Fabregas, Rakitic
& The Narratives
Within The Narrative of FC Barcelona, 2006 — Present
Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Cesc* But Were Afraid to Ask
June 6th 2015; Barcelona do what is expected of them and see off a resolute Juventus at the Olympic Stadium in Berlin to complete a historic treble — making them the only club in a major league to have two to their name. It only took them six years since the first one. The 2015 Champions League trophy is their fourth in the last nine years — no other club has more than one in that period, one in which they have also claimed six league titles. Barcelona are without doubt the dominant force over the last decade or so.
The problem with building a narrative based on an era that stretches almost a decade is that it can only become blurred — there is a huge amount of overlap, and over time the constants that once were are no longer; nine years is a very long time in football — it’s a time period that’s outlasted the senior Barcelona careers of all but three players (soon to be two); Messi, Xavi and Iniesta are the only ones with all four Champions League winners medals, and only the latter playing in every final.
Which isn’t to say there aren’t names and words distinctly unblurry, clear and synonymous with this success. Luis Enrique has impossibly matched Pep Guardiola’s debut season, whilst the late Tito Vilanova’s ‘12-’13 league campaign claims a club record most points and goals scored in a season. Messi’s four Ballon’s Dor (soon to be five) and individual records speak for his influence. Xavi & Iniesta spent years in perfect metronomic sync to become two of the most decorated footballers in history at national level as well as club level. Joan Laporta will be selling himself at this year’s elections as the president that made this all possible. La Masia is responsible for an extraordinary amount of the individuals that made this all happen. And that’s without mentioning;
Valdes, Ter Stegen, Bravo.
Pique, Puyol, Marquez, Mascherano. Alves, Alba, Abidal, Belletti.
Deco, Busquets, Toure, Keita
Henry, Eto’o, Ronaldinho, Villa, Pedro, Neymar, Suarez.
This era belongs to many, some more than others, but no one in particular. The club has gone through too many changes at institutional level, management level, and on the pitch; too many back fours, front threes and midfield combinations for this long-term domination to be reduced to a snappy tagline. Too many narratives within the narrative.
Since 2006, you can move the goalposts and create many such mini-narratives. Some neatly — every individual season will always be analysed, as will each managerial & presidential reign, especially those of great success or failure. The Guardiola & Martino reigns are very well documented in the football canon, for example. There is currently a lot of contextualising Luis Enrique’s achievements as coach as the dust is settling on a remarkable campaign.
Like Guardiola’s before him, Enrique’s “perfect season” followed one that yielded no major honours. The developments made by the club since last summer are many — Barcelona are lapping themselves, such is the amount of corners they have turned in the past 12 months; a new-found defensive solidity, especially when it comes to defending set pieces, an upturn in the form of the senior non-movers — Pique, Alves, Xavi, as well as Lionel Messi, which combined with the development of Neymar in his second season and the bedding-in of Luis Suarez, have completed an already famously monumental attacking trident.
It’s difficult to look past ‘MSN’ as the primary reason for this season’s success, but I’d like to give a special mention to Ivan Rakitic’s performances, especially as a comparison of what came before him — Cesc Fabregas, a player who is very interesting when considering “the narratives within The Narrative” of FC Barcelona, post-2006 — this one being the relatively fruitless three years that he spent at the club.
After a typically protracted transfer saga, Fabregas returned “home” in 2011 — given what he showed at Arsenal, his La Masia past, and how he had gelled with many Barcelona players for the national team, it was a logical, seemingly low-risk transfer. His quality was clear to see throughout his Arsenal career, but it was the style in which he played that seemed a perfect fit;
After three years, with one league title and one domestic cup — a success by most standards, but a notable drop in the glut of trophies in the time before — Fabregas was sold to Chelsea for little more than they bought him for — the fans had largely grown frustrated with his performances, and when announcing the transfer, Barcelona posted an infamously critical statement on their website;
“Despite glowing starts to each campaign, Cesc’s contributions to the cause gradually decreased as each season drew to a close. From being someone who joined in with the attack, supplying and scoring goals, the magic tended to fade later on in each season. He only scored one, six and one goals in the last 24 games of each season. For some reason, he was never as good in the second half of a season as in the first.”
