How China Maintains Working Class Rule: Highlighting the Feedback Mechanisms of the Chinese Political System

Introduction and context

As someone who has studied Marxism and the Chinese political system for a long time with great interest, I have often found the interpretations of China’s political structure by western sources, or even Chinese sources explaining to a western audience, lacking in both precision and depth. The concrete, tangible mechanisms ensuring that Chinese politicians are held to account by the will of the people often remain shrouded, leading to oversimplifications and misconceptions about Chinese politics, even in pro-China communities. Through this text, my goal is to unravel these most basic feedback mechanisms and illuminate the robust structure that ensures the continued rule of the working class in China. Since I speak Chinese, I have made great use of Chinese sources as guidance, and I hope to share some things that are hard to come by when relying purely on English language sources.

Central to an understanding of China’s political system is to first understand the relationship between the state and the Communist Party of China (CPC). A common mistake made by westerners is to focus too heavily on the workings of China’s state apparatus and overlook the structure of the CPC. In western liberal democracies, the state apparatus is considered the crux of democratic enforcement, which is why it’s the main focus of study. But to understand China’s political system, one should primarily look at the CPC. In China, we should see the state mechanism more as a tool for the CPC to carry out its objectives, since the majority of those who work within the state apparatus are CPC members. The state mechanism does indeed work independent of the party at times, as well as aids politicians in decision-making to some extent, but it has no way to influence the overarching ideological direction of the country. It should be emphasized that the state mechanism is excellently designed with significant portions of it directly elected by the people. However, the state is not exactly essential to understanding China’s political system, but we will still be explaining the state mechanism in further detail throughout this article.

To give an initial simplified conclusion of my findings, the Communist Party of China is designed to carry out the goals of its constitution, which outlines the party’s many duties including acting as a vanguard of the Chinese working class under Marx’s guiding philosophy. The way this constitution is enforced comes principally through the discipline inspection system, the mechanism responsible for investigating all party members and evaluating their performance against the duties outlined in the party’s constitution. The larger populace is often involved in these investigations. These evaluations play a pivotal role in determining who climbs the party ladder, and who gets ousted. Consequently, we find at the top echelons those who have demonstrated their capacity to work effectively for the will of the people. Even these top-ranking members are not beyond the reach of the discipline inspection system and are therefore encouraged to reinforce the constitution, and subsequently this inspection system.

This feedback process reinforces the party’s adherence to the constitution by ensuring that the upper ranks of the CPC are composed of the politicians who have most effectively enforced the constitution’s goals. To put it simply, the party filters out ineffective members and cultivates the growth of capable and trusted members into higher positions. The ascent to the upper echelons of the party is a highly competitive process with a substantial increase in scrutiny the higher one goes. The success of this ‘filtering’ system is evidenced in studies such as one by Harvard University’s Ash Institute, which found that Chinese citizens expressed more trust in their national government compared to local government bodies. Interestingly, these local government bodies are elected directly by the population, which hints that this system of evaluating and filtering is more effective than liberal style democracy.

Before we dive deeper into the technical details of this system, let me take some time to show what this system has accomplished. The effectiveness and success of the Chinese political system can be gauged by its exceedingly high government approval rating, a focus on policies that ensure long-term well-being of the Chinese people, and the handling of corruption cases, even when they involve high-standing politicians.

One of the most prominent pieces of evidence proving the efficiency of this system is its increasing level of popularity and approval among the Chinese people over time. Several reputable international studies have shown that the Chinese Government’s approval rating is exceptionally high. For instance, a study conducted by Harvard University’s Ash Center has shown the government approval rating in China to be among the highest in the world, hovering at around 90%. Moreover, the Copenhagen Alliance of Democracies has ranked China number one in terms of the percentage of the national population that believes their country is democratic. The outcome of the Edelman Trust Barometer, another global assessment of public trust, reveals that among all 28 countries surveyed, China ranks first in terms of trust in their government, with an astonishingly high 89% of respondents placing trust in their ruling government. Furthermore, an Ipsos study measuring global happiness has identified China as being the happiest country among all 32 countries surveyed.

