Democratic Repression: Analysis of Modern Turkey (Part 2/2)

By looking at Turkey’s behavior, it satisfies illiberal features such as electoral manipulation, unfair media access, abuse of state resources, varying degrees of harassment and violence. Erdogan has repeatedly attempted to polarize and politicize the society in violation of the terms of impartiality. Through its authoritarian practices, and due to weak opposition, the AKP has presented itself as the singular valid option amid economic and political crises. By establishing a competitive authoritarian regime, the AKP’s repressive behavior contests democratic features in various institutions.
The characteristics of competitive authoritarianism (CA) fit with the practices of the Turkish state under the AKP. CA regimes, as explained by Levitsky and Way, are: “civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist …but in which incumbents’ abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-`a-vis their opponents…they are not democratic because the playing field is heavily skewed in favor of incumbents.” (Levitsky and Way, 2010) I have used four criteria, as per Levitsky and Way, to demonstrate the AKP’s partisan infiltration into state institutions: the electoral arena; the legislature; the judiciary, and the media.
- Electoral Arena
In terms of the electoral contestation, the AKP utilizes its popular support to hinder other parties from winning elections. While Turkey does not prohibit any parties or candidates from running, the electoral process was recently criticized. A particular incident is a visit by high-level government officials to centers of Ankara and Antalya which led to suspicions of electoral abuse during vote counting in the March 2014 local elections. (Esen and Gumuscu, 2016) Using a cross coalition of social class and geographical area, the regime dominated countrywide institutions and exploited state resources in a partisan manner to prevent the opposition from contesting the AKP’s rule.
- The Legislature
By utilizing the legislative branch, the AKP commences authoritarian behavior in Turkey. Following the Gezi protests, the AKP amended the legal framework concerning civil society twice. This has made registration, action, and fundraising by CSOs subject to strict government approval (Yabanci, 2019) The new code prohibits CSOs that are contrary to: ‘laws and morality’, ‘the Republic’s principles’, ‘Turkish family’, ‘public order’, ‘ethics’, ‘national integrity and national interest’ to run in elections. Such vague terms allow authorities to sanction and dissolve CSOs.
- The Judiciary
To prevent the opposition from using legal measures against it, the AKP infiltrated the judicial branch. In 2014, new amendments were adopted that limited the independence of the High Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors (HSYK). Soon after, pro-government members were added to the structure of the HSYK (Ozbudan, 2015) The new HSYK carried new appointments swiftly to avoid any order by the Constitutional Court. Since then, several practices including amending, initiating defamation cases and lifting parliamentary immunities were carried out.
- Media
Lastly, the repression of the Turkish government was facilitated by building state-media relations. The AKP, in its thirteen years in power, invested in streamlining the mainstream media and building its pro-government media bloc. The AKP used its access to state resources to reward its supporters and punish its critics from the media society. After the 2016 coup attempt, the government shut down media outlets that were mainly left-wing, pro-Kurdish and Alevi. (Sarfati, 2017) Furthermore, the government banned non-Islamic, non-Turkic symbols and instead portrayed a Turkic nationalist identity. The support and revival of national identity is an essential aspect of understanding the paradox of democracy in Turkey.
The paradox of democracy in Turkey was not generated in tandem with positive socioeconomic performance but rather due to the appropriation of both institutions and the public by the AKP under the banner of identity and ideology. At the micro-level of state institutions and ruling party behavior; Turkey defies the role, discussed by Lipset, of economic development in sustaining a liberal democracy. The increased wealth and socioeconomic performance in Turkey did not reflect democratic practices among various state institutions. Instead, the revival of Turkish nationalism normalized abusing democratic values.
- The Revival of Turkish Nationalism
Cultivating the nationalistic rhetoric helped the AKP to win elections and thwart its opposition. Following the 2016 coup attempt, the more conservative Gullenists, responsible for the 2016 coup attempt, were portrayed as radical terrorists and enemies along with the Alevis, Shiites and oppositional Kurds. The ruling party represented the interests of “challenging the Kemalist order that, since the beginning of the Republic, had alienated the conservative Anatolian classes and denied the validity of traditional and religious values.”(Waldman and Caliskan, 2017)
The advent of globalization, political Islam and the Kurdish challenge provided the AKP with a platform for nationalistic revival through state repression. Democracy was a means for Erdogan to challenge the ruling secular elites and cement the AKP rule in the early years. Therefore, and in contradiction with Lipset’s ideas, the Turkish economic revival led to a party that promoted national unity and state interests rather than championing the rule of law and human rights.
- What is next for Turkey
The AKP increasing authoritarian behavior puts a challenge ahead of the regime’s survival. Turkey remains an authoritarian state with weak institutions that abuses human rights, oppress media and keeps civil society under check. Turkey will be challenged as long as it maintains a heavily centralized power, crippled party system and ineffective branches of governments. Turkish democracy paradox is a valid issue in modern politics. While I approached the Turkish case from a historical perspective and by analyzing state institutions; other elements such as culture, identity, and further analysis of the AKP can be utilized to understand current trends in Turkey. We cannot deny the positive impact of Erdogan in achieving economic equality and providing better services on the nationwide level. Alas, contemporary Turkey remains politically polarized and socially agitated.
To read Part 1: https://medium.com/@noman.ahmed14/democratic-repression-analysis-of-modern-turkey-part-1-2-48cbcb94c461
Sources:
1- Esen, B., & Gumuscu, S. (2016). Rising competitive authoritarianism in Turkey. Third World Quarterly, 37(9), 1581–1606.
2- Levitsky, S., & Way, L. (2002). The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism. Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 51–65.
3- Levitsky, S., & Way, L. (2010). Competitive authoritarianism hybrid regimes after the Cold War New York: Cambridge University Press.
4- Özbudun, Ergun (2015) Turkey’s Judiciary and the Drift Toward Competitive Authoritarianism, The International Spectator, 50:2, 42–55.
5- Sarfati, Y. (2017). How Turkey’s slide to authoritarianism defies modernization theory. Turkish Studies, 18(3), 395–415.
6- Waldman, S., & Caliskan, E. (2017). The New Turkey and Its Discontents. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Incorporated.
7- Yabanci, B. (2019). Turkey’s tamed civil society: Containment and appropriation under a competitive authoritarian regime. Journal Of Civil Society.
