATO to operate in the Middle East while keeping a loose eye on Russia. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the surprise to its NATO allies, signaled both a disengagement of the US from international affairs and also capacity to now refocus the alliance on Russia again. The military security threat towards Russia would now not be given to Middle Eastern distractions. While China could be seen as the primary threat towards the US, differing US and EU positions towards China meant NATO would not be the vehicle to contain or confront China.
The chafing of dictatorial and corrupt powers in Eastern Europe brought the threat of a popular democratic revolution on the doorstep of Russia. The Belarussian elections of 2020 meant the people almost got a democratic parliament they actually wanted. The Ukrainian people already proved they were able to overthrow a Moscow-friendly government in their self-expression. Combining these democratic aspirations with President Biden’s ‘Democracy Summit’ meant the free choice of government was coming too close for the anxious laden authoritarian President Putin of Russia.
Closer NATO cooperation with Ukraine has been held up by Putin’s friend, Prime Minister Orban of Hungary. Orban has managed to play both NATO and Putin in extracting NATOs security guarantee while benefiting financially from Russia’s many investments into Hungary. Orban’s ruling style is often compared to Putin’s in limiting the freedom of the press, constraining the opposition, and designing a system of oligarchs to control the country’s wealth. The Hungarian people are now the second poorest in the EU, just ahead of Bulgarians, and watching Romanians surpass them. Because of the Orban government’s undermining the rule of law, further EU financial support is essentially suspended. If Orban loses the elections this April, NATO cooperation with Ukraine, which Hungary has been blocking, can’t be stopped.
Orban has been able to thrive and turn into a right-wing populace through both deft political maneuvers and with the tactic support of President Trump and even the European People’s Party and of course Putin. Therefore, his rise and style should not be seen as an unhinged and unaided power grab. Rather, he has also been able to properly read and discern the fallacy of EU democratic norms, encouragement from the US President, and gain with financial support from Russia. He is a true product of a Communist political system of autocratic means of government combined with awareness to retain democratic institutions, which project a democratic norm. But without actually allowing the public discourse necessary to make democratic institutions work.
Orban’s ability to rise as a key player in the EU, by being a bold in-your-face authoritarian prime minister, demonstrated to others the weakness of EU institutions. He is able to ignore the founding norms of the European Union, which are based on mutual cooperation in social, political, and economic matters. It’s as if the Union let in the bull in the China shop with a doctor’s note. Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, have in some form built on Orban’s Communist era politburo leadership style, which resonates with a majority of their populace to develop their own democratic post-communist norms. (Orban is not unique in his tendency, just he has been the most successful in co-opting democratic institutions and creating a new form for the post-communist political system, for his political party, Fidesz, this is a true historical success).
The threat to Russia is the EU is attempting to clamp down on these authoritarian tendencies practiced in the Russian sphere of influence. The Ukrainian model of mafioso-oligarch, controlled from Moscow, and so well emulated in Hungary (and Serbia), now has a limited shelf-life. This means Russia is constrained in buying influence in the region. If the EU is serious about enforcing democratic norms on the periphery of the EU, then Moscow’s influence over its ‘traditional’ sphere of influence will diminish.
A democratic Eastern Europe may have been allowed when Russia was also experimenting with democracy itself, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but a democratic eastern Europe that seeps democratic social movements even further east, into Belarus and Ukraine, is an existential threat to Russia. As the people in Kazakhstan know well now, an uprising against an authoritarian government is not allowed. Freedom of expression remains at home, not in the streets.
The year 2022 also coincides with a world with high gas and oil prices. Russia supplies 40 percent of the EU’s gas. With the EU’s explicit policy agenda to transition away from fossil fuels, which are at the heart of Russia’s relations with the EU, the country’s power of influence can be seen to shrink even further in the future. Russia has been able to complete both its North Stream Two to Germany, and its Southern gas corridor to Turkey and up to Hungary. If necessary, Moscow can reward its southern allies without any interference from the EU. As for its ability to deliver to Germany, Russia has already been able to send a clear message to national governments, ‘if you don’t buy Russian gas, your voters and industry will pay more, a lot more.’ Sanctions or other actions against Russia also hold a high cost for politicians in the EU.
Time of course is transitory. But it seems like the winter of 2022 is the time for Russia to press her luck and assert regional dominance. The ground has been laid well by the Russians, while the US and the EU have only enabled the eastern periphery of the EU to develop in non-democratic ways. The future for Russia in Europe does not look bright. While of course, Russia’s previous military actions against Ukraine, Gregoria, and even back to Chechenia, created isolation from the west, what is missing now is any carrot that Russian engagement with the EU can result in something substantial for Russia. But, with Putin’s authoritarian governance, and fixation on territorial influence, it may be beyond the EU and the US to entice Russia back to an integrated and mutually beneficial economic relationship.
The response from NATO members to an invasion by Russia is the placement of more troops in the East. The obvious situation is that this is a re-militarization of Europe and the establishment of a new Iron Border between EU countries in the Baltics and Russian-occupied territories of Belarus and Ukraine. However, there should be no optimism that the disorder created from this new order will be limited to a static tense military border. Rather, a disorder in the southern lands, as is usual in European wars, is on the cards — and already apparent.
Again, the Orban government of Hungary comes into focus as a key player for Russia. First, it is apparent the simmering discord and independence of the Republika Srpska from the rest of Bosnia-Hercegovina will go through. This is already supported by Russia and Hungary. This is both a diversionary tactic by the Russians and a genuine nationalistic move in the Balkans to rekindle nationalism throughout Eastern Europe. Nationalism is the tool to be used against the EU and its democratic framework of cooperation in the Union.
Second, Orban’s tactics are utilized by the Polish government in its conflicts with the EU. Continually expanding nationalism as an action against the EU will be used by eastern politicians to further undermine the legitimacy of the EU. Governments won’t leave it up to the EU to protect their interests — or territory. And NATO membership looks the other way requiring only a stable and secure government to function, regardless of democratic status.
Poland is a proud member of NATO and will vehemently fight against the Russians, but they are also not willing to give in to EU democratic demands. The imposition of democratic norms by the EU threatens the Eastern-flavored autocracy that has developed. Poland, therefore, exemplifies the future, a military alliance takes precedence over democratic tendencies. If Russia can force a military standoff it also forces a political standoff with the EU that Poland or Hungary does not need to stand down from. The option remains for both countries to leave the EU but remain NATO members. Hungary could even be given its former territory in Ukraine from Russia. Further destabilizing Europe in Moscow’s favor.
It is hard to see how this is not the time for Russia to invade Ukraine. Russia, or rather Putin, shows little interest in retaining the current geopolitical and economic situation. The calculations to shake up the European political and territorial order means Russia re-secures its hard boundaries with Belarus and Ukraine while ensuring nationalism rises in the Eastern member states, thereby counter-acting democratic and self-determination tendencies of citizens.
The fallacy of the post-Cold War was that democracy was established in eastern Europe. It is also a damning indictment of the EU and Western member states to not stand up for the founding values of what was once the European Economic Community which evolved into a more political set-up of the European Union. The original purpose was to prevent an outbreak of war in Europe. Now on the eve of a new geopolitical battle in Europe, the continent finds itself again resting on the security umbrella of the United States and with a populace that questions overseas involvement.
The recent call by President Macron of France for the EU to stand up for itself should be heard. Nonetheless, for the EU to protect its territory, it needs to reclaim its founding values. The first round goes to Russia, but who wins the second remains to be seen.
Michael Carnegie LaBelle is an associate professor at Central European University and a former holder of the Jean Monnet Chair in Energy Innovations and Strategy.