These figures are highly significant and cannot simply be brushed off as the result of alleged influence by the Chinese Government over the conducted surveys. These are esteemed western-based institutions, and their results are trusted worldwide. The institutions conducting these surveys have the expertise to mitigate against possible sources of bias including governmental interference. Their main conclusion for these high government approval ratings is the direct firsthand experience the Chinese people have of their lives improving economically and socially. Harvard, for instance, attributes the high approval ratings primarily to the rapidly improving material well-being among the Chinese people.

Critics might argue that these high approval ratings could be a result of state propaganda. However, empirical evidence suggests otherwise. According to a 2018 Purdue Survey, Chinese foreign students studying in the United States, despite being extensively exposed to American culture and democracy for years, actually developed a more favorable view of China while living in the US, rather than a worse one. This neutralizes the argument that high government approval ratings are merely the effect of domestic propaganda.

To illustrate the type of politicians and leaders this system cultivates, an exemplary case study is found in the CPC’s current General Secretary, Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping had a robust nearly 40-year career in the CPC before reaching the leadership position, and we’re about to see that attaining such roles require valuable field experience and hard-earned public trust built over decades. His educational background includes a degree in Marxist political doctrine and studies of organic synthesis at Tsinghua University. It’s notable that many high-ranking CPC members are not only well-versed in political science but also possess a strong foundation in STEM fields. This diverse scholastic background aids effective governance due to the importance of understanding technological developments to steer long-term resource allocation efficiently.

Looking at the early part of Xi Jinping’s career is as illuminating as looking at where he stands now. Initially, he worked, often shoulder-to-shoulder with the people, in impoverished villages in rural China, dedicating his efforts to alleviate poverty. His experience was by no means restricted to administrative work — he farmed, he picked manure, he witnessed the challenging realities of rural life in China. This grounding experience has likely been a significant driver in his poverty eradication initiatives. Xi Jinping’s principle at that time, which remains dominant, was to “seek hardship”. This is not an isolated case. Many of the CPC’s top leaders have similarly grueling stories from their early careers. Only those with this kind of hands-on experience, a deeply ingrained sense of hard work, and an intense connection with the working class coupled with extensive knowledge in political science and STEM ascend to the top of CPC leadership.

Another significant piece of evidence showing the effectiveness of this system is seen in the comparative wages of the top-ranking political leadership in China. The salaries earned by top level Chinese politicians, including Xi Jinping, are aligned with the median wage in China, with little to no financial incentive accruing from rising to political power. This dampens the motivation for those whose only aim is to enrich themselves, rather than to serve the people.

The quote from Lenin in his work ‘State and Revolution’ reiterates this principle, “…The abolition of all representation allowances, and of all monetary privileges to officials, the reduction of the remuneration of all servants of the state to the level of ‘workman’s wages’ reminds us that this democracy is not of the oppressors but of the oppressed, not of a ‘special force’ for the suppression of a particular class but for the suppression of the oppressors by the general force of the majority of the people–the workers and the peasants.”

Another way to look at this, is that China has no elite. This is because those who have wealth do not have political power, and those who have political power do not have wealth.

Moreover, the Chinese system does not shy away from taking punitive actions against high-ranking politicians involved in corruption, attesting further to the impartiality and effectiveness of its process of discipline inspection. Political standing or power does not provide any cloak of immunity against corruption charges.

The direct outcomes of this system are most visible in the pro-working class policies enacted by the Chinese government. An example of this can be seen in the rapid increase in minimum wages for Chinese workers and a rapid improvement in workplace safety standards. Moreover, as a sign of its commitment to economic equality, the wealth of China’s billionaires is depleting rapidly, in stark contrast to the west where the wealth of billionaires is reaching record heights. These developments show us that the politcal class does not serve the interests of capital.

