Karl Marx’s Private Property and Communism
Examining a Pivotal Section of Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844
Private Property and Communism
Karl Marx begins the section titled Private Property and Communism by describing the relationship between those who have property and those who don’t have property. He writes:
The antithesis between lack of property and property, so long as it is not comprehended as the antithesis of labour and capital, still remains an indifferent antithesis, not grasped in its active connection, in its internal relation, not yet grasped as a contradiction.
Essentially, the apparent tension between those who own property and those who don’t lacks significance on its own (which is why Marx defines this an an “indifferent antithesis”). In the quote above, Marx notes that the clash between these groups must be contextualized within the dynamics of labor and capital. The real conflict lies between those who control the means of production and those who do not, forming an integral aspect to the foundation of society.
Marx continues:
[The tension between property owners and non-owners] can find expression in this first form even without the advanced development of private property (as in ancient Rome, Turkey, etc.). It does not yet appear as having been established by private property itself. But labour, the subjective essence of private property as exclusion of property, and capital, objective labour as exclusion of labour, constitute private property as its developed state of contradiction — hence a dynamic relationship driving towards resolution.
Marx outlines how the conflict between property owners and non-owners has emerged in societies with less developed property systems like ancient Rome and ancient Turkey. While the tension may initially appear unrelated to private property, Marx argues that the crux of this tension lies in the relationship between labor and capital. Let’s briefly discuss labor and capital:
- Labor — a necessary element of the production process — represents the “subjective essence” of private property. (Though, it is integral to note that not everyone has access to own private property, resulting in individuals being excluded from owning private property.)
- Capital — constituted by machinery and resources necessary for the production process — represents the “objective labor” aspect of private property. Controlled by capitalists, the tools utilized to produce goods enable production but exclude laborers from ownership.
For example, one can work at a coffee shop or a library, but the worker does not own the means that produces these goods. Thus, the conflict lies in who owns the means vs. who labors over them. Because labor serves as the “subjective essence” of private property and capital serves as the “objective labor” of private property, Marx argues that private property exists within a contradictory state. Labor and capital are interdependent yet in constant conflict with one another.
Marx continues by discussing the concept of self-estrangement:
The transcendence of self-estrangement follows the same course as self-estrangement.
To properly explain this, Marx discusses various perspectives on private property:
Private property is first considered only in its objective aspect — but nevertheless with labour as its essence. Its form of existence is therefore capital, which is to be annulled “as such” (Proudhon).
In the quote above, Marx isolates how private property is recognized as an objective form, with labor being a necessary component. However, despite labor being private property’s “essence,” private property constitutes the form of capital in society. Theorists like Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, referenced above, advocate for abolishing capital to solve this conflict. (Though, this is not the only solution posited). Marx continues:
Or a particular form of labour — labour levelled down, fragmented, and therefore unfree — is conceived as the source of private property’s perniciousness and of its existence in estrangement from men. For instance, Fourier, who, like the Physiocrats, also conceives agricultural labour to be at least the exemplary type, whereas Saint-Simon declares in contrast that industrial labour as such is the essence, and accordingly aspires to the exclusive rule of the industrialists and the improvement of the workers’ condition.
Other thinkers have proposed other alternatives such as altering labor conditions as a means to challenge alienation and liberate the worker. For example, Charles Fourier regarded agricultural labor as crucial in addressing individuals’ alienation. This perspective stems from Fourier’s belief that farming enables workers to reconnect with nature in a meaningful way. Yet, other thinkers such as Henri de Saint-Simon advocated for the advancements facilitated by industrial labor and advocated for improving workers’ rights and conditions as a means to challenge alienation.
Yet, Marx was much more radical in his views. Rather than piecemeal reforms that never seem to work, Marx was interested in the complete liberation of all workers:
Finally, communism is the positive expression of annulled private property — at first as universal private property.
Private property, which serves to estrange the worker, is counteracted in Marx’s formulation of communism; however, it must be noted that the initial stages of communism view private property as universal. But, we must be aware that this is only in the initial stages of communism. The end goal is complete abolition of private property.
This background information serves as the foundation for how Marx will define communism. Marx proceeds to describe different types of communism, the functions of communism, the purpose of communism, and what he advocates for: true communism. He writes:
By embracing this relation [i.e., background information] as a whole, communism is: …
The Five Elements of Communism
First … Crude Communism
[Communism is …] in its first form only a generalisation and consummation of it [of this relation].
In his initial argument, Marx asserts that, in the early phases of communism, private property is consummated by transforming into collective or universal private property. Marx describes this in two ways (“As such it appears in a two-fold form”):
On the one hand, the dominion of material property bulks so large that it wants to destroy everything which is not capable of being possessed by all as private property.
In the early stages of communism, Marx notes that there is a domination over material goods. This perspective aims to eliminate everything that cannot be owned collectively. In this fashion:
[Early communism] wants to disregard talent, etc., in an arbitrary manner. For it the sole purpose of life and existence is direct, physical possession.
Specific talents possessed by individuals are considered less valuable than material possessions. This perception arises from the belief in universal equality, but only in terms of labor. Because everyone cannot possess individual talents (i.e., some are better at singing, dancing, acting, etc. than others), these talents get discarded. To sum up this point, Marx succinctly states:
The category of the worker is not done away with, but extended to all men. The relationship of private property persists as the relationship of the community to the world of things.
(Now, on the other hand:)
Finally, this movement of opposing universal private property to private property finds expression in the brutish form of opposing to marriage (certainly a form of exclusive private property) the community of women, in which a woman becomes a piece of communal and common property. It may be said that this idea of the community of women gives away the secret of this as yet completely crude and thoughtless communism.
In this concluding aspect concerning crude communism, Marx explores how the concept of upholding private property extends to the notion of bodily ownership — particularly the control over women. Marriage is constituted by a relation of “exclusive private property,” where two individuals pledge their affection and commitment to one another (in a normative sense). Thus, within crude communism, women are reduced to mere possessions by getting rid of this exclusive private property; women are now viewed as common private property because crude communism abolishes this concept of exclusive private property.
Marx continues:
Just as woman passes from marriage to general prostitution, [Prostitution is only a specific expression of the general prostitution of the labourer, and since it is a relationship in which falls not the prostitute alone, but also the one who prostitutes — and the latter’s abomination is still greater — the capitalist, etc., also comes under this head. — Note by Marx [31]] so the entire world of wealth (that is, of man’s objective substance) passes from the relationship of exclusive marriage with the owner of private property to a state of universal prostitution with the community.