It was a petty, ill-timed and unnecessary statement that left you wondering what the club achieved by releasing it. It did, however, accurately summarise how many fans came to view the player after his three years at the club. See tweets like this getting retweeted over 800 times;
Fanboy twitter is a bizarre and confusing place. You only need to look at large swathes of replies to anything about Messi & Ronaldo to see people that make a YouTube comments section look like a MENSA meeting. But there is something to be said for valuing (some of) the opinions of those that watch their players week-in week-out. There’s almost always an inherent bias to club fandom but there are times when bias can’t account for certain evaluations — Cesc Fabregas isn’t Sergio Ramos or Pepe, he’s a La Masia graduate from Catalonia and there’s no reason for anything to lurk disingenuously when criticising his performances. Perhaps the reason his performances were criticised is that, simply, they warranted criticism.
European Record
Let’s take the above tweet as one that states Fabregas’ shortcomings. Is he the weak link, a reason, or the reason for Barcelona’s European underachievements in ‘12–’14? Let’s go through them;
Chelsea, 2012. A side that finished domestically 6th that season (behind Alan Pardew’s Newcastle, only three seasons ago), who played two thirds of the second leg without their best and most influential centre-half, knocked the then-reigning champions out. It was, and remains even more so with hindsight, a massive achievement from an inferior side. In the first leg, Fabregas had a lukewarm response to his performance in the 1–0 loss at Stamford Bridge. He failed to convert two fairly clear cut chances, though played quite a dangerous ball to Alexis Sanchez. Bar Sanchez and Thiago, he had fewer touches of the ball than any other Barcelona player, with a similar number of touches in the 2nd leg. He was substituted in both games, and made a single interception, and no tackles across the two legs.
Bayern, 2013. One of the dangers of retweet-baity and overly succinct statements is that they fail to include details like the fact Fabregas didn’t play in the first leg against Bayern, where Barcelona lost 3–0 at home and the tie was effectively killed. He did play, badly, in the 4–0 mauling in the second leg, but then so did everyone else. There’s little value in any conclusions you can draw from this tie.
Atletico, 2014. A match repeated six times over the course over ‘13-’14 that would come to define both clubs fortunes that season. This was Barcelona’s earliest Champions League exit since 2007. Fabregas was substituted in both legs, and had fewer touches than any other outfield starter in the second leg, that they lost 1–0. He played a single key pass in each game (Xavi, as a comparison, played five in the first leg alone) — and received amongst the lowest WhoScored.com ratings for Barcelona players in each leg.
They’re the most telling arbiters of the “big game” problems that Fabregas is charged with, but it’s an unfair sample — no player will come out well if the selection you highlight is unsuccessful knockout ties. So let’s look at the successful champions league ties that got them there;
2011–2012; In the first knockout stage, Fabregas assisted one goal in the first leg, and had more touches of the ball than anyone else in the 7–1 2nd leg victory over Leverkusen, assisting two goals and receiving a perfect 10 for his performance from WhoScored.com. It was, just a little, overshadowed by Messi’s 5 goals that night. It’s worth considering that Leverkusen side had finished 2nd above Bayern in 2011, they finished 5th in the season and it would be difficult to make a case for them being anything approaching the top-tier of European club football.
The quarter-finals saw Barcelona face a Milan side that still featured Seedorf, Nesta and Ibrahimovic and had already caused them some problems in the group stages. Fabregas was an unused substitute in the goalless first leg, and in the second leg played three key passes — more than anyone bar Messi, though he didn’t score or assist any of the three goals that took them through to the ill-fated semi against Chelsea.
2012–2013; Barcelona faced Milan again , this time in the second round — putting in one of their worst European knockout performances of the past decade in a 2–0 loss at the San Siro. Fabregas was the worst-rated outfield player that night on WhoScored.com — lacking in his offensive and defensive contributions, playing a single key pass, tackling once, and never intercepting. He was substituted on 60 minutes, and was dropped for the second leg; where a revitalised Barcelona won 4–0 without him.
Fabregas found himself remaining out of the starting line-up in the quarter final first leg against PSG, but was substituted on at half-time in place of an injured Lionel Messi. That second half saw the score go from 0–1 to 2–2 in a frantic last 20 minutes where Barcelona failed to control the ball in midfield and neutralise PSG’s late substitutions by keeping the ball. Fabregas was playing in an advanced role and can’t shoulder too much blame for a lack of control, though as an outlet, his offensive contributions of 35 touches and one shot off-target could’ve been better.