Some notes on the discourse

Before delving further into this exploration of China’s political system, we need to address an important consideration: the vocabulary and frameworks we’ve developed to understand liberal democracies are often ill-equipped to fully capture the nuances of how China’s political system operates. The basic structures and responsibilities of the ‘state mechanism’, for instance, bear different connotations in the contexts of liberal democracies and China’s. Given this discrepant context, we should strive to break down our preconceived notions and sink into a granular-level study of the underlying feedback mechanisms that drive the Chinese leadership’s decisions.

Interesting to note is that western societies tend to be entangled in the reel of proving why their form of liberal democracy works in theory. This can often result in the deflection of blame onto the public, arguing that it’s the public’s fault for letting things go astray rather than a failure of the democratic system itself. In contrast, China side-steps lengthy theoretical justifications. Instead, it focuses on practical demonstrations of its system’s triumphs: impressive socio-economic advancements, poverty alleviation, improvements in quality of life, etc.

The downside of this is that it becomes hard for westerners like me who are obsessed with that theoretical basis to find the underlying reasons for why China’s democracy works, since it isn’t as publicized. However, it’s certainly not impossible, especially when you can dig into Chinese sources, and so here in this article I want to share those findings with you.

Ultimately, when it comes to evaluating whether a country is democratic or not, who should be the ultimate judge? Should we rely on academics measuring countries against a fabricated set of theoretical criteria? Or should we listen to the voices of the people living within respective countries, allowing them to decide whether or not their system is democratic? If we adopt the latter criterion, China tops the list. Once again, according to data from the Copenhagen Alliance of Democracies, more citizens in China affirm their country’s democratic nature than anywhere else. This shows that China’s approach, although remarkably different from western models, is one of the most successful democratic projects in history. Let us now dive deeper into the mechanisms which make this possible.

Unraveling the mechanisms of the chinese political system

Let’s clarify a few things about the working dynamics between the state mechanism and the CPC (Communist Party of China). Without a solid grasp of this aspect, the whole image of China’s political workings may come across as blurred, or perhaps skewed. Let’s start by clarifying the state mechanism somewhat. My primary source for the Chinese state mechanism is the book China’s Political System by Yin Zhongqing, which I recommend you to read if you want a more thorough understanding. Similarly, a great source for the basic structure of the CPC and how it’s elected is CGTN’s interactive explanation.

The core of the state mechanism consists of the people’s congresses. At the very top lies the National People’s Congress (NPC) which administers over the entire country. The national level is then subdivided into provincial level jurisdictions which are also administered by their own people’s congresses. The provinces are then divided into prefecture level jurisdictions, which are divided into county level jurisdictions, which are divided into township level jurisdictions (National → Provincial → Prefecture → County → Township). Each jurisdiction has a people’s congress which governs over it. At the same time, the CPC has a party congress for each of these jurisdictions as well, operating outside of the state mechanism. Many of the members in these party congresses may be part of the people’s congress of the same jurisdiction. During the party congresses, the party members may discuss how to implement the goals of the CPC, and during the people’s congresses, the party members will try to implement these decisions through making use of the state mechanism.

The Chinese state mechanism operates somewhat differently at various levels of governance. For the township and county level people’s congresses, politicians are elected directly by the populace. The electorate has the power to decide who best serves their interest and can choose to recall their elected representatives any time if they sense incompetence or negligence. It’s important to note that the individuals elected are mostly CPC members, primarily because they carry greater trust within the political sphere. However, candidates from a limited set of allowed parties can also run, and candidates can also run independent of any party.

The dynamics change when we move beyond the township and county levels of governance. The elections for higher levels of people’s congresses become indirectly representative, with politicians elected by the level immediately below them in the hierarchy. For instance, the prefecture level people’s congresses are elected by the representatives from the county level people’s congresses below them, while the provincial level is selected by those from the prefectures and so on, up to the national level which is elected by the provincial level people’s congresses.