Marx elucidates how crude communism erroneously extends an individual’s marriage to the entire community. Because the exclusive ownership of private property ceases to exist in crude communism, crude communism dismantles marriage in order to eliminate marriage as a form of exclusive ownership. Consequently, crude communism manifests private property, likening prostitution not to the abolition of private private property, but to the transformation of everyone into laborers.
Marx continues:
This type of communism — since it negates the personality of man in every sphere — is but the logical expression of private property, which is this negation.
I appreciate Marx’s exploration of how individuals’ personalities are negated under crude communism because this echoes a common criticism that people have of communism: “everyone will be the same!” Marx acknowledges this notion, but only for crude communism. Here, he is laying the foundation for a later explanation about why true communism liberates the masses from alienation.
Nonetheless, it is evident that envy is inherent in crude communism, reinforcing the hierarchical structure of private property ownership. Marx explicates:
General envy constituting itself as a power is the disguise in which greed re-establishes itself and satisfies itself, only in another way. The thought of every piece of private property as such is at least turned against wealthier private property in the form of envy and the urge to reduce things to a common level, so that this envy and urge even constitute the essence of competition.
Thus, we can properly define the terms of crude communism:
Crude communism is only the culmination of this envy and of this levelling-down proceeding from the preconceived minimum. It has a definite, limited standard.
Marx is skeptical about the abolition of private property under crude communism. In fact, he finds it to be a regression. He doesn’t believe that resorting back to a primitive state is beneficial and that we should discard advancements:
How little this annulment of private property is really an appropriation is in fact proved by the abstract negation of the entire world of culture and civilisation, the regression to the unnatural simplicity of the poor and crude man who has few needs and who has not only failed to go beyond private property, but has not yet even reached it.
Earlier, we discussed the inherent tension between labor and capital. In his first point detailing communism and its stages, Marx makes clear that crude communism upholds labor and capital. He states:
The community is only a community of labour, and equality of wages paid out by communal capital — by the community as the universal capitalist. Both sides of the relationship are raised to an imagined universality — labour as the category in which every person is placed, and capital as the acknowledged universality and power of the community.
In this quote, Marx explains how crude communism functions as a community of laborers with wages distributed equally from communal funds; the community is described as the “universal capitalist.” Both labor and capital are described as an “imagined universality.”
At any rate, Marx continues to describe how the degradation of women in crude communism is problematic for all:
In the approach to woman as the spoil and hand-maid of communal lust is expressed the infinite degradation in which man exists for himself, for the secret of this approach has its unambiguous, decisive, plain and undisguised expression in the relation of man to woman and in the manner in which the direct and natural species-relationship is conceived. The direct, natural, and necessary relation of person to person is the relation of man to woman.
Rather than viewing people are mere objects, Marx believes that the true essence of human interaction is to recognize one another’s humanity. Not only does Marx find it morally reprehensible that women are viewed as objects for “communal lust” within crude communism, but he also believes it goes against the nature of humanity. If a man views woman as an object, then he views both himself and nature as an object due to the alienation of himself through labor.
On this latter point, Marx continues by explaining the nature of humans:
In this natural species-relationship man’s relation to nature is immediately his relation to man, just as his relation to man is immediately his relation to nature — his own natural destination. In this relationship, therefore, is sensuously manifested, reduced to an observable fact, the extent to which the human essence has become nature to man, or to which nature to him has become the human essence of man.
Here, Marx explains the inseparable connection between humans and nature, viewing humans as an integral component of the natural world. He discerns that the inherent bond humans share with nature mirrors their interactions with one another. Marx places significant emphasis on the relationships humans have with one another; this plays a necessary role in the tenants of communism.
He continues:
From [one’s relationships with one another] one can therefore judge man’s whole level of development. From the character of this relationship follows how much man as a species-being, as man, has come to be himself and to comprehend himself; the relation of man to woman is the most natural relation of human being to human being. It therefore reveals the extent to which man’s natural behaviour has become human, or the extent to which the human essence in him has become a natural essence — the extent to which his human nature has come to be natural to him. This relationship also reveals the extent to which man’s need has become a human need; the extent to which, therefore, the other person as a person has become for him a need — the extent to which he in his individual existence is at the same time a social being.
We must not overlook a fundamental aspect of alienation: under capitalism, humans become estranged from their essential humanity. It’s apparent that capitalism reduces humans to mere commodities; crude communism results in the same reduction. Nevertheless, in their natural state, humans inherently rely on each other due to their social nature. Marx is clearly blurring the distinction between the individual and society.
Marx concludes this first point with a quick summary:
The first positive annulment of private property — crude communism — is thus merely a manifestation of the vileness of private property, which wants to set itself up as the positive community system.
Second … Communism with and without Governance
Communism [is] still political in nature — democratic or despotic; (β) with the abolition of the state, yet still incomplete, and being still affected by private property, i.e., by the estrangement of man.
Marx continues by criticizing various formations of communism that are not the type of communism that he defends. In this case, Marx isolates one of two scenarios: either communism has a political governance (such as a democratic or despotic system of governance) or communism abolishes the state but still maintains private property which leads to the alienation of humans.
However, Marx acknowledges that, in both of these forms, communism has the goal of reintegrating humanity with itself. But both fall short:
In both forms communism already is aware of being reintegration or return of man to himself, the transcendence of human self-estrangement; but since it has not yet grasped the positive essence of private property, and just as little the human nature of need, it remains captive to it and infected by it.
- Marx noted above that the essence of private property was labor.
Marx concludes this second point by stating that these two forms of communism come close but don’t go far enough:
It has, indeed, grasped its concept, but not its essence.
Third… Communism as the Positive Transcendence of Private Property
Communism as the positive transcendence of private property as human self-estrangement, and therefore as the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man; communism therefore as the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e., human) being — a return accomplished consciously and embracing the entire wealth of previous development.
In this third point, Marx describes what he envisions true communism to look like. Communism is deemed a “positive transcendence” that rises above private property in order to liberate humans from alienation. Because Marx notes that communism allows humans to revert back to their original, social nature, he is not only discussing alienation of one’s self — he’s taking about how capitalism alienates us from one another.
To further elaborate:
This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man — the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this solution.
Marx identifies that communism is capable of resolving the conflicts present between humans and nature along with the conflicts between humans and each another. I appreciate how Marx states that communism resolves the “strife between existence and essence” which was a large area of debate amongst existentialists.
