11 Personnel: Key to the Birds’ Attack of the Patriots Linebackers
Attacking the New England defense has been a difficult task since the middle part of the 2017 season. Much is cited statistically for their improvement over the second half of the season, despite significant injuries to key personnel. Their philosophy is littered with mainstream NFL media labels, such as “bend don’t break,” “set the edge” and “do your job” (can hear Jim Nantz saying them right now). Like most NFL defenses, this unit has spots of tremendous talent (at the line and secondary) coupled with various weaknesses. The real difference in NE is the tremendous coaching that goes on to cover up for these weaknesses, and against in some cases foes that were specifically designed to exploit them (read Pittsburgh Steelers receivers).
One of the weaknesses Head Coach Bill Belichick has to account for on a weekly basis is defending the run against 11 personnel (3 WRs, 1 RB, 1 TE). Last night, Warren Sharp of Sharp Football Analysis, investigated the numbers behind this weakness very succinctly (link below). Against the Patriots, opposing teams are rushing 6.0 yards per carry out of 11 personnel, and even higher 6.7 yards per carry out of 11 personnel with shotgun formation. The Eagles run a lot from 11 personnel, and feature it as much as anyone in the league. They run 60% of their total rushes from that grouping, with only teams like McVay’s Rams and the Raiders with higher rates.
We often like to find ourself at the intersection of smart football statistics and film study, and times like this make us lose sleep to take on projects like this at full steam. The below deep dive will go beyond the above media cliches and examine why the NE defense yields so much against 11 personnel and what that means for Eagles Head Coach Doug Pederson. His offensive concepts link old school West Coast schemes with kind of new school Spread, and some resulting play calls specifically look to create time and space for his running backs and tight ends in the short flat and interior parts of the field. For New England, this space will be covered by their linebackers, and the best place to start is to understand their formations and players.
Against 11 personnel, NFL teams most often answer with nickel and dime defensive groupings. One of the more liberally used fronts within nickel for the Patriots is the the 5–1 front (above). At its heart this front is a 3–3–5 nickel defense: three down lineman consisting of some combination of a 0-tech NT and two 3-tech DTs, three linebackers two of which are edge defenders on the line, one “stacked” at the second level, and five defensive backs. The first level of lineman puts very talented lineman Lawrence Guy, Malcom Brown, and Ricky Jean-Francois in position over the interior line where the double teams of inside zone become single blocks. Any type of interior power running or trapping must go on with three stout defenders in a very small box. In pass rush, an odd front limits an offensive line’s options, often dictating one on one blocking and allowing the defense an easier platform to initiate stunts and twists. The 5–1 front has found success in this league, particularly with teams like the Carolina Panthers. For them, Pro Bowl Luke Kuechly plays the “1” with very quick recognition and incredible speed allowing him to dominate at times this season. Quite frankly, the Patriots do not have Pro Bowl personnel at this position.
It must be disclosed that this linebacking group possesses a lot of talent. Linebacker Kyle Van Noy, most often playing as an edge defender, is very flexible in pass coverage, as well as a solid pass rusher. His signing from the Lions has proven critical with the injury of starter Dont’a Hightower. Backer Elandon Roberts, often playing the “1”, has real run stuffing ability, reminding many of a traditional 5–2 bear Sam linebacker. Players like Roberts attack downhill ferociously, most often the first contact on ball carriers. Recently signed James Harrison still possesses strong speed to power pass rushes at the twilight of his career, and can make any edge blocker nervous. But, in this defense they all are at times under much pressure to simply do their jobs with very very little room for error. Part of it can be attributed to the proclivity of man pass coverage behind them in the secondary (with their backs to the play, any help in the run game is near impossible) to lack of run stopping ability (talented corner Stephen Gilmore is pretty much the exact opposite of a gnarly Tampa 2 Corner).