The relationship between the CPC and the state is symbiotic. The reason the CPC is deeply integrated and influential within the state is due to a significant majority of the state comprising CPC members. This allows the plans and protocols designed by the party to be effectively carried out within the state machinery. Now, some might wonder why the CPC, given its influence, doesn’t directly merge with the state. The answer lies in the CPC’s ubiquitous positioning in Chinese society. Its members are not confined to government offices, but are spread throughout public life and the private sector as well, governing various corporations and institutions as well as working at the grassroots level within communities. In this way, the state mechanism is only one of the domains in which the CPC operates.

By being part of the state and other sectors of society, the CPC has the broad influence required to carry out its guidelines and policies efficiently. With a nexus that extends to the local grassroots levels and into private companies, the CPC can effectively drive efforts towards meeting set goals. Members positioned within private companies have the unique leverage to align the company’s direction with party objectives, further amplifying the reach and efficacy of the party’s policies. We will delve deeper into the specifics of how the CPC accomplishes this later.

Now, let’s turn our spotlight towards the structure of the CPC itself. Specifically, let us discuss the implementation of democratic centralism, which fundamentally underpins the decision-making processes within the CPC. With roughly 100 million members, the CPC stretches across every corner of Chinese society, with party branches existing not just in government entities, but private companies, schools, and neighborhoods. Following a democratic centralist model, the organizational hierarchy extends from the CPC National Congress at the top, to party congresses at each jurisdictional layer below, and down to the grassroots level party branches at the bottom (National → Local → Grassroots). The party congresses at local levels are made up of delegates elected from the grassroots party branches below them. The CPC National Congress is similarly elected by all party members.

The CPC national congress with over 2000 active members elected by the larger body of party members, is responsible for creating guidelines and plans that the entire party is obliged to follow. The directives they decide on, however, are often formulated to allow room for local-level politicians to adapt to their specific circumstances.

Consider a hypothetical scenario where the party identifies a national housing shortage. Rather than a rigid demand like “every jurisdiction must build two new housing units per 100 people over the next five years”, directives often take a more flexible approach such as “every jurisdiction should aim to construct necessary housing units to firmly guarantee shelter for every citizen”. This ensures a degree of freedom and adaptation based on local resources and circumstances.

Once these directives are passed down, the discipline inspection system then reviews the politicians tasked with carrying out these guidelines and assesses their efforts. Those deemed as having best adhered to and campaigned for the guidelines are more likely to ascend within the party ranks. This system of review provides a balance between giving local politicians the latitude to adapt to local circumstances while ensuring they remain accountable to the larger goals of the party. The success of this mechanism is seen in China’s track record of consistently overperforming on set goals, such as its transition to renewable energy, where China is running years ahead of schedule (and these are no small goals, China’s transition to renewable energy is happening at an absurd rate).

Let’s take a look at communication within the party structure. A primary concern of the CPC is ensuring that the right information gets to the right people, a task easier said than done with 100 million members spread across the entire country. Essentially, the method employed is the same across both the CPC and the state mechanism. The process begins with the grassroots level collecting relevant developments and trends, which are then augmented and passed onto the levels above, effectively creating a bottom-up flow of information. Each subsequent level filters through this information to pass the most vital points up further, providing a concise yet comprehensive picture of the jurisdiction’s state.

A critical instrument for the CPC’s successful operation is the extensive degree of communication between party members at all levels. For instance, before official votes are even organized for the five year plans, there is a continuous exchange of ideas, criticisms, and modifications between all levels of party members. Hence, by the time the plans are put to vote, most disagreements have been ironed out and the plan is ready to be executed. This preemptive collaboration shapes the decision-making process within the CPC such that final decisions are typically reached before official voting takes place. Any proposal lacking sufficient consensus is usually not put to vote until modifications have been made to satisfy general agreement. This is why you will often see unanimous votes on decisions and subsequently why western media paints the NPC as a ‘rubber-stamping body’.