In the second leg, Fabregas was played as a forward in place of an injured Messi, who eventually came on to replace him on 65 minutes, a stage that had Barcelona trailing 1–0 and going out. Again, such an advanced role isn’t Cesc’s favoured position, so it should be taken with a pinch of salt, but yet again he was one of Barcelona’s least involved and least effective players. On the way to the semi-finals, there was a huge discrepency between between a Barcelona with Fabregas on the pitch (an aggregate score of 6–0), and a Fabregas not on the pitch (an aggregate score of 1–5).
2013–2014; One of the few positives of that season were Barcelona’s composed performances against the side that would go on to lift the premier league trophy, Man City. Fabregas played almost all of the two matches, and yet again didn’t score or assist, but was solid enough in both matches, completing six dribbles across the two, tackling and intercepting a little more to show a little more of a physical presence than in previous years.
Overall, when looking at a picture that stretches across three years, Fabregas’s European record at Barcelona is damning. He didn’t score a single goal in a knockout match, and only registered assists against a mediocre Leverkusen team. Whilst he was certainly poor in many of these games — both legs against Atletico and Chelsea, Milan in 2013 all stand out — it’s more the cumulative lack of impact that he had that reflects so badly. Over three years, you can’t point to a single game or moment in the Champions League knockouts where you can cite Fabregas as a reason for advancing.
The Clasicos
There are other big games — let’s look at his performances in the biggest game of all, the Clasico. Discounting the four Super Cup games (he only made brief cameos in the 2011 and 2012 editions), Fabregas actually had a great debut Clasico as a starter, scoring to make it 3–1 at the Bernabau in the first Liga match of the 2011–2012 season, being used infront of a trusted Busquets-Xavi-Iniesta midfield, and justifying his selection ahead of David Villa.
He didn’t make the return fixture, a 1–2 loss at the Camp Nou, bar the last 10 minutes, though that night Thiago Alcantara shone for the losing side in his place — having more touches of the ball than anyone else — created big, scuffed chances by Tello and others, and tackling three times and intercepting four times; it was the kind of big-game involvement that Fabregas has seldom shown for Barcelona.
He played the majority of the two-legged Copa quarters that season, where Barca edged past Madrid en route to lifting the trophy — one of Fabregas’s two at Barcelona. In both ties, he took part in the front-three but was moved back into midfield when Barcelona needed control. He played a dangerous ball to Iniesta in the first leg, that resulted in hitting the woodwork, but otherwise was relatively anonymous over the two legs.
In 2012–2013, Fabregas took part in the first league match of the season (2–2 at the Camp Nou) but was an unused substitute in the return fixture (a 2–1 loss at the Bernabau). In the one he did play, Fabregas played in a front three of sorts, with Messi and Pedro. He saw a decent amount of the ball, but didn’t register a shot and on an individual basis caused Madrid few problems.
They met again in the copa that season and in the first leg, Fabregas got hold of a loose ball to coolly finish past Casillas and open the scoring the first leg against Madrid, though he should take some of the blame for allowing Verane to leap past him and equalise that night. The return leg saw Fabregas play in a midfield three with Xavi and Busquets, a comprehensive 3–1 loss at the Bernabau. He was substituted on 60 minutes. He didn’t see a lot of the ball, made one tackle and no interceptions — though bar Busquets, this was true of the whole team that was dominated and overrun that night.
The were a comparatively paltry two Clasicos in Fabregas’s final season. He played the first ahead of the Busquets-Xavi-Iniesta midfield three in a 2–1 home victory, though in an offensive position he didn’t complete a dribble, attempt a shot, or play a key pass, though he did tackle four times. He was substituted for Alexis Sanchez on 70 minutes. In the memorable second game of the season, a 4–3 win at the Bernabau in which Messi scored a hat-trick, he played alongside Xavi and Busquets back in his more natural midfield. He played two key passes, but in his final Clasico appearance, again didn’t register an assist, and was not one of the standout players.