Let us return to a more topical debate: has communism ever been practiced in human history? A very common argument we hear against communism is that history shows it hasn’t worked. Marx responds to these claims by criticizing this limited conceptualization of history:
The entire movement of history, just as its [communism’s] actual act of genesis — the birth act of its empirical existence — is, therefore, for its thinking consciousness the comprehended and known process of its becoming. Whereas the still immature communism seeks an historical proof for itself — a proof in the realm of what already exists — among disconnected historical phenomena opposed to private property, tearing single phases from the historical process and focusing attention on them as proofs of its historical pedigree (a hobby-horse ridden hard especially by Cabet, Villegardelle, etc.). By so doing it simply makes clear that by far the greater part of this process contradicts its own claim, and that, if it has ever existed, precisely its being in the past refutes its pretension to reality.
To initiate his critique of his opponents’ argument, Marx highlights the dynamic nature of history, emphasizing that history is always in a process of becoming. He notes that certain, inherently restrictive perspectives, assert that communism has failed at various points in history or never came into fruition at all. However, Marx contends that this manner of thinking is a form of “immature communism” whereby one needs to seek historical validation for communism’s existence; this only impedes our ability to forecast historical progression. He references thinkers such as Étienne Cabet and François Villegardelle who approach communism in this immature manner. The last sentence encapsulates Marx’s arguments against these types of thinkers: relying solely on past events to gauge historical and social transformation inherently limits possibilities for the future.
There is no question, however, that revolutionary efforts are rooted in relation to private property:
It is easy to see that the entire revolutionary movement necessarily finds both its empirical and its theoretical basis in the movement of private property — more precisely, in that of the economy.
Private property as a material, perceptible reality, is responsible for the alienation one’s species-being. Furthermore, the movement of private property (i.e., both production and consumption) reflects the historical development of society. This is the crux of Marx’s historical materialism:
This material, immediately perceptible private property is the material perceptible expression of estranged human life. Its movement — production and consumption — is the perceptible revelation of the movement of all production until now, i.e., the realisation or the reality of man.
Marx continues by identifying various modes of production that are usually characterized as major historical developments:
Religion, family, state, law, morality, science, art, etc., are only particular modes of production, and fall under its general law.
This sentence serves of extreme importance. Various religions, family formations, forms of governance, legal norms, etc. are all in relation to historical development; however, Marx’s argument is that these concepts are just modes of production: private property undergirds all of these developments. Thus, if private property undergirds these modes of production, then the positive transcendence of private property ought to liberate individuals from these overarching modes of production:
The positive transcendence of private property as the appropriation of human life, is therefore the positive transcendence of all estrangement — that is to say, the return of man from religion, family, state, etc., to his human, i.e., social, existence.
Marx further elaborates by explaining the difference between religious estrangement and economic estrangement:
Religious estrangement as such occurs only in the realm of consciousness, of man’s inner life, but economic estrangement is that of real life; its transcendence therefore embraces both aspects. It is evident that the initial stage of the movement amongst the various peoples depends on whether the true recognised life of the people manifests itself more in consciousness or in the external world — is more ideal or real.
Let’s turn our attention to religious estrangement and economic estrangement as individual constructs:
- Religious Estrangement: This refers to the alienation of individuals from their humanity as a result of religion; Marx notes that this only occurs in one’s consciousness (i.e., one’s thoughts).
- Economic Estrangement: This refers to the alienation of individuals from their labor, the products of their labor, and fellow human being; Marx notes that this occurs in one’s real life (i.e., affecting people in tangible, material ways).
Thus, transcendence of private property must necessarily address religious and economic aspects. However, communism must begin with atheism:
Communism begins from the outset (Owen) with atheism; but atheism is at first far from being communism; indeed, that atheism is still mostly an abstraction.
In alignment with the ideas of earlier Socialist thinkers such as Robert Owen, Marx contends that communism must begin with the rejection of religious beliefs. But we must note that this is only the first step. Atheism addresses the realm of consciousness; it only challenges ideological alienation. However, atheism does not directly address the material, economic conditions that result in alienation. Thus:
The philanthropy of atheism is therefore at first only philosophical, abstract philanthropy, and that of communism is at once real and directly bent on action.
Marx sums up what we’ve been discussing so far in regards to the positive annulment of private property:
We have seen how on the assumption of positively annulled private property man produces man — himself and the other man; how the object, being the direct manifestation of his individuality, is simultaneously his own existence for the other man, the existence of the other man, and that existence for him.
In this quote, Marx emphasizes that in a society where private property is abolished, people develop complex connections with each other beyond mere objectification. He also suggests that objects, when crafted by individuals, embody aspects of the creator’s identity. Therefore, creations serve a collective purpose, rather than being exclusive to one person. When one makes a creation, their individuality is embedded within that object; so when one views a creation, they see an extension of the person that created it.
- This isn’t to say that one cannot have their own pair of glasses or laptop. Instead, everyone has access to these goods because the means to make these goods are given to everyone. These creations are employed for the benefit of all.
Marx proceeds by arguing that the material resources utilized in the labor process and the laborers themselves constitute the starting point and outcome of the production process:
Likewise, however, both the material of labour and man as the subject, are the point of departure as well as the result of the movement (and precisely in this fact, that they must constitute the point of departure, lies the historical necessity of private property). Thus the social character is the general character of the whole movement: just as society itself produces man as man, so is society produced by him.
Because the materials and the laborers begin the production process, there is a “historical necessity of private property.” This means that there must be private ownership over the materials and labor-power in order to begin the production process. And finally, Marx notes that this movement of production is innately social: the lines between human and society are completely blurred.
For the rest of this paragraph, Marx reiterates his points about humans being innately social.
Humans are social beings:
Activity and enjoyment, both in their content and in their mode of existence, are social: social activity and social enjoyment.
This social-ness of human beings is rooted in humans’ nature:
The human aspect of nature exists only for social man; for only then does nature exist for him as a bond with man — as his existence for the other and the other’s existence for him — and as the life-element of human reality. Only then does nature exist as the foundation of his own human existence. Only here has what is to him his natural existence become his human existence, and nature become man for him.
Therefore:
[…] Society is the complete unity of man with nature — the true resurrection of nature — the consistent naturalism of man and the consistent humanism of nature.
At any rate, it it must be noted that not all social interactions occur communally. Though, communal activities and communal enjoyment do exist as there exists direct association between humans:
Social activity and social enjoyment exist by no means only in the form of some directly communal activity and directly communal enjoyment, although communal activity and communal enjoyment — i.e., activity and enjoyment which are manifested and affirmed in actual direct association with other men — will occur wherever such a direct expression of sociability stems from the true character of the activity’s content and is appropriate to the nature of the enjoyment.
In fact, social activities can exist through individual pursuits. Marx employs the example of one being active scientifically:
But also when I am active scientifically, etc. — an activity which I can seldom perform in direct community with others — then my activity is social, because I perform it as a man. Not only is the material of my activity given to me as a social product (as is even the language in which the thinker is active): my own existence is social activity, and therefore that which I make of myself, I make of myself for society and with the consciousness of myself as a social being.
