Anti-Aging: a Deep Dive into Drew Brees
In Part 1 of our interpretation of NFL Writer Cian Fahey’s post on on older quarterbacks and their alleged lack of production manifested in sub-par accuracy, we examined recent efforts by New England’s Tom Brady (see below appendix for link to our work and Fahey’s). Our eagerness to follow up on last week’s effort from New England is only seconded by our breakdown of the play of New Orleans’ Drew Brees. Recently turned 39 years young, Brees was selected for his 11th Pro Bowl where he posted his highest seasonal completion percentage of his career (72%), while only throwing 8 interceptions, the second lowest total of his career. In Part 1 there was a real need to focus on and then question the validity of recent statistics of Brady’s; for Brees that is simply not the case. In Games 1–2 he threw for 71.5 completion percentage, 17 TDs, 5 picks, and a 104.2 QB rating. In games 13–16 he went for 73.6% completion rate, 1036 yards, 6 TDs, and 3 picks. In the playoffs his completion rate did drop to 65.7%, and although roughly 600 basis points is significant the film showed many more positive examples than negative against two very talented defenses. But, as always, we must dive deeper.
Taking a step back, Head Coach Sean Payton’s offense this year really showed an evolution in running the football, with frankly dominant results. In previous seasons running has seemed more of an an after thought, but 2017 brought a good mix of zone and man concepts resulting in top tier statistics. They finished 5th in yards, 1st in touchdowns and 2nd in yards per attempt. Some may say that was was by design and supportive of Fahey’s point; that an aged Brees would force their offense to be successful through a balanced attack. Others would say that both running backs Kamara and Ingram had somewhat unexpected career years. We must note that Brees’ pass attempts (536) was his lowest since 2009 (514), and that was the year they won the Super Bowl. We will show that although the success of their running game was certainly by design (Payton’s offense and many are most deadly when balanced well between run and pass), but the need for balance did not come from a lack of arm strength or fading accuracy, particularly during key stretches of games in the playoffs.
As we dive into film examination, context must be given to establish proper background of this offense within the sixteen game season and two playoff games . As great offenses do, the Saints attack had shifted slightly as the season wore on, mostly because of the various weekly match ups in the hyper competitive league. To sum up the shifts, Payton and Brees had excelled at the quick passing game to compliment their powerful rush attack for the first half of the season. We tracked Brees time in the pocket (and noted this in our Weekly piece back in week 14), and found that in weeks 1–10 65% of the time his throws came from<2.5 seconds in the pocket. This statistic dropped off for a three week span (weeks 11–13) down to 46% and then reverted again in the last 4 games back above 60%. We wrote in Week 14 that this reversion needed to happen, not because of correlation to Brees’ accuracy or wins and losses, but because conceptually it does many things two of which are as follows. It slows the pass rush by frustrating particularly edge rushers who have little chance of impacting the throw. Secondly it allows for easier distribution to multiple targets in the passing game putting pressure on a defense to make tackles. Whether or not coaching perspectives would agree on this tactic is always debatable, but the point was defenses by the end of the season were expecting mostly the quick rhythmic passing to start the game. Pulling an example from week 16 against the Falcons, this second play from scrimmage for the Saints’ offense featured 21 personnel and an empty set backfield (a Payton favorite) vs. base defense Cover 1 man. See below:
First off, Atlanta was in man coverage partially because of down, but partially because that can take away short routes by putting a defender between the QB and the receiver. Payton counters with a running back wheel route where Brees had to put the throw on a dime to the far sideline. The coverage by Pro Bowl Safety Keanu Neal was tight, this was not an “easy throw” where Kamara had blown past a linebacker. Payton had the confidence for his quarterback to put it exactly where it needed to be over 20 yards down field.
Sticking and elaborating on these far side throws, the 4th down play on Brees’ final drive of the season in the now infamous Vikings Divisional Playoff really stands out. On this drive, Head Coach Mike Zimmer had shifted two a 2 deep safety coverage here with man on man underneath and stymied the Saints for three downs. Payton and Brees answered on 4th down with the below play:
If you notice the far out route was even more dangerous for the Saints than the wheel route with more time for the defender to turn around. It was imperative that the throw has enough distance, and very difficult with the receiver running away from the quarterback. The accompanying go route from the X wide receiver helped keep the deep safety at bay, but Brees’ penetrating trajectory also delivered the ball in more than enough time before the safety help could arrive. For all intents and purposes, this throw set up what should have remained as the go ahead field goal.