In 8 starts against Madrid, Fabregas registered a respectable 2 goals, but not a single assist. In and of itself, that’s not totally damning, but combined with his performances and lack of impact in European knockout matches, it becomes it.
The rest of the best
It’s not the be-all and end-all of his performances against top-class opposition; his record against the upper-tier Spanish clubs is a little better, though still mixed. In 2011, he scored a late equaliser against Unai Emery’s Valencia that up to that point had a 100% win record in September and were top of the table, and put in a good midfield performance in the return fixture, 5–1 at the Nou Camp.
At the end of Vilanova’s record breaking season, Fabregas played a lovely one-two with Alexis Sanchez to assist him in equalising against 3rd placed Atletico Madrid, in a game that he looked dangerous, involved and composed in — he had a 97% pass accuracy that day. It was something of an antithesis to his performances against Atletico to come.
Real Sociedad, the 4th placed side that season, were the first side to defeat Barcelona under Vilanova’s reign, coming back from 2–0 down to win 3–2 — Fabregas was the man to make way in a tactical reshuffle once Gerard Pique had been sent off, justified by his quiet first hour.
In his final season, his performances against the more organised clubs of La Liga were increasingly impotent. In December 2013, a Messi-less Barca went to the new San Mames and were beaten fairly by an inoxerable Athletic Club, 1–0. Cesc was played in an advanced position, but didn’t create very much, and had one off-target shot himself. A few weeks later, he was involved in the first of the two league games against that seasons champions, Atletico, in a goalless stalemate at the Vicente Calderon. He looked lacking ideas and creativity, but to be fair, so did everyone else that whole season against Simeone’s men — including the likes of Messi, Neymar, Alexis Sanchez, and Iniesta. He was also involved of one of the only goals that Barcelona scored against Atletico that season, one that could have been enough to win them the league title, in May 2014. He played a delightful ball into Messi, who layed it off for a special Alexis Sanchez rocket.
What is compelling, is that some of Barcelona’s most impressive results in this time came with Fabregas absent —Pep’s final game, the 3–0 Copa final win against Athletic, a 4–1 away win over Pellegrini’s Malaga (though he played in a home fixture with the same scoreline), who finished 4th in 2012, and a 4–1 win over Simeone’s Atletico in the 2012–2013 season. Many of those impressive domestic performances can be filed alongside the European encounters outlined above, Milan especially, in a folder titled “Cesc-less Barca”.
Fabregas’ performances and influence in his three years at Barcelona, in terms of the top-tier opposition is, by any number of estimations, a poor reflection on the player. But his general stats are still, generally, very impressive — 9 goals and 8 assists in 23 starts in his first season, 11 goals and 11 assists from 30 in his second season, and 8 goals and 13 assists from 28 in his final season. That is up there with any midfielder in world football — including those, from a Blaugrana perspective, you’d be inclined to compare him to; Xavi, Iniesta, Rakitic, Thiago.
However, Barcelona’s season and success is largely defined by the matches that Fabregas has tended to not assist, score, or perform in. It’s a myth that the midtable or lower Spanish sides were of particularly low quality, or even necessarily worse than the equivalents of other top leagues, and more a reflection of how comprehensively strong and dominant Real, Barca (and Atletico in 2014) have been, as evidenced by their consistent supremacy in the two tiers of European competition. So it is that La Liga is often a 100-point league, and the margins are often in the Clasico, or the trickiest trips to the Mestalla, Ramón Sánchez Pizjuán, or Vicente Calderon. Likewise, for a club who’s dominance on the continent has bookended either side of Cesc’s Barcelona tenure, it’s also defined by the big European fixtures. It is in these defining margins that Fabregas doesn’t stand up to such players.
Chelsea so far — Continuing the trend.
Mourinho has accused Barcelona of not utilising Fabregas properly, and whilst there are some key differences stylistically and positionally at his new club (he tackles twice as much as he used to, for example), his first season at Chelsea largely continued the trend of what came before it.
This season has probably been the strongest of his career. He sits way ahead of anyone else on league assists on a total of 19 — seven more than anyone else, and only one shy of Henry’s Premier League record. Two came in his five matches against Top Four opposition, which is a slight improvement on his record at Barcelona and a decent ratio.