There are two points that Marx isolates in order to explain how individual pursuits are innately social:
- Human nature is inherently social, as humans are fundamentally social beings. Therefore, one’s very existence is an act within a social sphere. Whether engaged in solitary study or not, the development of one’s character and the society that they are a part of inevitably influences one’s activities (and the results of these activities).
- The resources utilized in activities are sources from the collective. For example, while one may independently pursue scientific research and experimentation, the language and tools employed are products of social production.
To proceed, Marx explains how one’s consciousness (i.e., one’s mind and thoughts) is shaped by social production; in a similar fashion, social production is shaped by one’s individual consciousness. Marx explains:
My general consciousness is only the theoretical shape of that of which the living shape is the real community, the social fabric, although at the present day general consciousness is an abstraction from real life and as such confronts it with hostility. The activity of my general consciousness, as an activity, is therefore also my theoretical existence as a social being.
This means that the conscious mind is embedded in a sociohistorical field. Our consciousness is shaped by a capitalist mode of production; essentially, this causes one’s consciousness to be an abstraction from one’s real life experiences. In any case, Marx prioritizes the notion that individuals are not separate from society; society is not an abstract entity that is divorced from individuals. He writes:
Above all we must avoid postulating “society” again as an abstraction vis-à-vis the individual. The individual is the social being. His manifestations of life — even if they may not appear in the direct form of communal manifestations of life carried out in association with others — are therefore an expression and confirmation of social life. Man’s individual and species-life are not different, however much — and this is inevitable — the mode of existence of the individual is a more particular or more general mode of the life of the species, or the life of the species is a more particular or more general individual life.
Again, society must not be understood as separate from the individual because the individual is a social being. (Most of this was already explained above.) However, Marx goes on to explain the effect of humans recognizing themselves as part of the broader human species (species-consciousness). Marx writes:
In his consciousness of species man confirms his real social life and simply repeats his real existence in thought, just as conversely the being of the species confirms itself in species consciousness and exists for itself in its generality as a thinking being.
Notably, when individuals have their species-consciousness affirmed, it reaffirms and validates the existence of humanity as a whole. On this point, Marx acknowledges that each individual is particular in their personality; however, individuals also embody the collective experience of what it mean to be human. Marx explains:
Man, much as he may therefore be a particular individual (and it is precisely his particularity which makes him an individual, and a real individual social being), is just as much the totality — the ideal totality — the subjective existence of imagined and experienced society for itself; just as he exists also in the real world both as awareness and real enjoyment of social existence, and as a totality of human manifestation of life.
Therefore, human existence has a dual nature: each person is a unique individual with a distinct personality and also represents the entire social body. Similarly, Marx explains how the mind and body are distinct modes of experiencing nature while simultaneously interconnected:
Thinking and being are thus certainly distinct, but at the same time they are in unity with each other.
Marx concludes this third point by explaining that while death might seem to contradict the unity between the individual and society, it ultimately does not. He clarifies that since every individual, as a particular species-being, is mortal, there is no contradiction. Mortality is a fundamental aspect of the human species. He writes:
Death seems to be a harsh victory of the species over the particular individual and to contradict their unity. But the particular individual is only a particular species-being, and as such mortal.
Fourth … Overcoming private property frees one from their alienation.
Just as private property is only the perceptible expression of the fact that man becomes objective for himself and at the same time becomes to himself a strange and inhuman object; just as it expresses the fact that the manifestation of his life is the alienation of his life, that his realisation is his loss of reality, is an alien reality: so, the positive transcendence of private property — i.e., the perceptible appropriation for and by man of the human essence and of human life, of objective man, of human achievements should not be conceived merely in the sense of immediate, one-sided enjoyment, merely in the sense of possessing, of having.
Here, Marx reiterates his arguments about how private property objectifies individuals, turning them into objects and alienating them from their own lives and humanity. He refers to this as a “loss of reality.” Thus, the positive transcendence of private property is the only way for individuals to genuinely appropriate their human essence and life. This doesn’t mean simply acquiring more goods; Marx is not suggesting that the equal distribution of goods themselves equates to positivity in the sense that we end up having more stuff. Instead, he argues that true freedom comes from overcoming this alienation caused by private property.
In this way, when there is a positive transcendence of private property, humans appropriate their entire essence:
Man appropriates his comprehensive essence in a comprehensive manner, that is to say, as a whole man.
This comprehensiveness refers to each human relation that allows one to experience the world:
Each of his human relations to the world — seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, observing, experiencing, wanting, acting, loving — in short, all the organs of his individual being, like those organs which are directly social in their form, are in their objective orientation, or in their orientation to the object, the appropriation of the object, the appropriation of human reality.
Marx argues that the positive transcendence of private property entails a genuine embrace of human life and essence. This involves a comprehensive conceptualization of what it means to be human where all senses — such as sight, hearing, smell, and taste — are fully liberated. Essentially, we never enjoy what’s in front of us because we can always be doing something more productive. We’re always at work, taking a break from work, or off work. It’s extremely common to discard the beauty that surrounds us — the beauty that we find through our senses — in the pursuit of private property.
Marx continues:
[Each of one’s human relations’] orientation to the object is the manifestation of the human reality, [For this reason it is just as highly varied as the determinations of human essence and activities. — Note by Marx] it is human activity and human suffering, for suffering, humanly considered, is a kind of self-enjoyment of man.
Despite the presence of human suffering (which exists independently of private property), Marx highlights how suffering serves as a form of self-enjoyment. From my understanding, Marx is stating that we ought not view the transcendence of private property as the transcendence of suffering. Rather, suffering is, in a very natural sense, a form of self-enjoyment. For example, it is sad and disheartening to witness a loved one pass away. However, this experience can make one appreciate life more and grow into a stronger person.
In any case, Marx continues his criticism by explaining how private property warps human relations and values, making people view objects throw the lens of ownership and use-value:
Private property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an object is only ours when we have it — when it exists for us as capital, or when it is directly possessed, eaten, drunk, worn, inhabited, etc., — in short, when it is used by us. Although private property itself again conceives all these direct realisations of possession only as means of life, and the life which they serve as means is the life of private property — labour and conversion into capital.
If an individual views objects solely as capital — or that an object is theirs when it is directly utilized — then the individual has succumb to a narrow-minded perspective of private property that continues to alienate them. This concept of private property limits one’s ability to appreciate the significance of things beyond their immediate utilize of ability to generate profit.