A key innovation for the CPC, reflected in both their party structure and strategies, is the amount of dialogue encouraged between levels and even outside of the party itself. Take, for example, the CPC’s regulation of the economy. Party branches within private companies play an instrumental role by informing the rest of the party about economic trends and updates on the development of their particular company. This inside view provides continuous surveillance and control over major companies and allows the CPC to guide these companies directly. If the company deviates from or fails to adhere to the party guidelines, the members will likely campaign to enforce them, possibly through enacting the necessary legislation.

Public feedback is also a significant element in this communication mechanism, whereby citizens’ complaints and concerns are conveyed directly to the relevant politicians. The National hotlines 12345 and 12388 and some online services (notably 领导留言板 and 中央纪委国家监委网站) have been established for this purpose. The reason services like these can even exist is because simply alerting the politician to a problem is typically sufficient for it to be addressed. Since party members are required and incentivized to cater to these public complaints promptly and efficiently, they are more likely to receive favorable evaluations and potentially secure higher ranks within the party if they take complaints seriously.

To address a common misconception, criticism of the government in China is not illegal, and the right to protest is in fact protected by the constitution. In stark difference to western debate, the nature of civil discourse in China mainly revolves around specific policy-based debates rather than direct critique against individuals or ideologies. The Chinese population doesn’t segregate themselves based on political ideologies as is seen in Western societies. The general consensus in the country supports the current national direction, leading to more civil and constructive discussions around the details of governance. One can see this simply by browsing the Chinese internet: topics such as the education system, LGBT rights, climate change, economic policies and sexual education spark lively dialogues. Protests are also not uncommon in China, reflecting the readiness with which citizens voice their concerns and disagreements. In fact, in 2010, there were reportedly about 500 protests every day. It should be noted however that this was an era of rapid change and widespread corruption, so it is likely much lower today.

Let’s take a quick look at the CPC constitution, the blueprint and compass for the party’s mission, operations, and goals. It proclaims and reaffirms the party’s position as “the vanguard of the Chinese working class”, and it outlines an overarching ambition and ultimate goal: the realization of communism. I recommend that you take a look at the constitution itself, but here is the very first paragraph: “The Communist Party of China is the vanguard of the Chinese working class, the Chinese people, and the Chinese nation. It is the leadership core for the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics and represents the developmental demands of China’s advanced productive forces, the orientation for China’s advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the greatest possible majority of the Chinese people. The Party’s highest ideal and ultimate goal is the realization of communism.”

A close inspection of the CPC constitution illuminates the emphasis placed on representing the Chinese working class and adhering to Marxist principles. The constitution is not a symbolic or aspirational text but serves as enforceable law within the party. Thus, the document binds every member to a clear set of obligations and roles, grounding the party’s work at every level and keeping the party united under a common ideological flag.

Key to this adherence to Marxism and representation of the working class, within the confines of the party Constitution, is the discipline inspection system. The discipline inspection system operates as a regulative organ within the party. It ensures that no member, irrespective of rank or prominence, steps out of line, and that corruption and bourgeois interests do not seep into the party’s composition.

A notable motto of the discipline inspection system, “Trust is no substitute for oversight,” encapsulates its purpose. This essentially means that trust among party members alone isn’t enough to ensure sustained adherence to Marxist-Leninist principles. A system of proactive monitoring and testing in the form of discipline inspection is necessary, ensuring that members are not deviating from the party’s original intentions.

The structure of the discipline inspection system also follows a hierarchy. At the top there is the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), which is elected by the party national congress (which of course is elected by all party members). The CCDI is tasked with monitoring the national level party members, as well as organizing the entire discipline inspection system as a whole. Local level commissions for discipline inspection are appointed by the level above to monitor the specific local party congress of their jurisdiction. The reason for this top-down election is due to the fact that there is a general trend of party members higher up being more trusted among the public, and this means that the safest option is to hand the power to appoint the commissions for discipline inspection to the level that’s higher up.