Yet, in a Top Four mini-table, Chelsea won 10 points out of a possible 18, with four draws and two wins — a very good, unbeaten record, yet still 6 points fewer than the 16 out of 18 points (five wins, one draw) that Chelsea gained in the equivalent matches in ‘13-’14, without Fabregas, in an otherwise poor and trophy-less season, where they finished third in the league.
The current landscape of the Premier League is such that the six points “dropped” by Chelsea don’t really matter — it’s a competitive enough league, often won by a low enough points tally, that it’s more the points gained or dropped against the mid-tier and lower half sides, that is where the league is won or lost. In the 2013–2014, this proved to be the case for Chelsea in losses to the likes of Villa, Sunderland and Palace. The creativity of Fabregas was instrumental in breaking those sides down in Chelsea’s title win, and for that he’s proved to be an excellent buy —arguably the most critical in deciding a title since Van Persie in 2012.
Whilst there was a habitual dip in the second half of the season — 75% of the assists came in the first half of the season, it was the Champions League knockout performances that will have proved the most comfortingly familiar for fans of his previous club. PSG are arguably one of only a small handful of genuinely top-class opposition that Fabregas has faced in a Chelsea shirt, and even they were in poor form, sitting third in Ligue 1 when the two sides met.
In the first leg, Fabregas was a blank — the worst rated player on WhoScored.com of the Chelsea starters. Offensively, he completed a single dribble but didn’t attempt a shot, or place a key pass. Mourinho’s away method is often based on stifling the opposition and stopping the flow of the game, so it’s not a surprise that Fabregas (and others) had ninety minutes that were creatively stunted. But in terms of his defensive contribution, he tackled fewer times than any of his midfield colleagues, aside from Oscar, yet got booked and conceded four fouls. He didn’t intercept the ball once, and generally didn’t impose his mark on a Chelsea midfield that were overrun, asking too much of Nemanja Matic. Cavani’s important equaliser came from a long spell of possession that was easy to maintain, with the forwards — uncharacteristacally against a Mourinho team — finding space in dangerous positions.
Chelsea were still favourites to qualify in the return leg at Stamford Bridge, especially after Ibrahimovic’s early sending off. Over the 120 minutes, Fabregas had over 100 touches of the ball, more than any of his team-mates, but to put it in context, fewer than most of the PSG midfield, playing with ten men; Pastore and Motta, and astonishingly, Verratti, who’d played forty minutes fewer. Against the depleted side, Fabregas created little; playing one key pass (in comparison, Willian who only appeared after half-time, played three, as did Diego Costa). In what turned out to be defined by Chelsea holding on; o-o, 1-o, and 2–1 all being just good enough, the blues lacked a control and composure to see it through, and whilst they were undone by set-pieces, they were contingent on a midfield that were unable to see much of the ball, dispatch to an outlet, or kill off the game — in extra time, against a tiring ten men.
What shouldn’t have been allowed to happen, did. It’s something that is a recurrence of Fabregas’ career — Chelsea in 2012, PSG twice in 2013, and again in both legs in 2015. Hell, even Bradford City; Cesc appearing on 70 minutes with the score at 2–1, only for the third tier outfit to win 2–4. Of course, none of these results are explicitly the man’s fault, or even his responsibility. Again, it’s not in any individual match that he is lamentable in his (small) part in a loss of control and composure, but rather in the cumulative repetition of his place in midfields that were bypassed or dominated in the face of all footballing logic.
It’s downright perplexing for a player of his calibre that this is even a trend in the first place. There is enough talent and technical ability there, that it’s more than likely — playing in a settled and balanced side like this, under a tactically astute manager — that it will be bucked; after all, at Chelsea so far this continuation essentially boils down to just two off nights. Another season of this though, and Mourinho might have to think about when to play (or not to play) Cesc Fabregas.
Ivan Rakitic’s role in Barcelona’s reinvention.
