Functionalism and the “Malinowskian dilemma”

As a new paradigm, functionalism was presented as a reaction against what was believed to be outdated ideologies. It was an attempt to move away from the evolutionism and diffusionism that dominated American and British anthropology at the turn of the century (Lesser 1935, Langness 1987). There was a shift in focus from the speculatively historical or diachronic study of customs and cultural traits as “survivals” to the ahistorical, synchronic study of social “institutions” within bounded, functioning societies (Young 1991:445). Functionalists presented their theoretical and methodological approaches as an attempt to expand sociocultural inquiry beyond the bounds of the evolutionary conception of social history. The evolutionary approach viewed customs or cultural traits as residual artifacts of cultural history. That is, the evolutionist school postulated that “an observed cultural fact was seen not in terms of what it was at the time of observation but in terms of what it must stand for in reference to what had formerly been the case” (Lesser 1935:55).
From the functionalist standpoint these earlier approaches privileged speculative theorizing over the discovery of facts. Functionalists believed the reality of events was to be found in their manifestations in the present. Hence, if events were to be understood it was their contemporary functioning that should be observed and recorded (Lesser 1935:55–56). Consequently, this led some to interpret functionalism as being opposed to the study of history altogether. Radcliffe-Brown responded to this critique by stating that functionalists did not believe that useful historical information could be obtained with respect to primitive societies; it was not history, but “pseudo-history” to which functionalists objected (Harris 1968:524).

In the “primitive” societies that are studied by social anthropology, there are few written historic records. For example, we have no record of the development of social institutions among the Native Australians. Anthropologists, thinking of their study as a kind of historical study, fall back on conjecture and imagination; they invent “pseudo-historical” or “pseudo-casual” explanations. We have had innumerable and sometimes conflicting pseudo-historical accounts of the origin and development of the totemic institutions of the Native Australians. Such speculations have little place in serious anthropological discussion about institutions. This does not imply the rejection of historical explanation, but quite the contrary (Radcliffe-Brown 1952:3).
The primary starting points of Malinowski’s theorizing included: 1) understanding behavior in terms of the motivation of individuals, including both rational, ‘scientifically’ validated behavior and ‘irrational’, ritual, magical, or religious behavior; 2) recognizing the interconnectedness of the different items which constituted a ‘culture’ to form some kind of system; and 3) understanding a particular item by identifying its function in the current contemporary operation of that culture (Firth 1957:55). The inclusiveness of Malinowski’s concept of culture is apparent in his statement: “It obviously is the integral whole consisting of implements and consumers’ goods, of constitutional charters for the various social groupings, of human ideas and crafts, beliefs and customs. Whether we consider a very simple or primitive culture or an extremely complex and developed one, we are confronted by a vast apparatus, partly material, partly human and partly spiritual by which man is able to cope with the concrete specific problems that face him” (Malinowski 1944:36).

Essentially, he treated culture as everything pertaining to human life and action which cannot be regarded as a property of the human organism as a physiological system. In other words, he treated it as a direct manifestation of biologically inherited patterns of behavior. Culture is that aspect of behavior that is learned by the individual and which may be shared by pluralities of individuals. It is transmitted to other individuals along with the physical objects associated with learned patterns and activities (Firth 1957:58). Malinowski considered institutions to be examples of isolated organized behaviors. Since such behavior always involves a plurality of persons, an institution in this sense is therefore a social system, which is a subsystem of society. Though functionally differentiated from other institutions, an institution is a segmentary cross-section of culture that involves all the components included in Malinowski’s definition of culture (Firth 1957:59). Malinowski believed that the central feature of the charter of an institution is “the system of values for the pursuit of which human beings organize, or enter organizations already existing” (Malinowski 1944:52). As for the concept of function, Malinowski believed it is the primary basis of differentiation of institutions within the same culture. In other words, institutions differ because they are organized to serve different functions. He argued that institutions function for continuing life and “normality” of an organism, or an aggregate of organisms as a species (Firth 1957:60). Indeed, for Malinowski, the primary reference of the concept of function was to a theory of the biological needs of the individual organism, “It is clear, I think, that any theory of culture has to start from the organic needs of man, and if it succeeds in relating (to them) the more complex, indirect, but perhaps fully imperative needs of the type which we call spiritual or economic or social, it will supply us with a set of general laws such as we need in sound scientific theory” (Malinowski 1944:72–73).