Some might express concern that since the CCDI is elected by the body it aims to be monitoring, this might lead to national-level party members having the leverage to weaken the discipline inspection placed upon themselves. However, it is highly unlikely for this to happen. Given the 2000-member size of the party national congress, it becomes very difficult to get a sizeable majority of these members to agree to a weakening of the discipline inspection. Let us consider what would happen if a small group of national-level party members start conspiring to undermine the discipline inspection system. Since party members will likely get a boost in their reputation and subsequently their ranks if they expose such a conspiracy to weaken discipline inspection, it is highly unlikely that it could remain unexposed and hidden from public view. It is also highly risky for any party member to engage seriously in such a conspiracy, since they will likely be ousted immediately if word ever got out of their involvement (which we just established is likely to happen).

As for how the discipline inspection system operates, the commissions for discipline inspcetion employ various methods to gauge the performance of all party members. This mainly involves listening for complaints among party members and the public in order to subsequently investigate the members involved more thoroughly, as well as actively going out to interview colleagues, superiors, subordinates as well as the public to acquire a solid understanding of a member’s work ethic, ideological beliefs, ability to mobilize, organizational abilities, and general trustworthiness. The discipline inspection system then makes important findings publicly available on the Discipline Inspection websites.

Any party member deemed to be underperforming and straying from Marxist-Leninist principles or the party constitution often faces steep consequences, ranging from admonitions and warnings to suspensions from the party, and in the most severe cases, criminal prosecution. The seriousness with which the CPC pursues these inquiries underscores the party’s commitment to preserving its ideological spirit and prioritizing working for the public good.

The commissions for discipline inspection communicate regularly with the party congress they are monitoring, as well as the commission for discipline inspection above them. This communication ensures that these findings are taken into account during internal elections. Therefore, those who excel in adhering to the party constitution and working for the people’s welfare have a significantly higher chance of ascending to higher ranks within the party. Any discrepancies in this process, such as the election of a candidate who clearly wasn’t the best choice, could trigger further investigations by discipline inspection, and if signs of corruption are found, members may be ousted. This considerable overlap of discipline inspection on electoral outcomes creates a robust accountability structure within the internal election process.

A testament to the functionality and adaptability of the discipline inspection system is its ability to progressively reform itself over the years, thereby validating its efficacy. Despite its robust structure, the system is not stagnant or resistant to change. Over time, it has introduced several amendments and enhancements, adjusting aspects of the process in order to facilitate better and more efficient discipline inspection. These reforms reveal a commitment to continuous improvement in response to dynamics within the party and wider society — underpinning the system’s effectiveness and resilience.

Further cementing the importance of discipline inspection and abidance by the party constitution is the role of Party Schools and Cadre Training. Providing cutting-edge education to party members regarding Marxist theory, modern governance, party guidelines, and other relevant areas, these schools deem it vital that every party member comprehends and internalizes the party constitution deeply. This arms them with a sound understanding of Marxism and equips them with the skills needed to apply it in practice and to handle various party duties.

The discipline inspection system, the party constitution, and cadre training form the backbone of the CPC’s governance mechanism. Together, they instill and preserve the party’s core tenets, ensuring the CPC remains resolute in its commitment to the Chinese working class, the advancement of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and the ultimate realization of communism. By weaving a tapestry of strict monitoring, disciplined governance, comprehensive training, and public input, the CPC has created a unique and remarkably successful political system that consistently meets its objectives. This methodology ensures that the balance of power is always vested in the hands of the masses and that macro policy is adapted to micro circumstances, thus facilitating robust progress towards China’s ambitious goals.