Marx reiterates how the alienation of the senses reduces all of one’s being to the focus of owning private property:
In the place of all physical and mental senses there has therefore come the sheer estrangement of all these senses, the sense of having. The human being had to be reduced to this absolute poverty in order that he might yield his inner wealth to the outer world. [On the category of “having”, see Hess in the Philosophy of the Deed].
Private property leads to the alienation of all physical and mental senses. In this manner, all of the rich and diverse ways one has to experience the world become reduced to a singular focus: owning private property. Marx notes that all human senses must be reduced to this “absolute poverty” in order to utilize their “inner wealth” (i.e., creative thoughts and ideas) for the sake of accumulating capital and profit.
However — not all hope is lost. When private property is completely abolished, the human sense become emancipated:
The abolition [Aufhebung] of private property is therefore the complete emancipation of all human senses and qualities, but it is this emancipation precisely because these senses and attributes have become, subjectively and objectively, human. The eye has become a human eye, just as its object has become a social, human object — an object made by man for man. The senses have therefore become directly in their practice theoreticians. They relate themselves to the thing for the sake of the thing, but the thing itself is an objective human relation to itself and to man, [In practice I can relate myself to a thing humanly only if the thing relates itself humanly to the human being. — Note by Marx] and vice versa.
The abolition of private property results in the liberation of both human senses and the objects they interact with. Marx illustrates this by describing how the eye becomes a “human eye” when it perceives objects that are no longer considered capital; the object that the eye sees is a social and human object. This implies that the eye is more than a mere biological organ; it is deeply connected to the world around it. Consequently, instead of viewing objects as private possessions, objects are recognized as “social, human objects” created and maintained for the collective benefit of humanity.
When the human senses and objects have become liberated, Marx writes:
Need or enjoyment have consequently lost its egotistical nature, and nature has lost its mere utility by use becoming human use.
Capitalism turns enjoyment into an egotistical pursuit. In this system, enjoyment involves accumulating and spending capital, which means that only some can experience enjoyment while others cannot. To be clear, Marx is not stating that poor individuals cannot enjoy; rather, Marx is stating that, under capitalism, people enjoy at the expense of others. However, when the humans senses and objects are liberated, everyone gains the ability to enjoy, as enjoyment becomes a communal rather than self-serving activity.
Marx proceeds:
In the same way, the senses and enjoyment of other men have become my own appropriation. Besides these direct organs, therefore, social organs develop in the form of society; thus, for instance, activity in direct association with others, etc., has become an organ for expressing my own life, and a mode of appropriating human life.
In communism, the focus shifts from individual enjoyment to collective well-being, where everyone prioritizes each other’s happiness. Marx illustrates this by describing society as a social body with its own organs. He emphasizes that society functions as a collective entity with its own “social organs,” suggesting that individuals transcend mere biological existence (i.e., individuals are more than organisms). Thus, in perceiving others beyond their utilize, we recognize their significance beyond a reductive use-value.
- Under capitalism, it is all too easy to view ourselves as organisms separated from the collective. In the earlier example, the eye is shown to be more than a simple organ when it becomes liberated. It is a machine that is interconnected with other machines (organs and objects).
Marx explicates:
It is obvious that the human eye enjoys things in a way different from the crude, non- human eye; the human ear different from the crude ear, etc.
None of this is to assume that objects themselves are the problem — the question lies in how the human relates to the object. In some cases humans do not lose themselves in objects, but in other cases, they do:
We have seen that man does not lose himself in his object only when the object becomes for him a human object or objective man. This is possible only when the object becomes for him a social object, he himself for himself a social being, just as society becomes a being for him in this object.
Marx isolates two aspects of humans in relation to objects.
First is the notion that humans become the objects. This is the objective aspect.
On the one hand, therefore, it is only when the objective world becomes everywhere for man in society the world of man’s essential powers — human reality, and for that reason the reality of his own essential powers — that all objects become for him the objectification of himself, become objects which confirm and realise his individuality, become his objects: that is, man himself becomes the object.
Marx emphasizes that when society aligns with nature, all aspects of nature (the objects of nature) reflect humans’ essential qualities. Our surroundings serve as extensions of ourselves, becoming part and parcel with our identity. Essentially, you are just a product of everything outside of your self.
Yet, the affirmation of the human in relation to the object is contingent upon the specific human faculty that conceptualizes the object. On this point, Marx states:
The manner in which they become his depends on the nature of the objects and on the nature of the essential power corresponding to it; for it is precisely the determinate nature of this relationship which shapes the particular, real mode of affirmation. To the eye an object comes to be other than it is to the ear, and the object of the eye is another object than the object of the ear. The specific character of each essential power is precisely its specific essence, and therefore also the specific mode of its objectification, of its objectively actual, living being.
Therefore:
Thus man is affirmed in the objective world not only in the act of thinking, but with all his senses.
This initial argument serves as a critique of the Cartesian concept of the subject. The Cartesian subject is one where the subject exists as a singular entity with everything existing around it; thus, allowing for René Descartes to utter his famous statement: “I think, therefore I am.” However, Marx suggests that it is insufficient to solely prioritize the liberation of thought — there must be a liberation of all senses. Unlike the Cartesian subject, Marx emphasizes that the subject is constantly being produced. Humans are shaped by their environment while also actively shaping the environment themselves. Humans are not divorced from Nature.
This is the objective aspect.
Second is the recognition of how individual subjectivity navigates the world. This is the subjective aspect.
Marx continues:
On the other hand, let us look at this in its subjective aspect. Just as only music awakens in man the sense of music, and just as the most beautiful music has no sense for the unmusical ear — is [no] object for it, because my object can only be the confirmation of one of my essential powers — it can therefore only exist for me insofar as my essential power exists for itself as a subjective capacity; because the meaning of an object for me goes only so far as my sense goes (has only a meaning for a sense corresponding to that object) — for this reason the senses of the social man differ from those of the non-social man.
Here, Marx is describing the subjective relationship between humans and objects. He illustrates this with the example of music, explaining that one’s appreciation for music depends on their specific relationship to it. A person can only appreciate and find meaning in music if they have developed a specific relationship to it. This concept does not end with music — it applies to all objects. The meaning and value of an object are shaped by an individual’s developed senses and abilities (which are influenced by their social context).
Marx is calling for the human to relinquish their senses from capital and appreciate all of life has to offer. Do you listen to music with a musical ear? Do you see with eyes that perceive the beauty of the world? But it doesn’t end there — there are also practical senses:
Only through the objectively unfolded richness of man’s essential being is the richness of subjective human sensibility (a musical ear, an eye for beauty of form — in short, senses capable of human gratification, senses affirming themselves as essential powers of man) either cultivated or brought into being. For not only the five senses but also the so-called mental senses, the practical senses (will, love, etc.), in a word, human sense, the human nature of the senses, comes to be by virtue of its object, by virtue of humanised nature.
