Statistics

*In addition over 5,000 day passes were issued, leading to over 41,000 passes produced in total

GENERAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Pre — Tournament

1. The Accreditation Provider needed to be appointed and mobilised sooner — due to the complexity of the tournament (including the large number of venues with their individual requirements)
2. Venues needed firmer and clearer communication from the LOC re: importance of a ‘universal’ and consistent accreditation programme and policies being used across all venues
3. Some venue contracts were not finalised until late, which had an impact on our operations
4. The Accreditation Centre specifications were scoped by Rushmans, designed/specified by LOC, but ultimately delivered and paid for by individual venues — leading to the Accreditation Centres not always being consistently fitted out or branded to a ‘normal’ standard for a Cricket World Cup / World Class Event
5. A total of 4,294 emails were received to our dedicated “cwc-info” email address, with 3,454 reply emails sent.
6. We also worked directly with Sami ul Hasan to process and either approve or reject any ‘appeals’ from declined media-specific applicants

SECURITY

1. New Zealand and Australia operated different systems and protocols which caused a lot of ‘double handling’ — eg NZ Police required a physical ‘letter of consent’ to be signed — in Australia, a check-box on the online application was sufficient
2. Five-day screening turnaround target in Australia was not achieved
3. Implemented Tournament-wide policies that worked in Australia ‘clashed’ with NZ police operations
4. Security-related accreditation processes were implemented without ICC approval
5. Emergency match day procedures were not carried out as per the policy. The match day emergency screening form was not issued until the day of the first match. Most of these records were not screened
6. Some key ICC-related personnel were accredited prior to screening results being received. This was necessary in order to allow essential operations to continue
7. The Security Director allowed non-screened personnel access on Day Passes with zone 1 access, which meant we had high numbers of uncleared personnel in venues and also that we had to re-issue passes multiple times until the individual was cleared
8. Had we known the impact of Security screening we would have requested budget for an additional dedicated staff member to oversee this task

LATE APPLICATIONS

1. A summary of application dates is as follows:
   October — December 2014 (ie the extended application period) — 6,472
   January 2015 — 16,434
   February 2015 — 8,668
   March 2015 — 2,756
2. In addition, over 500 PMOA passes were issued across February and March and approximately 5,000 day passes were issued during the Tournament
3. Primary reasons for late applications were:
   • Application portal was not ‘shut down’ and cut off dates were not enforced, however this was not practically able to happen because:
   • Service providers were unable to confirm event staff until last minute due to casual nature and last minute employment of their staff
   • Contracts awarded by both the ICC and LOC were concluded and agreed late
4. Impact of late applications were:
   • Unable to submit and receive security screening clearance between application time and issue of pass
   • Unable to verify applications ahead of issue
   • Unable to verify and amend any zoning variations ahead of pass collection
   • Due to time restriction, were unable to pre-verify and/or challenge all late applications via online portal (we did challenge a large amount)

VENUE OPERATIONS

1. Many Centres were delivered late and to a lower than expected standard of finish
2. In some notable cases (eg, Christchurch and Auckland) services and the Centre were decommissioned earlier than agreed, which meant that final synchronisation was not fully completed as planned and agreed
3. Internet connectivity was largely stable, with the exception of two or three venues that experienced difficulties. In these cases, LOC and venue technology staff worked well with our teams to solve issues

VENUE SECURITY

1. Our offer to brief security staff in advance of matches was largely declined
2. We issued a security briefing presentation — we do not believe it was used to any great extent
3. Security staff were confused by the system and we encountered many cases of security staff letting in accreditees with incorrect accreditation (this would have been largely negated had the barcode system been in operation)
4. However, had the barcode system been implemented, further challenges would have been created as RATS would not have allowed for last minute changes to staff being permitted into venues which, given the large number of late service provider personnel changes would have caused operational problems
5. Revalidation was not always understood by security staff (we thought it was a simple system!) which meant that we had a number of cases where staff had to be re-briefed
6. The usual instances of staff entering the stadia with incorrect or invalid accreditation were experienced

MEDIA ACCREDITATION AND MATCH TICKETING

1. Needs to be addressed by the ICC for future events, with additional budget committed for this function
2. Required a significant amount of extra, dedicated resource. Rather than ICC employing a Media Accreditation Manager, Rushmans negotiated extra budget to engage this person
3. Internal (CWC-wide) miscommunications meant that many media did not get the fantastic first impression of the Tournament that we strived to provide
4. Many media required assistance with visa applications. Whilst the LOC secured an agreement with Australian and New Zealand immigration services that was planned to negate the need for visa letters, this did not filter down to all embassies across applicant countries and as a result, we assisted in many visa applications, with assistance from the LOC Government Relations department
5. Policy of approvals for media was very — perhaps too — stringent.
6. A lot of media applications — initially rejected by ICC Media Manager — were overturned and approved on appeal by ICC Head of Media
7. The departure of the ICC’s media manager in charge of accreditation two weeks prior to the start of the tournament did not assist our operations
8. Inconsistencies in approach from ICC Media team meant that certain individuals were approved for some matches and rejected for others, with no obvious pattern, leading to a large number of queries and a great deal of additional work for us
9. An error by one of our support staff resulted in incorrect confirmations and rejections being sent to media for one high profile match. Whilst this was identified quickly, it did damage the integrity of our communications with the media and led to a certain amount of confusion
10. Due to the very significant number of media no-shows for chosen matches, an informal wait list was instigated (agreed by ICC) and ‘walk ups’ were accommodated. This went against ICC policy but was by far the most practical solution and prevented media antagonism
11. We received undue criticism from venue media teams that photographer and broadcaster bibs and camera stickers were not available in venues to the desired quantities, however, we delivered all bibs and stickers as directed by the ICC
12. We experienced an unprecedented number of late broadcast personnel applications. These had to be managed on a real time basis, as they were unexpected by the ICC. Better central management of the host broadcaster by the ICC, along with establishing zoning protocols would have saved an enormous amount of work and unnecessary issues in this regard (we acknowledge that the ICC found the host broadcaster virtually unmanageable!)

BUDGET

1. We tailored the budget to what we knew would be accepted by the ICC, despite anticipating that it would be impossible to deliver a world class accreditation operation within this budget
2. We eventually agreed with the ICC a budget that did not include a contingency, on the basis that the budget was a fixed contracted amount
3. 21 laptops were procured by the ICC under their sponsorship from LG leading to a reduction in our budget of US$21,000

VOLUNTEER OPERATIONS

1. Initial general Volunteer welcome was very good
2. Further training time was needed for volunteers for the specific requirements for operating RATS. Often a volunteers first shift was on a very busy ‘open’ day for accreditation, leaving no time for formal training of RATS
3. Volunteers were generally very good, dedicated and hardworking, although some weren’t as computer literate as they claimed to be

SUMMARY

KEY ISSUES

1. More time needed — we were appointed less than 12 months out which was not enough time — earlier appointment does not mean more cost — quite the contrary
2. Further training for Assistant Managers and Volunteers would have been beneficial (this was a cost removed from the budget)
3. Security Screening — Further resource was required. Previously we have dealt directly with the screening authorities and had we been permitted to do so for CWC15 security could have been a lot smoother
4. Late applications
5. Communication with venues
6. Applicants still able to apply up til the day of match — no chance at all for security to be checked

WHAT WE DID RIGHT

1. Committed, hardworking locally based staff and Volunteers.
2. Good relationships built — both centrally and at venue level
3. Revalidation processes implemented well and without issue
4. Everyone who needed to access venue was issued with a pass. The majority with only one visit to the accreditation centre