Rolling with more far side throws in critical moments, we jump to the Wildcard game against the Caroline Panthers, on a third and six late in the game that the Saints just needed to have converted:
The above was another great throw for another great completion but all of them can not turn out that way. How a quarterback misses, however, is a very big deal in the NFL. Turnovers are deadly, almost more so for prolific offenses because it most often means points that were going to come on the board are taken off. Pulling a first down up and out for Ted Ginn again against the Panthers in the playoffs, Brees illustrated perfectly the definition of a “good miss”:
The throw here was in a place where even very tight coverage from safety Coleman could not get to it. Wide receiver Ginn had a shot at it, and to be fair that is what most offenses ask for on throws like these.
The NFL Fantasy Football obsessed fan often only tunes in for the highlights. So, week after week getting bombarded with the successful scoring plays, it is easy to overlook that the real game is marred by errors, missed opportunities and in some cases just poor play. An example of that from Brees earlier in this same game against the Panthers, came at the 2 minute mark of the 2nd quarter, on first and 10. Again he was dialing up Tedd Ginn’s number:
The above example properly showed the perils of having a deep ball vs. zone coverage. Brees had a clean pocket, for whatever reason the ball was under thrown and off the mark enough where both zone defenders have a chance to find the ball. If you note though in the third frame above Brees was just delivering the ball as the receivers were making their break. Timing here, even on a 40 yard+route, was crucial. The ball should have been out before the break was made. The video above captured this better, because taking a second look it was clear the ball did not sail that much. This route concept of two seam receivers attacking down field is seen widely in football; Brady in New England had the very same one highlighted in last week’s piece. Although seen here as an example of Brees’ error of both timing and accuracy, the fact that Payton called it and kept it against zone shows again a lot of confidence in his quarterback’s ability to get the ball deep.
This confidence for this game was probably stemming from late in the first quarter when Brees connects on an 80 yard touch down pass to Ted Ginn. Apologies for the Chris Nolan-esque mixing of chronological order, but for this sequence the best was saved for last. This was an absolute textbook example of how to execute a deep post, and the route set up must be accompanied by viewing it in real time video:
So most of these examples were deep throws coming from clean pockets where Brees had a lot of time and space to plant his lower body (not a buttockal comment, talking about his wide stance) and deliver. Below in the Carolina game, Brees provided yet another example to his critics who claimed his height and release point would hinder his abilities at this level. Again, his arm strength and accuracy delivered a pin point strike exactly where it needed to be catchable by the receiver. No breakdown of this play is necessary, please view from the pocket:
One of the more underrated aspects of Drew Brees’ game is his ability to use his legs to not only find space and get out of the pocket but throw on the run. The below play came versus the Vikings in the Divisional playoff game, and after play action there was solid coverage downfield and Brees was forced to exit the pocket. As he threw while not setting his feet (usually death for QB accuracy), he kept his shoulders very level and delivered an absolute strike to Teddy Ginn. Again, no need to breakdown the play, please see the video below:
The conclusion for our deep dive has written itself above; Brees at age 39 and the end of a long season possessed a top level amount of arm strength and accuracy. His confidence was such that immediately following the devastating loss to the Vikings he stated his wish to come back next year to New Orleans. Who knows how the contract situation will play out, but film study and statistics clearly illustrated that there was little to no drop off in results. The bigger point, for any quarterback at any age, is that often a balanced attack really does keep a defense off balance and few quarterbacks’ abilities can carry a one dimensional scheme. This year the obvious example has been the Los Angeles Rams, who fell from the number one spot ranking of number of rushes near the end of the season. Film study showed in losses against the Eagles, Vikings, and in the playoffs vs. the Falcons that getting away from a rushing attack had tough consequences. Advocating for “establishing the run” is indeed a myth, but effective running mixed with multi-pronged passing attack makes weekly defensive planning very difficult. This especially be the truth for any coordinator who has to prepare for Brees next year.
Appendix C: Brees Throws from Caroline Wild Card Game
Appendix D: Entire NO-MIN Playoff Game