Against the very diverse rushing attack of the Eagles, this 5–1 front and personnel makes some concepts very difficult to execute. The Eagles wham concept for trapping, center lead plays for Pro Bowler Kelce, as well as simple inside zone for RB Ajayi face headwinds. However, outside zone with simple measures like pin/pull concepts and other blocking schemes to get to the alley could find success. The first example is below:
This is a first down run late in the third quarter against the Minnesota Vikings from the NFC Championship game. Although not exactly the same, the Vikings employ a quasi 5–1 front to the overloaded left front of the Eagles (RT Johnson is lined up on the left side. The run outside zone left with pin/pull blocking on the perimeter to free up running back Corey Clement. If you notice on the film, right guard Brandon Brooks does not get a good block on speedy safety Harrison Smith, yet outside contain is lost as the runner side steps Smith. Clement is not featured as heavily as LeGarrete Blount and Jay Ajayi in this offense, coming in mostly on third down and later in games. But his speed and ability to attack the perimeter from inside and outside in the flat may be a huge weapon in this game.
The target of outside zone in the Patriots defense will either be Van Noy or Harrison. The first example of Van Noy dates back to Week 11 against the Raiders, the game that Warren Sharp cites for strong statistical weakness from New England. This play was the first from scrimmage, an outside zone rush, and note it came against a “normal” 4–2 nickel front. Van Noy’s responsibility as a 5–1 edge defender would be the same, hence applicable for example purposes:
This play only yielded 4 yards, but attacking the edge was a foundational principle of the Raiders’ offensive line that day, and this was a unit that preseason many thought would bring Oakland to the AFC Championship game. Philadelphia, although not as big, is certainly as talented and runs much more diverse schemes. Outside zone, as shown a bit later, can be a foundational piece in the RPO game.
Although it may not be as successful, it is not as if inside zone runs versus a 5–1 front would be impossible to gain yardage,though the success would likely only be found by a lacking linebacker. In the Miami game from week 14, in the middle of the third quarter, running back Drake got past edge defender Eric Lee. See below:
Starting off, if you noticed on this play the play side blocked to the weak side of the field all received single one on one blocks. The only double team came on the backside defensive tackle. Edge defender Lee was freed up to make the play as tight end Fasano blocked the backside safety Chung. The cutback lanes on inside zone blocking can be big, but even here with this one being tight RB Drake still runs strong and Lee can not bring him down. On the Eagles side, both Ajayi and Blount can take many edge defenders for a ride. The 5–1 front does not make it impossible for the Eagles this week to run this, but for a team whose only real offensive line “weakness” is at guard (particularly left guard), it is not the place to start. Watch for plays like this to find success later in the game.
One of the main issues of the 5–1 front is the pressure that it puts on the middle line backer. Going back to that week 14 game against the Dolphins, Head Coach Adam Gase’s unit saw much success from running back Drake. The very first run for Miami went for 26 yards. and the initial screen shot was used above to show the 5–1 front, see video below:
Notice the delay steps Drake and the quarterback took as Roberts drove downhill very fast. The Miami line stuck with their blocks and once Roberts had whiffed in the backfield Drake found it easy to get to the next level. Philadelphia’s Doug Pederson could employ delays in either counter or really many of the zone read type mesh’s that his quarterback Nick Foles and their running backs go through. Also, and really more dangerous, is the element of misdirection to this lone second level line backer. Against the Dolphins, watch pre-snap jet motion that took Roberts well out of the play, as Drake received a counter pitch:
The Eagles, due to one aspect of their schemes, have what analysts call natural misdirection baked into their offense. The RPO or Run Pass Option has been both very misunderstood by mainstream NFL media in recent weeks; its much simpler than its made out to be. A run play is called simultaneously as a pass play (usually involving one receiver and to a different part of the field), and the quarterback based on pre or post snap reads decides which play to elect. They are not some unstoppable juggernaut that leave defensive coordinators in endless trouble, but rather not that different from run option concepts where defenders must stick to reading their keys. But conceptually, its easy to visualize part of the offensive unit executing play X while the other part executes Y creating difficulty in defender recognition and also slowing down speedy players.