These practical senses are those of human will and human love — both of which are human senses. The existence of the liberated five-senses, mental senses, and practical sense are in opposition to a capitalized existence whereby the senses are only deemed useful when accumulating capital.
The human senses are not static, however, as they are contingent upon a specific socio-historical process. Marx writes:
The forming of the five senses is a labour of the entire history of the world down to the present. The sense caught up in crude practical need has only a restricted sense. For the starving man, it is not the human form of food that exists, but only its abstract existence as food. It could just as well be there in its crudest form, and it would be impossible to say wherein this feeding activity differs from that of animals. The care-burdened, poverty- stricken man has no sense for the finest play; the dealer in minerals sees only the commercial value but not the beauty and the specific character of the mineral: he has no mineralogical sense.
Yet, instead of senses evolving without constraint, individuals are largely limited by capitalism. When a person is consumed by their basic needs, their sensory perception becomes limited. For example, when a person is starving, they will perceive food as a means to cure their hunger; but they won’t appreciate the aesthetic beauty of food or its taste. In a similar vein, individuals who sell minerals have no sense of the beauty that minerals hold as sellers are solely focused on the monetary value of the mineral. Marx is arguing that material deprivation limits the potentiality of the development of human senses. This restricts human experience to survival instincts like to those of animals.
Marx concludes this second observation by stating:
Thus, the objectification of the human essence, both in its theoretical and practical aspects, is required to make man’s sense human, as well as to create the human sense corresponding to the entire wealth of human and natural substance.
After explaining these two observations, Marx states:
Just as through the movement of private property, of its wealth as well as its poverty — of its material and spiritual wealth and poverty — the budding society finds at hand all the material for this development, so established society produces man in this entire richness of his being produces the rich man profoundly endowed with all the senses — as its enduring reality.
It is here that Marx acknowledges the historical development driven by the contradictions of private property (with its wealth and poverty) has contributed to the production of individuals — with these individuals developing a wide-array of sensory capacities. However (quite obviously), this does not assume an endorsement of private property by Marx. Instead, Marx is isolating that society writ large — with or without private property — develops in a manner that produces humans and is produced by humans.
Regardless, Marx indicates the apparent tension that lies between various (and important) concepts:
We see how subjectivity and objectivity, spirituality and materiality, activity [Tätigkeit] and suffering, lose their antithetical character, and — thus their existence as such antitheses only within the framework of society; we see how the resolution of the theoretical antitheses is only possible in a practical way, by virtue of the practical energy of man. Their resolution is therefore by no means merely a problem of understanding, but a real problem of life, which philosophy could not solve precisely because it conceived this problem as merely a theoretical one.
The tension between subjectivity and objectivity, spirituality and materiality, activity and suffering, etc. seems irreconcilable. However, Marx indicates that the tension between these concepts is resolved “within the framework of society.” Rather than contemplating how subjectivity and objectivity can be resolved, Marx highlights the importance of philosophy as a practical application. He discards mere contemplation in favor of a real-world, lived philosophy.
- To me, it appears that Marx suggests that physicalism and idealism find their roots in contemplation. However, one’s lived experience blurs the boundary between mind and body, physical and metaphysical, etc. Despite Marx acknowledging the usefulness of concepts like subjectivity/objectivity distinctions as cognitive tools, he highlights their dissolution “within the framework of society.” Here, the lines between subject and object, spirituality and materiality, enjoyment and suffering, etc. become less distinct as humans find themselves as part of a network, both shaping and being shaped by society.
As history plays an integral role in Marx’s analysis, Marx writes that the history of industry serves as a useful area of study, worthy of further contemplation, as the history of industry can give necessary insight on fundamental aspects of human nature (i.e., what humans are capable of and their psychology). Marx explains:
We see how the history of industry and the established objective existence of industry are the open book of man’s essential powers, the perceptibly existing human psychology. Hitherto this was not conceived in its connection with man’s essential being, but only in an external relation of utility, because, moving in the realm of estrangement, people could only think of man’s general mode of being — religion or history in its abstract-general character as politics, art, literature, etc. as the reality of man’s essential powers and man’s species-activity. We have before us the objectified essential powers of man in the form of sensuous, alien, useful objects, in the form of estrangement, displayed in ordinary material industry (which can be conceived either as a part of that general movement, or that movement can be conceived as a particular part of industry, since all human activity hitherto has been labour – that is, industry – activity estranged from itself).
As humans are alienated from their species-being and one another, they often fail at viewing industry in this manner. Industry has mainly been conceptualized as solely a question of utility. Historically, Marx notes that people have tended to view human’s “essential being” through external terms like religion or an obfuscated perception of history. Instead of viewing human’s essential being as intrinsic to individuals and their relationship to social activities, it has often been viewed as something external to humans.
All areas pertaining to the study of humans must incorporate the fact that humans are embedded in a sociohistorical field if they wish to be legitimate:
A psychology for which this book, the part of history existing in the most perceptible and accessible form, remains a closed book, cannot become a genuine, comprehensive and real science. What indeed are we to think of a science which airily abstracts from this large part of human labour and which fails to feel its own incompleteness, while such a wealth of human endeavour, unfolded before it, means nothing more to it than, perhaps, what can be expressed in one word — “need”, “vulgar need”?
- Marx is calling for a materialist view of psychology. (The way he worded this was really incredible.)
Though, we must not forget that psychology is not the only area that seems to be lacking the analysis and incorporation of historical materialism. Marx even criticizes the natural sciences:
The natural sciences have developed an enormous activity and have accumulated an ever-growing mass of material. Philosophy, however, has remained just as alien to them as they remain to philosophy. Their momentary unity was only a chimerical illusion. The will was there, but the power was lacking. Historiography itself pays regard to natural science only occasionally, as a factor of enlightenment, utility, and of some special great discoveries. But natural science has invaded and transformed human life all the more practically through the medium of industry; and has prepared human emancipation, although its immediate effect had to be the furthering of the dehumanisation of man.
While Marx acknowledges the flourishing of the natural sciences and their mass accumulation of knowledge, he emphasizes that the natural sciences have largely been detached from philosophy (and vice-versa). If there was ever a unity between the two, it was fleeting and temporary (“a chimerical illusion”). Historiography approaches the natural sciences primarily for its utility, neglecting deeper implications, and focusing solely on their direct societal impacts. Regardless, the natural sciences have significantly transformed human life in a practical manner, benefitting us through various advancements like modern medicine, housing construction, and technology. However, while these advancement may hold promise for emancipation in the long term, their immediate effects contribute to the dehumanization of individuals.