With an impending transfer ban, the loss of Xavi looming, and Fabregas’ transfer to Chelsea, a strong midfield signing was imperative for Barcelona at the start of the Luis Enrique era. Rakitic had just had his strongest season to date for an excellent Sevilla side, captaining them to Europa League triumph, and getting double figures in both assists and goals in La Liga. He also saved many of his best performances for Sevilla’s biggest games;
After a transfer fee of about 16 million euros (roughly half of what Fabregas was sold for), Rakitic’s early performances for Barcelona were promising. He played the full ninety of the first five Liga matches of the season, in a side that was otherwise rotated. He got an assist in his debut against Elche, and his first goal came only a couple of games later, a cracking strike from outside the box against Levante. It seemed like Rakitic was fitting in well, and also providing extra defensive guile alongside Busquets — Barcelona did not concede in the first eight matches of the season, with Rakitic starting the first six.
Luis Enrique did not repeat the same line-up in the first 22 league matches. It was something that heavily contributed to the criticism he faced when Barcelona were going through a “crisis” in January. After Rakitic’s five consecutive starts, he found himself coming off the bench, rested, and starting the first real domestic test of the season — October’s Clasico — on the sidelines, with the experience of Xavi & Iniesta opted for instead. Madrid were deservedly ahead when Rakitic was substituted on after 60 minutes. His first contribution was one to forget — a sloppy and wasteful corner found the feet of an opposition player, which catalysed a typically clinical Madrid break, Benzema scoring to put the game beyond Barcelona, 3–1. The tie was over and Rakitic did little.
He’d also had an underwhelming Champions League debut against PSG a few weeks earlier, though he was generally quite involved and a physical presence, he was suffocated creatively by the imposing PSG midfield, as Fabregas was a few months later. Premature evaluations might have pointed to a player who suffered from the same flaws as his predecessor.
As the season went on, it proved to be quite the opposite. Rakitic started quite often in midfield, but would still miss out occasionally as the team would rotate throughout the entire first half of the season. After the meltdown catalysed by Barcelona’s shoddy loss to Sociedad (Rakitic was also rested that night, alongside the more headline-demanding, Messi and Neymar) and all the drama and institutional changes that followed — a juncture that has already, decidedly, become the integral turning point that in the narrative that is the ‘14–’15 season.
Rakitic found himself back in the Starting XI the following week; an XI that would establish itself as Barcelona’s best. They put in their best and most complete performance that night, convincingly batting aside an Atletico Madrid who they’d failed to beat in six matches the season before — this was their first of four wins out of four matches this campaign; something that best encapsulates the differences between the Martino and Enrique reigns. Fabregas started each of those (Super Cup aside), Rakitic started each of these.
That night was defined by Messi, Neymar and Suarez, each scoring, and two of them assisting one another. They would define many of Barcelona’s wins from then on. So it would be false to put Rakitic at the centre of that picture, in that now-famous turning-point match, but he’s still an important cog in a Barcelona that had exorcised their demons. He was a more physical presence, intercepting, tackling and winning the ball back to prove more of a nuisance-like occupancy in midfield than had been their before (see gif below)— which combined with Busquets doing what Busquets does, a Pique at his best, and a u-turn in set-piece competence, explain Barcelona’s defence being amongst the best in Europe, and better than ever before. In attack, he still created space and switched dynamics, aiding the front three, through some of his crossfield balls, and his movement as part of the counter would often cause problems for the defence. He didn’t claim a direct assist, but played the dangerous ball across the box that eventually found Messi, for him to put the game to bed. Both of these facets to his game would be a theme of his solid performances against Atletico to come.
He can also take a sizable amount of the credit for Barcelona’s solidity and superlative defensive record. In an attacking sense, his league record of five goals and seven assists in La Liga is far from poor (Iniesta had one goal and no assists), but it doesn’t actually match his Sevilla total, or even any of Fabregas three seasons, in goals or assists. But his role is different — he’s admittedly fortunate that that he’s playing behind arguably the greatest front three in history, who can usually be relied upon to create and score the goals themselves, but if he’s lacking in his direct contributions to scoring, his positional sense and passing (especially in his long passes) is absolutely vital in anchoring between that front three and the defence, in a way that Fabregas never really was. He is excellent in finding, and helping to create, the space that the front three utilise to tear apart teams. Admittedly, you’d expect Rakitic and Iniesta as a creative midfield duo to improve upon the eight assists and five goals between them, next season.