Malinowski’s basic theoretical attempt was to derive the main characteristics of the society and its social systems from a theory of the causally pre-cultural needs of the organism. He believed that culture is always instrumental to the satisfaction of organic needs. Therefore, he had to bridge the gap between the concept of biologically basic needs of the organism and the facts of culturally organized behavior. His first major step was to set up the classification of basic needs which could be directly related to a classification of cultural responses which could then in turn be brought into relation to institutions. Next, he developed a second category of needs (derived needs) which he inserted between his basic needs and the institutional integrates of collective behavior (Firth 1957:63).
However, it is equally important to point out the criticisms of this “pseudo-history” reasoning for synchronic analysis. In light of readily available and abundant historical sources encountered in subsequent studies, it was suggested that this reasoning was a rationalization for avoiding a confrontation with the past. Such criticism may have led to efforts to combine diachronic and synchronic interests among later functionalist studies.
Radcliffe-Brown’s emphasis on social function is derived from the influence of the French sociological school. This school developed in the 1890s around the work of Emile Durkheim who argued that “social phenomena constitute a domain, or order, of reality that is independent of psychological and biological facts. Social phenomena, therefore, must be explained in terms of other social phenomena, and not by reference to psychobiological needs, drives, impulses, and so forth” (Broce 1973:39–40).

Emile Durkheim had argued that ethnographers should study the function of social institutions and how they function together to maintain the social whole (Broce 1973:39–40). While Radcliffe-Brown shared this emphasis of studying the conditions under which social structures are maintained, he also believed that the functioning of societies, like that of other natural systems, is governed by laws that can be discovered though systematic comparison (Broce 1873:40). It is important to note here that Firth postulated the necessity of distinguishing between social structure and social organization. Social structure “is the principle(s) on which the forms of social relations depend. Social organization refers to the directional activity, to the working out of social relations in everyday life” (Watson-Gegeo 1991:198).
Radcliffe-Brown established an analogy between social life and organic life to explain the concept of function. He emphasized the contribution of phenomena to maintaining social order. However, Radcliffe-Brown’s disregard for individual needs was apparent in this analogy. He argued that as long as a biological organism lives, it preserves the continuity of structure, but not preserve the unity of its constituent parts. That is, over a period of time, while the constituent cells do not remain the same, the structural arrangement of the constituent units remains similar. He suggested that human beings, as essential units, are connected by a set of social relations into an integrated whole. Like the biological organism, the continuity of the social structure is not destroyed by changes in the units. Although individuals may leave the society by death or other means, other individuals may enter it. Therefore, the continuity is maintained by the process of social life, which consists of the activities and interactions of individual human beings and of organized groups into which they are united. The social life of a community is the functioning of the social structure. The function of any recurrent activity is the part it plays in the social life as a whole and thereby, the contribution it makes to structural continuity (Radcliffe-Brown 1952:178).
Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski formulated distinct versions of functionalism, yet the emphasis on the differences between them obscures their fundamental similarities and complementarily. Both viewed society as structured into a working unity in which the parts accommodate one another in a way that maintains the whole. Thus, the function of a custom or institution is the contribution it makes to the maintenance of the entire system of which it is a part. On the whole, sociocultural systems function to provide their members with adaptations to environmental circumstances and to connect them in a network of stable social relationships. This is not to say that functionalists failed to recognize internal social conflict or other forms of disequilibrium. However, they did believe that societies strongly tend to maintain their stability and internal cohesion as if societies had homeostatic qualities (Broce 1973:38–39).