One of my favorite quotes of the entire text is the following sentence:
Industry is the actual, historical relationship of nature, and therefore of natural science, to man.
Marx asserts that industry is the expression of the interaction between humans and nature. Because humans transform their environment through the application of the knowledge they have natural sciences, industry serves as the expression of natural science. Marx explains:
If, therefore, industry is conceived as the exoteric revelation of man’s essential powers, we also gain an understanding of the human essence of nature or the natural essence of man. In consequence, natural science will lose its abstractly material — or rather, its idealistic — tendency, and will become the basis of human science, as it has already become — albeit in an estranged form — the basis of actual human life, and to assume one basis for life and a different basis for science is as a matter of course a lie.
Industry must be understood as a way to conceptualize humans’ essential characteristics. Marx states that this manner of thinking must be conceptualized as an “exoteric revelation,” indicating that industry is an outward manifestation of human potential and essence. Because industry expresses this human essence, natural science becomes a science that reflects human nature instead of being solely an abstract or physical study. Marx is blurring the distinction between industry and science, showing how they are interconnected.
As industry serves as the expression of human essence — and as industry is always changing — we must note that human nature is always in a state of flux:
The nature which develops in human history — the genesis of human society — is man’s real nature; hence nature as it develops through industry, even though in an estranged form, is true anthropological nature.
Marx argues that the develpoment of human society, largely driven by industry, reflects changes in human nature. While the current form of industry under capitalism alienates humans from their true essence, it still reveals aspects of human nature. Marx does not claim capitalism is human nature itself; rather, Marx explains how the interaction between humans and nature is ever-evolving. Capitalism distorts and limits this nature, but understanding the development of industry within these limitations is key to crafting a true anthropological study. Thus, Marx concludes that human nature is not fixed (and that there is a potentiality for different types of political economies).
To continue this analysis regarding the foundations of science, Marx writes:
Sense-perception (see Feuerbach) must be the basis of all science. Only when it proceeds from sense-perception in the two-fold form of sensuous consciousness and sensuous need — is it true science.
Here, Marx states that the basis of all types of science is sense-perception (i.e., the process of gathering information about the universe through the five senses). Though Marx doesn’t clearly define sensuous consciousness and sensuous need, we can safely define them as:
- Sensuous Consciousness: The awareness and conceptualization of sensory experiences.
- Sensuous Need: The human inclination and drive shaped by these sensory perceptions.
When sensuous consciousness and sensuous need proceed from sensory experience, Marx defines this as “true science.” To put simply, Marx believes that scientific inquiries must remain connected to our real, sensory experiences rather than being divorced from sensory experience. None of this is to assume that Marx discards all abstract theories, such as string theory or quantum mechanics. Rather, Marx’s prioritization is on the material conditions that people face. He continues:
All history is the history of preparing and developing “man” to become the object of sensuous consciousness, and turning the requirements of “man as man” into his needs. History itself is a real part of natural history — of nature developing into man. Natural science will in time incorporate into itself the science of man, just as the science of man will incorporate into itself natural science: there will be one science.
In this quote, Marx identifies the purpose of history and the idea that history “prepares and develops” humans as the object of sensuous consciousness. Marx notes that human history is a real and integral aspect of natural history, where “nature develop[s] into man.” This perspective, however, goes beyond the study of history; Marx emphasizes the need for the science of humans and natural science to coalesce and merge as a single discipline. Since humans have evolved from nature and are a part of nature, the development of the human species is simply a continuation of nature as a process of production. Human science = natural science.
Furthermore, Marx highlights that one’s understanding of the natural world and human nature cannot be divorced from one’s interactions with other humans:
Man is the immediate object of natural science; for immediate, sensuous nature for man is, immediately, human sensuousness (the expressions are identical) — presented immediately in the form of the other man sensuously present for him. Indeed, his own sense-perception first exists as human sensuousness for himself through the other man.
Marx proceeds by explaining how nature becomes the “immediate object of the science of man” because humans first encounter themselves within nature:
But nature is the immediate object of the science of man: the first object of man — man — is nature, sensuousness; and the particular human sensuous essential powers can only find their self-understanding in the science of the natural world in general, just as they can find their objective realisation only in natural objects. The element of thought itself — the element of thought’s living expression — language — is of a sensuous nature. The social reality of nature, and human natural science, or the natural science of man, are identical terms.
Humans’ sensuous perceptions can only be understood in relation to the natural world as these abilities are realized through natural objects. Even abstract concepts like thoughts and language are rooted in sensory experiences. Thus, the “social reality of nature” and “human natural science” are intertwined and must be understood as identical terms.
Marx concludes the fourth element of Private Property and Communism with a description of how wealth and poverty serve as characteristics of the political economy:
It will be seen how in place of the wealth and poverty of political economy come the rich human being and the rich human need. The rich human being is simultaneously the human being in need of a totality of human manifestations of life — the man in whom his own realisation exists as an inner necessity, as need. Not only wealth, but likewise the poverty of man — under the assumption of socialism — receives in equal measure a human and therefore social significance.
Instead of conforming to conventional definitions of wealth and poverty, Marx presents the idea of a “rich human being” who eagerly seeks liberation and self-fulfillment as essential aspects of life. The rich human being is different than the rich capitalist as the rich human being is not concerned with maximizing private property; the rich human being is concerned with living a fulfilling life. In a similar vein, the rich human being is functionally synonymous with the impoverished socialist. Marx conceptualizes poverty, under social, as a positive term. The impoverished socialist foregoes an over-accumulation of material goods that they could have under capitalism for the liberation of everyone’s senses.
Marx concludes by stating that poverty serves as an integral bond between humans:
Poverty is the passive bond which causes the human being to experience the need of the greatest wealth — the other human being. The dominion of the objective being in me, the sensuous outburst of my life activity, is passion, which thus becomes here the activity of my being.
- This reminds me of the best life experiences I’ve had; the experiences that come to mind are about being surrounded with loved ones and playing games or cooking. Efforts to maximize private property ownership is not what comes to mind when thinking about the activity of my human essence.
Fifth … True Communism
In this final section, Marx begins by explaining that an individual is independent when they are self-sufficient, but are dependent when they rely on another:
A being only considers himself independent when he stands on his own feet; and he only stands on his own feet when he owes his existence to himself. A man who lives by the grace of another regards himself as a dependent being. But I live completely by the grace of another if I owe him not only the maintenance of my life, but if he has, moreover, created my life — if he is the source of my life.