Take a 1st and 10 play from the NFC Championship game late in the first quarter, where the Eagles feature a TE slant coupled with out side zone to the weak side. Notice the 5–1 front from Minnesota, and how quickly LB Barr gets downhill after the potential run. See full breakdown below:
The clear throwing lane came from Barr vacating his position with the natural misdirection of the run element of the play. The quick slant is something very difficult to defend, even for Patriots’ safety Patrick Chung who matches up on TE’s in man coverage. Zach Ertz uses his body very well, particularly from the slot. There is very little way to stop this play other than underneath help from the lone line backer. Maybe the Patriots will be okay with yielding 6–8 yard plays in the pass game. For a quarterback like Nick Foles, however, he can thrive as he did against the Vikings two weeks ago in the quick game.
Misdirection can come from many places, even simple play action. Back in the Miami game again, the Dolphins attack the lone second tier of the Dolphins defense. On a 1st and 10 later in the 2nd quarter, versus the 5–1 front quarterback Cutler play actioned a hand-off (and no, not all play actions are RPOs, in this one actually it looks close to an RPO but the line is setting up for a backside screen not outside zone) and found tight end Fasano on a drag route. See below:
The point was sole backer Roberts, even if not for the distraction of play action, was late in recovering Fasano in man. This example also brings up an interesting point of New England and two deep safeties. Bill Belichick is one of the primary innovators of Cover 2 and the resulting endless defensive coverages. In this example, it was simply Cover 2 man; two deep safeties and man coverage underneath. The second deep safety was Patrick Chung who retreated backwards from the second tier. Most man coverages feature Chung as the main defender of the tight end; and as we show here it must remain that way in nickel because otherwise one of the line backers has to account for Ertz, in man or zone for that matter. This is a bit of a tangent, but Belicheck will only be able to employ two deep safeties if they are in 6 defensive back personnel, aka dime.
At this point in the analysis, one may question that Belichick may simply choose the even 4–2 nickel front against PHI, as he did in recent weeks like against Jacksonville in the AFC Championship game. This more traditional look features only two 3-tech defensive tackles to handle the interior line.
The problem here is both man and zone blocking schemes can easily double these two lineman, and with an offensive line like Philadelphia’s, losing much ground initially at the point of attack. For a backer like Roberts, thats okay, but when backers such as Van Noy as the other paired backer, it can be very problematic. Pulling actually an RPO from the AFC Championship game, pay close attention to Van Noy’s steps as the inside zone run is elected.
The two double teams demolished the interior defenders, and on top of that Van Noy gave ground before engaging blockers, and then did not find the ball at all. The other line backer Roberts was taken by the screen element in the play and could not make it back in time. Its understood that Van Noy is not the typical middle line backer, who can decisively cut down field to take on blockers, but a lot of pressure will be put on him to execute while in some ways on an island.
In the passing game, the 4–2 front can still be susceptible to speed, even to the short side of the field. In 11 personnel, the Eagles often employ tight end Ertz as the sole X “wide-receiver” in a 3x1 set. Pulling an example from the Vikings game from two weeks ago on and 3rd and 6, Ertz was lined up on the short side of the field, and even against Cover 1 man, the deep safety was shaded to his side of the field. That alone showed the level of respect and focus a player like he received. He ran a mesh concept towards the interior clearing out space for running back Clement to run a quick swing route to the short side line. See below:
The video was given in real time to show the move that Clement put on the Pro Bowl level Viking line backer. He did not simply beat him with speed to the wide side of the field, this was a move near the sideline on a key third down.
Summing it up, there are many ways to attack a New England front in nickel for Doug Pederson. The reasons for the statistical weaknesses here stem from line backer play that has been both injury plagued and physically lacking. This unit sorely needs Dont’a Hightower back. The versatility for a player of his size is truly one of a kind. Backers Van Noy and Roberts are both very talented but both better when put in positions of strength. Roberts, particularly, will be the better back over time as he gains experience being in this New England system and hones his coverage and play recognition skills. This unit has endured much as the season went on, from featuring aging David Harris (his film examples were omitted as his speed is virtually gone from his game), to signing rival veterans in a hope to get a pass rush like James Harrison. The key is all of the above examples not only single out this unit for its weaknesses, but hinder each player from sticking to his strengths. The already feeble pass rush can be nullified by the run game. This all comes from a personnel grouping that Philadelphia runs more often and arguably better than any other team in the league. Belichick will have his cut off sleeves full.