In the league, Barcelona only lost a single game that Rakitic started (0–1 against Celta). They lost three without him. In the six pointers of the season, he was actually quite poor in a Busquets-less midfield in the second Clasico of the season, a 2–1 win that was instrumental to the title win, as he didn’t impose himself like he often does — having fewer touches of the ball than any outfield Barcelona starter, and his substitution for the returning Busquets actually contributed to them seeing out the game so coolly, killing it off totally after Suarez’s winning goal. His performances in the 5–1 win over Sevilla, and 5–2 win at the San Mames stuck out a bit more, and he put in a solid, composed shift to beat Athletic again in the Copa final.
The most impressive thing about Rakitic is that he saved many of his best performances for the latter half of the season, especially in Europe. In his one season in the Champions League knockout stages, Rakitic’s two goals and one assist match Fabregas’ record of direct goal contributions in the same stages, in his three years at Barcelona (his three assists against Leverkusen) — and all of which were important goals against genuinely top-class opposition (the Italian champions, the German champions, and the incumbent English champions). They also demonstrated the versatility of Rakitic in midfield;
The genius of Messi’s second goal in the semi against Bayern is 99% him, and one his greatest — a genuine masterpiece of individual skill and ability. But it’s also interesting to consider the directness of the build-up; Rakitic plays a one-two to turn and find an extra yard of space, and very quickly plays a great, accurate through ball to Messi. The rest is history, but this is quite a goal created by something more head-on than the 2009 and 2011 Guardiola editions of Barcelona. It’s very much a goal of the counter-attacking and more direct elements that Enrique has brought to the Catalan club.
Contrast that to the opening goal of the Champions League final, which is something straight out of that era. Intricate passing and movement in the final third, from midfielders who moved into very advanced positions and linked up well with a front three whose movement was also vital.
These are both important and impressive expressions of Rakitic’s talent, and contribution to Barcelona winning the Champions League this season. But outside of these noteworthy contributions are excellent performances otherwise.
In the Champions League final, Rakitic played more key passes (4) than anyone else on the pitch, saw a lot of the ball, and tested Buffon once. He played 3 key passes in the first leg against Bayern, and intercepted the ball three times. He played as many key passes as any other Barcelona player in the first and second legs of the quarters against PSG (1 and 2) and had an average 95% passing accuracy across the two legs. He tackled an impressive 4 times in the first away leg. He scored the only goal of the second leg against Man City.
Over the season, Rakitic totally justified his place in the best starting XI of a treble-winning side. There aren’t many higher accolades than that. At 27, you’d expect the best might be come from him, especially as he further aclimatises and gels with this team. Their most important players are tied down for next season at least, and without being able to tinker in the transfer market, a stability and continuation and development of this very balanced squad might be exactly what Barcelona need — another season without major injuries and they have as good a chance as anyone ever has of retaining the European Cup.
“Better?”
There are too many caveats and hypotheticals that you can try and bring into a conversation about Rakitic and Fabregas — so many in fact that to ask “who is better?” is reductive and futile.
Whilst Fabregas underperformed individually at Barcelona, it’s worth considering those three years of underperformance aligned with many other flaws on and off the pitch at the club. The extent to which Fabregas should take responsibility for a lack of trophies will always be a point of contention.
The argument that Fabregas was never utilised properly doesn’t hold much water, considering he was afforded many opportunities at Barcelona in the more natural creative midfielder role that he has excelled in during his two Premier League tenures. But it’s also worth considering that the “wrong”, more advanced role — ahead of the midfield three — has produced many of his strongest performances, both at national level, especially during Euro 2012, and also his best season at Barcelona under Vilanova’s management, where he played a big role in the title win.
He often performed in that role against lesser club sides, and against the best national sides — so he has to take a large share of the responsibility that he was poor in an advanced role against the best club sides. Three coaches in three years certainly wouldn’t have benefitted him, and he’ll feel hard done by that he never got to play in his natural position behind Messi, Neymar and Suarez — how he might have done in that role instead of Rakitic is anyone’s guess; though I suspect that’s a hypothetical that Las Blaugranas don’t care much about the answer to.
There is some clarity that belongs in the conversation; Fabregas has been very important in Chelsea’s title win, as has Rakitic in Barcelona’s treble. This has been a rare, genuine, mutually beneficial transfer. Chelsea are a much better team with Fabregas, and Barcelona are a much better team without him.