The functionalists also shared an emphasis on intensive fieldwork, involving participant-observation. This methodological emphasis has resulted in a series of excellent monographs on native societies. In large part, the quality of these monographs may be attributed to their theoretical framework, since the investigation of functional interrelationships of customs and institutions provides an especially fruitful perspective for the collection of information. In their analysis, the functionalists attempted to interpret societies as they operated at a single point in time, or as they operate over a relatively short period of time. This was not because the functionalists opposed, in principle, the study of history. Instead, it was a consequence of their belief that very little reliable information could be secured about the long-term histories of primitive peoples. Their rejection of the conjectural reconstructions of the evolutionists and the diffusionists was based largely on this conviction (Broce 1973:39).
By the 1970’s functionalism was declining, but its contributions continue to influence anthropologists today. Functional analysis gave value to social institutions by considering them not as mere custom (as proposed by American ethnologists), but as active and integrated parts of a social system (Langness 1987). Though Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown differed in their approaches to functional interpretation, they both contributed to the push for a “shift in the assumptions of ethnology, from a concern with isolated traits to the interpretation of social life” (Winthrop 1991:130). This school of thought has contributed to the concept of culture that traditional usages, whatever their origin, have been shaped by the requirement that human beings must live together in harmony. Therefore the demands of interpersonal relationships are a causative force in culture (Goldschmidt 1967:17–18). Though, despite its theoretical limitations, functionalism has made important methodological contributions. With its emphasis on intensive fieldwork, functionalism has provided in-depth studies of societies. Additionally, the investigation of functional interrelationships of customs and institutions provides a ready-made framework for the collection of information.
Theorists have criticized functionalism for failing to conceptualize adequately the complex nature of actors and the process of interaction. Marxist theory argued against functionalism’s conservativism and the static nature of analysis that emphasized the contribution of social phenomena to the maintenance of the status-quo. Advocates of theory construction questioned the utility of excessively classificatory or typological theories that pigeonholed phenomena in terms of their functions (Turner and Maryanski 1991). Functional theory also has been criticized for its disregard of the historical process and for its presupposition that societies are in a state of equilibrium (Goldschmidt 1996:511).
Logical problems of functional explanations also have been pointed out, namely that they are teleological and tautological. It has been argued that the presence of an institution cannot precede the institution’s existence. Otherwise, such a teleological argument would suggest that the institution’s development anticipated its function. This criticism can be countered by recognizing an evolutionary or a historical process at work; however, functionalism specifically rejected such ideas. Functional analysis has also been criticized for being circular: needs are postulated on the basis of existing institutions which are, in turn, used to explain their existence. This criticism can be countered by establishing a set of universal requisite needs, or functional prerequisites. It has been argued that to account for phenomena by showing what social needs they satisfy does not explain how it originated or why it is what it is (Kucklick 1996:250). Furthermore, functionalism’s antihistoric approach made it impossible to examine social processes, rejection of psychology made it impossible to understand attitudes and sentiments and the rejection of culture led to a lack of recognition of the ecological context (Goldschmidt 1996:511).
In light of such criticisms, some anthropologists attempted functional explanations that were not constrained by such narrow approaches. In Clyde Kluckhohn’s functional explanation of Navaho witchcraft, he avoided tautology by positing a social need (to manage hostility), thereby bringing a psychological assumption into the analysis. He demonstrated that more overt means of managing hostility had not been available due to governmental controls, thereby bringing in historical and ecological factors (Goldschmidt 1996:511).
Comparative functionalism attends to the difficulties posed by Malinowski’s argument that every culture can be understood in its own terms; every institution be seen as a product of the culture within which it developed. Following this, a cross-cultural comparison of institutions is a false enterprise in that it would be comparing phenomena that could not be compared. This is problematic since the internal mode of analysis cannot provide either a basis for true generalization or a means of extrapolation beyond the local time and place (Goldschmidt 1966:8). Recognizing this “Malinowskian dilemma,” Walter Goldschmidt argued for a “comparative functionalism.” This approach recognizes the universality of functions to which institutions are a response. Goldschmidt suggested that problems are consistent from culture to culture, but institutional solutions vary. He suggested starting with what is problematical in order to discover how institutional devices provide solutions. In this way, he too sought to situate his explanations in a broader theoretical framework (Goldschmidt 1996:511–512).
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