Marx criticizes the idea that one cannot be fully independent if they owe their existence to a higher power or deity. This belief in a transcendent Creator or God makes individuals perceive all creation as dependent on a higher being rather than on themselves or nature (because they view nature as creation). Marx writes:
When it is not of my own creation, my life has necessarily a source of this kind outside of it. The Creation is therefore an idea very difficult to dislodge from popular consciousness. The fact that nature and man exist on their own account is incomprehensible to it, because it contradicts everything tangible in practical life.
Evidently, Marx finds it extremely challenging to dislodge the notion of a transcendent God from popular consciousness. This difficult arises because humans and nature exist interdependently; the idea of their coexistence appears incomprehensible. The complexity of this interdependence makes it difficult to question the concept of a transcendent God because people seem to need an explanation for their existence.
Yet, creation myths are losing weight with the advancement of scientific progress:
The creation of the earth has received a mighty blow from geognosy — i.e., from the science which presents the formation of the earth, the development of the earth, as a process, as a self-generation. Generatio aequivoca is the only practical refutation of the theory of creation.
- Generatio aequivoca refers to ‘spontaneous generation.’
- It must be noted that Marx is incorrect here. Spontaneous generation is not the “only practical refutation” of a transcendent Creator creating nature. However, Marx is touching on evolution here which does challenge traditional creation myths.
Marx continues:
Now it is certainly easy to say to the single individual what Aristotle has already said: You have been begotten by your father and your mother; therefore in you the mating of two human beings — a species-act of human beings — has produced the human being. You see, therefore, that even physically man owes his existence to man. Therefore you must not only keep sight of the one aspect — the infinite progression which leads you further to inquire: Who begot my father? Who his grandfather? etc. You must also hold on to the circular movement sensuously perceptible in that progress by which man repeats himself in procreation, man thus always remaining the subject.
Citing Aristotle’s argument, Marx presents a notable point raised by creationists: the inquiry into lineage leads to a logical conclusion that there must be a creator at the end of the chain of progenitors. However, Marx counters this by asserting that such reasoning is circular, as it overlooks the continuous role of humans in procreation, rendering humans central to the process. Marx notes the creationists’ reply:
[Creationists] will reply, however: I grant you this circular movement; now grant me the progress which drives me ever further until I ask: Who begot the first man, and nature as a whole?
In this context, creationists inquire about the origin of the first man and nature itself. Marx’s response critiques the underlying premise of this inquiry:
I can only answer you: Your question is itself a product of abstraction. Ask yourself how you arrived at that question. Ask yourself whether your question is not posed from a standpoint to which I cannot reply, because it is wrongly put. Ask yourself whether that progress as such exists for a reasonable mind. When you ask about the creation of nature and man, you are abstracting, in so doing, from man and nature. You postulate them as non-existent, and yet you want me to prove them to you as existing.
According to Marx, the question regarding the origins of humanity and nature represents an “abstraction,” detached from tangible reality and practical life. He deems the question ill-formulated, noting that the question is “wrongly put.” In essence, Marx suggests that the creationists’ question presupposes their non-existence while simultaneously seeking evidence for their existence. They demand proof of their existence while claiming they don’t exist. To which, Marx replies:
Now I say to you: Give up your abstraction and you will also give up your question. Or if you want to hold on to your abstraction, then be consistent, and if you think of man and nature as non-existent, then think of yourself as non-existent, for you too are surely nature and man. Don’t think, don’t ask me, for as soon as you think and ask, your abstraction from the existence of nature and man has no meaning. Or are you such an egotist that you conceive everything as nothing, and yet want yourself to exist?
Marx’s argument suggests that if the creationist relinquishes their abstraction, then the question they pose about the origin of humans and nature becomes irrelevant. Conversely, if they persist in holding on to their abstraction, Marx asserts that they must remain consistent in their reasoning. In this scenario, if the creationist views humans and nature as non-existent entities (as they remove humans and nature from existence and demand a response that explains their existence), the creationist must logically extend this perception to themselves. As the creationist exists, their question is found illegitimate.
Again, Marx states the creationists’ reply:
[The creationist] can reply: I do not want to postulate the nothingness of nature, etc. I ask you about its genesis, just as I ask the anatomist about the formation of bones, etc.
However, the socialist conceptualizes history in a much different fashion than the creationist. Rather than understanding history in an abstract manner that necessitates a God at the very beginning —a history that is fundamentally divorced from lived experience — the socialist understands that all of history is just the creation of humans through labor:
But since for the socialist man the entire so-called history of the world is nothing but the creation of man through human labour, nothing but the emergence of nature for man, so he has the visible, irrefutable proof of his birth through himself, of his genesis. Since the real existence of man and nature has become evident in practice, through sense experience, because man has thus become evident for man as the being of nature, and nature for man as the being of man, the question about an alien being, about a being above nature and man — a question which implies the admission of the unreality of nature and of man — has become impossible in practice.
Individuals discover undeniable evidence of their existence through their interactions with the world. Their genesis is substantiated by their sensory perceptions and life encounters, affirming their intimate connection with nature. Consequently, the idea of a transcendent deity or higher power becomes irrelevant, as it negates the tangible reality of humans as active participants in the natural world. From a socialist standpoint, questions regarding human origins hold little significance given the substantial evidence of humanity’s emergence within nature — as nature.
Marx proceeds:
Atheism, as the denial of this unreality, has no longer any meaning, for atheism is a negation of God, and postulates the existence of man through this negation; but socialism as socialism no longer stands in any need of such a mediation. It proceeds from the theoretically and practically sensuous consciousness of man and of nature as the essence. Socialism is man’s positive self-consciousness, no longer mediated through the abolition of religion, just as real life is man’s positive reality, no longer mediated through the abolition of private property, through communism.
In socialism, the concept of atheism loses its significance. Atheism, being a negation of the existence of God, frames human existence in terms of negation. However, socialism situates itself in a different manner, emphasizing the interconnectedness of humans and nature. Instead of defining humanity through negation, socialism affirms the unity between humans and nature, shifting the focus from negation to affirmation. At the end of this quote, Marx isolates that communism must also not be understood through negation.
Marx concluded Private Property and Communism by proclaiming:
Communism is the position as the negation of the negation, and is hence the actual phase necessary for the next stage of historical development in the process of human emancipation and rehabilitation. Communism is the necessary form and the dynamic principle of the immediate future, but communism as such is not the goal of human development, the form of human society.
It is here that Marx defines communism as the “negation of negation,” where it does not define itself by negating private property or capitalism. Communism is, instead, understood by affirmation whereby humanity positions itself towards emancipation. However, Marx notes that communism must not be understood as an end goal. Communism is both a process and a a transitional phase that humanity to progress towards increased emancipation. Emancipate the senses!