This principle of looking out for the masses isn’t just abstractly stated on paper, but can be observed in the concrete policies and tangible actions of the CPC. As stated earlier, the politicians who are indirectly elected using results from discipline inspection, rather than a popularity contest among the people, generally demonstrate stronger government approval ratings. This counters the western notion that direct elections consistently result in better officials. In the west, it is common to put all faith into elections, hoping that these elections will be enough to drive efficient democracy, and subsequently completely ignore making active efforts to curb the power of politicians. China’s discipline inspection system provides constant monitoring of officials, and doesn’t simply rely on the pressure valve release every four years which is characteristic of liberal democracy.

Consider the impressive degree of attention the CPC allocates to minority groups. The Chinese constitution guarantees the rights of minorities, and the implementation of this principle can be seen in the form of policies outlining preferential treatment for ethnic minorities (ethnic minorities enjoy affirmative action for college entrance for instance), and even overrepresentation of ethnic minorities in the NPC. By interacting somewhat with Chinese culture, you will notice that there is a strong sense of respect for all ethnic minorities. This is yet another reason why narratives regarding oppression of minorities are ridiculous. Every genocide in history has come with a dehumanization campaign against the ethnic group that is being targeted. In China, there is not a single trace of such a dehumanization campaign.

Another initiative which we can see that the government has put as one of its priorities is that of supporting people with disabilities. You can see very clearly that there is a big push to integrate people with disabilities much more into society and bring forth respect. If China was this authoritarian state obsessed with industrial productivity, it wouldn’t really make sense that this would be such a priority.

China’s non-imperialist policy provides another insightful case. Despite all its capabilities, China distinctly avoids embarking on an imperialist strategy akin to that of the United States. Mainly, that’s because its political leadership remains committed to principles of international Marxism, as highlighted in the party’s focus on achieving communism — an objective innately incompatible with imperialism and unequal exchange. The ramifications of China’s non-imperialist policy are felt throughout the globe, and this can be seen clearly by the fact that the developing world has a more favorable view of China than the United States, as outlined by the Bennett Institute report on global attitudes towards superpowers.

Conclusion and clarification

We have seen that this system at the most fundamental level firmly upholds the continued working class rule in China. The CPC is fundamentally an organization designed to carry out the goals of its constitution. Through making sure that those who are the best at and most invested in carrying out these goals rise to the top, this organization perpetually evolves and reforms itself to fulfill these goals even more effectively. We can see how the party has optimized itself over the years by encouraging better flow of information and more robust discipline inspection and party member education. This gives rise to a system where regular consulting and scientific investigation of societal issues is encouraged, and a firm level of trust is built between the top-level government and the Chinese people.

We can see how this thorough and scientific investigation of societal issues has led to effective and highly popular policy which has propelled Chinese society on the trajectory to advanced socialism. The Chinese system identified well in advance the importance which artificial intelligence and renewable energy technology would have in the modern economy and has in turn invested effectively in these fields. China now dominates the field of renewable energy, and has the only AI industry in the world that can compete with the United States’. When it comes to effective infrastructure planning, the Chinese system was able to see the economic efficiency of public transport and in turn prioritize high-speed rail as well as walkable cities which discourage car use. This is reflected in the low motorization rate and the large kilometer-wide walkable blocks of Chinese cities.

China has, in spite of opening up its markets to private capital, managed to firmly hold onto the dictatorship of the proletariat. Unlike Western nations like the U.S, China does not bail out big banks but instead, forces wages and working conditions to improve. In their pursuit of socioeconomic equality, the wealth of China’s billionaires is rapidly depleting, pointing towards a contrasting reality in comparison to the rest of the world.

The Communist Party of China is undeniably the most successful proletarian party throughout history, and has created the most comprehensive and efficient democratic system in the world. In stark contrast to the western systems where there is a growing sentiment of distrust towards the government, the CPC has cultivated a level of trust and unity between the state and the people which is unseen throughout history. Naturally, it could only be a proletarian state of this caliber that will fire the final bullet to the bourgeois world order.

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